Imperialism's long-term opposition to Kosova’s independence
The previous article of this series showed that the basis for Kosova’s right to self-determination is real, and that there has been a genuine, mass-based striving for it all century. Yet some on the left have argued that Kosova’s recent declaration of independence is merely an initiative of the imperialist powers, which allegedly have had a long-term aim to create an ``independent’’ Kosovar state under their control.
(Click here for the first article in the series.)
This
article will show that the imperialist powers have long opposed Kosova’s right
to independence, and explains the reasons for this. As such, imperialism’s
belated recognition of it is an acceptance of the inevitable, and given this,
an attempt to control, ``supervise’’ and limit Kosova’s independence. A key focus
will be the war in 1999, showing how even as NATO bombed
***
Post-war
Western
support increased after Tito’s death in 1980, as de-Titoisation removed many
progressive aspects of Titoism. In the 1980s,
The
US ignored the massive human rights violations in Kosova due to Yugoslavia’s
role in the Cold War as a bulwark against the Warsaw Pact: ``(while) human
rights in Kosovo has been the subject of US concern, its relative importance
was reduced by many other factors; the USA saw Yugoslavia as a symbol of
differences within the communist world. Its human rights policy seemed liberal
in comparison with the countries of the Warsaw Pact, while its foreign policy
was one of non-alignment.’’[5]
Not
surprisingly, the
It
became hard to avoid the worst human rights situation in
The
only concern was about the effects that resistance
by Kosovars might have. The alienation of the Albanians might cause damage to
the ``territorial integrity and stability of
Serbia’s
smashing of the Yugoslav constitution in Kosova, its imposition of economic
sanctions on Slovenia in October 1990, its new 1990 bourgeois constitution
declaring its ``right’’ to intervene in other republics, and finally its
refusal to accept the Croat Stipe Mesic’s legal turn as Yugoslav president, led
to overwhelming majorities of Croats and Slovenes voting for independence in
early 1991. While remaining unrecognised by any country, the Yugoslav army then
smashed Croatia to pieces in six months of massive bombing, smashing anything
that remained of the concept of ``Yugoslavia’’ in the eyes of the masses. At
the end of this, in late 1991 the European Union launched the Badinter
Commission to assess the claims of
The
abolition of Kosova’s autonomy and years of repression and apartheid in the
1990s drew little reaction from Western circles, and never calls to reinstitute
autonomy. The EC Declaration on Bosnia
and Herzegovina in May 1992[10]
outlined policy towards the successor states of
When
Milosevic finally abolished the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
1992, setting up the new
While
Western powers accepted Serbian rule, no UN resolution recognised the new
state’s borders, as its insistence on occupying the seat of former
In
the US-imposed Dayton Plan ending the Bosnian war in 1995,
Yet
when Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova, leading a peaceful ``Gandhian’’ resistance,
appealed to be invited to
A
Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) commander explained, ``we feel a deep, deep sense
of betrayal. We mounted a peaceful, civilised protest. We did not go down the
road of nationalist hatred, always respecting Serbian churches and monasteries.
The result is that we were ignored.’’
The
`nightmare scenario’ of Kosova’s independence precedent
The
West greatly feared this threat of an armed uprising. Western leaders believed
independence for Kosova may be a precedent for other peoples, such as
Kosova’s
union with
This
could in turn lead Macedonia, truncated to its ethnic core, looking to closer
ties with its oppressed ethnic kin in Greece and Bulgaria, resulting in a wider
conflict involving Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, the latter two NATO
allies on opposite sides, threatening NATO’s ``southern flank’’.[13]
This was called the ``nightmare scenario’’.
For
these reasons,
The
West advocated improving human rights to dampen Albanian resistance while
insisting Kosova remain in
However, for the Serbian ruling class the aim was less
clear. Kosova’s population was
completely alienated from Serbian rule and set up ``parallel’’ institutions;
many forms of protest intensified. Though victorious at
Voices in the imperialist camp also pushed this solution. ``Kosovo is to Serbs
what Jerusalem and the West Bank are to Israelis -- a sacred ancestral homeland now
inhabited largely by Muslims. The Kosovo issue may have to be settled by some
sort of partition’’, stated Warren Zimmerman, former
However,
this could also pose great risks for Western policy. The independence or union
with Albania of even part of Kosova could
have even worse destabilising effects than independence for the whole, as it
would even more clearly pose the ethnic principle as a basis for border
changes; if an autonomous Kosova could be called multi-ethnic, the precedent
effect could be dampened. Therefore, any internal
partition would have to avoid the Albanian part formally breaking away. Further,
Serbs were a far smaller section of the population in Kosova than in
Thus
both actions by
*Rise
of the KLA and Washington’s reaction
The
KLA’s sudden rise in late 1997 was due to the liberation of hundreds of
thousands of weapons in
At
this time the
The
``Moslem aid for Albanians’’ was ``a threat to peace’’ according to US
advisers, and could turn the KLA into ``a more dangerous military force’’.
Some
who believe the
The
uprising in Kosova drove the Serbian elite to the right; in March 1998 Seselj
and his fascistic Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was brought back into the ruling
coalition for the first time since 1993. The SRS advocated solving the Kosova
problem by expelling the Albanian population.
Within
weeks of Gelbard’s speech, villages in Kosova were in flames, dozens of
civilians killed and thousands driven from their homes, their villages attacked
by helicopter gunships, providing thousands of recruits to the KLA, uprooted people
with nothing to lose. As the pattern continued, the KLA blossomed into an
organisation of 20,000 guerrillas, based in villages throughout the country.[23]
In
this new reality, regional branches of Rugova’s Democratic League, of Demaqi’s
Parliamentary Party and Qosja’s Democratic Union -- the major political groups of
the peaceful struggle – became local KLA village guards. Under massive military
attack, the movement responded by taking up arms, rather than setting up a new
``parallel school’’. “There is no doubt that these groups have the full support
of the local population.”[24]
The
KLA thus became the armed force of the Kosovar population, containing vastly
different political currents, from its Maoist core to left, right and liberal
currents, to those more or less in favour of accommodation with imperialism,
from former human rights fighters in the peaceful struggle to traditional clan
leaders, advocates of independence and of union with Albania, from Albanian
anti-Serb chauvinists to strong defenders of the rights of the Serb minority.
While demonisers of the KLA often focus on more negative traits among some
elements and attempt to roll them together and depict the KLA as a uniformly
Serb-hating, mafia-led tool of the CIA, in reality its political breadth
reflected its emergence as a real national movement.
Western
intervention follows Serbian elite’s failure to check KLA
Thus
the strategy of the new Serbian government had the opposite effect to that
intended. Gelbard’s speech indicated
The
first Western intervention was an arms embargo on massively armed
With
far superior weaponry, the Serbian forces drove the KLA back from much of the
central region. Western rhetoric went up and down, but the Economist reported that ``the operations by the Serb security
forces that began in central Kosovo in late July were quietly condoned by
western governments’’.[26]
Holbrooke
negotiated a ceasefire with Milosevic in October.
The
KLA rejected the plan as ``not even worth dealing with’’[28],
appalled at being asked ``to negotiate about rights and institutions which the
citizens of Kosova once enjoyed and which were then abolished unlawfully’’.[29]
The ``autonomy’’ offered was not only less than what Milosevic took away in
1989, but even ``less than what he was
ready to give us back’’.[30]
But
none of this stabilised the situation. As people were not fleeing across borders,
the scenario of mass refugee exodus was avoided; but the 250,000 uprooted
Kosovars inside Kosova provided a huge
base of recruits to the KLA. ``Western diplomats in
A
situation of permanent instability developed, which did not only affect Kosova,
but
The
main problem with Milosevic’s brutal tactics were not their success, but lack of success. The Guardian, a key pro-war Blairite mouthpiece, pointed to the
dilemmas. Doing nothing, or even a ``limited bombing campaign’’, could lead to
a drastic attempt by Milosevic to ``wipe out the KLA’’, which might include ``large
scale evacuation of villages’’, but ``all this might be done quite quickly and
the casualties might not be huge’’. The Guardian
implied this would be an enviable outcome, but ``even if that were the
case, the situation would be absolutely unstable. Kosovars would never be
reconciled to it, nor would their kin in
A
further fear was that the KLA ``will swiftly become utterly disenchanted with
the west and turn to Islamic radicals. There are already signs contacts have
been established’’, according to Chris Hedges in Foreign Affairs,[34] claiming
to have seen ``mujahideen, who do not look Albanian, wandering around
The
growing chorus for intervention by early 1999 did not result from dramatic new
Serbian offensives. Milosevic’s new operations in January were well below the
scale of mid-1998. In January, Serbian forces massacred 45 civilians in Racak. Yet
while blown up in the media, it was not the catalyst for the NATO war, as is
often claimed by both propagandists for the war, and left opponents of the war,
who call Racak a ``hoax’’.
Western
politicians more and more gave the actions of the KLA as a major concern. UK
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook claimed the KLA had been responsible for more
deaths since the ceasefire than the Serbian forces,[35]
not mentioning that most of these were of military forces. The KLA’s alleged
sin was to re-occupy the regions Serbian special forces had withdrawn from
under the ceasefire.[36]
The head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), the international monitors of
the ceasefire, claimed ``the irresponsible actions of the KLA are the main
reason for the significant increase of tension’’,[37]
yet the KLA insisted that not only did it stick to the ceasefire, but did so
despite increased Albanian suffering,[38]
as the KVM prevented it from aiding its people under attack.[39]
Almost
every outburst in January-February stressed both sides were at fault and faced
air strikes. Following Racak, NATO’s General Klaus Naumann, warning of air
strikes, said that ``both sides must
be made to understand that they’ve reached the limit’’.[40]
NATO head Solana declared, ``We rule out no
option to ensure full respect by both
sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community’’.[41]
However,
as the US News and World Report (``Bomb
‘em Both’’) explained, it would be
easy to destroy ``the heavy weapons, command centres, and air defence batteries
belonging to the Serb forces in Kosovo. The Albanian rebels, however, are a guerrilla
force with few assets visible from above.’’ Thus strikes on Serbian weaponry
would benefit the KLA, meaning ``renting our air force out to the Albanians’’.[42]
Thus
air strikes would need to be supplemented by Western troops to prevent the KLA
taking advantage. Hoagland continues, ``Britain, France and now Germany have
formally told the United States that they will commit ground troops to a NATO
force in Kosovo if a small number of US troops join that force. They are opposed to air raids alone.’’[47]
The Guardian claimed that even with air
strikes the two sides ``will fight unless a substantial third force, armed and
determined, stands between them’’.[48]
Imperialism decided it needed its own troops in Kosova to disarm the KLA,
having lost confidence in
In
early 1999, the
In
this autonomy, the KLA would be disarmed, and a purely local police force would
be set up, with less powers than most police in the world.[49]
Most Serbian forces would withdraw, but 2500 Yugoslav troops would patrol a
5-kilometre border zone inside Kosova, and 2500 dreaded Serbian Interior
Ministry police would remain the first year.
Given
the Albanians’ disbelief they could feel secure within
In
the first Rambouillet round in February, the KLA refused to capitulate to
autonomy and
Of
the three Kosovar Albanian delegations, only the KLA held out. To get the KLA
to sign on, the US pressured a section of its leadership under Hashim Thaci to
surrender its independence demand, capitulating on March 15. Veteran Kosovar
independence fighter Adem Demaqi, who had led the KLA politically over the six
months until Rambouillet, denounced this attempt to ``convince Albanians to
accept capitulation, by launching illusions and empty promises’’,[52]
and quit the leadership.
NATO’s
air war: Defending Kosovars?
By
this time, the aim of getting in to control the Albanian movement had coalesced
with a broader US aim of establishing a new strategic doctrine for NATO’s
post-Cold War existence and for imperialist intervention: executing ``out of
area’’ actions with ``humanitarian’’ aims. This tendency wanted a victory for
NATO force to crown the alliance’s upcoming 50th birthday in April.
Between
the first and second Rambouillet meetings, an annex was inserted into the
agreement allowing NATO troops in Kosova to roam all over Serbia and not be
bound by Serbian law. It is widely believed that this was inserted to guarantee
a Serbian rejection, as NATO was now determined to bomb. Milosevic’s ``No’’ to
NATO troops allowed imperialism to turn his government into a convenient
``rogue regime’’ target as a trophy for NATO’s birthday, made easier by the real
crimes it had committed.
Serbia’s
rejection led on March 24 to NATO’s air war. Did the actual war, whatever the
previous motivations, now constitute an imperialist intervention on behalf of
the KLA, for Kosova independence?
The
bombing imposed a terrible toll on Serbian working people and infrastructure. Use
of cluster bombs and depleted uranium was indicative of how anti-humanitarian
this ``humanitarian’’ war was; destroying the bridges across the Danube,
hundreds of kilometres north of Kosova, also indicated aims beyond ``defending
Kosovar Albanians’’. The Serbian government claimed a death toll of some 2000
civilians and 600 troops, though some estimates of both are higher.
Neither
did this anti-humanitarian war have any humanitarian effects for the Albanians.
Belgrade had been tied down with its ``Vietnam’’ in Kosova. Parents all over
the country demonstrated with the message: ``Bring our sons back from Kosovo’’.[53]
When nationalist parties attempted in February 1999 to organise rallies outside
parliament to demand rejection of Rambouillet, a few dozen turned up. Passers-by
took no notice;[54] few in
Belgrade had any interest in volunteering to go and fight in Kosova. With 2
million Serbs out of work and pensioners owed seven months’ pension, Serbia was
close to social rebellion.
Then
the bombing gave the regime the political cover it hadn’t had previously to carry
out its most radical plan: emptying Kosova of its Albanians. Within a couple of
weeks of the bombing beginning, the Serbian armed forces had driven some
850,000 Albanians – half their population – from their country into gigantic
camps in Albania and Macedonia. Some 10,000 Albanians were killed, and 100,000
houses and 215 mosques destroyed.
What
then was NATO’s aim? Many claim NATO had aimed to get Milosevic’s rapid
capitulation, which they believed required ``a few days bombing’’ to give him
the political cover to do so, but ``blundered’’.[55]
In the first two weeks, bombing was fairly light, initially concentrating on scattered
air defence targets and command and control facilities far from major cities. The
US aircraft carrier in the region was moved out of the Mediterranean to the
Persian Gulf just eight days before the bombing began![56]
However,
a ``few days’’ was unrealistic. When NATO bombed the Bosnian Serb armoury in
late 1995, even though the Dayton partition was what Karadzic had been fighting
for, and Milosevic was already signed on and pressuring Karadzic, it still took
two weeks of bombing for Karadzic to
feel politically able to sign Dayton. It was scarcely likely to take less time
over Kosova. While NATO had not expected an 11-week war, its anticipated ``few
days’’ campaign should be translated as ``a few weeks’’.
Did
NATO expect Milosevic to play dead during those few weeks? Western leaders were
surprised by the attempt to empty Kosova, but did expect an all-out attempt to smash the KLA. ``All the
alliance’s secret services had the same hypothesis: (Milosevic) was about to
clear away the two or three main centres of the KLA as soon as the bombardments
began. Nobody imagined the deportations.’’[57]
Wesley Clarke said ``we thought the Serbs were preparing for a spring offensive
that would target KLA strongholds, but we never expected them to push ahead
with the wholesale deportation of the entire Albanian population’’.[58]
Was getting Belgrade to soften up the KLA actually Western strategy?
The
desire to bomb as a NATO trophy dovetailed with an understanding that a
peaceful entry of NATO into Kosova, even if approved by the KLA leadership,
would not make it easy to disarm the KLA. Michael Mandelbaum of the US Council
on Foreign Relations claimed that if both sides accepted Rambouillet, ``NATO
forces would enter Kosovo’’ but ``are not guaranteed a peaceful stay. NATO’s
plan envisages keeping Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia indefinitely. The Kosovars
are unlikely to accept this, nor is the
KLA likely to surrender its arms. (NATO’s) forces might well become KLA
targets.’’[59] Hedges
claimed it was ``wildly unlikely’’ the KLA would disarm. ``Villages have formed ad hoc militias
that, while they identify as KLA, act independently.’’[60]
Guerrilla
armies are based on such a village structure. It was in NATO’s interests for
Serbian forces to destroy the KLA’s real village social base, rendering it less
able to resist NATO’s disarmament later. As Turkish journalist Isa Blumi
suggests, while the bombing ``was initially intended only to be a face-saving
gesture, to allow Milosevic to return to the table, the paucity of the first
few weeks of night bombing was also meant to allow Serb forces to eliminate the
KLA … Serb daytime operations inside Kosova were not immediately threatened by
NATO's night-time bombing.’’[61]
NATO
bombing escalates
Where
NATO did miscalculate was that Milosevic would use this crackdown to further the
more radical aim of emptying Kosova of its Albanians. These massive refugee
camps in neighbouring countries were the kind of regional destabilisation NATO
wanted to avoid; even worse for NATO credibility, it had occurred as a result
of its actions.
It
was then, in later phases of the war, that the bombing escalated into a
horrific attack on civilian infrastructure, as NATO sought to force Serbia to
quit and allow the refugees to return. This sequence also discredits the theory
that NATO aimed to destroy Serbia’s economy, which was hit later in the war as
a by-product of this unintended escalation.
What
of the claim that NATO aimed to destroy the Serbian military? This is related
to the claim that NATO aided the KLA. In fact, Solana’s statement that NATO
cannot be the KLA’s air force was stuck to during the war; the Serb military
was largely untouched.
In
the first two weeks – when nearly all the Kosovars were driven out – not a single Serbian tank was hit in
Kosova. Even when NATO later stepped up its bombing, hitting bridges, factories
and civilian infrastructure in Serbia, it did little to attack the
Serb military in Kosova. Forty per cent
of total damage to the Serb military occurred in the last week of the 11-week war, and 80 per cent in the last
two-and-a-half weeks.[62]
By
the end of the war, NATO had destroyed
only 13 of the 300 tanks Serbia had in Kosova. As Serbian troops marched
out, ``at least 250 tanks were counted out, as well as 450 armoured personnel
carriers and 600 artillery and mortar pieces’’.[63]
``All NATO’s powers have anti-tank helicopters, but no country offered to send
them into Kosovo.’’[64]
Zero
NATO support for KLA
This
meant zero NATO action to support the KLA. ``It is all very well to blast
bridges and oil refineries in Novi Sad, but our struggle to shield Albanian
villages would be more effective if NATO focused on hitting Serb forces in
Kosova’’,[65] KLA
fighters were quoted. KLA officer Shrem Dragobia claimed ``when we signed
Rambouillet, we were led to believe NATO will help the Albanians. So we stopped
arming and mobilising ourselves. The KLA was not to take advantage of any NATO
action to embark on an offensive.’’ The KLA kept its word, but ``NATO has
failed to keep its part of the besa’’.[66]
During
a visit to a rugged corridor which the KLA was desperately holding against a
Serb offensive, the Christian Science
Monitor’s Jonathon Landay claimed ``there was no sign of any NATO support,
even though American and British military officials visited the area last week.
Yugoslav tanks, troops and artillery opposing the rebels are untouched by
NATO’s bombs, as are watchtowers along the border from which Serbian artillery
spotters direct fire.’’ KLA fighter ``Guri’’ told him, ``NATO has basically
done nothing against the Serbian ground troops. At least we have not seen
anything in the vicinity of the fighting.’’[67]
The
KLA ``has not persuaded Western governments to lift an arms embargo that has
blocked its access to the Swedish-made BILL-2 anti-tank missile, the Carl
Gustav M2 missile, Western-made heavy artillery and other sophisticated
weaponry’’.[68] The
Albanian government appealed to the West to arm the KLA, but the US State
Department spokesperson James Rubin stated the US continued to oppose arming or
training them.[69]
Sections
of the left’s demonisation of the KLA
Despite
all this, much ink has been spilt on claims the West backed the KLA. Michel Chossudovsky
compared the demonisation of Milosevic to his straw dummy of the KLA being ``upheld
as a self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the rights of ethnic
Albanians’’.[70]
Yet,
the Washington Post claimed ``NATO is
seeking to maintain its distance from the KLA, declining to supply it with
weapons, or endorse the goal of independent Kosovo. It remains an object of
suspicion. There is concern about their role in a post-conflict Kosovo.’’[71]
The London Times claimed ``there is a concern within NATO that
once its troops are inside Kosovo, the KLA could be part of the problem. Thus
they have not been supplied with ammunition.’’[72]
The KLA remained on Germany’s list of terrorist organisations, and the
government banned their fund-raising and confiscated funds.[73]
Chossudovsky
alleged the CIA funded the KLA, providing two sources: Belgrade, and
``intelligence analyst’’
However,
there is ample evidence that the US had made contact with the KLA several
months before the war, providing small-scale assistance. Given the refusal to
arm the KLA or give it air cover, it is worth looking at what US aims may have
been. All the pro-Milosevic left and right has come up with are a couple of
articles in the mainstream media, notably one Sunday Times article in which US
agents admit they had infiltrated the OSCE ceasefire monitors’ mission in the
months before the war, developing links with the KLA, giving them ``American
military training manuals and field advice’’.[75]
US
agents had also made early contact with less known KLA figure Hashim Thaci, who
emerged at Rambouillet as new number one. Given US hostility to the KLA’s goals,
the aim of this small-scale ``training’’ and ``advice’’ was to win influence
and mould a pro-imperialist current around Thaci, in order to moderate its
aims, to drop the independence demand, allowing Thaci to sign Rambouillet which
only allowed for ``autonomy’’. This also allowed the CIA to ``gather
intelligence on the KLA's arms and leadership’’.[76]
Meanwhile,
when the OSCE mission left before the bombing, ``many of its satellite
telephones and global positioning systems were secretly handed to the KLA’’ by
these agents, ``ensuring guerrilla commanders could stay in touch with NATO’’.[77]
These KLA spotters relayed intelligence on Serbian positions, to help NATO
targeting. Yet as shown above, NATO rarely used it to give cover to the KLA; aiding
a struggle for independence remained distant from NATO’s objectives even when
``coordinating’’ with it.
NATO even reminded the KLA who was boss. On May 21, US planes
bombed a key KLA base, held for six weeks, though ``for more than a month,
regular reports on who controlled which small parts of this mountain were fed
back to NATO on a satellite fax link from rebels’’. A reporter visiting two
days earlier ``was told by KLA officers that they frequently sent NATO
targeting information on Serb units opposing them’’.[78]
Certain
facts are unassailable. First, if the US was sending all the aid to the KLA
that many imagined, it was strange that they were hardly able to defend any
villages once the war began. A million people were driven from their country
because the KLA had so few arms.
Second,
the only arms ever seen in possession of the KLA were the AK-47s looted from
Albanian armouries. If they got a few more as an influence-buying gesture, they
were clearly not aimed at helping their struggle.
Third,
even if imperialist states had supplied some small arms to the KLA, engaged in
its life and death struggle to defend Kosovars, this itself cannot transform
the entire KLA from a liberation movement to a tool of NATO. While both
fighting Serbia, they had opposite aims. The KLA was fighting for independence;
any influence buying by NATO was aimed at derailing this struggle.
For
example, Clinton made a widely touted tough speech in mid-April, warning Serbs
to expect more civilian casualties. Yet he sounded less ``tough’’ when warning Serbia
that Albanians, given all they were suffering, now have a right to … autonomy
within Serbia.
NATO’s
goals were spelt out in the US ruling-class journal Foreign Affairs, which claimed NATO ``is working feverishly -- even
as it bombs the Serbs -- to blunt the momentum toward a war of independence.
The allies want NATO troops to separate the warring factions. The underlying
idea behind creating a theoretically temporary, NATO-enforced military
protectorate is to buy time for a three-year transition period in which
Albanians will be allowed to elect a parliament and other governing bodies --
meeting enough of their aspirations, it is hoped, to keep Kosovo from seceding.’’[79]
If
NATO had armed sections of the KLA, the aim would have been to use them as an
auxiliary, and then be in a position to cut them off before the KLA could use
the arms to achieve its goals. This would have required only minimal arms going
to the KLA. If the Kosovars had sufficient arms to defend themselves they would
not have needed NATO.
Kosovars’
just struggle
It
must be remembered that, aside from NATO’s criminal bombing of Serbia, there
was concurrently a just war being waged by the Kosovar people to defend their
lives and villages. According to the Independent,
the KLA was ``defending 250,000 civilians in the Lapski and Shalja region in
the north’’ from a fierce Serbian offensive.[80]
In such a struggle, did the KLA not have the right to defend those villages,
which would otherwise be ethnically cleansed? Was expelling the population
necessary for ``anti-imperialist resistance’’? Of course, the KLA leadership is
also to be condemned for supporting NATO bombing of Serb working people. But
the KLA as a whole was simply the only armed force the Kosovars had to defend
themselves. Socialists cannot call on an entire people to commit
``revolutionary’’ suicide because they have a bad leadership, yet that is what
much of the left did by opposing the Kosovars’ just struggle.
Much
of the ``NATO supported the KLA’’ claims rely on events near the end of the
war, when the Serbian military was hit, due to NATO’s increasing desperation to
force a surrender. The risky strategy of finally
giving air cover to some controlled KLA attacks from Albania into the border
region, to flush out Yugoslav troops and hit them, was employed only in the last 10 days of the war. By hitting the
military, NATO brought the war to an end within days, quickly enough to bring the
KLA back to heel.
In
early June, just before the peace agreement, Operation Arrow, ``involving up to
4,000 KLA guerrillas, was launched to drive into Kosovo from across its south western
border with Albania’’, where they ``received their first known NATO air support’’.[81]
However,
there remained ``uncertainty’’ in the West ``about the extent to which the KLA,
designated a terrorist organisation by the US, should be supported’’.[82]
Despite the KLA’s earlier capture of territory near the Albanian border, ``armed
only with light weapons, it has been unable to break through Serbian armour
since NATO started bombing’’, revealing how little support the it had received until
then. ``NATO commanders are reluctant to enter into a formal relationship with
the KLA. They have not, for example, provided secure communications channels.’’
A
NATO source explained: ``We are acutely conscious that at some point, in
enforcing a peace agreement, we may have to disarm the KLA and even fight them.’’[83]
The peace agreement, signed in early June, mandated that Kosova remain under
Serbian ``sovereignty’’, while putting it under a UN authority (UNMIK) and an
occupation by thousands of mostly NATO troops (KFOR). Given NATO’s smashing
victory; if it had desired a move towards independence, it could have set the
ball rolling; it clearly did not.
To
trick the KLA into signing Rambouillet, a clause had said the future of Kosova
would be determined by a conference in three years’ time, taking into account
``the will of the people’’. However, it would also be based on ``opinions of relevant
authorities, each party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this
Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act’’[84]--
the latter ruling out border changes. Petritsch maintained the mediators ``expressly
included this provision to ensure Kosovo would remain in Yugoslavia’’.[85]
Nevertheless,
with the overwhelming NATO victory in June, even this vague suggestion about
the ``will of the people’’ was removed. One NATO promise that was kept,
however, was the disarmament and dissolution of the KLA, achieving what
Milosevic could not.
From
the outset, everyone from Bernard Kouchner (the first UNMIK proconsul to rule
Kosova) to US, UN and EU leaders insisted there would be no independence for
Kosova.[86]
On September 23, 1999, NATO chief Solana insisted that ``one outcome will not be independence for Kosovo’’.[87]
UN interim governor Sergio Vieira de Mello declared ``we will determine on a
case to case basis’’ whether the KLA mayors who had sprung up were performing
according to Western dictates. If they are not, ``You sack them, absolutely.’’[88]
In
December 1999, Kouchner forced the Kosova provisional government, which UNMIK
had refused to recognise, to dissolve into his new ``Interim Administrative
Agency’’ of Kosova, consisting of four members of UNMIK, three Albanians and
one Serb, and giving Kouchner final say – the 90 per cent majority got 37.5 per
cent of the power, in a structure dominated by anti-independence forces.
Despite Thaci taking part, other factions of the KLA condemned this body which
made Kouchner ``the King of Kosova’’.[89]
***
As
Kosova set in for nine years of limbo under a colonial authority, the threat of
being returned in any form to the state which had tried to annihilate them
weighed heavily over the heads of its people. Total opposition to independence,
whatever the ``behaviour’’ of Kosovars, remained official imperialist policy
through the first half of the next decade.
This
imperialist view contrasts sharply with the century-long struggle by Kosovar
Albanians for independence, and the overwhelming nature of this aspiration
among Kosovar Albanians, as demonstrated in the previous articles in this
series. These facts illustrate how incorrect is the view that Kosova’s recent
declaration of independence as an imperialist, not Kosovar, initiative.
However, given that the imperialist states have now accepted a form of so-called ``supervised’’ (by them) independence, the next article of this series will discuss how and why imperialist states finally changed their view, and their broader geo-political objectives.
[Michael Karadjis is the author of Bosnia, Kosova and the West: The Yugoslav Tragedy: A Marxist View. Published by Resistance Books, 2000, 256 pp, $24.95. He is a member of the Democratic Socialist Perspective of Australia.]
Notes
[1] Anton Bebler, “US Strategy and
[2] Abel, D, “
[3] ibid.
[4] Janes Defence Weekly,
[5] Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, Washington,
[6] Binder, D, “In
[7] Glenny, M, “The Massacre of Yugoslavia,”
[8] The New York Times,
[9] Woehrel, S, “
[10] EC Declaration on
[11] Hedges, C, “Kosovo’s Next Masters,” Foreign Affairs, May-June 1999.
[13] This scenario was widely discussed. See for example articles
“Catastrophic Kosovo”, “The Fire is Being Rekindled”, “The Next Domino?” The
Economist,
[14] Broder, J, “US Warns of Broad War Over Kosovo,” Sydney Morning Herald,
[15] Minxhozi, S, “Why Did Kinkel Visit Tirana,” Alternative Information Mreza,
[16] Zimmerman, op cit, p13, 130.
[17] Friedman, T, “Redo
[18] Mearsheimer,J, and Van Evera, S, “Redraw the Map, Stop the
Killing,” NYT,
[19] Wayne Madsen,
‘Mercenaries in Kosovo: The US connection to the KLA’, The Progressive, August 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1295/is_8_6/ai_55309049/pg_1.
“In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, the Clinton Administration viewed
Milosevic as an ally against
[20] ‘
[21] Kitney, G, “Muslim Aid For Albanians a Threat to Peace,” Sydney Morning Herald,
[22] Commission for Economy and Finances/Commission for Industry, Power
Industry and natural Resources, Parliament of the
[23] After the war the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) registered 25,723 ex-combatants, but this may include “non-combatants
looking for assistance,” Human Rights Watch, ‘Structure and Strategy of
the KLA’, Under Orders – War Crimes in Kosovo, October 2001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo
[24] Rexhepi, F, “Unproclaimed Curfew,” Alternative Information Mreza, Pristina,
[25] Newman, R, “One Possibility: Bomb ‘em Both,” US News and World Report,
[26] “Kosovo in Peril,” The
Economist,
[27] Perlez, J, “Kosovo Talks Offering Limited Autonomy,” New York Times,
[28] Kosova Liberation Army, General Headquarters, “20th
Political declaration,”
[29] Krasniqui, A, “Negotiations, Despite Everything?”
[30] Interview with Pleurat Sejdiiu by Christopher Ford and David Black,
Hobgoblin,
[31] Bird, C, “People Will Come and Force Us Apart,” Guardian Weekly,
[32] Stefani, A, “Shooting in Kosovo Prevents Investments in
[33] Editorial, “Kosovo Requires a Forceful Response,” The Guardian Weekly,
[34] Hedges, Foreign Affairs, op cit.
[35] Cornwell, R, “Serbs Goad Impotent West,” The Independent International,
[36] Bird, op cit; Guardian Weekly
editorial
[37] Schwarm, P, “Drama of Eight Soldiers,” Alternative Information Mreza (AIM),
[38] Rexhepi, F, “With massacre Against Dialogue,” AIM,
[39] Smakaj, L, “Kosovo on the Verge of Controlled Chaos,” AIM, Podgorica,
[40] Kitney, G, “New Atrocity Throws Talks Bid Into Doubt,” Sydney Morning Herald,
[41] Kempster, N, “Fire at Will, NATO Orders,” Sydney Morning Herald,
[42] Newman, op cit.
[43] Hoagland, J, “Time to Call Up GI Joe,” Washington Post, in Guardian
Weekly,
[44] Editorial, “Kosovo Requires a Forceful Response,” The Guardian Weekly,
[45] Cornwell, R, “Serbs Goad Impotent West,” The Independent International,
[46] Kitney, G, ‘View to a Kill’, SMH,
[47] Hoagland, op cit.
[48] Editorial, “Stopping War in Kosovo,” Guardian Weekly,
[49] Interim Agreement for Peace
and Self-Government in Kosovo, “Chapter 2: Police and Civil Public
Security,”
[50] Mirko Klarin, ‘Petritsch sheds light on Rambouillet’, IWPR – Tribunal Report, No. 273, 1-6
July, 2002, http://iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=tri&s=f&o=164862
[51] Ibid.
[52] Adem Demaqi in Pristina daily Sot,
[53] Putnik, M, ‘Vojvodina Against the War’, Alternative Information Mreza,
[54] Hofnung, T, ‘Make or Break for Serb Regime’, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1999.
[55] Macintyre, B, ‘Kosovo Blows Up n Albright’s Face’, The Australian, April 9, 1999; Luttwak, E, ‘NATO Started Bombing to Help Milosevic,’ Sunday Telegraph, London, April 25, 1999. Luttwak is a member of the National Security Study group of the US Defence Department.
[56] ‘Admiral: Could have Slowed Slaughter’, UPI,
[57] Jauvert, V, “Nothing Went According to Plan,” Le Nouvel Observateur,
[58] Smith, R, and Drozdiak, W, “The Anatomy of a Purge,”
[59] Mandelbaum, M, “
[60] Hedges, Foreign Affairs, op cit.
[61] Isa Blumi, ‘A Story of Mitigated Ambitions: Kosova's Torturous Path to its
Postwar Future’, Alternatives,
Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 2002, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number4/blumipdf.pdf
[62] Daalder, I, and O’Hanlon, M, “Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign policy, Fall 1999, p131.
[63] Evans, M, The Times,
[64] Luttwak, E, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 1999, p41.
[65] Heinrich, M, “NATO Urged to Focus on Serb Forces,” Sydney Morning Herald,
[66] Meaning “sworn vow,” Nazi, F, “KLA Commander’s Talk of NATO
Betrayal,” IWPR,
[67] Landay, J, “Despite Shortfalls, KLA Shows Muscle,” Christian Science Monitor,
[68] Smith, J, “Training, Arms, Allies Bolster KLA Prospects,”
[69] Finn, P and Smith, J, “Rebels With a Crippled Cause,”
[70] Chossudovsky, M, “Freedom Fighters Financed by Organised Crime,” International Viewpoint,
[71] Finn, P and Smith, J, “Rebels With a Crippled Cause,”
[72] Lloyd, A, “Balkans War,” Times,
[73] Liebknecht, R, “Inside the KLA,” International Viewpoint,”
[74] Beyer-Arnesen, H, “The Balkan War and the Leftist Apologetics for
the Milosevic Regime,” A-Info News
Service, www.ainfos.ca,
[75] Tom Walker, Aidan Laverty, ‘CIA aided Kosovo guerrilla army’, The Sunday Times,
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] The Scotsman
24 May 1999.
[79] Hedges, Foreign Affairs, op cit.
[80] Boggan, S and Nazi, F, “War in the Balkans – ‘Arm Us or Invade’,
KLA Tells NATO,” Independent,
[81] Dana Priest, Peter Finn, ‘NATO
Gives Air Support To Kosovo Guerrillas’,
[82] ‘
[83] Ibid..
[84] Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, “Chapter 8: Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses,” op cit.
[85] Mirko Klarin, ‘Petritsch sheds light on Rambouillet’, IWPR – Tribunal Report, No. 273, 1-6
July, 2002, http://iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=tri&s=f&o=164862
[86] Kouchner Says He is to Prepare Kosmet Autonomy Within Yugoslavia,” Serb Info News,
[87] “Solana: Kosovo Must Not Be Independent,” UPI,
[88] “UN Threatens KLA Mayors With Removal,” Associated Press,
[89] Kosovapress, December 20,