Philippines socialists on the phenomenal rise of presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte

"The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." This whole election feels like watching the muck of Philippine society bubbling unto the stage of history. From way out here in Canada, it feels as though the Left back home may be underestimating the danger posed by this election.
Taking a broad view, the failure of the current administration's "daang matuwid" (straight path) as well as their insistence on sticking to it appears to demonstrate the deadlock not merely of Liberal Party policy, but of Philippine capitalism itself. Yes, some things could have played out differently -- in particular the window for establishing a just peace in Mindanao seems almost closed as a result of a military gaff (unless it was not a gaff, but there is no point to speculation). But what the LP did, and from the perspective of the capitalist class it was an historic achievement, was to unite the most productive sections of the class around a plan for development centered on resource extraction, the special economic zones, urban construction, the service industry (esp call centers), and, of course, as ever, OFW remittances ($30B in 2015, $20B in 2014). To put this in perspective, there are now at least 288 special economic zones in the Philippines in which industries pay a rent of 5% of their gross income and ZERO taxes. Fully 178 of these zones are dedicated to IT parks and centres -- I could not find the breakdown of these, but it is a safe bet that call center work is one of the largest segments of these. Workers employed in these zones, often as PBOs (outsourced labour), have some of the worst conditions and are among the most poorly organized.
There are 17 “Agro-Industrial” zones, but a proportion of these are actually ports and warehouses. At least one is dedicated to bio-fuel. In other words, to the extend that the agricultural industry has been given the “incentives” of the ecozones, this has not gone into food security. In the SONA2015, the administration actually claimed that the Philippines had hit 96% rice self-sufficiency and had stocked up for the drop that they already knew the El Nino would cause. Who knows what statistical magic they have used to come up with these claims. Either people are hungry because there is not enough rice, or there is indeed enough rice but they cannot afford it. The poverty rate among farmers remains crushingly high -- above 38%. Almost 40% of the labour force is employed by this sector -- somebody do the math, how many food producers are hungry? Of course, not only farmers are hungry. The administration crows about consistent growth rates (about 6.5 on average since 2010), but the agricultural sector (according to the government’s own entirely unreliable statistics) only grew at less than half that rate. This does not necessarily mean much for physical production, except to show that agriculture has not been a significant part of the development plan of the daang matuwid. It is an historical accident that 2015 saw a drop in agricultural production -- the neglect and suffering that farmers have been subjected to in the light of the El Nino is emphatically not an accident.
What is clear is that the path to internationally competitive development paved by Noynoy is (in general terms) the only one available to the Philippines and countries like it. It is not an accident that contractualisation has expanded to such a degree that it has become an electoral issue nationwide. Nor is it an accident that at the start of his term, the president attempted to break PALEA in their struggle against contractualisation. Noynoy paved the path of Philippine development against workers, against farmers, against small time capitalists, against the petty bourgeoisie -- and, interestingly enough, against the old but relatively unproductive fractions of the Philippine ruling class. The most dynamic sections of the class (eg the Makati business club) fully back the Liberal Party because his plan has worked extraordinarily well for them. But make no mistake, what we saw was an attempt to restructure Philippine capital, and sections of the ruling class were also left out in the cold in that process.
Into this comes Duterte and Marcos. By no means ingenue in the world of Philippine politics but both, in a sense, locked out of the set that rules in Manila. The rise of Duterte begins with the abject and repeated failure of Malacanang to ‘manage’ its rule over Mindanao. Duterte has a long record of (at least verbally) supporting an end to the civil war on the basis of a recognition of the Bangsamoro and supported the Bangsamoro Basic Law and All Out Peace in Mindanao. He opposed Estrada’s “all out war” and has explicitly said that the armed Moro resistance groups need to be included in any peace. Appealing to the rapacity and officiousness of “Imperial Manila,” he has brought the question of federalism back into political discourse. In light of widespread suspicions (that is to say, certainty) that the LP engages in massive electoral fraud, he has made the fairness of the elections a key issue. But the mistrust of and dissatisfaction with the government is not only an issue for the ‘periphery’ -- massive inequality in the cities, the utter shambles of the roads and public transportation (the consequences of which are well nigh unimaginable in the first world), the ever increasing precarity of life in the midst (one wants to say because) of consistent economic growth, has meant that at the Malacanang sits at the heart of a blisteringly discontented, desperate, and angry population. A population that deposed a sitting president in 2008 and very nearly unseated the president that came after.
Duterte has completely outflanked the Left on all these issues. His massively attended miting de avance was called “Occupy Luneta,” the byline on a poster of the campaign’s facebook page reads “we are the 99% who are tired of: corruption, crime, poverty, drama in the government, traffic, selective justice, war in the South, etc.” and, amazingly, informs Duterte that he doesn’t “need money to campaign! We are here to support you!” People are drawing parallels between Duterte and Trump, fair enough, but his campaign is positioning him differently. Here is how a prominent member of his campaign is writes of Duterte and the rally “I cannot miss a historic event because many years from now, when I am old sitting in a rocking chair, I could tell my grandchildren a complete story of a people's movement, you could even call it a revolution, which pushed the most unlikely person to become President of the Philippines. The Luneta Event will be the denouement of a national drama where people worked, campaigned, supported and defended a presidential candidate who does not have the money and resources. Saturday will be history unfolding.” All this is sufficiently eye-brow raising, given that Duterte is part of a fairly significant political dynasty -- as Sonny Melencio pointed out: “His father was a mayor of Danao, Cebu who migrated to Mindanao and became a governor of Davao. His mother was a Roa, a political clan that ruled Leyte for a long time. Duterte’s cousin was the mayor of Cebu City in 1983-86, a position also held by his cousin’s father in 1957-59. The Dutertes are also related to the political clans of Almendras and Durano in Cebu.” And also given that his backers appear to include king makers in Mindanao as well as the former president and unanimously reviled semi-human, GMA.
The point, however, is that he has given the Left almost no space to operate. The Partido Lakas ng Masa are tailing him -- joining the rally on the basis of the demands while insisting rhetorically on their independence. Melencio again on the possibility that the LP will steal the election: “Without merging with the Duterte camp, we can march side-by-side with them and jointly undertake other forms of direct action of the masses, in the face of electoral fraud perpetrated by the government and the ruling Liberal Party. We need to prepare for this. Make sure that the wind of change will not pass over to the celebration of the government and the ruling Liberal Party, but will lead to the outbreak of street protests. The protests that will erupt at the polling places can be the spark that will lead to national conflagration.” Well he is not wrong about that -- but what happens if Duterte’s forces are not above calling protests of their own, what if they too decide that a “national conflagration” might be useful? If a failed election is declared, Duterte’s forces will be well positioned to take Malacanang. The PLM’s perspective is that “the only institution that can bring back the confidence and trust of the masses to the election is the Congress of the People. Not the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the Comelec, and all other government institutions involved or tainted with fraud. We should call for a Congress composed of genuine representatives of people’s organizations in different regions and provinces in the country, a Congress that can plan appropriate changes and policies and prepare for genuine democratic elections.” But this will not be the general orientation of the people who will march on this issue, nor is the PLM strong enough to raise this demand and have it be carried.
Duterte’s campaign rests on precisely the same ground as this perspective: that the government has no validity. Whether we call this populism, Peronism, or fascism (premature), it is clear that Duterte makes his appeal in much of the same ground on which a principled Left should have been hegemonic. More than that, to a significant degree, his rise has set the terms in which these issues will be cast for many of the same social forces that the Left wants to organise. In part, the “Left” itself bears responsibility for this: the re-affirmists (the Nat.Dems., CPP, NPA -- i.e.: the Moaists), inveterate opportunists that they are, have worked in coalition with Duterte in Davao for ages (rumour has it, they comprised part of his death squads) and the official line is support for his campaign, although it seems that there are mutterings of disagreement with this. Once again, the Maoists are sabotaging things for the ‘rejectionists’ (the various groups that broke with the CPP line) by their sheer strength relative to the rest of the Left. A principled opposition by the CPP and its various satellites would help to de-legitimize Duterte’s populist appeal, and it would go a long way towards creating the kind of organised and armed opposition that will become necessary if he turns out to be as good as his word. As it stands, the force on the Left with the most extensive roots among the farmers and working class, the force which is almost hegemonic in its strength is giving Duterte their imprimatur. It is not at all clear how the rest of the Left can intervene in this situation. PLM’s position risks strengthening Duterte’s forces. As far as I can tell, the Partido ng Manggagawa (PM, Workers’ Party) has written no position document on the issue. They are calling for an abstention in the presidential election, which is certainly correct -- but how to position itself in relation to the forces supporting Duterte?
Whether or not Duterte will push it as far as it can go (and he might), the current situation may well be the beginning of a deep legitimation crisis for Malacanang. This will almost certainly create opportunities for the Left, but in the event of a victory for Duterte, these may come only after he very literally turns his guns on it (as, indeed, he has already basically promised to do). In the long run, this crisis may become the most important factor, but not yet -- in the mean time, there is the problem of survival.
It is easy enough to point out Duterte’s contradictions. He is a populist capable of taking genuinely left wing positions. But he is an avowed authoritarian who, as mayor, built most of his political capital by organising the paramilitary Davao Death Squads (DDS) which he used against the ‘criminal element’ -- he emphasizes rapists, drug pushers, and kidnappers, but naturally his targets were the criminal poor in general. And, as is well known, he killed quite a few people who he mistook for accused criminals. Since they were poor and powerless, there were no consequences. He wants to murder rapists, but openly regretted not having gotten the chance to rape an Australian missionary. He campaigns on the basis of eradicating poverty and opposes contractualisation. But he has also vowed to shoot strikers that make things difficult for his administration. He calls out the anti-democratic vote buying of the LP. But he has also promised to shut down congress if they attempt to impeach him (This last contradiction is perhaps not such a riddle, though: the same LP accused of electoral shenanigans also controls congress).
From the outside (and maybe from the inside too?), it’s harder to make an accurate measure of Duterte and his ability to make good on his threats. Clearly, there are two possible scenarios coming from this election: either Duterte wins or he loses. It is worth taking both in turn.
If Duterte wins, as all the polls currently suggest that he should he will be the commander in chief of the police and the army. He has already promised that he would swiftly kill 100,000 ‘criminals,’ and dump so many bodies into Manila Bay that the “fish will grow fat” on their bodies. It is not at all clear that he will be able to make good on these promises. His supporters outside of Davoa do not have a direct experience of what this entails. Extraordinary police powers and a massive ramping up of its surveillance powers, certainly, but also the active participation of citizens as informants or as actual members of the death squads. It is a measure of how bad things have gotten in the rest of the country that a policy developed in the context of the social pressures generated by civil war should be gaining traction outside of Mindanao. Still, it is not at all clear that the movement pushing Duterte forward will furnish him with the same active support that he has gotten in Davao. It may well be the case that simply attempting to transfer his policies unto the national arena will cost him all his political capital. Duterte is polling at around 33% (LP bet Mar Roxas is at 22, Grace Poe is at 21, and Jejomar Binay is at 17) -- if these numbers reflect what will happen on Monday Duterte will win, but he will still have gotten about 9% less than Noynoy did in 2010. Promises to salvage half the population aside, one man, no matter how foul, cannot make a police state on his own.
Moreover, he will be in the heart of the Manila oligarchy’s power. Duterte will face an analogous problem to that faced by the LP: he cannot help alienating powerful sections of the ruling class. If he squares off against congress set on impeaching him, the struggle will almost certainly involve various sections of the elite mobilizing the “masa.” It is impossible to say who would win such a contest. But it may create openings for the left.
In the meantime, Duterte will give the police carte blanche authority to murder and kill.
If Duterte loses the elections, there will be a widespread feeling that he will have had it stolen from him. Even those sections of the Left who despise Duterte are not happy to stand by and let the ruling party commit electoral fraud. Just as if he wins the election, the key variable will be how willing and able Duterte is to mobilise his supporters AFTER the election. If a large proportion of his supporters are willing to become activists in the long term, Duterte can make much of the Philippines next to ungovernable. In either case, Mar will come to power with no credibility as the heir of an administration that is wildly unpopular among the lower and middle income segments of the population.
There are, of course, 2 important other factors: the Vice Presidential race, and the armed forces.
The armed forces remain a major political factor. Mampasano scuttled the BBL, Kidapawan badly hurt the administration’s chances. The previous administration had to consistently bribe the generals to keep them on side, but even that did not prevent the Oakwood mutiny or the Occupation of the Manila Peninsula by the lower ranking officers. The conflict in Mindanao remains a political issue, and therefore the political state of the military is of vital importance. It seems pretty clear that the police would love the freedom that Duterte is promising them, but unfortunately the internal dynamics of the military remain fairly mysterious.
Regarding the VP race, the LP must be thanking every god it can think of that Robredo’s fate does not hinge on a Mar victory the way it would in the US. Right now, she is neck and neck with Bongbong Marcos (Duterte’s nominal running mate, Escudero, has no chances). Congress will only risk impeaching Duterte if Robredo wins VP, alternatively, if Marcos wins not only will he be next in line for the presidency, his ability to bring the weight of the far North into the political arena will drastically increase. The Manila oligarchy and the regional powers that have made their bed with them will find themselves pincered between North and South.
The return of the Marcos family to the national arena in the last senatorial election is shocking, but not inexplicable. He has the support of the Solid North behind him, and this is not merely the result of Ilocano provincialism: the Marcoses run their home turf like a fiefdom with all the concomitant noblesse oblige. That is a voting bloc in excess of 6 million, and he will get the majority of it. But more importantly than that, there has been a long and extraordinarily well funded effort to revise Philippine memory. It has to be said that the failures of Cory and Ninoy Acquino’s son has been an exceptionally useful foil for this work.
It is commonly held that the ‘millennial’ vote is bulking up Marcos’ popularity, since after all, we never lived through the horrors of Marcos rule. This is a very convenient fiction that easily ignores the fact that ousting Marcos merely made it possible for other sections of the elites to jocky for political power. Ordinary Filipinos, young and old, have had to deal with the fallout of this fraternal feuding.
In point of fact, however, millennials do not constitute the bulk of Marcos’ vote. At the moment, Marcos actually trails just behind Robredo in percentage of 18-34 year olds voting for them (29% vs 26%), but he leads in both the 35-54 and the 55 and up age groups (31% to Robredo’s 28%, and 33% to 30% respectively). Moreover, at the start of polling, it was Escudero (who voted for the Reproductive Health bill so popular among millennials and who before that was so prominent in the attempts to impeach GMA) who lead among 18-34 year olds -- as his viability waned, Robredo seems to have won more of his young votes than Marcos did, rising from a flat 18% all throughout January to April before leaping 11% at the start of May.
According to Rappler, Marcos is the preferred candidate among voters in the top 3 income brackets (ABC). This is probably an exaggeration, but it says something about the kind of revolution that EDSA I was: the kind that mobilised the entire population right down to the poorest squatters in order to allow a different section of the elites to take over. The gains of that revolution should not be discounted, but this fundamental reality remains. What we are talking about here are rival fractions of the entire ruling class, fractions, moreover whose borders are exceedingly porous. Hence Enrile can be Marcos’ defense minister before defecting then support Marcos Jr. once again to no one’s surprise. Hence the presence of the Cojuanco’s on either side of the fence. Even where individuals do not skip fences as easily as one might change a shirt, the ABC is composed of siblings, cousins, friends, classmates who each back one horse or another but maintain their connections. The political prospects of the Marcos’ were not eliminated because their class remained in power -- and with this class, they are fundamentally close, tied by blood, acquaintance, culture, sensibility, and money.
I have a bit of an inside ticket into this culture. My family’s set is generally liberal enough, but growing up it was not unheard of for quite close friends or relations to wax nostalgic about the discipline and order of those happy days where the police could tell a boy how short to crop his hair. The development of Philippine capitalism is today disintegrating its own social structure and criminality and anxiety are on the rise. Elites are having to share congested roads with hoi polloi who won’t be put in their place because no place exists. The nostalgia of the rich who may well have marched against the dictatorship for the good old days is the affect of a class that wants to keep on raking in the profits without having to suffer the blow back of a dispossessed population.
It is also interesting that Marcos does not only take the North, he also takes Central Luzon and the National Capital region. If not for his thoroughly understandable unpopularity in Mindanao and Robredo’s popularity in her home region in Southern Luzon and the Visayas, he would sweep the VP elections by a landslide. The ‘Solid North’ does not explain Marcos’ strength: the administration’s track record does. The most important indicator of voter support for Marcos is not location or age. It is dissatisfaction with Acquino. Those who highly trust the president vote Robredo, those who don’t overwhelmingly vote Marcos. Marcos may be the preferred candidate of the ABC (although I doubt Rappler’s claim here), but it is clear that most ordinary Filipinos are dissatisfied with the administration as well. It was Acquino Jr. who wound up paving the way for Marcos Jr.
We need to be clear, however, about the kind of responsibility that Acquino bears. In a sense, what Noynoy has done (and he is perhaps unique in this regard), was to try to use the office of the presidency to make the Filipino capitalist class behave as a class. To make Filipino capital competitive on the international scene. In the context of a sluggish global and ASEAN economy, he actually has had success in this regard. The situation is such that this could not be done without the special economic zones, without the extraction economy, without OFWs and PMOs, without contractualisation. The development of capitalism means the development of profitability for the ruling class -- there is no necessary correlation between this and improvements in the situation of the poor. But clearly, the poor were no better off in the days before Noynoy where the state existed to funnel money and power to various little kings without regard to the general development of the economy.
The competence and coherence of the ruling class is not an issue for the Left. We need take no sides in their squabbles.
Nevertheless, we need to be clear about what they mean. This election has revealed a political limit in built into the structure of Philippine capital -- this limit will be persistent, especially given the international situation. One way or another, we are seeing a return to the instability that has been the major characteristic of Philippine politics since EDSA I. We should not be complacent about this -- the administration has been an exception to the rule. Even if Mar wins, and even if he sees off the first challenge that the forces of Duterte might raise, he will face a longer term political challenge that will be difficult to resolve. The elections will likely usher in a new period of instability similar to the days of Estrada and GMA, but the forces are not the same and the anger is deeper. Moreover the challenge to the legitimacy of Manila itself is new.
These factors are extraordinarily mercurial, even a character like Duterte can have difficulty controlling such anger. The wind is blowing in favour of reaction at the moment, but even that may change quickly. The Left is out of step with current developments, but new opportunities are very likely to emerge, as well as old and new dangers. What all of this demonstrates with heartbreaking clarity is that the challenge of building an independent, principled, revolutionary Left remains as the fundamental condition for breaking the deadlock of Philippine capitalism.