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In defence of Naomi Klein's analysis of South Africa
By Patrick Bond
In response to Beware Electocrats: Naomi Klein on South Africa by Ronald Suresh Roberts in Radical Philosophy commentaries, July-August 2008, http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2187&editorial_id=26668
Klein’s chapter on
Protest in Durban demanding treatment for HIV/AIDS patients
Ronald Suresh Roberts: … In her discussion of non-African countries, Klein confronts the articulated logic of decision makers. But when she turns her attention to post-apartheid South Africa Klein is content to recycle the impressions of a small and like-minded clique of analysts such as fellow-Canadian activist Patrick Bond...
Patrick Bond: The first of RSR’s untruths. I lived in
RSR: ... described as someone “who worked as an economic advisor in Mandela’s office during the first years of ANC rule.” Actually Bond is best known as an anti-government fund-raising maestro within global “social movements” circles.
PB: For good reason, no one else has ever accused me of being a fund-raising maestro.
RSR: His Centre for Civil Society has at times accepted money from USAID and the Ford Foundation and has had links at Board level with Ford, Kellogg and other such foundations.
PB: This is a strange manipulation.
RSR: Klein decries neocon “transitionologists” as a “hypermobile class” that intellectually dominates “inherently inward-looking” native governments, softening them up for neoliberal restructuring. Yet she and some of her informants participate in the same condescension and hypermobility.
PB: Most of us reading these words are hypermobile, especially
RSR (as so many in
RSR: To avoid duplicating the imperialism they supposedly resist, the ‘social movements’ elite may need to become a little more ``electocratic’’ than at present.
PB: That is, simply, too great a challenge, at least while the
African National Congress (ANC) lock on voting prevents a genuine contestation in
that sphere, i.e., until the trade unions split from the ruling party and start
their own. My suspicion is that, with a few exceptions (Operation Khanyisa Movement
RSR: ... Klein uncritically recycles the Mbeki-bashing views of
William Mervyn Gumede, a self-described Oppenheimer Scholar at St Anthony’s
PB: Gumede needed funding to live, and won a competitive fellowship and writing job, but you won’t find in his work any bias towards imperial capital. RSR’s smeary attack-by-association not only doesn’t work, but instead recalls his own personal sponsorship – and corresponding pro-Mbeki hackery - from the South African president’s office via a major Afrikaner-dominated banking group.
RSR: ... by the time [John] Pilger published this essay in 2006
(based on a 1998 documentary), the electorate had given an even larger
percentage of its vote to the ANC in 1999 (66 per cent) and then a larger still
share in 2004 (70 per cent). If Pilger was correct,
PB: There is a simple reason, one parallel to US workers’ votes
for the Democratic or Republican parties, or British workers’ votes: there is
not yet a viable alternative party on the left. Where such have emerged, in
RSR: ... The suggestion that millions of newly enfranchised blacks have been so quickly and so easily reduced to a quasi-comatose passivity is a proposition that must be expressed with great delicacy, to say the least.
PB: Given that
RSR: Klein excels in this. Her favoured strategy is to find a black native informant who mentions the unmentionable, rendering it printable…
PB: First it’s the “Canadian” Bond, now the “black native informant”. RSR seems to need a moving target to insult. Why not address the critique head on?
RSR: And yet when it comes to plain
factual matters Klein herself is frequently caught napping. At page 203 of her
chapter on ``
PB: This is a contentious issue, and a great many agricultural analysts and rural movements have noted the state's refusal to carry out the needed large-scale land expropriation. This point the ANC elite conceded themselves, in August 2008, by removing from consideration a proposed parliamentary bill with that intent.
RSR: Likewise, an ANC government that successfully litigated against intellectual property rights that had stymied cheap generic antiretrovirals gets faulted by Klein for upholding the very constraints they successfully fought down!
PB: This is nonsense, for although in 1997-99, the Mandela government's health ministry promoted antiretroviral medicines and passed a law providing for compulsory licensing so that intellectual property rights would not apply, by 2000 the Mbeki government was explicitly opposed to use of that law, to the medicines themselves, and to the civil society organisation (Treatment Action Campaign) most active in advocating access to the life-saving drugs.
RSR: Again, she emphasizes the interest bill on pre-democracy
loans as though debt repudiation would have enhanced the democratic
government’s cash flows for social spending ...
PB: Klein is correct; servicing the apartheid-era debt was the second-highest budgetary item under Mandela, at more than 20%, just below education spending. Mandela himself has said the same, as she quotes from a Jubilee South Africa documentary film.
RSR: ... without addressing the cash crunch that debt repudiation would entail as retaliating banks shut down credit lines.
PB: Prescribed assets would easily have dealt with this problem, as it had during the apartheid regime's mid-1980s credit crunch. Access to international finance was not much of an issue, as reflected in the very small rise in foreign debt in the first decade of democracy.
RSR: She suggests that the World Bank succeeded in ``making private-sector partnerships the service norm''. As strategy and policy adviser to the ANC minister who piloted the 1998 water law reforms, I personally insisted upon precisely the opposite bias, which is why section 19 of the 1997 Water Services Act establishes an explicit onus against public–private partnerships, of which there have been next to none. Moreover, section 3 of the 1998 Water Act effectively nationalizes water resources.
PB: This is sophism (and I also worked for the water minister, as a budget advisor, at exactly the same time as RSR). Even though too many municipalities were badly run and impoverished, hence distasteful to Paris and London water companies, a $1 billion apparatus (the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit) was established at the Development Bank of Southern Africa, with World Bank and US AID support, to make PPPs the norm (and the unit was readily embraced by the water ministry: http://www.dwaf.gov.za/DIR_ws/content/pds/AlternativeDeliveryMechanism/PDF%5CD4747%20Toolbox%20(4).pdf). The spirit of commodification was most explicitly introduced by that same water minister in his 1994 White Paper, which explicitly rejected subsidies to cover operating/maintenance costs even for poor rural recipients of new water systems - leading to most of those new systems' bankruptcy. The following year, the World Bank's main water staffer in the region insisted that the same minister not introduce the free lifeline water that was promised in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, and he complied, and by 1999 the Bank openly declared victory in its Country Assistance Strategy. RSR may have thought he put a damper on PPPs but he apparently was not paying attention. As for 'nationalising' water, yes, the current system is an improvement over Riparian Rights in which water was owned by whomever owned the land above it. But the real question to ask is whether the system set up by Roberts and his minister has delivered adequate decommodified water to the masses, and it is undeniable that thousands of social protests have occurred because the answer to the question is no.
RSR: Klein convinces herself that ‘currency controls’ needed to be imposed in 1994. Actually these were already thick on the ground, a result of the apartheid regime’s earlier battles with capital flight.
PB: Coming late to the scene, RSR doesn't understand that the SA Finance Ministry and Reserve Bank were rife with corruption prior to 1994 (one Bank employee was convicted of US$1 billion in forex fraud), or that the meagre 1985-95 "finrand" exchange controls merely put a premium on exporting money. Much more intense capital controls should have been applied so as to prevent the rich white people and companies that benefited from apartheid, from removing the loot so easily.
RSR: Klein repeatedly mentions an $850 million IMF deal ‘signed, conveniently enough, right before the elections’ of 1994; this deal then supposedly constrained the incoming government.
PB: Supposedly? Of course it constrained the ANC government. Here is the leading financial journalist's opinion: "The ANC wants to create an almost utopian society, described in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. But it has to build that society while keeping its promises to the IMF and its own commitment to ‘macroeconomic balance’" (Greta Steyn in Business Day, 30 May 1994). The IMF agreement included wage restraint and shrinkage of the fiscal debt, and informally compelled Mandela to reappoint the apartheid-era finance minister and central bank governor.
RSR: But she neglects to mention that the IMF has been begging the ANC, with zero success in fifteen years, to take its money.
PB: Nonsense, the IMF did not beg SA to do anything by way of taking credit, because SA kept such strong relations with foreign creditors that it did not need to. The IMF did not beg SA to make any change in economic policy, because it did not need to: Mbeki’s team was imposing IMF policies on the populace from May 1994 in any event. The World Bank did make loans, and the Bank's International Finance Corporation also made major investments. The Bretton Woods Institutions were quite satisfied with SA, so much so that they allowed SA finance minister Trevor Manuel to chair their board of governors in 2000.
RSR: She even believes the minimum wage was not raised. It was. Repeatedly.
PB: This is the sophist in RSR again. What Klein actually writes, in the context of the IMF loan, is: "Raise the minimum wage to close the apartheid income gap? Nope. The IMF deal promises 'wage restraint.'" And indeed it did, so that the wage bill in the state budget shrunk, and only much later were the first minimum wages applied (after enormous lobbying by trade unions). Yet wages were and are so very low, that instead of the apartheid income gap shrinking, it actually widened steadily since 1994, to amongst the highest levels in the world. Klein is correct, RSR is wrong even when twisting her words.
RSR: Additionally, Klein implies that the ANC implemented a massive privatization plan. This is a major theme in Shock Doctrine; privatization is to political economy what sensory deprivation is to clinical psychology. In fact the ANC successfully resisted massive international pressure on privatization, and Mbeki took the steps that were required to allow such resistance to prevail. The ANC has privatized nothing strategic other than the telephone company.
PB: Successfully resisted? More like: tried hard and failed at
every single attempt. Thanks to telecommunications privatisation, the cost of
local calls skyrocketed as cross-subsidisation from long-distance (especially international) calls was phased out. As a result, out of 2.6
million new lines installed, at least 2.1 million disconnections occurred, due
to unaffordability. More than 20,000 Telkom workers were fired, leading to
ongoing labour strife. Telkom’s 2003 Initial Public Offering on the New York
Stock Exchange raised only $500 million, with an estimated $5 billion of
RSR: While Patrick Bond at least quotes Mbeki’s many and varied
assaults upon the Washington Consensus before caricaturing them as lip service
(as in his book Talking Left, Walking Right) ...
PB: Ahem, that’s Talk Left Walk Right.
RSR: .. Klein proceeds as though Mbeki’s vigorous and long-standing critiques, such as his speech at the ILO Conference in June 2003, simply do not exist.
PB: Thankfully, she doesn’t cite all that nonsensical anti-imperialist rhetoric, because it’s merely a distraction, part of the shock treatment.
RSR: When Klein turns her attention to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which investigated the apartheid past, she suggests that the ANC played a role in limiting its political effects. She suggests that the ANC wanted a narrow torture-focused process that neglected apartheid’s systemic aspects. Again I was a direct participant in the formative debates surrounding the Truth Commission, and at the time I co-authored a book with Professor Kader Asmal, the human rights lawyer and ANC minister who had first floated the idea in a 1992 lecture. We explicitly advocated a systematic focus and rejected precisely the narrow torture-based approach that Klein criticizes.
PB: If so, RSR lost, and should have the humility to admit that
only murder/torture “counted” in the TRC, and hence a larger group of victims
had to go to the
RSR: We emphasized the role of business, which Klein claims the ANC tried to play down…
PB: Simply put, RSR lost again. Making profits from apartheid and
then lying about it to the TRC was big business' ANC-approved practice, as
periodically codified at the tycoons' funerals, dutifully attended by ANC
leaders. The refusal to support apartheid victims in the
RSR: The plain truth is that Klein’s account of
PB: My own view, on the contrary, is that the colonial status quo needed three kinds of shock consistent, with Klein’s thesis. First was the murder or maiming or torture of tens of thousands of black South Africans by the state and ``Third Force'' in the decade prior to democracy, so as to soften up the liberation forces; second being the shock of happiness that apartheid ended, mixed with a euphoric trust that the party they voted into power would reduce poverty, unemployment, inequality, homelessness and illness (followed by an aftershock -- that the reverse happened); and a third being the repeated pounding the SA currency took from international financial speculators (1996, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2008). Once those psycho-social shocks set in, weariness of fighting combined with a political honeymoon. That allowed the small group of neoliberal state managers to impose policies such as the 1994 White Papers dealing with water and housing, the 1995 infrastructure plan, the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (especially in the wake of the 1996 currency crisis) and myriad other policies. In these ways, the guiding assumptions of Shock Doctrine work very well when applied to SA.
RSR: Instead, for obvious reasons, they seek a kind of continuity that was vividly described by one Anglo-American official in the 1980s as ``permanent transition''. He meant the continuation of state powerlessness: the powerlessness of the apartheid state, buffeted by sanctions and pariah status before 1994 ought to give way to a new powerlessness of the democratic state, which must be weakened by factionalism and delegitimized (not least by reckless internal talk of ``betrayal'') so that private and international interests can continue to dominate the field as the only entities capable of collective action.
PB: The apartheid state was not powerless, by any means -- but the crucial missing link here is that ``private and international interests'' were conjoined with the rise of the betrayal-oriented ANC elite, both within the state and out, ably led by Mbeki. RSR’s failure to grapple properly with this factor is revealing.
RSR: This is why the choice of Klein’s chief source in this chapter, William Gumede, is so profoundly problematic. Klein thoroughly buys Gumede’s anti-Mbeki line. In January 2005 the Economist had the following peculiar sentence in a hostile profile of Mbeki, based on Gumede’s book: “Mr Mbeki and a team of friends [sic] – Trevor Manual as finance minister, Tito Mboweni at the central bank – pushed through a set of tough economic reforms known as GEAR (the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Plan) to cut the deficit, lower inflation, cut tariffs and bureaucracy and privatize some state firms. These reforms left opponents reeling. Those who wanted to see a state-dominated economy were barged aside.”
PB: That particular shock to the left, which I witnessed when I was chief drafter of the ill-fated National Growth and Development Strategy working in Mandela’s office, began building in February 1996, when the currency crashed by a third following a (false) rumour Mandela was ill. Those left reeling included our Reconstruction and Development Programme office (shut down within days of the currency crash), and the trade unions, whose leader Mbhazima Shilowa uttered the famous words about GEAR in July 1996: “Something has gone terribly wrong”.
RSR: But since when has the Economist taken up cudgels on behalf of labour unions that were allegedly ``barged aside'' by market measures? Klein’s book itself demonstrates what everybody knows: the Economist traditionally proselytizes in favour of the sort of economic reforms embraced by Augusto Pinochet and other neoliberal ``modernisers'' …
PB: Yes, they were obviously celebrating in that sentence, above, as they always have regarding ANC neoliberalism -- only now they are a bit more aware of how little legitimacy these policies have within the ANC mass base.
RSR: On AIDS policy, in particular, Mbeki has steadfastly resisted the Big Pharma disaster capitalist logic, peddled by Jeffrey Sachs himself, who advocates a medical form of shock therapy in the form of massive drug-buying binges – a strategy criticized by William Easterley [sic] in The White Man’s Burden.
PB: Citing World Banker Easterly so favourably may be satisfying to AIDS denialists who don't like anti-retroviral medicines, including Mbeki, but won’t change the reality that tens of thousands of treatment activists handed Mbeki, Clinton/Gore and Big Pharma a massive defeat, by decommodifying and deglobalising the production of generic AIDS medicines which will save millions of lives. RSR could not come to grips with this in his praise-book for Mbeki, and somehow still believes that the successful campaign to bring generic anti-retrovirals to Africa was supported by Big Pharma, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.
RSR: And yet, despite her generally unremitting criticisms of Sachs, Klein gives Mbeki no credit here, scared away as she is by the propaganda that has caricatured his position as an ill-defined ``AIDS denialism''.
PB: No, Mbeki deserves blame for what is often termed “genocide”, namely denying millions of his subjects the medicines for so long, as is well documented.
RSR: The rise of factionalism inside the ANC is not now and never was about the country’s location on a policy spectrum between right-wing ‘shock doctors’ and left-wing progressives.
PB: Most people in South Africa believe differently.
RSR: Since the defenestration of Mbeki at the ANC conference last December, the new leadership has reiterated the old economic policy commitments…
PB: This is a point, finally, that I agree with. But the trade unionists and Communists do not agree and intend fighting within the Zuma camp for post-neoliberal policies, and given their social weight, the future is indeed hard to predict.
RSR: Klein herself is, of course, a powerful part of the global media, with her well-meaning and yet stubbornly Orientalist representations of African politics, complete with a ``culture-shocked'' Mandela and a chronically paralysed native electorate, falsely unconscious of its authentic best interests.
PB: It’s this sort of language that made RSR infamous as a
political hack in his SA days, labelled by one of the main newspapers “The
unlikeable Mr Roberts”. (A lawsuit for defamation, and appeal, both failed,
suggesting how little RSR’s spin gets traction now in
Democracy Born In Chains: South Africa’s Constricted Freedom
By Naomi Klein
Chapter 10 of The Shock Doctrine, 2007, pp.194-217.
Reconciliation means that those who have been on the underside of history
must see that there is a qualitative difference between repression and freedom.
And for them, freedom translates into having a supply of clean water, having
electricity on tap; being able to live in a decent home and have a good job; to
be able to send your children to school and to have accessible health care. I
mean, what’s the point of having made this transition if the quality of life of
these people is not enhanced and improved? If not, the vote is useless. -- Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chair of
Before transferring power, the Nationalist Party wants to emasculate it. It is trying to negotiate a kind of swap where it will give up the right to run the country its way in exchange for the right to stop blacks from running it their own way. Allister Sparks, South African journalist 
In January 1990, Nelson Mandela, age seventy-one, sat down in his prison compound to write a note to his supporters outside. It was meant to settle a debate over whether twenty-seven years behind bars, most of it spent on Robben Island off the coast of Cape Town, had weakened the leader’s commitment to the economic transformation of South Africa’s apartheid state.
The note was only two sentences long, and it decisively put the matter to rest:
“The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy
of the ANC, and the change or modification of our views in this regard is
inconceivable. Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and
encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy
is unavoidable.” History, it turned out, was not over just yet, as
That belief had formed the basis of the policy of the African National Congress
for thirty-five years, ever since it was spelled out in its statement of core
principles, the Freedom Charter. The story of the charter’s drafting is the
stuff of folklore in
Roughly three thousand delegates---black, Indian, “colored” and a few white---sat together in an empty field to vote on the contents of the document. According to Nelson Mandela’s account of the historic Kliptown gathering, “the charter was read aloud, section by section, to the people in English, Sesotho and Xhosa. After each section, the crowd shouted its approval with cries of ‘Afrika!’ and ‘Mayibuye!’ “ The first defiant demand of the Freedom Charter reads, “The People Shall Govern!” In the mid-fifties, that dream was decades away from fulfillment. On the Congress’s second day, the gathering was violently broken up by police, who claimed the delegates were plotting treason.
For three decades,
“The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people; the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; all other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the people,” the charter states. At the time of its drafting, the charter was viewed by some in the liberation movement as positively centrist, by others as unforgivably weak. The Pan-Africanists castigated the ANC for conceding too much to white colonizers (why did South Africa belong to “everyone, black and white?” they asked; the manifesto should have demanded, as the Jamaican black nationalist Marcus Garvey had, “Africa for the Africans.”) The staunch Marxists dismissed the demands as “petty bourgeois”: it wasn’t revolutionary to divide the ownership of the land among all people; Lenin said that private property itself must be abolished.
What was taken as a given by all factions of the liberation struggle was that apartheid was not only a political system regulating who was allowed to vote and move freely. It was also an economic system that used racism to enforce a highly lucrative arrangement: a small white elite had been able to amass enormous profits from South Africa’s mines, farms and factories because a large black majority was prevented from owning land and forced to provide its labor for far less than it was worth---and was beaten and imprisoned when it dared to rebel. In the mines, whites were paid up to ten times more than blacks, and, as in Latin America, the large industrialists worked closely with the military to have unruly workers disappeared. 
What the Freedom Charter asserted was the
baseline consensus in the liberation movement that freedom would not come
merely when blacks took control of the state but when the wealth of the land
that had been illegitimately confiscated was reclaimed and redistributed to the
society as a whole.
That was what Mandela was confirming with his two-sentence note from prison: he
still believed in the bottom line that there would be no freedom without
redistribution. With so many other countries now also “in transition,” it was a
statement with enormous implications. If Mandela led the ANC to power and
nationalized the banks and the mines, the precedent would make it far more
Amid all this change there was little time for catching up: immediately on his release, Mandela had a people to lead to freedom while preventing a civil war and an economic collapse---both of which looked like distinct possibilities.
If there was a third path between Communism and capitalism---a way of democratizing the country and redistributing wealth at the same time--- South Africa under the ANC looked uniquely positioned to turn that persistent dream into reality. It wasn’t only the global outpouring of admiration and support for Mandela but also the particular way in which the antiapartheid struggle had taken shape in the preceding years. In the eighties, it had become a truly global mass movement, and outside South Africa, the weapon that activists wielded most effectively was the corporate boycott--- both of South African--made products and of international firms that did business with the apartheid state. The goal of the boycott strategy was to put enough of a squeeze on the corporate sector that it would lobby the intransigent South African government to end apartheid. But there was also a moral component to the campaign: many consumers firmly believed that companies that were profiting from white supremacist laws deserved to take a financial hit.
It was this attitude that gave the ANC a unique opportunity to reject the
free-market orthodoxy of the day. Since there was already widespread agreement
that corporations shared responsibility for the crimes of apartheid, the stage
was set for Mandela to explain why key sectors of
We will never know which of these forces would have proved more powerful.
In the years that passed between Mandela’s writing his note from prison and the
ANC’s 1994 election sweep in which he was elected president, something happened
to convince the party hierarchy that it could not use its grassroots prestige
to reclaim and redistribute the country’s stolen wealth. So, rather than
meeting in the middle between
I went to
However, it did not manage to prevent
The talks that hashed out the terms of apartheid’s end took place on two parallel tracks that often intersected: one was political, the other economic.
Most of the attention, naturally, focused on the high-profile political summits between Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk, leader of the National Party.
De Klerk’s strategy in these negotiations was to preserve as much power as
possible. He tried everything---breaking the country into a federation,
guaranteeing veto power for minority parties, reserving a certain percentage of
the seats in government structures for each ethnic group---anything to prevent
simple majority rule, which he was sure would lead to mass land expropriations
and the nationalizing of corporations. As Mandela later put it, “What the
National Party was trying to do was to maintain white supremacy with our
consent.” De Klerk had guns and money behind him, but his opponent had a
movement of millions. Mandela and his chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, won on
almost every count. Running alongside these often explosive summits were the
much lower profile economic negotiations, primarily managed on the ANC side by
Thabo Mbeki, then a rising star in the party, now
As the political talks progressed, and it became clear to the National Party
that Parliament would soon be firmly in the hands of the ANC, the party of
In these talks, the de Klerk government had a twofold strategy. First, drawing
on the ascendant Washington Consensus that there was now only one way to run an
economy, it portrayed key sectors of economic decision making--- such as trade
policy and the central bank---as “technical” or “administrative.” Then it used
a wide range of new policy tools---international trade agreements, innovations
in constitutional law and structural adjustment programs--- to hand control of
those power centers to supposedly impartial experts, economists and officials
from the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the National Party---anyone except the liberation fighters from the ANC. It
was a strategy of balkanization, not of the country’s geography (as de Klerk
had originally attempted) but of its economy.
This plan was successfully executed under the noses of ANC leaders, who were naturally preoccupied with winning the battle to control Parliament. In the process, the ANC failed to protect itself against a far more insidious strategy---in essence, an elaborate insurance plan against the economic clauses in the Freedom Charter ever becoming law in
While these tense negotiations between adversaries were unfolding, the ANC was
also busily preparing within its own ranks for the day when it would take
office. Teams of ANC economists and lawyers formed working groups charged with
figuring out exactly how to turn the general promises of the Freedom
Charter---for housing amentites and health care---into practical policies. The
most ambitious of these plans was Make Democracy Work, an economic blueprint
Padayachee entered the liberation struggle in the seventies, as an adviser to
“We were caught completely off guard,” recalled Padayachee, now in his early fifties. He had done his graduate studies at
For Padayachee and his colleagues, who strongly believed that monetary policy
needed to serve the new government’s “big goals of growth, employment and
redistribution,” the ANC’s position was a no-brainer: “There was not going to
be an independent central bank in South Africa.” Padayachee and a colleague
stayed up all night writing a paper that gave the negotiating team the
arguments it needed to resist this curveball from the National Party. If the
central bank (in
Obviously, the National Party was trying to find a backdoor way to hold on to power even after it lost the elections---a strategy that needed to be resisted at all costs. “They were locking in as much as possible,” Padayachee recalled.
“That was a clear part of the agenda.” Padayachee faxed the paper in the
morning and didn’t hear back for weeks. “Then, when we asked what happened, we
were told, ‘Well, we gave that one up.’ “ Not only would the central bank be
run as an autonomous entity within the South African state, with its
independence enshrined in the new constitution, but it would be headed by the
same man who ran it under apartheid, Chris Stals. It wasn’t just the central
bank that the ANC had given up: in another major concession, Derek Keyes, the
white finance minister under apartheid, would also remain in his post---much as
the finance ministers and central bank heads from
What happened in those negotiations is that the ANC found itself caught in a new kind of web, one made of arcane rules and regulations, all designed to confine and constrain the power of elected leaders. As the web descended on the country, only a few people even noticed it was there, but when the new government came to power and tried to move freely, to give its voters the tangible benefits of liberation they expected and thought they had voted for, the strands of the web tightened and the administration discovered that its powers were tightly bound. Patrick Bond, who worked as an economic adviser in Mandela’s office during the first years of ANC rule, recalls that the in-house quip was “Hey, we’ve got the state, where’s the power?” As the new government attempted to make tangible the dreams of the Freedom Charter, it discovered that the power was elsewhere.
Want to redistribute land? Impossible---at the last minute, the negotiators agreed to add a clause to the new constitution that protects all private property, making land reform virtually impossible. Want to create jobs for millions of unemployed workers? Can’t---hundreds of factories were actually about to close because the ANC had signed on to the GATT, the precursor to the World Trade Organization, which made it illegal to subsidize the auto plants and textile factories. Want to get free AIDS drugs to the townships, where the disease is spreading with terrifying speed? That violates an intellectual property rights commitment under the WTO, which the ANC joined with no public debate as a continuation of the GATT.
Need money to build more and larger houses for the poor and to bring free
electricity to the townships? Sorry---the budget is being eaten up servicing
the massive debt, passed on quietly by the apartheid government. Print more
money? Tell that to the apartheid-era head of the central bank. Free water for
all? Not likely. The World Bank, with its large in-country contingent of
economists, researchers and trainers (a self-proclaimed “Knowledge Bank”), is
making private-sector partnerships the service norm. Want to impose currency
controls to guard against wild speculation? That would violate the $850 million
IMF deal, signed, conveniently enough, right before the elections. Raise the
minimum wage to close the apartheid income gap? Nope. The IMF deal promises
“wage restraint.” And don’t even think about ignoring these
commitments---any change will be regarded as evidence of dangerous national
untrustworthiness, a lack of commitment to “reform,” an absence of a
“rules-based system.” All of which will lead to currency crashes, aid cuts and
capital flight. The bottom line was that
A longtime antiapartheid activist, Rassool Snyman, described the trap to me in stark terms. “They never freed us. They only took the chain from around our neck and put it on our ankles.” Yasmin Sooka, a prominent South African human rights activist, told me that the transition “was business saying, ‘We’ll keep everything and you [the ANC] will rule in name. . . . You can have political power, you can have the façade of governing, but the real governance will take place somewhere else.’ “(**) It was a process of infantilization that is common to so-called transitional countries---new governments are, in effect, given the keys to the house but not the combination to the safe.
Part of what I wanted to understand was how, after such an epic struggle for
freedom, any of this could have been allowed to happen. Not just how the
leaders of the liberation movement gave up the economic front, but how the
ANC’s base---people who had already sacrificed so much---let their leaders give
it up. Why didn’t the grassroots movement demand that the ANC keep the promises
of the Freedom Charter and rebel against the concessions as they were being
made? I put the question to William Gumede, a third-generation ANC activist
who, as a leader of the student movement during the transition, was on the
streets in those tumultuous years. “Everyone was watching the political
negotiations,” he recalled, referring to the de Klerk--Mandela summits. “And if
people felt it wasn’t going well there would be mass protests. But when the
economic negotiators would report back, people thought it was technical; no one
was interested.” This perception, he said, was encouraged by Mbeki, who
portrayed the talks as “administrative” and of no popular concern (much like
the Chileans with their “technified democracy”). As a result, he told me, with
great exasperation, “We missed it! We missed the real story.” Gumede, who today
is one of
Like many people I spoke with, Gumede reminded me
that South Africa was very much on the brink of civil war throughout the
transition period---townships were being terrorized by gangs who had been armed
by the National Party, police massacres were still taking place, leaders were
still being assassinated and there was constant talk of the country descending
into a bloodbath. “I was focusing on the politics---mass action, going to Bisho
[site of a definitive showdown between demonstrators and police], shouting,
‘Those guys must go!’ “ Gumede recalled. “But that was not the real
struggle---the real struggle was over economics. And I am disappointed in
myself for being so naive. I thought I was politically mature enough to
understand the issues. How did I miss this?” Since then, Gumede has been making
up for lost time. When we met, he was in the middle of a national firestorm
sparked by his new book, Thabo Mbeki and the
It’s hard to see how the outcome could have been different. If Padayachee is right and the ANC’s own negotiators failed to grasp the enormity of what they were bargaining away, what chance was there for the movement’s street fighters? During those key years when the deals were being signed, South Africans were in a constant state of crisis, ricocheting between the intense exuberance of watching Mandela walk free and the rage of learning that Chris Hani, the younger militant many hoped would succeed Mandela as leader, had been shot dead by a racist assassin. Other than a handful of economists, nobody wanted to talk about the independence of the central bank, a topic that works as a powerful soporific even under normal circumstances.
Gumede points out that most people simply assumed that no matter what compromises had to be made to get into power, they could be unmade once the ANC was firmly in charge. “We were going to be the government---we could fix it later,” he said.
What ANC activists didn’t understand at the time was that it was the nature of democracy itself that was being altered in those negotiations, changed so that---once the web of constraints had descended on their country---there would effectively be no later.
In the first two years of ANC rule, the party still tried to use the limited resources it had to make good on the promise of redistribution. There was a flurry of public investment---more than a hundred thousand homes were built for the poor, and millions were hooked up to water, electricity and phone lines. But, in a familiar story, weighed down by debt and under international pressure to privatize these services, the government soon began raising prices. After a decade of ANC rule, millions of people had been cut off from newly connected water and electricity because they couldn’t pay the bills.(***) At least 40 percent of the new phones lines were no longer in service by 2003. As for the “banks, mines and monopoly industry” that Mandela had pledged to nationalize, they remained firmly in the hands of the same four white-owned megaconglomerates that also control 80 percent of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In 2005, only 4 percent of the companies listed on the exchange were owned or controlled by blacks. Seventy percent of South Africa’s land, in 2006, was still monopolized by whites, who are just 10 percent of the population. Most distressingly, the ANC government has spent far more time denying the severity of the AIDS crisis than getting lifesaving drugs to the approximately 5 million people infected with HIV, though there were, by early 2007, some positive signs of progress. Perhaps the most striking statistic is this one: since 1990, the year Mandela left prison, the average life expectancy for South Africans has dropped by thirteen years. Underlying all these facts and figures is a fateful choice made by the ANC after the leadership realized it had been outmaneuvered in the economic negotiations.
At that point, the party could have attempted to launch a second liberation movement and break free of the asphyxiating web that had been spun during the transition. Or it could simply accept its restricted power and embrace the new economic order. The ANC’s leadership chose the second option. Rather than making the centerpiece of its policy the redistribution of wealth that was already in the country---the core of the Freedom Charter on which it had been elected---the ANC, once it became the government, accepted the dominant logic that its only hope was to pursue new foreign investors who would create new wealth, the benefits of which would trickle down to the poor. But for the trickle-down model to have a hope of working, the ANC government had to radically alter its behavior to make itself appealing to investors.
This was not an easy task, as Mandela had learned when he walked out of prison.
As soon as he was released, the South African stock market collapsed in panic;
Not only did the volatile market not like the idea of a liberated Mandela, but just a few misplaced words from him or his fellow ANC leaders could lead to an earth-shaking stampede by what the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has aptly termed “the electronic herd.” The stampede that greeted Mandela’s release was just the start of what became a call-and response between the ANC leadership and the financial markets---a shock dialogue that trained the party in the new rules of the game. Every time a top party official said something that hinted that the ominous Freedom Charter might still become policy, the market responded with a shock, sending the rand into free fall. The rules were simple and crude, the electronic equivalent of monosyllabic grunts: justice---expensive, sell; status quo---good, buy.
When, shortly after his release, Mandela once again spoke out in favor of
nationalization at a private lunch with leading businessmen, “the All-Gold
Index plunged by 5 per cent.” Even moves that seemed to have nothing to do
with the financial world but betrayed some latent radicalism seemed to provoke
a market jolt. When Trevor Manuel, an ANC minister, called rugby in
The person inside the ANC who seemed to understand how to make the shocks stop
was Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s right hand during his presidency and soon to be his
successor. Mbeki had spent many of his years of exile in
According to Gumede, Mbeki took on the role of free-market tutor within the party. The beast of the market had been unleashed, Mbeki would explain; there was no taming it, just feeding it what it craved: growth and more growth.
So, rather than calling for the nationalization of the mines, Mandela and Mbeki began meeting regularly with Harry Oppenheimer, former chairman of the mining giants Anglo-American and De Beers, the economic symbols of apartheid rule. Shortly after the 1994 election, they even submitted the ANC’s economic program to Oppenheimer for approval and made several key revisions to address his concerns, as well as those of other top industrialists. Hoping to avoid getting another shock from the market, Mandela, in his first postelection interview as president, carefully distanced himself from his previous statements favoring nationalization. “In our economic policies . . . there is not a single reference to things like nationalization, and this is not accidental,” he said. “There is not a single slogan that will connect us with any Marxist ideology.”(****) The financial press offered steady encouragement for this conversion: “Though the ANC still has a powerful leftist wing,” The Wall Street Journal observed, “Mr. Mandela has in recent days sounded more like Margaret Thatcher than the socialist revolutionary he was once thought to be.”
The memory of its radical past still clung to the ANC, and despite the new government’s best efforts to appear unthreatening, the market kept inflicting its painful shocks: in a single month in 1996, the rand dropped 20 percent, and the country continued to hemorrhage capital as South Africa’s jittery rich moved their money offshore. Mbeki convinced Mandela that what was needed was a definitive break with the past. The ANC needed a completely new economic plan--- something bold, something shocking, something that would communicate, in the broad, dramatic strokes the market understood, that the ANC was ready to embrace the Washington Consensus.
As in Bolivia, where the shock therapy program was prepared with all the secrecy of a covert military operation, in South Africa only a handful of Mbeki’s closest colleagues even knew that a new economic program was in the works, one very different from the promises they had all made during the 1994 elections. Of the people on the team, Gumede writes, “all were sworn to secrecy and the entire process was shrouded in deepest confidentiality lest the left wing get wind of Mbeki’s plan.” The economist Stephen Gelb, who took part in drafting the new program, admitted that “this was ‘reform from above’ with a vengeance, taking to an extreme the arguments in favour of insulation and autonomy of policymakers from popular pressures.” (This emphasis on secrecy and insulation was particularly ironic given that, under the tyranny of apartheid, the ANC had pulled off a remarkably open and participatory process to come up with the Freedom Charter.
Now, under a new order of democracy, the
party was opting to hide its economic plans from its own caucus.) In June 1996,
Mbeki unveiled the results: it was a neoliberal shock therapy program for
Shock therapy is always a market performance---that is part of its underlying
theory. The stock market loves overhyped, highly managed moments that send
stock prices soaring, usually provided by an initial public stock offering, the
announcement of a huge merger or the hiring of a celebrity CEO. When economists
urge countries to announce a sweeping shock therapy package, the advice is
partially based on an attempt to imitate this kind of high-drama market event
and trigger a stampede---but rather than selling an individual stock, they are
selling a country. The hoped-for response is “Buy Argentine stocks!” “Buy
Bolivian bonds!” A slower, more careful approach, on the other hand, may be
less brutal, but it deprives the market of these hype-bubbles, during which the
real money gets made. Shock therapy is always a significant gamble, and in
The shock of the base
“The new convert is always more zealous at these things. They want to please even more,” remarked the Durban-based writer Ashwin Desai when we met to discuss his memories of the transition. Desai spent time in jail during the liberation struggle, and he sees parallels between the psychology in prisons and the ANC’s behavior in government. In prison, he said, “if you please the warden more, you get a better status. And that logic obviously transposed itself into some of the things that South African society did. They did want to somehow prove that they were much better prisoners. Much more disciplined prisoners than other countries, even.” The ANC base, however, proved distinctly more unruly---which created a need for yet more discipline.
According to Yasmin Sooka, one of the jurors on
Some commissioners felt that multinational corporations that had benefited from
apartheid should be forced to pay reparations. In the end the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission made the modest recommendation of a onetime 1 percent
corporate tax to raise money for the victims, what it called “a solidarity
tax.” Sooka expected support for this mild recommendation from the ANC;
instead, the government, then headed by Mbeki, rejected any suggestion of
corporate reparations or a solidarity tax, fearing that it would send an
antibusiness message to the market. “The president decided not to hold business
accountable,” Sooka told me. “It was that simple.” In the end, the government
put forward a fraction of what had been requested, taking the money out of its
own budget, as the commissioners had feared.
I would look at the systems of apartheid---I would look at the question of
land, I would certainly look at the role of multinationals, I would look at the
role of the mining industry very, very closely because I think that’s the real
Reparations in reverse
The fact that the ANC dismissed the Commission’s call for corporate reparations is particularly unfair, Sooka pointed out, because the government continuesto pay the apartheid debt. In the first years after the handover, it cost the new government 30 billion rand annually (about $4.5 billion) in servicing---a sum that provides a stark contrast with the paltry total of $85 million that the government ultimately paid out to more than nineteen thousand victims of apartheid killings and torture and their families. Nelson Mandela has cited the debt burden as the single greatest obstacle to keeping the promises of the Freedom Charter. “That is 30 billion [rand] we did not have to build houses as we planned, before we came into government, to make sure that our children go to the best schools, that unemployment is properly addressed and that everybody has the dignity of having a job, a decent income, of being able to provide shelter to his beloved, to feed them. . . .
limited by the debt that we inherited.” Despite Mandela’s acknowledgment
that paying the apartheid bills has become a disfiguring burden, the party has
opposed all suggestions that it default.
The fear is that even though there is a strong legal case that the debts are “odious,” any move to default would make
Dennis Brutus, a longtime ANC member and a former prisoner on
What makes the ANC’s decision to keep paying the debt so infuriating to activists like Brutus is the tangible sacrifice made to meet each payment. For instance, between 1997 and 2004, the South African government sold eighteen state-owned firms, raising $4 billion, but almost half the money went to servicing the debt. In other words, not only did the ANC renege on Mandela’s original pledge of “the nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industry” but because of the debt, it was doing the opposite---selling off national assets to make good on the debts of its oppressors.
Then there is the matter of where, precisely, the money is going. During the transition negotiations, F. W. de Klerk’s team demanded that all civil servants be guaranteed their jobs even after the handover; those who wanted to leave, they argued, should receive hefty lifelong pensions. This was an extraordinary demand in a country with no social safety net to speak of, yet it was one of several “technical” issues on which the ANC ceded ground. The concession meant that the new ANC government carried the cost of two governments---its own, and a shadow white government that was out of power. Forty percent of the government’s annual debt payments go to the country’s massive pension fund. The vast majority of the beneficiaries are former apartheid employees.(*****)
In the end,
When I arrived in
Yet there was something strange about the event. Kliptown---an impoverished township with dilapidated shacks, raw sewage in the streets and an unemployment rate of 72 percent, far higher than under apartheid---seems more like a symbol of the Freedom Charter’s broken promises than an appropriate backdrop for such a slickly produced celebration. As it turned out, the anniversary events were staged and art-directed not by the ANC but by an odd entity called Blue IQ. Though officially an arm of the provincial government, Blue IQ “operates in a carefully constructed environment which makes it look and feel more like a private sector company than a government department,” according to its very glossy, and very blue, brochure.
Its goal is to drum up new foreign investment in
What is now a slum is set to be remade “into a desirous and prosperous” Johannesburg suburb, while many of its current residents will be relocated to slums in less historic locales. With its plans to rebrand Kliptown, Blue IQ is following the free-market playbook---providing incentives for business to invest, in the hope that it will create jobs down the road. What sets this particular project apart is that, in Kliptown, the foundation on which the entire trickle-down apparatus rests is a fifty-year-old piece of paper that called for a distinctly more direct road to poverty elimination. Redistribute the land so millions can sustain themselves from it, demanded the framers of the Freedom Charter, and take back the mines so the bounty can be used to build houses and infrastructure and create jobs in the process. In other words, cut out the middleman.
Those ideas may sound like utopian populism to many ears, but after so many failed experiments in Chicago School orthodoxy, the real dreamers may be those who still believe that a scheme like the Freedom Charter theme park, which provided handouts to corporations while further disposessing the neediest people, will solve the pressing health and economic problems for the 22 million South Africans still living in poverty. After more than a decade since South Africa made its decisive turn toward Thatcherism, the results of its experiment in trickle-down justice are scandalous: . Since 1994, the year the ANC took power, the number of people living on less than $1 a day has doubled, from 2 million to 4 million in 2006.
Between 1991 and 2002, the unemployment rate for black South Africans more than
doubled, from 23 percent to 48 percent. Of
Not so long ago, the document represented the ultimate threat to white
privilege in the country; today it is embraced in business lounges and gated
communities as a statement of good intentions, at once flattering and totally
unthreatening, on a par with a flowery corporate code of conduct. But in the
townships where the document adopted in a field in Kliptown was once electric
with possibility, its promises are almost too painful to contemplate. Many
South Africans boycotted the government-sponsored anniversary celebrations
completely. “What is in the Freedom Charter is very good,” S’bu Zikode, a
Key economic leaders were regularly ferried to the head offices of
international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, and during 1992 and
1993 several ANC staffers, some of whom had no economic qualifications at all,
took part in abbreviated executive training programs at foreign business schools,
investment banks, economic policy think tanks and the World Bank, where they
were ‘fed a steady diet of neo-liberal ideas.’ It was a dizzying experience.
Never before had a government-in-waiting been so seduced by the international
community.” Mandela received a particularly intense dose of this elite form
of schoolyard peer pressure when he met with European leaders at the 1992 World
Economic Forum in Davos. When he pointed out that
As leaders like Mandela traveled the globalization circuit, it was pounded into
them that even the most left-wing governments were embracing the Washington
Consensus: the Communists in
By their very nature, people spearheading intense national transformations are
narrowly focused on their own narratives and power struggles, often unable to
pay close attention to the world beyond their borders. That’s unfortunate,
because if the ANC leadership had been able to cut through the transitionology
spin and find out for itself what was really going on in
Footnotes to `Democracy born in chains’
* Milton Friedman often joked that if he had his way, central banks would be based so purely on “economic science” that they would be run by giant computers---no humans required.
** It was the Chicago Boys in
*** The question of whether more
people have been cut off from new services than connected to them is highly
**** In fact, the ANC’s official economic platform, on which it had been elected, called for “increasing the public sector in strategic areas through, for example, nationalisation.” Then there was the Freedom Charter, which continued to be the party’s manifesto.
***** In fact, this one
apartheid-era burden is simultaneously driving the growth of the country’s
overall debt and putting billions of rand of public money out of reach every
year. A “technical” accounting change in 1989 switched the state pension fund
from a “pay as you go” system, in which benefits are paid from contributions
made in any given year, to a “fully funded” system, in which the fund has to
have on hand enough capital to pay out 70 to 80 percent of its total
liabilities at any given time---not a scenario it will ever face. As a result,
the fund ballooned from 30 billion rand in 1989 to more than 300 billion rand
in 2004---certainly qualifying as a debt shock. What this means for South
Africans is that the huge pool of capital administered independently by the
pension fund has been cordoned off and placed out of reach for spending on
housing, health care or basic services. The pension agreement was actually
negotiated on the ANC side by Joe Slovo, the legendary leader of the South
African Communist Party, a fact that continues to be a source of great
resentment in the country today.
Endnotes to `Democracy born in chains’
2. Martin J. Murray, The Revolution Deferred (London: Verso, 1994), 12.
3. “ANC Leader Affirms Support for State Control of Industry,” Times (
4. Ismail Vadi, The Congress of the People and Freedom Charter Campaign, foreword by Walter Sisulu (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1995), http://www.sahistory.org.za.
5. Nelson Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 150.
6. The Freedom Charter, adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, on
7. William Mervin Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
8. Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom, 490-91.
9. Simple majority rule was actually delayed until 1999. Until then, executive power was shared among all the political parties that won more than 5 percent of the popular vote. Unpublished interview with Nelson Mandela by the filmmaker Ben Cashdan, 2001; Hein Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition (
10. Milton Friedman, “Milton Friedman---Banquet Speech,” given at the Nobel Banquet,
11. Bill Keller, “Can Both Wealth and Justice Flourish in a New
12. Mark Horton, “Role of Fiscal Policy in Stabilization and Poverty Alleviation,” in Post-Apartheid
13. Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 31, 33, quoting Pinochet’s minister of economy Pablo Baraona’s definition of the “new democracy”; Robert Harvey, “Chile’s Counter- Revolution: The Fight Goes On,” The Economist, February 2, 1980 (Harvey was quoting Sergio Fernandez, the minister of the interior); José Piñera, “Wealth Through Ownership: Creating Property Rights in Chilean Mining,” Cato Journal 24, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 298.
14. James Brew, “
15. David McDonald, “Water: Attack the Problem Not the Data,” Sunday Independent (
16. Bill Keller, “Cracks in
17. Gumede cites Businessmap statistics asserting that “around 98 per cent of executive directors of JSE-listed companies are white, and they preside over 97 percent of the exchange’s total value.” Simon Robinson, “The New Rand Lords,” Time,
18. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
19. Moyiga Nduru, “
20. “Study: AIDS Slashes SA’s Life Expectancy,” Mail & Guardian (
21. The rand recovered slightly by the end of the day, closing 7 percent lower. Jim Jones, “Foreign Investors Take Fright at Hardline Stance,” Financial Times (
22. Steven Mufson, “
23. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Branch (
24. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
25. Ibid., 85; “
26. Nelson Mandela, “Report by the President of the ANC to the 50th National Conference of the African National Congress,”
27. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
28. Ibid., 79.
30. Ken Wells, “
31. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
32. Ibid., 87.
34. Ibid., 170.
35. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
36. Ginger Thompson, “South African Commission Ends Its Work,” New York Times,
37. ANC, “The State and Social Transformation,” discussion document, November 1996, www.anc.org.za; Ginger Thompson, “
38. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
39. Ibid., 119.
40. South African Communist Party, “The Debt Debate: Confusion Heaped on Confusion”, November-December 1998, http://www.sacp.org.za; Jeff Rudin, “Apartheid Debt: Questions and Answers,” Alternative Information and Development Centre, March 16, 1999, http://www.aidc.org.za; Congress of South Africa Trade Unions, “Submission on the Public Investment Corporation Draft Bill,” June 25, 2004, http://www.cosatu.org.za; Rudin, “Apartheid Debt”; South African Communist Party, “The Debt Debate.”
41. “The Freedom Charter.”
42. Nomvula Mokonyane, “Budget Speech for 2005/06 Financial Year by MEC for Housing in
43. Lucille Davie and Mary Alexander, “Kliptown and the Freedom Charter,”
44. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
45. Scott Baldauf, “Class Struggle:
2006; Michael Wines and Sharon LaFraniere, “Decade of Democracy Fills Gaps in
47. Simon Robinson, “The New Rand Lords.”
48. Michael Wines, “Shantytown Dwellers in
49. Mark Wegerif, Bev Russell and Irma Grundling, Summary of Key Findings from the National Evictions Survey, Polokwane, South Africa: Nkuzi Development Association, 2005, 7, http://www.nkuzi.org.za.
50. Wines, “Shantytown Dwellers in
51. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the
52. Ibid., 70.
53. Stephen F. Cohen, Failed Crusade: