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Bolivia's vice-president on the course of revolution
By Álvaro García Linera, vice-president of Bolivia
Translation, notes and introduction by Richard Fidler
The following article, based on a speech given in December 2007 but only recently transcribed and published in Spanish by Bolpress on May 12, 2008, is an important statement by a leading member of Bolivian President Evo Morales’ government on the political situation in that country in the wake of the Constituent Assembly’s vote on a draft political constitution. The draft constitution is to be put to a popular vote for adoption later this year.
Álvaro García Linera, Bolivia’s vice-president, is a former leader of the Tupac Katarí guerrilla army. He was subsequently employed as a university sociologist. He is also a prominent Latin American Marxist, strongly influenced by post-World War II European non-Stalinist Marxist currents inspired by the ideas of the Italian communist leader and political theorist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci, who died in 1937, was an innovative Marxist thinker who wrote extensively on the concept of cultural hegemony and its role as an ideological mainstay of capitalist societies.
Some readers may be surprised by García Linera’s frequent invocation of
Gramscian ``hegemony’’ in the Bolivian context, as that concept is often
associated primarily with Marxist attempts to explain the particular problems
of mass consciousness as they arise in the complex class societies of the
imperialist countries. However, there is a long line of thinking among Latin
American Marxists influenced by Gramsci; it goes back to José Carlos Mariátegui,
the Peruvian communist who lived in
García Linera’s title, in the original Spanish, is ``Empate catastrófico y punto de bifurcatión’’. He attributes the expression ``empate
catastrófico’’ to Gramsci. The ``empate’’ (blockage, standoff, deadlock or
impasse), as García Linera uses the concept, appears to refer to Gramsci’s use
of the concept of ``equilibrium’’, often conjoined with the adjective
``catastrophic’’, in his Prison Notebooks;
it denotes a sort of stasis in the configuration of the class struggle, when
neither of the major contending class blocs has the ability to establish its
hegemony over the other, a situation that can endure (as García Linera says)
for months or even years. See also the interview with García Linera in the
Argentine on-line periodical Renacer,
http://tinyurl.com/5jwxb9: ``
Suggestions for further reading: ``Neo-liberalism and the New Socialism
– Speech by Alvaro Garcia Linera’’, Political
Affairs (see first comment at the end of this article), January-February 2007, http://politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/4683/1/234/;
and
``Marxism and Indigenism in
* * *
Catastrophic equilibrium and point of bifurcation
By
Álvaro García Linera, vice-president
of
Presentation
in the Escuela de Pensamiento Comuna,
I
will provide a short explanatory outline of some events of recent years in this
country that, I believe, will help to link and give some sort of intellectual
coherence to these events, which are infinitely more complicated than what can
be processed by our thinking. It is possible to define at least three major
stages (perhaps a fourth, ultimately) in a process of state crisis that is transforming
the organisation of the state in its content, its social nature and its
institutionalisation.
The state crisis and our ability to
visualise it
A
number of Comuna comrades have been working
for some time on the idea of the crisis of the state. In various writings in
2000 or 2001 we characterised what was going on in
We
were beginning to experience this crisis of the state in 2000. The correlation
of forces with decision-making capacity was beginning to come apart. The
dominant ideas of the business bloc that is linked to foreign investment
interests, the agro-export industry, banking and the political elite formed
around them were losing the capacity to define the public policies of our
country in a stable and straightforward way.
That
was also the year in which we entered a crisis and the dominant ideas that
present foreign investment as the engine of the economy, globalisation and
exports as an unassailable horizon for our modernity, and the coalitions of
political parties as a condition sine qua
non in defining governability, understood as the common sense of politics, were
no longer attractive to the whole of the society. The same thing was occurring
in the institutions. The parliament was no longer a place for political debate,
which had been expropriated by the executive power. The executive, in turn, was
being expropriated by the foreign business lobbies and hard-line political
elements. And in turn this intransigent core was finding itself expropriated by
foreign investment and a pair of embassies that were defining the situation in
the country. An initial stage in the state crisis, in 2000, was its visibility.
A
state crisis does not necessarily lead to a new state; there may be internal
adjustments in forces, alliances and policies and there may be a reconstitution
of the old state. For example, the national revolutionary state of 1952 had
stages of internal mutation and reconfiguration that enabled it to survive a
bit longer, amidst the military authoritarianism of the nationalist state. It
was the same nationalist state, with only a few adjustments, internal linkages
and partial changes in content.
Catastrophic equilibrium and
construction of hegemony
Any
state crisis, then, may be reversible, or it may continue. If the crisis
continues, a subsequent stage is the catastrophic equilibrium. Lenin spoke of a
revolutionary situation, Gramsci of catastrophic equilibrium, both referring to
the same phenomenon albeit in distinct languages. The catastrophic equilibrium
is a phase in the state crisis, if you wish, a second structural moment that is
characterised by three things: a confrontation of two national political projects
for the country, two perspectives for the country, each with a capacity for
mobilisation, attraction and seduction of social forces; a confrontation in the
institutional sphere — it might be the parliamentary arena or the social sphere
— of two social blocs shaped by a will and ambition for power, the dominant
bloc and the ascendant social bloc; and, thirdly, a paralysis of the upper
echelons of the state and a failure to overcome this paralysis. This
equilibrium might last weeks, months, years; but a moment will come when a
breakthrough, a way out, is achieved.
The
way out of the catastrophic equilibrium or deadlock would be the third step in
the state crisis, which we will call ascendant hegemonic construction. This is
characterised by unrest and, generally speaking, upsurge. Marx’s writings on
the political crisis of 1848 and 1849 are highly illustrative of this idea of
waves of unrest that come and go: stability, unrest, stability, unrest.
This
ascendant hegemonic construction, in turn, will have three stages and four
other sub-stages. The first is the preponderance or partial victory of a
national political project with a capacity for attraction and social mobilisation.
In the case of
This
crisis, of necessity, must end at some moment; no society can live permanently
in mobilisation (as the anarchists hold) or permanently in stability (as
Christians believe). There may be instability, struggles, but at some point an
orderly structure must be consolidated, which will continue to experience
internal conflicts, of course, but later it will be possible to say: ``From
this moment on, we have a reconstituted neoliberalism or we have a national, indigenous,
popular, revolutionary state.’’
We
have termed this historical, precise, datable moment the point of bifurcation.
The
point of bifurcation means that either there is a successful counterrevolution
and a return to the old state in new conditions, or a new state is
consolidated, with conflicts still but in the context of its stabilisation. The
counterrevolution, to obtain international support or a collapse of the command
structure and leadership of the revolutionary bloc, will require a hegemonic re-articulation
of regional resistances with a capacity for regional or national expansion.
I
would illustrate this idea of the point of bifurcation with the crisis of the latifundist mining state, which actually
began in 1944 or 1945; the Movimiento Nactionalista Revolutionario (MNR) won
the elections in 1951, but its point of bifurcation is not in that year but in
1952. The April insurrection is the moment of bifurcation in that the state,
with the characteristics and qualities of the worker, productivism, homogenisation,
was consolidated and was to enjoy a relative stabilisation until a time of
internal renewal, internal metamorphosis, with the presence of the military.
But the nationalist state lasted until 1985.
A
second moment of point of bifurcation may have been in 1986. The
national-popular state went into a crisis in 1977. Coup d’état, elections, coup
d’état, elections, elections, coup d’état, democratic government, problems,
early elections. The right wing won the elections in 1985, but the point of
bifurcation occurred in 1986, with the March for Life[2], when the nucleus of
the old state, the social nucleus and the social thinking of the old state
collapsed, surrendered, in the face of the force, the vitality, the discourse
and the coercive and cohesive capacity of the new neoliberal state.
The
points of bifurcation may be insurrectional, they may be a display of force or
(as a working hypothesis) they may be resolved democratically. In any case, the
idea of the point of bifurcation is the following: first, it is a moment of
resolution of the stabilisation of the structure of the new state; secondly, a
point of bifurcation is inevitably a moment of force; and thirdly, it is a
moment in which politics actually becomes the continuation of the war by other
means. It is a moment in which Nietzsche and Foucault are right.
A
point of bifurcation is, basically, an act of force in the practical mediation
of things. It is an act of leadership, of hegemony in the Gramscian meaning of
the word, of moral leadership over the rest of society. Thus, if the Indigenous
peoples want to consolidate themselves as a nucleus of the state, they have to
demonstrate that they are capable of handling and advancing the interests of
the middle class, of the Bolivian business world, and isolating a very few, the
implacable ones, but depriving them of their social base. To do this, it is
important to talk with the adversaries; the Indigenous were required to talk
with them.
In
the case of
Society’s
proposal to the society mediated by the state is the new political constitution,
and the response of the bloc of the displaced, now coming not from the state
but from a part of the society, is the autonomy statute. It may appear to be
the same thing, but the location of the social subjects has altered by 180
degrees.
Theoretically, then, we must be approaching the point of bifurcation. In the last 100 years, the primary experience with a point of bifurcation has been armed insurrection. The second experience of a point of bifurcation, the March for Life, was not an armed experience, but an exhibition and a measurement of political, military and moral forces between the contending blocs and, without firing a single shot, the point of bifurcation was consolidated, a new state was stabilised.
Third form of point of bifurcation
In
actuality, the government is betting on another, a third form of point of
bifurcation, which would be a sort of democratic resolution through a form of
iteration, that is, of successive approximation. The idea is that through
various democratic actions the tensions between contending forces will be
resolved. This is one of the possibilities that has opened up and the one that
the government will be trying to promote. The idea is that the point of
bifurcation will be resolved neither through insurrection (the hypothesis of
civil war, which is always latent) nor through a show of force and the
political and moral defeat of the adversary, but through the repeated manifestation
of the sovereign power based on the relocation of powers, of local and regional
forces, and the use of surpluses.
A
referendum will determine how many prefects [governors] remain, or a referendum
will determine whether the president and the vice-president continue to govern.
A referendum will determine the viability of the new political constitution,
which is reorganising the state. Another referendum will determine the type of
autonomy that will be implemented in the country. In other words, the three
moments of force — how to resolve the state architecture between the national
and sub-national levels, how resources are to be redistributed, and how the
institutional level of the state is organised — will have to be determined
through electoral action, if it comes to that.
Now
basically I would say that this is a time of truce that may be broken when the
time comes to implement the Renta
Dignidad, which redistributes the 60% of the IDH [Impuesto directo a los Hidrocarburos – direct tax on hydrocarbons]
from the prefecturas [departmental
governments]. Or, depending on the particular strategy of the right wing, it
may not be until the referendum on autonomy, on their autonomy statute, is
held. That referendum must go to the parliament and if parliament amends or
rejects it, they are going to try to hold a referendum for a decision by their
regional autonomous assembly and if this happens, they are going to want to
apply their statute, and in trying to apply it without the corresponding
legality, they are going to come into confrontation with the structure of the
state. That may be another moment.
What
else can happen in the days to come? A territorial counter-offensive in two
dimensions, which is already happening in fact. The central government with the
departments, and the confrontation between the departmental level and the sub-departmental,
regional and municipal levels which, under the new political constitution, have
the right to a type of autonomy in which resources and powers will be
subordinate to the Departmental Council.
The
Indigenous peoples will therefore look for their powers to the central government
and will have to draw on it for their resources, while the regional and
provincial autonomies will have to derive their resources and powers within the
departmental limits. Hence there is going to be rising tension from regional
forces and local elites that will extend to the prefecturas and, in turn, to
the central government. So there will be rising tension among the territorial
levels of the state.
In
some of these moments, the deterrent capacity of the new social power bloc will
probably be put to the test, and this will illustrate its ability to make
decisions based on its capacity for social mobilisation at the national,
departmental and fundamentally regional levels, which in turn will reveal its
capacity to maintain command, control and compliance with the structures of
legitimate coercion in the hands of the state, that is, the national police and
armed forces.
That
is more or less the panorama for the months to come. I am sure this initial
reading will be modified week by week, because this is a time in which politics
has again assumed a condensed form, and the correlation of forces is changing
to a large degree within a very short timeline. Again, there is a condensation
of politics in space and time, and this will oblige us to modify our modes of
interpretation.
New political constitution of the state
The
reading Raúl Prada has made of the Constituent Assembly as a social project and
a collective myth[3] should really be fully incorporated here. But I include
what I say, simply situating it at a merely instrumental level of
objectification of the new programming of forces. In its own way, this new constitution
provides for an Indigenous popular nucleus, but it adds other sectors as well.
The concerns of the middle class. Will I or will I not be able to send my son
to private school? I can. Will I be entitled to hold my religious beliefs? I
have that right. Can I inherit? I can. Can I invest in the country without the
risk of being nationalised? If I pay taxes and comply with the rules, I have
that right and no one should expropriate me.
The
businessperson, too, can feel he or she is recognised in the new constitution.
This sector may have preferred the old constitution and the old bloc, when, in
order to negotiate a line of credit, there was no need to wait six months to
have a meeting with Evo Morales. In the past, deals were settled over a weekend
coffee or in a tennis game; now this is no longer the case, because Evo Morales
never goes to tennis games or the embassies and he does not do deals in that
way. But this constitution incorporates them, as well.
I
think this is a demonstration of the possibility of exercising moral and
intellectual leadership over the rest of society. As Raúl Prada says, it is a constitution
of transition that has had to be adaptable, that has had to incorporate other
things without which it would be a constitution solely for the poorest of the Indigenous
and without appeal to the average Indigenous person. To be a constitution for
the mestizos, the middle classes, the businesspeople, as well, and not for only
one group, it had to be adjusted accordingly.
What
group is not incorporated here, in the decisive referendum? The referendum
question says: Do you agree that the extent of the lands be 5000 or 10,000
hectares? Who own more than 5000 hectares: 8000 families. But only 400 families
have upwards of 10,000 hectares. It is a powerful blow against the large landowners;
clearly there is not much to negotiate with these gentlemen so let’s proceed
with the referendum. I am sure the option of not extending it to more than five
thousand hectares will be adopted, defining the irreducible core that will not
be renegotiated.
It
is possible that by the time the referendum is called, the Congress will
negotiate 5000 or 10,000, but it is clear that there is a core of major
landholdings that have been defined in isolation from the rest of society.
However, attempts were made to dialogue with them, because politically one
should exhaust all channels for dialogue before making a tough decision. As any
military strategist will say, take all possible steps, and once they are
exhausted, the next step is justified. And here we have had to try again and
again, not out of weakness but because we are obliged to dialogue and to
listen, and in the worst of cases, after having exhausted all options, it is
possible to define things by another route. That is why we have to dialogue.
Nationalisation of natural resources
protected
On
the subject of natural resources, we have given constitutional protection to
the nationalisation of hydrocarbons. This means that no one can legally
re-privatise above- or below-ground gas and petroleum, the refineries or the
ability to make decisions, to market and to set the price of hydrocarbons; this
is now under lock and key. [Former Bolivian president] Sánchez de Lozada, with
the old constitution, which declared that the deposits (but nothing else) belonged
to the state, privatised everything. With that experience, we say here: the gas
and oil in the deposits and in any of the states where they are found belong to
Bolivians through the national state.
The
state determines the volumes, the marketing, the prices and terms of export. No
one can adopt a re-privatisation law without changing the constitution, which
would take 15 years. So if Sánchez de Lozada were to return in 2010, God
forbid, but if he were to return, it would take 15 years to go back to privatising
the resources. It cannot be done instantaneously, as he did. And the same
applies to the forests, water and minerals. Concerning the protection of
national resources, the constitution is very strong.
Applying
the new political constitution of the state to the fight against corruption, we
establish for the first time that the law is retroactive, that not only is
there no limitation period on prosecutions for stealing from the state but such
prosecutions can go back in time. No one is immune, all the presidents,
vice-presidents and ministers preceding the new constitution are subject to
investigation and, if subsequently convicted, are subject to imprisonment for
their corruption.
So
no one is immune now from prosecution and incarceration for stealing a fountain
pen, or a million dollars, from the state. I think this is the only legislation
in
Missing
from this analysis are the nature and characteristics of the consolidation and
articulation of the new right-wing forces in the country that have now displaced
Podemos as a project and that have new leaderships such as Branco Marinkovic,
Mario Cossio, Rubén Costas[4], as well as the civic committees, a nucleus of
mass mobilisation and a youth strike force that we have to get to understand.
This is not explained in this outline. It would require an analysis of the new
right in its capacity for social mobilisation, but I think that in general terms
the chessboard is moving in that way.
In
any case, looking at this from the government’s point of view, the following
steps have to be taken in its ability to articulate social mobilisation around
very concrete objectives such as, for example, the new constitution, and the
ability to maintain control over the structures of legitimate coercion in the
hands of the state: justice, police, armed forces. And it also depends on what
moves the right wing makes. Whatever the case, either this point of bifurcation
is resolved through public support and its pressure in the voting and the
referendums that settle the consolidation of the new state, or there will be
some type of confrontation and a test of forces for which, I hope, we are
prepared.
* * *
Notes
[1]
October agenda: The main demands of the social movements arising from the
October 2003 rebellion that removed Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada from the
presidency: nationalisation of gas, a constituent assembly and trial for those
responsible for the massacre of over 60 civilians during the uprising.
[2]
In 1986 the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) sponsored a mass ``March for Life’’
to frustrate government plans to restructure Comibol, the nationalised mining
company, and to halt mass firings and raise salaries. A deal under which the
government conceded many of the COB’s demands subsequently collapsed, the
mining sector was restructured and the radical labour leaders were ousted at a
COB convention.
[3]
Raúl Prada is a sociologist and professor at the Universidad Autónoma Gabriela
René Moreno and the Universidad Mayor Real. He is also a Movement Towards Socialism (MAS)
delegate to the Constituent Assembly from
[4]
Respectively, president of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, prefect of the
department of Tarija, and prefect of the department of