Caught between the military junta and Arakan Army: Rohingyas and the fight for Myanmar’s Rakhine state

Myanmar has been embroiled in a complex civil war since the military coup in February 2021. This has exacerbated long-standing ethnic conflicts, including those involving the Rohingya , a minority Muslim ethnic group that mostly originate from the state of Rakhine (formerly Arakan). 

The Rohingya have historically faced persecution, with significant displacement following military crackdowns, notably in 2017. Rohingya factions that fought the military junta before the Arakan Army (AA) took control of Rakhine continue resisting armed groups that refuse to recognise them as citizens. 

The AA is an armed ethnic Rakhine Buddhist group that has engaged in a long-standing conflict with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw). As the AA steadily expanded its control over Rakhine, it refused to recognise the rights of the Rohingya, leading to tensions with Rohingya groups, especially the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO). These tensions have escalated into violent clashes in the region, with Rohingya groups and AA locked in a permanent state of conflict. 

Recent developments in 2025 indicate that Rohingya armed groups, such as the ARSA and RSO, have become more active amid the broader conflict between the Myanmar military junta and various ethnic armed organisations, particularly the AA. Another strong Rohingya group, Islami Mahaz, has a clear plan to counter the movements of the AA while training its members in Arakan land. They have not attacked anyone yet though, remaining extremely secretive and very shrewd about their future moves. 

Rohingya groups are striving to bring justice for their people. As long as the oppression of the Rohingya people in the Myanmar state of Rakhine (formerly Arakan) continues, Rohingya groups will keep fighting to reclaim their rights — against the AA, the military junta and any other power responsible for their persecution. 

The report below expands on the current situation, looking at the key domestic groups, individuals and arms/drugs traders involved, as well as interested foreign parties. It synthesises as much of the available information as possible at the time of writing (March 30, 2025) to best reflect the existing reality.

Territorial clashes, humanitarian impacts

The conflict between the AA and Rohingya armed groups remains violent and unresolved, with Rohingya civilians caught in the crossfire. As the AA consolidates power in Rakhine, the humanitarian crisis deepens, while a long-term solution remains uncertain. The international community, including the US, has stepped in with aid, but without a political resolution, Rohingya communities continue to face persecution and instability.

The AA has sought diplomatic engagement with Bangladesh, particularly regarding border trade, but has not addressed Rohingya repatriation or inclusion in governance. This has created uncertainty about the future of displaced Rohingya populations, as Bangladesh refuses to accept more refugees and the AA is reluctant to integrate the Rohingya politically. 

The main conflict zones include Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, where intense clashes between Rohingya groups and the AA are ongoing. By late 2024 and early 2025, the AA had successfully taken over Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Paletwa townships, establishing its rule in areas that include significant Rohingya populations. The AA’s expansion brought it into direct conflict with ARSA and RSO, groups accused of collaborating with the Myanmar military against the AA. 

The following is a short timeline of recent events:

• Mid-2024 — Clashes between the AA and ARSA intensified in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, leading to casualties and displacement of Rohingya civilians.

• August 5, 2024 — A major attack in Maungdaw reportedly resulted in the deaths of more than 200 Rohingya civilians. The attack was allegedly carried out by the AA, after RSO fighters were spotted in the area.

• December 2024 — Fresh fighting broke out in northern Maungdaw, as the AA continued its operations against ARSA.

• January 2025 — The AA established fully local governance structures, solidifying its rule while suppressing remaining Rohingya armed factions.

The conflict has severely impacted Rohingya civilians, leading to widespread displacement, extrajudicial killings, and destruction of homes. Some example of these are as follows:

• May 2024 — The AA allegedly burned down parts of Buthidaung, forcing thousands of Rohingya to flee.

• August 2024 — Drone attacks  attributed to the AA occurred on fleeing Rohingya civilians near the Naf River.

• March 2025 — The arrest of ARSA leader Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi in Bangladesh further weakened ARSA’s ability to resist the AA.

Based on daily field information and expert observations, it seems Rohingya groups are primarily on the defensive, protecting Rohingya civilians in Rakhine, despite their weaker military capacity. 

However, in the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar (a majority Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh), some Rohingya factions have been known to attack individuals who disobey their directives. Members of these groups, whether inside the camps or in Rakhine, have been involved in violent actions against the population, much like the AA targeted Rohingya civilians.

The following is a short breakdown of the fighting involving Rohingya groups, assessing their role based on data available up to March 30, 2025. 

Northern Rakhine state (Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships)

• Current status — These townships remain the epicentre of active fighting involving Rohingya groups.

• Context — Northern Rakhine, particularly Maungdaw and Buthidaung, has been a hotspot due to its proximity to the Bangladesh border and significant Rohingya population. Since the AA relaunched its offensive against the junta in November 2023, the region has seen intensified conflict. The AA has made significant territorial gains, capturing Maungdaw Township last December, including the last junta outpost (Border Guard Police Detachment No. 5) on December 8. The AA’s offensive has expanded beyond northern Rakhine to capture towns such as Rathedaung (March 17, 2024) and Ramree (March 12, 2024). While these areas are not primary Rohingya strongholds, the junta’s use of forcibly conscripted Rohingya as human shields has been reported, notably during the defense of Rathedaung.

• Recent developments — Clashes between the AA and Rohingya armed groups (ARSA and RSO) persist into 2025. Posts on X from March 29 indicate “intense clashes” between ARSA and the AA in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Similar clashes were reported in northern Maungdaw in December, highlighting a pattern of sustained conflict.

• Other actors — The Myanmar junta has been largely pushed out of Maungdaw, but retains some presence in the region through airstrikes and alliances with Rohingya militias. The junta has forcibly recruited Rohingya men and boys, using them as human shields or fighters against the AA, complicating the conflict dynamics.

Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas 

• Current status — Sporadic fighting and cross-border incidents continue, indirectly involving Rohingya groups, such as the ARSA and RSO.

• Context — The border region has seen spillover effects from the Rakhine conflict, with junta forces and AA actions occasionally impacting Bangladesh. For example, in February 2024, mortar shells and bullets landed in Bangladesh, injuring residents. More than 200 Myanmar Border Guard Police fled into Bangladesh seeking refuge from AA advances. In January 2025, landmine explosions near Naikhongchhari, Bandarban, injured Bangladeshis, allegedly due to AA-planted mines.

• Rohingya involvement — While direct fighting by Rohingya groups in Bangladesh is limited, recruitment and mobilisation occurs in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. Reports from late 2024 indicate that 3-5000 Rohingya fighters have been recruited from these camps to join the conflict, often aligning with the junta against the AA.

Rohingya groups: On the defensive or offensive?

The role of Rohingya armed groups in the conflict varies depending on their alignment, objectives and specific engagements. In many instances, Rohingya groups, particularly ARSA and RSO, appear to be on the defensive. The AA’s territorial dominance in Rakhine has put pressure on Rohingya communities and their armed factions. 

The March 29 clashes in Maungdaw and Buthidaung suggest a response to AA aggression, after the AA was accused of targeting Rohingya civilians and burning their villages (for example in May 17-18, 2024, in Buthidaung). ARSA’s claims of “defensive actions” in past statements (for example in August 2017) align with this pattern. Reports from August 2024 indicating AA attacks, possibly triggered by RSO gatherings, on Rohingya civilians in Maungdaw Township, killing more than 200, further suggesting a defensive stance by Rohingya groups against AA advances.

The junta’s conscription of Rohingya men and boys, often under duress, places them in defensive roles as human shields or unwilling combatants against the AA, rather than as proactive attackers.

Despite a predominantly defensive stance, Rohingya groups have engaged in offensive actions against the AA, particularly when the AA is allied with the junta. The December 27, 2024, clashes in northern Maungdaw between ARSA and the AA indicate proactive engagement, possibly to counter AA control or protect Rohingya interests.

ARSA’s video statements in March 2025 (for example, Sheikh Burhan’s call to fight “continuously” against the AA and junta) suggest an intent to take offensive action in Rakhine.
ARSA’s coordinated attacks on police posts in August 2017 also demonstrated a capacity for offensive operations, though such large-scale actions have been less frequent in 2025.

The recruitment of thousands of Rohingya from Bangladeshi camps to fight in Myanmar indicates an offensive strategy, albeit often under junta influence and targeting AA-held areas. Many Rohingya fighters are aligned with the junta, either voluntarily or forcibly, complicating their role. This alliance pits them against the AA offensively, but their lack of autonomy suggests limited strategic initiative.

Clashes between ARSA and RSO, as well as with the AA, indicate internal divisions among Rohingya factions, with some engagements reflecting territorial or ideological disputes rather than a unified offensive or defensive strategy.

Rohingya civilians are often caught in the crossfire, with both junta and AA forces committing atrocities (extrajudicial killings, arson, etc), forcing armed groups to react to protect their communities, blurring the line between defense and attack.

Who is backing the Rohingya?

The situation remains fluid, with Rohingya groups’ shaped by external pressures (junta conscription, AA dominance) and internal motivations (self-defense, territorial claims). A lack of mass support within the Rohingya community, combined with their statelessness and vulnerability, limits their ability to sustain a coherent offensive campaign, leaving them caught between larger forces in Myanmar’s civil war.

Most of the weapons possessed by Rohingya groups were captured from the military junta. Much like the AA acquired arms by seizing military bases and checkpoints during their battles with the junta, Rohingya groups have also found ways to obtain firepower. For example, on October 9, 2016, ARSA captured a significant number of weapons after a surprise attack on the military. In August 2017, they seized small checkpoints belonging to border guard police and looted military storage sites.

Rohingya groups primarily rely on locally made weapons, as external supplies remain difficult to obtain. While the AA receives arms from Thailand, China, Laos, and India, Rohingya groups lack stable suppliers. In Bangladesh, they have no access to significant external or internal arms supplies. However, some local criminal networks in Bangladesh have been known to facilitate illicit arms deals, selling low-grade weapons to Rohingya factions, often in areas outside the camps or near border regions.

There is no confirmed large-scale external support for Rohingya fighters. However, some wealthy individuals — primarily from the Middle East — provide financial assistance through private donations. These contributions mostly come from independent benefactors and family networks rather than organised governmental or institutional backing.

Some Rohingya groups receive backing from individuals in Saudi Arabia. There have been reports indicating that certain Rohingya factions maintain connections with Saudi-based supporters, though the full extent of these relationships remains unclear. Support from Saudi Arabia is largely informal, coming through local community networks and private donors rather than official government channels. These funds are often transferred through unofficial means, making them difficult to trace. 

There is no evidence of official support from Bangladesh or Pakistan. Due to this lack of structured assistance, Rohingya fighters are primarily reliant on local resources and occasional illicit transactions to acquire supplies.

There is no verifiable evidence indicating direct support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to Rohingya fighters. While some Rohingya fighters receive aid from individuals in Pakistan, ISI itself has not provided any structured support, as Rohingya factions remain relatively unrecognised on a global scale. 

Since Rohingya factions lack strong international support, there is no significant movement of funds through major financial networks. Most of their funding comes from private donors abroad, often transferred through bank accounts in Thailand. Some Thai nationals assist in processing these transactions and facilitating access to Myanmar-based bank accounts. Additionally, some Rohingya fighters have illegally established Myanmar bank accounts by bribing government officials with large sums of money, allowing them to receive funds discreetly.

There are no credible reports confirming Rohingya fighter training programs in Bangladesh, Myanmar or Pakistan. However, in the past, Rohingya fighters were known to undergo training at the “Zero Point border” between Bangladesh and Myanmar. After the dismantling of that location, they are now primarily trained in the jungles of Myanmar near the border. There are reports suggesting that some Rohingya fighters received training from the military junta in 2024, when they were briefly aligned with them.

What is China’s role?

China’s role in the Myanmar conflict, particularly regarding the AA and the Rohingya, is complex and appears driven by strategic self-interest rather than a clear alignment with any single faction. There is no definitive evidence that China is explicitly helping the AA target the Rohingya, but its actions suggest it is pragmatically engaging multiple sides to secure its geopolitical and economic goals.

China has historically supported Myanmar’s military junta, providing arms and diplomatic backing, as seen in its long-standing trade ties and infrastructure projects, such as the oil and gas pipelines in Rakhine. However, China has adapted its approach as the junta has weakened. 

Since the 2021 coup, the junta has lost significant territory to rebel groups. Reports indicate China has engaged with the AA as it progressively gained control over much of Rakhine. This shift is not necessarily about targeting the Rohingya, but reflects China’s interest in stabilising the region to protect its investments and border security. China’s indirect support for the AA, through alleged arms flows, could be seen as tacitly enabling its actions, which include accusations of atrocities, such as forced displacement and killings. However, it is not clear this is intentional. 

Meanwhile, China has also pushed for Rohingya repatriation talks between Myanmar and Bangladesh, positioning itself as a mediator. This suggests it is not fully siding against the Rohingya either; playing both sides seems more likely. 

China arms and influences the junta, has engaged with the AA as it gains power, and maintains a public stance of neutrality on the Rohingya crisis. This hedging ensures China retains leverage regardless of who controls Rakhine, a region critical to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Recent news, such as Bangladesh’s March 2025 talks with China on the Rohingya issue, reinforces this view. The Chinese government wants stability in Myanmar to progress the BRI, rather than a specific outcome for any group.

So, while China’s actions may indirectly bolster the AA’s campaign, which harms the Rohingya, the evidence points more to a calculated balancing act than a deliberate anti-Rohingya agenda in Arakan (Rakhine) state.

Who are some of the key individuals?

Dil Mohammed, a prominent Rohingya spokesperson, is currently in the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, where he has secured protection from certain influential figures within Bangladesh’s internal government networks. Mohammed plays a dual role, actively influencing Rohingya fighters through corruption and financial exploitation while serving as a key fundraiser. Although he lacks formal political expertise, his control over funding sources enables him to exert significant influence over armed groups operating in the region. 

Mohammed uses alleged profits from drug trafficking, including yaba and heroin, to finance Rohingya fighters. He maintains control over these groups by distributing large sums of money, which allows him to dictate their activities. His operations are largely concealed from higher-level government authorities in Bangladesh, having allegedly bribed multiple officials responsible for refugee protection.

Mohammed’s deep financial ties with corrupt officials, particularly within Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), enable him to continue his illicit activities unchecked, reinforcing his influence over the Rohingya armed factions. Powerful individuals, such as Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) Secretary-General Mirzanur Rahaman, also support him secretly under the pretense of working towards better solutions for the Rohingya. However, this has little effect, as Mohammed exploits these connections for his own benefit, positioning himself as a key representative of the Rohingya, despite his questionable dealings.

According to field-level sources, Rohingya Islamist cleric Abu Dhar Azzam is not directly involved in armed combat but has been consistently providing ideological support to Rohingya jihadists. As a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, he continues to encourage Rohingya jihadists through online and personal communication to keep their morale high.

While there is no direct evidence of logistical or financial support from Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Mujahideen networks, Abu Dhar maintains ideological connections with these groups. He continues to advocate for their ideological vision, though there is no proof of active networking with these groups at this point.

After a long period of silence, Abu Dhar released a voice clip expressing sorrow over the arrest of ARSA leader Abu Ammar and praying for his release. In this clip, he urged ARSA jihadists to continue their struggle, demonstrating his ongoing support for the Rohingya militant cause.

There have been no direct statements or evidence showing that Abu Dhar has called for attacks on Chinese projects in Myanmar. However, there have been rumours in certain circles that some Rohingya militant factions, including ARSA, might be targeting Chinese infrastructure as part of their broader opposition to foreign influence in Myanmar. Abu Dhar has not openly advocated for such actions.

Where are the weapons and drugs coming from?

In Myanmar, the civil war has supercharged the trade in arms and drugs, which groups use to fund their operations. The Golden Triangle, where Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, meet remains a hub. A critical corridor has also emerged in this region being the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India border region, especially Rakhine and India’s Northeast. 

Pinpointing the exact “key brokers” handling weapons and drugs between Myanmar, Bangladesh and India is tricky because these networks operate in the shadows, and concrete, up-to-date evidence is often fragmented or classified. This is a fluid and opaque network hard to nail down without insider leaks or fresh investigations. The real brokers stay faceless, leveraging chaos and corruption to keep the pipelines open. 

Based on available patterns and reports, we can piece together a picture of the types of actors involved. Broadly, the trade involves a mix of ethnic armed organisations, insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, corrupt officials and border traders. No single “kingpin” emerges from public data, but the ecosystem thrives on middlemen: militia leaders, rogue traders and firms exploiting weak border controls. Within Rohingya factions, the primary brokers are small-scale local groups and criminal gangs operating within Bangladesh. 

Myanmar’s Shan State is the epicentre of synthetic drug production (typically yaba, a methamphetamine mix), which is controlled by groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and smaller militias. These drugs flow into India’s Northeast (Manipur, Mizoram) and Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar) via land and maritime routes. 

The AA has been linked to drug trafficking to finance its fight against the junta. The AA has a well-established network inside Bangladesh, particularly in Bandarban and Nhila, which facilitates the supply of new drugs such as yaba, meth and heroin. 

Rohingya factions, including those associated with Mohammed, lack the capacity to operate international routes and can only conduct drug activities within Bangladesh. In contrast, the AA actively smuggles drugs into India, particularly through Manipur, leveraging its support networks that extend from Rakhine to various locations inside India. This has been a consistent practice since the AA’s establishment.

Between Bangladesh and Myanmar, Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh is a hotspot for drug mule recruitment. Rohingya refugees, desperate for income, have been roped into smuggling yaba, even though they are small fry compared to Bangladesh and Myanmar-based syndicates. 

Insurgent groups in India’s Northeast, such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have camps in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Chin regions, where they are suspected of trading drugs and arms, often using opium as currency.

On the arms side, Myanmar’s military junta relies on brokers to procure weapons despite sanctions. Companies like International Gateways Group (IGG), led by Naing Htut Aung, have been sanctioned by the US and European Union for supplying fighter jets and gunships, often via China. 

Justice For Myanmar has identified 116 firms — mostly Myanmar and Singapore-based — that have been brokering arms post-coup, with 255 directors and shareholders involved. Singapore serves as a financial and transit hub, while firms from India (for example, Sandeep Metalcraft, which ships explosive fuses) and China feed the junta’s arsenal. The junta’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI) runs factories (KaPaSa) that assemble these imports, with raw materials coming from at least 13 countries.

In contrast, weapons such as AK-series rifles, M16s, RPGs and sniper rifles, are rarely accessible to Rohingya factions. The vast majority (about 97%) of the weapons in their possession are pistols, along with a few unbranded firearms sourced from local traders.  Rohingya factions primarily acquire these weapons from local black markets, rather than sophisticated international arms networks. Most of these arms originate from Southeast Asian sources, including Thailand and Laos. Indian-manufactured weapons, such as INSAS rifles, are rarely found among Rohingya factions.

The AA relies on a network of Rakhine-affiliated armed groups operating along the tri-border area for its weapons. Reports also suggest that certain individuals based in Manipur, particularly those with Rakhine family ties, are involved in this trade.

In India’s Northeast, Manipur and Mizoram are transit hubs. It is widely believed that Northeast Indian rebel groups benefit from the arms trade linked to the AA. While the specific names of these groups remain unclear, several active insurgent factions near the India-Rakhine border reportedly engage in weapons transactions with the AA. This includes dealings involving arms, drugs, and even military-grade equipment such as drones. The AA has established strong connections in these areas, facilitating the flow of illicit arms into Northeast India.

A 2023 bust in Manipur nabbed the Chin Kuki Liberation Army (CKLA) with AK-47s, M16s and opium. This suggests Myanmar-based militants broker both arms and drugs across the porous 1643 kilometre border. The Free Movement Regime (allowing 16 kilometres of cross-border travel) aids this flow. Assam Rifles and police seizures — $267 million in contraband in 2022-23 — point to sophisticated networks, likely involving local traffickers and Myanmar rebels.

Currently, there is no confirmed evidence of ISI involvement. However, there are speculative reports suggesting that ISI might be considering collaboration with certain groups to counter the armed factions persecuting Rohingya in Rakhine, whether it be the AA or Myanmar military. Some discussions among Rohingya militant circles have hinted at potential ISI involvement in future operations, but nothing concrete has surfaced.

Among all this, China’s shadow looms large, arming the junta and possibly rebels, but direct links to specific brokers are murky. The AA’s rise in Rakhine, controlling the Bangladesh border by early 2025, might shift dynamics, potentially making it a bigger player in both trades.

Noor Sadaque can be reached at noorsadeque97@gmail.com.