HTS’ strategy to consolidate its power in Syria

First published at Syria Untold.

[Author's note: This text was written and published in Arabic before the recent dramatic events of Sweida, which in many ways confirmed the argument of this article. The military escalation in Sweida followed discussions in Baku, Azerbaijan, between Syrian and Israeli representatives, according to the website Syria in Transition. During the talks, the Syrian ruling authorities led by Hay’at Tahrir Sham (HTS) allegedly requested Tel Aviv’s approval for the reintegration of Sweida. While Israeli officials expressed openness to limited reintegration — that is, the restoration of state services and the deployment of a limited local security force — Damascus misinterpreted this as authorization for a full-scale military operation. Regardless of the misunderstanding, the Syrian authorities' decision, if confirmed, reveals a persistent tendency to rely on external validation and support to justify certain policies, including coercive measures against local populations like in the case of Sweida, rather than politically engaging with them. Moreover, it has used the tool of sectarianismas a way to mobilise sectors of the population and divide Syrian popular classes. This has resulted in heightened sectarian tensions in the country, and many violations of human rights against civilians. Finally, the dramatic events in Sweida confirms the need to (re)build a strong civil society from below to impose a counterweight to the centralization and monopolization of power in the hands of HTS and its affiliates. Otherwise, Sweida’s events might repeat themselves.]

More than six months after the fall of the Assad regime, HTS has continued its strategy to consolidate its power over a fragmented Syria, which relied first of all on gaining external recognition and legitimation to foster its domination within the country.

Indeed, this has helped the new ruling authorities to reinforce their domination over the country’s state institutions and social actors.

Moreover, HTS is using the tool of sectarianism as a tool to construct a so-called homogeneous popular basis in the Arab Sunni community, mobilising sectors of the population around sectarian dynamics. These policies seek to discipline and divide the Syrian popular classes and divert them from socio-economic and political challenges and difficulties.

International legitimacy, sanctions and economy

On 14 May 2025, US President Donald Trump announced the full removal of the sanctions on Syria during a high-profile visit to Saudi Arabia. In the following weeks, the European Union and Japan lifted economic sanctions on Syria in a bid to help the war-torn country’s recovery. At the end of June, Trump once again dismantled a web of sanctions against Syria.

US, European and Japanese decisions to deliver sanctions relief represent a significant diplomatic victory for Syria’s new authorities, signaling their ability — despite HTS’s jihadist origins — to address international concerns and establish formal relations with key regional and global powers.

Beyond its symbolic importance, the decision to lift the sanctions is already generating tangible policy outcomes. Not only it has paved the way for renewed regional engagement with the Syrian state and its institutions but it also paves the way for the reintegration of Syria’s economy into regional and global markets. It will facilitate financial transactions, revitalize trade flows, and open the door for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as engagement from the Syrian business diaspora — key priorities for the new ruling authority. In this context, Damascus has intensified efforts to attract regional and international firms to invest in infrastructure modernization and revenue-generating sectors.

Immediately following the removal of the US sanctions announcement, the Syrian government signed several Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with regional and international companies, such as with Dubai Port World, a subsidiary of the UAE’s Dubai World, valued at $800 million, to develop the Tartous port.

This agreement followed a 30-year deal signed on May 1 between the French shipping and logistics giant CMA CGM and Damascus to develop the port of Latakia.1 Several contracts were concluded throughout the month of May, including the memorandum of understanding between the General Authority for Land and Maritime Ports and Chinese company, Fidi, to invest in free zones for 20 years.

Moreover, Syria signed a memorandum of understanding with a consortium of companies (including American, Qatari, and Turkish companies) led by the Qatari based company UCC Concession Investments, whose chairman is Syrian-Qatari entrepreneur Moutaz Al-Khayyat and whose president and CEO is his brother, Ramez Al-Khayyat, to enhance investment in the energy sector, with a value of up to seven billion US dollars.

According to the Minister of Energy, the agreement includes the development of four gas turbine power generation stations operating on a combined cycle (CCGT) in the areas of Deir Ezzor, Mhardeh, Zeyzoun in Hama countryside, and Trifawi in Homs countryside, with a total estimated generation capacity of about 4000 megawatts, in addition to a solar power station with a capacity of 1000 megawatts in Wadi al-Rabi in southern Syria. Construction is expected to begin after final agreements and is targeted to finish within three years for the gas plants and less than two years for the solar plant.

On the financial front, the lifting of a broad array of U.S. sanctions — originally imposed through executive orders between 2004 and 2019 — represents a major breakthrough for Syria’s economic reintegration. This move could lead to the unfreezing of Syrian state assets abroad, the restoration of access to US dollar transactions, and the reconnection of Syrian banks to the international SWIFT payment system. These steps are critical to re-establishing normal banking operations, restoring investor confidence, and enabling the flow of capital into and out of the country. The decision also opens the door for renewed access to funding from international financial institutions and development banks such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

In the beginning of June, an IMF delegation visited Syria for the first time since 2009 and met with officials from the public and private sectors, notably the finance minister and central bank governor.

The lifting of US sanctions represents a major source of hope for the Syrian population, as it removes one of the most significant barriers to economic recovery. However, substantial legal and procedural uncertainties remain that could delay or complicate full economic normalization. First, the lifting of sanctions must be institutionalized through a clear and formal process. Secondly, and more critically, even in the absence of sanctions, Syria faces deep structural economic obstacles regarding the instability of the Syrian Pound (SYP) and competition of Turkish Pound and USD; damaged and destroyed infrastructures; high cost of production; continued shortages of key inputs; transport networks in disrepair; shortage of qualified labor; the private sector, dominated by micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), still requires significant modernization and capital; state resources remain limited, curbing public investment capacity; energy access constitutes a critical bottleneck.

Moreover, HTS political and economic orientation, rooted in neoliberal dynamics and accompanied by harsh austerity measures, makes it harder to establish the foundations for a viable and inclusive reconstruction process. For instance, the government recent contracts regarding electricity sector privileges forms of full privatization through the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model. In this model, a private company undertakes the construction and operation of a project, maintaining ownership of the asset indefinitely. This signifies that the control over a public service or infrastructure asset transitions permanently from state to private hands. They could therefore decide on their own of the price of electricity and its distribution.

In addition, the current economic trajectory is exacerbating poverty and deepening structural underdevelopment in key productive sectors.

In the private sector, the Ministry of Economy and Industry published a decision at the end of May removing the obligation for businessmen and company directors to register their employees with social security, under the pretext of facilitating the process and encouraging investment. Following criticism of this decision, which was deemed contrary to workers' rights, the ministry issued a clarification the following day, specifying that this measure does not exempt entrepreneurs from the obligation to register their employees with social security, but simply temporarily suspends this obligation until the end of the year to encourage membership in chambers of commerce. However, this explanation has not alleviated fears of renewed worker exploitation.

After months of waiting, the government finally raised the salaries of public employees and retirees by 200 percent, making the minimum wage SYP 750,000 per month, or around $68 (according to the official exchange rate of SYP 11,000 for $1), effective as of July. While a step in the good direction, most of the population, whether employed by the state or the private sector, cannot cover their monthly needs with their salaries. According to estimates made by the newspaper Kassioun at the end of June 2025, the minimum cost of living for a five-member Syrian family living in Damascus reached approximately SYP 9 million (around $818).

The Syrian population not only needs jobs, but jobs that pay enough to allow individuals to live in dignity and cover their daily needs. In addition, the cuts in subsidies and rise in the prices of essential products will only worsen the situation and cancel out the effects of a salary increase.

Syria is also facing one of the most severe food crises in the recent decades, as an acute drought in 2025 threatens to decimate the domestic wheat harvest, traditionally a cornerstone of the country’s agricultural output. More generally, this crisis is connected to a systemic agricultural decline, and unstable trade relations. Rumors are circulating about the abandonment of support for wheat cultivation, traditionally a pillar of the country's agricultural production, according to a source at the Ministry of Agriculture, as reported by The Syria Report website. Even before the fall of the Assad regime, input costs were consistently high, with fertilizer prices tripling since 2023 — increasing production costs, limiting farmers' access to inputs and negatively affecting agricultural production.

In this context, the economic decisions of the new authorities are further impoverishing large swathes of the population and deepening underdevelopment in Syria’s productive economic sectors.

Rooting Syria in a US led regional axis and normalisation with Israel

But more generally, in this strategy to gain international recognition and acknowledgment, there is a clear willingness of the Syrian president al-Sharaa and its HTS affiliates to root its country in a US led axis allied with regional countries such as Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as a way to consolidate their power over Syria. In this framework, the new ruling authority also seeks a form of normalization with the Israeli state. Al-Sharaa has reiterated on numerous occasions that his rule is not a threat to Israel and apparently also declared to President Trump his readiness to join the Abraham Accords under the “right conditions”.

Officially, there are no conditions for lifting US sanctions, but it is clear that it was achieved in exchange for negotiations and concessions on various issues, including control of Palestinian actors in Syria, and normalization with Israel. Several Palestinian officials in Syria have been arrested, including members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement and the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command, who was an ally of the former Assad regime.

The Syrian government, led by HTS, is prepared to make numerous concessions to Israel and provide security guarantees, with the aim of rapprochement with the United States and strengthening its power. Al-Sharaa confirmed the existence of indirect negotiations with Israel aimed at easing tensions. According to various sources, direct talks were also recently held between Israeli, Syrian, and Turkish officials in Azerbaijan. This is despite the continuous attacks by the Israeli occupation army of Syrian territories, particularly in the occupied Syrian lands.

This is also why Damascus has not condemned the massive Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran. They perceive quite positively a weakening of Iran, just as they did with Hezbollah in Lebanon. This position is not only connected to Iran’s role during the Syrian uprising and hostility towards it of large sectors of the population, but it reflects, as explained above, the political orientation of the new ruling elite in Syria, as they seek to root the country in a US-led axis to consolidate their power. For the same reasons, they increased control of the border between Lebanon and Syria, where weapons destined for Hezbollah are regularly seized.

At the same time, the rapprochement between Damascus and Washington will probably put more political pressure on the Autonomous Administration of the North East of Syria (AANES), as the ongoing drawdown reduction of US military presence continues. This could increase the refusal of Syrian ruling authority, supported by Turkey, of any decentralized or federal framework in Syria. Ankara has recently reiterated its total rejection of any plans that undermine the central government in Syria or threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in response to demands from large sectors of the Kurdish population and political parties for Damascus to adopt a decentralized system of government. Damascus has adopted a similar position and described these demands as a threat to national unity.

In this framework, international recognition, promoting a potential normalization process with Israel, and seeking good relations with the US and its regional allies are all made in the perspective to consolidate HTS power and strengthen its rule over the country.

Dominating state’s institution and society

Building on the continuous legitimation of its rule by regional and international powers, HTS new ruling authorities have pursued measures to consolidate their power over political, economic and social actors. As explained in a previous article, HTS dominates the key positions in the state institutions, in the army and security services. Similarly, key positions in the new transitional government are held by figures close to al-Sharaa. For example, Asaad al-Shibani and Abu Qasra retained their positions as foreign minister and defense minister, respectively, while Khattab was appointed interior minister. Moreover, the new ruling authorities established parallel institutions to further consolidate their power, such as the National Security Council in Syria, headed by al-Sharaa and made up of his close associates (the foreign minister, defense minister, interior minister, and director of general intelligence). In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministry established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs at the end of March to supervise domestic political activities, formulate general policies related to political matters, and manage assets of the dissolved Baath Party.

The absence of an inclusive democratic process within the new ruling authority was also reflected in various initiatives, conferences, and committees that were supposed to be participatory and chart the next steps for the country's future. Such initiatives included the Syrian National Dialogue Conference, on February 25, which was widely criticized for its lack of preparation, representation, and seriousness due to the limited time allocated to the sessions. The interim constitution, signed by the interim Syrian president, was also widely criticized by various political and social actors, both for the lack of transparency in the criteria for selecting the drafting committee and its content. Furthermore, while the interim constitution formally declares the separation of powers, this is hampered by the broad scope of powers vested in the presidency.

At the same time, the new ruling authority has failed until now to establish a framework for comprehensive, long-term transitional justice aimed at holding all individuals and groups accountable for war crimes. On May 17, Syria’s transitional authorities announced presidential decrees establishing two new government bodies: the Transitional Justice Commission and the National Commission for the Missing. However, the Transitional Justice Commission’s mandate, as laid out in the decree, is troublingly narrow and excludes many victims, including from HTS and its allied armed groups.

This is selective justice and therefore very problematic, which can provoke new political and sectarian tensions in the country. In addition, no process of transitional justice regarding efforts to recover state assets and hold accountable businessmen linked to the former regime and responsible for serious financial and economic crimes have been implemented.

At the same time, the establishment of the Higher Committee for the Election of the People’s Assembly in the beginning of June has resulted in many criticisms. The methodology and process adopted for selecting members of the future parliament lacks transparency and inclusivity and could act as a tool to favor actors close to the new ruling actors. Ahmad Al-Sharaa will appoint a third of the members of Parliament, while the remaining two-thirds are to be selected by “regional subcommittees” that are themselves appointed by the Higher Committee for the Election of the People’s Assembly.

Outside state institutions, they try to expand their domination over other social actors. For instance, they restructured the country’s chambers of commerce by replacing the majority of members with appointees and reduced the number of board members in the main chambers, including Damascus, Damascus Countryside, Aleppo and Homs. Several new board members are known for their close relations to HTS such as the new president of Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce Alaa Al-Ali, former head of the HTS affiliated Idlib Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Other members are well known business personalities from pre-2011 such as Issam Ghreiwati, who now serves as chairman of the board. Issam Ghreiwati is the son of Zuhair Ghreiwati, who established the Ghreiwati Group, one of Syria’s most prominent commercial conglomerates.

The ruling authorities have also brought in new, affiliated figures to head trade unions and professional associations. These practices of appointing members, rather than promoting internal elections, is in direct continuity with the former Assad’s regime.

The risk of an exclusive control power by HTS and its allies of state’s institutions and expanding power over society could create further cycles of violence and sectarian tensions, while resulting in an elite-led transition process and reconstruction process, which will only reproduce social inequalities, impoverishment, a concentration of wealth in the hands of a minority, and the absence of productive development.

Sectarianism, a tool of domination

Finally, to consolidate its power over society, HTS is using sectarianism as a tool of domination and control over the population.

While the sectarian violence unleashed in March against Alawite civilians was initially provoked by remnants of the Assad regime who organized coordinated attacks against members of the security services and civilians, the counterreaction encompassed all Alawites, according to a logic of sectarian hatred and revenge. In April and May, armed groups connected to or supportive of the authorities mounted attacks against the Druze population.

Responsibility for the massacres in March and the continuous killings of Alawite civilians, and then attacks on the Druze population, lies principally with the new Syrian authorities. They failed to prevent them, and indeed some of the militia groups were directly implicated in the attacks, and higher echelons of the state were aware of the massacres and gave their approval, as reported by the Reuters report. Moreover, HTS ruling authorities produced the political conditions making them possible.

Indeed, human rights violations against Alawite individuals and communities, including kidnappings and assassinations, have been on the rise in the past few months, some of which — like the Fahil massacre at the end of December 2024 and the Arzah massacre at the beginning of February 2025 — felt like dress rehearsals before the coastal massacres. Then sectarian attacks against Druze populations in Damascus and in the South in Sweida occured. Once again, no measures were taken against militia groups involved in the attacks, or against individuals in sectarian calls and actions.

The ruling authorities continuously described these acts as isolated, while taking no serious actions against their perpetrators. To date, despite government overtures to investigate, there has been no accountability.

Moreover, HTS and Syrian officials have repeatedly misrepresented the Alawite community as a tool of the former regime against the Syrian people. For instance, during his speech at the 9th edition of the donors' conference on Syria in Brussels, Belgium, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani stated, “54 years of minority rule led to the displacement of 15 million Syrians...” — implicitly suggesting that the Alawite community as a whole had ruled the country for decades, rather than a dictatorship controlled by the Assad family.

While it is undisputed that Alawi figures held key positions in the former regime, particularly within its military and security apparatus, reducing the nature of the state and its dominant institutions to an “Alawite identity” or portraying the regime as favouring religious minorities while systematically discriminating against the Sunni Arab majority is both misleading and far from reality.

The authorities also failed to establish a mechanism promoting a comprehensive transitional justice process aimed at punishing all individuals and groups implicated in war crimes during the Syrian conflict. This could have played a crucial role in preventing acts of revenge and putting a lid on rising sectarian tensions.

Indeed, Ahmad al-Sharaa and his allies have a common interest for a selective transitional justice, fearing that they may be judged for their own crimes and abuses committed against civilians.

More generally, there are three main objectives in these sectarian tensions and attacks.

Firstly, instrumentalizing sectarian tensions, and the narrative of “Mazlumiya Sunniya” (Sunni victimhood or injustice) to try to build a popular consentment and unite large segments of the Arab sunni community around them, despite many political and social differences within this community.

Sectarianism is fundamentally a tool for consolidating power and dividing society. It serves to distract the popular classes from socio-economic and political issues by scapegoating a particular group — defined by sect or ethnicity — as the root of the country’s problems and a security threat, thereby justifying repressive and discriminatory policies against it.

Moreover, sectarianism acts as a powerful mechanism of social control, shaping the course of class struggle by fostering dependence between the popular classes and their elite leadership. As a result, the popular classes are stripped of independent political agency and instead come to be defined — and engage politically — through their sectarian identity.

Also in this regard, the new ruling authority is following in the footsteps of the former Assad regime, continuing to use sectarian policies and practices as a means of governance, control and social division.

Secondly, these sectarian attacks and tensions seek to break democratic space or dynamics from below. Following the march massacres, people are scarier to organize. For instance, protests in different governorates in January and February 2025 by laid-off public employees have been organised, as were attempts to organize alternative trade unions, or at least coordination structures. However, the sectarian massacres in the coastal areas significantly reduced the potency of the protest movement, because of fears that armed groups close or from the new ruling authorities might react with violence.

Thirdly, these sectarian attacks allowed the new ruling authorities in Damascus to reassess their domination in some territories (coastal areas) and try to do so in the areas with significant Druze populations, although unachieved particularly in the province of Sweida, frustrating the central authorities. The objectives of the ruling authorities in these events were therefore part of a broader strategy to centralise power and consolidate their domination in areas outside of their total control.

Conclusion

While any post-Assad government would have inherited a daunting set of political and economic problems, the current ruling authorities led by HTS bring their own set of challenges. Their political and economic orientation makes it even harder to establish the foundations for a viable and inclusive democratic and reconstruction process. Moreover, its policies are resulting in increasing loss of the country’s sovereignty to foreign actors. Quite the opposite: HTS has sought to consolidate its own power in the state's institutions, army and society.

This is why HTS policies should not be viewed as separate files: they are connected. Indeed, rooting the new Syria in a total alliance with western led axis, with its regional allies, and seeking forms of normalization with Israel, help consolidate the external legitimacy of the new ruling elite and attract foreign investments, including through privatisation of state assets and liberalization of the economy. The implementation of such policies, normalization with Israel and neoliberal dynamics impoverishing further society and deepening socio-economic inequalities, could create instability in the country, including through protests movements and rising criticisms.

Here, sectarianism is a useful tool to try to build a so-called homogeneous Sunni bloc, in trying to ignore and hide socio-economic and regional differences, in order to neutralise dissent in the country or mobilise sections of the populations against particular groups to divert them from class dynamics and divide the population.

Moreover, despite the rhetoric of the new ruling authority and supporters of its orientation, there are no guarantees that alliance with Western powers and normalization with Israel will improve the economic and political situations. We can look at Egypt’s evolution following the peace agreement with Israel in 1981. Despite an average of around $1 billion in US financial assistance since 1981, the socio-economic situation in Egypt worsened in the past decades, while wealth gaps increased considerably. In addition, the Egyptian economy is in crisis. At the same time, Egypt increasingly lost its sovereignty to USA and Israeli interests, as its role in the blockade of the Gaza Strip or attacks on demonstrators in the Gaza march recently demonstrated it.

In this framework, many questions arise regarding what strategy to adopt to improve the country’s situation. How to help Syria? Some actors, whether individuals and groups, think they can help Syria by working and engaging with the new ruling authorities to improve their practices and competencies. While engaging with specific state’s institutions is a necessity, simply because it is to them that demands and requests are made, to expect state’s authorities to change their policies and political behavior because of comments and councils on good governance is to create false hopes.

We must be clear: the ruling authorities will not change its policies and behavior, or even make real concessions in favor of the political and socio-economic interests of the Syrian popular classes, without a change in the balance of forces and moreover the construction and development of a counter power within the society, which gathers democratic and progressive networks and actors. Democracy is a daily struggle: it has to be won and is not given.

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  Under this agreement — worth $260 million — CMA CGM will construct a new berth and invest in port infrastructure, with the revenue-sharing arrangement granting 60 per cent to the Syrian state and 40 per cent to the company. CMA CGM has operated at Latakia since 2009, marking a continuity of its presence under new political circumstances. In parallel, high-level discussions have begun on energy development.