Joseph Daher: Connecting democratic and socio-economic issues in Syria to serve the 99%

First published in Syria Untold.

Following the fall of the Assad’s regime, Damascus has been witnessing significant dynamism in terms of visits of returnees, exiled activists, and Syrians from other regions, especially from northwestern areas, as well as conferences and meetings organized by various political and social actors, NGOs, activists and intellectuals. Unfortunately, the rest of the country did not have a similar level of dynamism, whether because more politically and economically isolated and in the country’s periphery, or because of the lack of security and civil peace. This said, local initiatives and conferences are being increasingly organized in areas outside Damascus, according to the local capacities and conditions of each area.

I had the privilege to witness this dynamism at the beginning of the year, especially in Damascus, while visiting Suwayda and Aleppo, and passing through Homs rapidly. I had the chance to participate in numerous meetings, discuss and exchange with numerous political and media activists, feminists, political actors, former political prisoners, students, individuals involved in local associations, workers in NGOs and INGOs, coming from various regions of Syria, from Damascus to the north (west and east) and the south.

I benefitted significantly from all these discussions and exchanges. My main objective during this time in Syria was to hear, see, and learn in order to understand better the complexity of the different dynamics within the country, without pretending to have full knowledge.

Debates and discussions largely focused on the issue of citizenship, democracy, the National Dialogue and its format, women’s rights, security situation in Homs and coastal areas and the issue of civil peace, Kurdish issue, sectarianism, political prisoners and disappeared, and so on. Similarly, we discussed the new HTS ruling government, its policies and the way to deal with it. Regardless of the diversity of opinions on all these issues and HTS ruling government, a vast majority agreed on the necessity to guarantee and foster the capacity of the civil society (not restricted to NGOs but in its wider definition) to self-organise and constitute a form of counter-power within the country to oppose any potential future authoritarian government. Recent announcements of the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim president and his responsibility for forming an “interim legislative council” after the dissolution of parliament and the freezing of the constitution show HTS’s desire for political dominance over the Syrian political transition.

The capacity and tools to strengthen this participation from below often remained an open question, especially in a country that suffered massive destruction and with 90% of the population living under the poverty line. This brings me to the key issue missing largely in the discussions and debates in Syria: the economy and what orientation to favor in order to tackle issues such as poverty, socio-economic inequalities, and a productive development of the economy. More generally, the economic orientation of the new ruling government is not very much debated and discussed, except regarding the issue of its legitimacy to take such decisions.

The ability to improve socio-economic conditions in the country’s future is indeed absolutely crucial to widen participation among local populations in the discussions and struggles for democratic rights in the country. The inability of large sectors of the population to see how they will deal with their lives on a daily basis, to cover their essential needs, their rents, electricity, fees for school, etc. prevent their inclusion and participation in the struggles, for which they have a direct and objective interest to be successful. There is a risk in this situation that democratic issues remain discussed among small segments of society and therefore be considered as elitist.

Part I : Neoliberalism, whether of the Assad regime or HTS, is a recipe for socio-economic inequalities

In this framework, I will try to show the necessity to connect the democratic and socio-economic issues to increase the participation from below. In the first section, I will briefly come back on the neoliberal economic orientation of HTS in power, and how it does not represent a break with the former regime’s economic policies, but rather a continuation and even an acceleration. I will then present the historical political and economic project of neoliberalism in the MENA region and analyse different regional experiences of neoliberal policies in post war, such as Lebanon and Iraq, and their consequences on the economy and population. Part II will tackle the need to re-energise trade unions and professional associations and their role in promoting democratic and socio-economic demands, but more importantly what kind of immediate demands could be put forward to try to improve the economy and living conditions in the short term.

HTS, or Islamic Neoliberalism

Since the arrival to power of HTS, the current government has made several declarations and decisions towards free market and austerity measures. The new Minister of Economy affiliated with HTS described on numerous occasions the neoliberal economic orientation of the new government, saying for example that “we will move from a socialist economy…to a free market economy respecting Islamic laws”. Regardless of the complete fallacy of describing the previous regime as socialist as we will see in the text, the class orientation of the minister was clearly reflected in the emphasis that “the private sector… will be an effective partner and contributor to building the Syrian economy”. HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa and his Minister of Economy have also held numerous meetings with representatives of these economic chambers and businessmen from different regions to explain their economic visions and listen to their grievances in order to satisfy their interests. The large majority of the representatives of various economic chambers of the old regime still occupy their positions.

In contrast, quasi no mention or meetings have been organized by the new authorities with workers, peasants, public state employees, or of any trade unions and professional associations regarding the country’s future economy.

Moreover, there are concrete signs of accelerating the process of privatization and austerity measures in the country. Prior to his visit the World Economic Forum in Davos, which symbolizes as a conference the interests shared by the western and global elites in neoliberal capitalist dynamics, the Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, told the Financial Times that the new rulers plan to privatise state-owned ports and factories, including of oils, cotton and furniture factories, invite foreign investment and boost international trade. He added that the government “ would explore public-private partnerships to encourage investment into airports, railways and roads”.

In terms of austerity measures, several measures have been undertaken, going from increasing the price of subsidized bread from 400 SYP (weight 1100 grams) to 4000 SYP (weight 1500 grams), announcing the end bread subsidies within one to two months to align with the liberalisation of the market and diminishing the number of public state employees in various ministries through campaigns of dismissals. The Minister announced indeed the laying off one-fourth of the state workforce, corresponding to employees who, according to new authorities, were getting a salary but not working. Since then, there are no estimates for the total number of employees dismissed, while some are currently on paid leave for three months to clarify their situation, whether they were working or not. Following this decision, protests by workers who were dismissed or temporarily suspended have erupted throughout the country and continue until today.

Moreover, while announcements have been made to raise workers’ wages by 400% for February 2025, making the minimum salary SYP 1,123560 (equivalent to $86), which is a step in the right direction, it is still insufficient for people to cover their needs during the continuing cost of living crisis. According to estimates made by Kassioun newspaper, the minimum cost of living for a five-member Syrian family living in Damascus reached SYP 9 million (equivalent to $692).

Along with other measures and decisions to control state institutions, especially the army and security services, HTS’ economic policies are part of a wider plan to consolidate its power. In this framework, HTS is also attempting to allay foreign fears, establish contacts with regional and international powers, and be recognized as a legitimate force with which it is possible to negotiate. Regional and international capitals’ change of behavior towards HTS are already visible, notably through the lifting or temporary suspension of sanctions by western states. Clearly, Ankara is the main political and military actor of the new Syria. By providing support for HTS, Ankara is consolidating its own power over Syria. Alongside other political objectives, such as carrying out forced returns of Syrian refugees, and denying Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, and more specifically undermining the DAANES, Turkey wants to benefit from future economic opportunities during the reconstruction phase in Syria and afterwards, and make Syria a main export market for Turkish products.

Turkish businessmen’s delegations have also already made visits to various chambers of commerce and industries in Syria to see potential investments opportunities. At the end of January 2025, Damascus reduced customs duties on more than 260 Turkish products, after the Syrian government raised customs duties on Turkish imports by up to 300%, aiming to unify rates across its borders. More generally, trade between Turkey and Syria gained significant momentum at the beginning of 2025, with Turkish exports to Syria increasing by 35.5% year-on-year, reaching $219 million as of January 25, according to Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat. In addition, Syrian and Turkish officials have agreed to initiate negotiations to revive the Turkey-Syria Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed in 2005, which was suspended in 2011, with a broader understanding of economic partnership. This will affect Syrian national production, both manufacturing and agriculture, that can’t compete with Turkish products. As a reminder, the Turkish Syria FTA agreement in 2005 and the resulting massive importation of Turkish products played a negative role in the dislocation of productive resources and in the closure of many local manufacturing plants, particularly those situated in the suburbs of the main cities.

Similarly, Qatar will most probably play a major role as an economic pillar. At the end of January 2025, Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani was the first head of state to visit Syria after the fall of Assad. Qatar's Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, who visited Damascus in mid-January, announced that his country would provide Syria with 200 megawatts of electricity and gradually increase production. This remains to be seen however. Moreover, there were rumours that Doha could also finance a public sector wage hike decided by the new Syrian administration.

Both actors, Turkey and Qatar are therefore already trying to provide various forms of assistance (political, military, economic) to the new ruling government in Damascus.

At the same time, al-Sharaa is working to build relationships with other Arab states. For example, the HTS praised the Saudi kingdom’s ambitious development plans, in reference to its Vision 2030 project, and expressed optimism about future collaboration between Damascus and Riyadh. In addition, a recent contract was concluded by Saudi-based Al Jouf Cement Company and Mohammed Shahi Al Ruwaili Contracting export cement and clinker goods to Syria for a value of around 10.1 million USD.

While HTS officials have promoted these liberalization policies and austerity measures as a break with “the socialist era” of the Assad regime, this is actually in continuity with the economic policies of the former regime and accelerating some of its processes.

As explained in previous articles, while Hafez al-Assad ended the radical social policies of the Bath of the end of the 1960s, it was under the rule of Bashar al-Assad that Syria witnessed an acceleration of neoliberal policies. The eruption of the revolution turned into war only intensified the Syrian regime’s pre-war neoliberal policies and orientation, alongside deepening austerity measures, while reinforcing the authoritarian and patrimonial aspects of the regime. These policies have contributed to expanding corruption dynamics and practices in the country.

This orientation and priority to the private sector was symbolised in February 2016 with the Syrian government’s announcement of “the National Partnership”, its new political economy strategy which replaced the previous "social market economy" established in 2005. A central aspect of the new strategy is the law on “Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)” enacted in January 2016, six years after its drafting, which authorizes the private sector to manage and develop State assets in all sectors of the economy as a majority shareholder/owner, except for the extraction of the oil sector. Former Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Humam al-Jaza'eri declared that the law created a “legal framework for regulating relations between the public and private sectors and meets the growing economic and social needs in Syria, particularly in the field of reconstruction”, while also providing the private sector with the opportunity to “contribute to economic development as a main and active partner, and to also help develop the public sector via the time-limited contractual relations with the private sector”.

Liberalisation and privatisation policies were therefore pursued by the successive Syrian governments, including state companies accumulating profits such as the liberalisation of the tobacco business announced in May 2024 or contracting a private company to manage Syrian Airlines of Syrian Airlines in July 2024. In addition to this, in October 2024, Damascus announced an agreement to privatise the production of car plates just prior to the beginning of a campaign compelling vehicle owners to update their car plates with newly designed plates. Other public-private partnership projects have been concluded, more particularly in cement, tractors and battery manufacturing, and medicine.

This privatization process consolidates the influence of regime-affiliated businessmen and their control over public goods, at the expense of state and public interests. Thus, these economic policies renew the strategies of private capital accumulation that date back to before 2011, while at the same time renewing and consolidating the regime’s authoritarianism and patrimonialism.

In November 2024, the Minister of Industry of the former regime, Mohammad Samer al-Khalil, said that there are very large losses in a large number of companies, institutions and factories affiliated with the ministry, which burdens the state treasury. In order to find a solution to this problem, he argued in favor of the sale of these companies to the private sector. The Prime Minister Muhammad Ghazi al-Jalali actually encouraged an ongoing privatization policy process of state assets.

The former regime’s willingness to privatise even further the economy has included as well key social sectors, such as the health and education system, as well as in the energy sector, comparable steps have already been taken to further privatise it.

In this framework and in the consolidation of such dynamics, the government has also deepened austerity measures and cutting on subsidy policies, by continuously in the past few years increasing the price of oil, diesel, electricity and bread, while diminishing the subsidized quantity provided. Moreover, Damascus also excluded approximately 600,000 families from its subsidy programme in February 2022.

The Syrian regime was therefore very far from socialist, but actually followed the neoliberal path successfully with catastrophic consequences on the large majority of the population. Ultimately, HTS shares this analysis and is willing to follow the neoliberal path creating deeper socio-economic inequalities, continued impoverishment and lack of productive development, which were some of the main reasons for the 2011 uprising. In this framework, HTS does not represent a rupture with the former regime but a continuation.

Neoliberalism in the MENA region

Among the regions called the “Global South”, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the one experiencing the most acute development crisis. After the 1960s, during which most of the region’s economies were dominated by the public sector in a state developmentalist perspective, the 1970s saw the inauguration and gradual extension of so-called infitah (opening) policies. Some countries in the region, Egypt in particular, were thus precursors of the “structural adjustment programs” that would be imposed worldwide from the 1980s onwards as part of neoliberal deregulation. Since the 1980s, a large majority of MENA states have adopted a neoliberal model focused on speculative investment in search of short-term profits in the unproductive sectors of the economy, especially in real estate, finance, and trade.

Neoliberalism is a particular organization of capitalism to ensure the conditions for capitalist reproduction at a global scale and as part of a ruling class offensive, which ran through the recessions in the 1970s and 1980s and resulted in the restructuring and generation of new and expanded forms of capitalist accumulation.

These features have progressively become regional following the crisis of the Arab nationalist regimes since the 1970s, which pushed them to abandon their previous social policies (such as domestic control of industry, support to education, subsidies for basic commodities, and state control of land and other resources) and increasingly operated a change in their foreign policies for two key reasons. First, they suffered defeat at the hands of Israel. Second, their state capitalist methods of development began to stagnate. As a result, they opted for a rapprochement with Western countries and their Gulf allies and adopted neoliberalism, rolling back many of the social reforms that had won them popularity among workers and peasants.

At different paths, the privatization of public goods began in the MENA region with the neoliberal policies of the early 1990s — mainly in the industrial, real estate, and financial sectors. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) also started to promote public-private partnerships (PPPs) to the regional states, in the same way it did around the world as a new tool for privatization and the management of public goods by private entities. Several Middle Eastern countries have indeed adopted PPP legislation in order to double down on privatization of public services and state infrastructure. In Saudi Arabia, PPPs have become a fundamental element in the economic and political strategy of Vision 2030 promoted by Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. The 2020 National Transformation Program, presented after the 2030 Vision,details the economic policies of the new Saudi leadership team and places private capital at the center of the future Saudi economy. The Saudi government has stated its plans to organize PPPs for many government services, including sectors such as education, housing, and health. The Financial Timesdescribed the plans as “Saudi Thatcherism". An economic plan hailed by HTS officials, including Ahmad al-Sharaa.

States have also opened their economies to foreign direct investment, developing the export and service sector. At the same time, the states have kept taxes on both foreign and domestic companies low and guaranteed them cheap labor. The regimes' repressive apparatuses have served as “security agents" protecting the interests of these companies and cracking down on workers, peasants, and the poor. The states have cut public services, removed subsidies to basic necessities like food, and privatized state industry often selling them to businessmen connected to the centers of political power. As a result, all the region's countries are characterized by extreme class inequality, high rates of poverty, high informality (which strips away protection rights granted by labor, even limited) and high unemployment, especially among youth. Those with education and valued skills leave their countries for opportunities elsewhere. And, in the case of the Gulf monarchies, their economies rely on temporary migrant workers who make up the majority of the laboring population and are deprived of political, labor, and civil rights. The proportion of migrant workers in Gulf monarchies is among the highest in the world with an average of 70.4%, ranging from 56 to 93% for states.

The process of neoliberal reforms accompanied by privatization and austerity measures did not mean a retreat of the state but rather its redeployment in ways that modify authoritarian rule. These neoliberal policies actually led to a new phase of “upgraded authoritarianism".

The outbreak of the popular uprisings in the MENA region in 2011 was therefore not just the result of the global economic crisis of 2008. Certainly, the Great Recession helped trigger them, but the region has deeper structural problems compared to the rest of the world system. This mode of capitalist production is focused on extracting oil and natural gas, underdeveloping productive sectors, overdeveloping services, and fuelling various forms of speculative investment especially in real estate.

The MENA is today the most unequal region in the world. A study measured the extent and evolution of income concentration in the region between 1990 and 2016 found that 64% of total income went to the top 10% of income earners, compared with 37% in Western Europe, 47% in the United States, and 55% in Brazil. Meanwhile, the bottom 50% of the region’s population received only 9% of overall income, compared with 18% in Europe.

Moreover, let’s see how neoliberal policies in various post conflict regional countries have affected their economies and local populations, and deepen very often pre-war dynamics just as in Syria.

The roots of the 2019 financial crisis in Lebanon are, for instance, to be found in the country’s political economy and the way it has developed since the end of the Lebanese Civil War. There has been a consistent emphasis placed on deeper integration into the global economy and, likewise, on private-sector growth. These neoliberal policies have reinforced certain historical features of the Lebanese economy: a development model focussed on finance, real estate and services, in which social inequalities and regional disparities have become pronounced. These policies have accentuated spatial and social inequalities in Lebanon and are closely linked to the heavily financialised nature of the country’s political economy and the marginalisation of important sectors such as agriculture and industry. The economic and political elites of sectarian communities benefited most from these policies through the various privatisation schemes and through, too, the clientelist allocation of state contracts.

In Iraq, following the occupation of the country by US and British forces, this coalition has privatized the bulk of the country’s economy and handed it over to foreign corporations in the name of reconstruction. Paul Bremer, the civil administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority named by the Bush Administration, during his 13 months in power issued some 100 Coalition Authority Orders, including Order 394, which dealt with foreign investments. This order played a key role in the forced march of Iraq toward a neo-liberal economy. It allowed foreign investors to enjoy exactly the same rights as the Iraqis in developing the national market, while it privatized the entire Iraqi public sector. Thus, some 200 national companies have been affected: railroads, electricity, water supply and sewerage (infrastructures for the most part destroyed by the U.K.-U.S. coalition), television and radio, hospitals (which were previously free), telephone service, airports etc. It allows for foreign ownership of up to 100 percent of Iraqi companies, with the exception of the petroleum industry, mining banks and insurance companies. These reforms included maintaining corporate tax at a low rate of 15 percent, privatisation of Iraqi state-owned facilities and granting foreign contractors immunity from Iraqi legislation, including private security companies. These policies have been pursued by the Iraqi ruling class afterwards. Iraq’s agriculture was also one of the sectors that has been massively impacted by post-invasion reforms. Pre-2003, Iraq was agriculturally self-sufficient. Up to 2002 it remained self-sufficient in fruit and vegetables. The farmers in Iraq had developed a centrally controlled, self-functioning seed industry by the sharing of seeds through farmers. Following the 2003 invasion, the agriculture system was destroyed and the National Seed Bank was no more. By 2005 only 4% of Iraq’s agriculture was grown from their own seeds. Afterwards, successive Iraqi governments pursued the project of neoliberal transformation of the country. Neo-liberal policies, accompanied with strong corruption, clientelism and nepotism, have had destructive effects on Iraqi society.

More generally, just like Syria, a number of countries, emerging from wars and severe crises have taken the opportunity to pursue and/or deepen economic liberalization, often with the assistance of international financial institutions. These policies should not be considered as merely “technocratic”. Rather they are attempts to restructure and push forward changes in ways that were previously foreclosed and significantly extend the reach of the market in a range of economic sectors that have hitherto been largely state dominated.

Many liberal oriented economists, politicians, NGOs outlets and reports have neglected the impacts of neoliberal economic dynamics in Syria and wider region of the MENA, and focused on the continuous growing influence of crony- capitalists and the high levels of corruption to explain their economic shortcomings and/or crisis and uneven distribution of wealth. At the same time, the concept of “democratization” supported by International Monetary Institutions in the framework of “reforms” and “good governance policies” in order to promote neo-liberal policies must be challenged. As we will see, these neo-liberal reforms have on the contrary strengthened the authoritarianism and patrimonial character of the states of the region.

While more accountability and economic transparency is a necessity, it is firstly the failure of the economic structures and policies of the regional regimes to generate sustainable and long-term growth accompanied by low levels of public investment in productive sectors of the economy, which is at the root of the region's economic situation, including in Syria alongside other elements such as sanctions and effects of war. In other words, regional economic development was, and still is in many ways, blocked by its mode of production: a speculative and commercial capitalism characterized by short term profit-seeking.

Part II: Mobilisation from below and immediate economic demands

The fall of the Assad regime brought changes at the level of the political ruling elites and key military institutions (army and security services), but did not modify as explained above the neoliberal system of capital accumulation and the mode production itself. While the end of the Assad dynasty is a great victory, the problems in Syria have never been limited to the authoritarian political system, but its particular form of capitalism resulting in socio-economic inequalities, impoverishment, absence of productive development.

In this framework, the socio-economic issue is key to Syria’s democratic future. However, HTS’s economic orientation is reproducing neoliberal economic dynamics, while reproducing already forms of authoritarianism and repression, although at a lower level as it is still consolidating its rule over society. How to challenge this in the short term?

First it is to see the tools to be used, and then what immediate demands to promote, based on the current level of mobilization.

The role of trade unions and professional associations in building a counter power to the ruling elites.

In order to promote democratic participation from below and promote socio-economic issues at the forefront of national debates among the country’s working and popular class conditions, re-dynamising the role of trade unions and professional associations is a crucial tool in this objective.

The historical repression by the Syrian regime in the past decades of combative trade unionists and leftist political actors promoting working class interests, together with policies controlling and instrumentalising the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) and professional associations, have severely hampered any potential labour mobilisation and collective action, particularly following the eruption of the uprising in March 2011. The GFTU has acted as a tool of control and repression in the hand of the regime, and it has defended its policies at the expense of the interests of large sections of the working classes.

The construction of autonomous , democratic and mass labor organisations in the future in Syria is essential to improve the living and working conditions of the population and more generally to struggle in favor of democratic rights. Strikes and collective action by workers and the unemployed were major factors in toppling the heads of state in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and likewise in Sudan in 2019. The examples of the protest movements led by the Tunisian General Labour Union (known by its acronym UGTT) and professional associations in the uprisings in Tunisia and Sudan showed the significance of mass trade union organisation in strengthening effective popular struggle.

A first step to reinvigorate trade unions and professional associations in Syria is to demand free and democratic elections within them. Syrian lawyers for instance launched a petition calling for free union elections after the new authorities appointed an unelected union council. Such initiatives should be made in all trade unions, professional associations and within federations.

Similarly, propaganda and activities encouraging and promoting the self-organisation of workers on their working sites is crucial. In this perspective the right to unionize and organize collectively for workers in the private and public sector are key issues to control and organize democratically their workplaces and extend their democratic and social rights, such as higher salaries, pensions, health insurance or better working conditions. The extension of popular control and democratic rights allow workers and popular classes to refuse government policies in opposition to their interests. Workers in their administrations and institutions, whether in the public or private sector, should also be able to control that people are selected on the basis of technical criteria for professional qualification and experience and in their interests and not on the basis of clientelism, favoritism and corruption from above. For example, several protests were organised these past few weeks in several Syrian governorates, including Tartous, Damascus, Daraa, and Suweida, around issues such as opposition to certain nominations made by the new authorities in particular administrations, for the dismissal and temporary suspension of state’s employees, or the delay in the payment of salaries.

The right to freely organize collectively is indeed a guarantee to provide the instruments to preserve a democratic atmosphere and framework. The battle for democracy can actually often be pursued far more effectively in workplaces, in communities, in schools, in the streets… Democratic initiatives seeking to develop participation from below are always welcome. For instance, in the absence of clarity of the future National Conference organized by HTS, the call of the Civil Gathering in Jaramana to hold a national dialogue conference at the level of the city of Jaramana with the participation of local actors and groups and to emulate such initiative throughout the country is a well inspired initiative to foster discussions and democracy from below.

What kind of economic immediate demands?

Re-activating trade unions and professional associations in society is a tool to mobilise workers and encourage their self-organisation. In addition to this, some immediate demands to attract the interests of large sectors of the population can be put forward in order to mobilise them. Based on the current low level of organization among workers and popular classes, demands should target any measures resulting in any further degradation of working living conditions and undermine even more the role of the state and its services, as well as processes connected to corruption schemes and whitewashing businessmen affiliated formerly with the Presidential Palace.

An audit of public state expenses and functioning has to be made to evaluate the numbers of employees, the organization of ministries and state companies and their global socio-economic impact on society, assess the cost of subsidies and their socio-economic advantages and shortcomings, etc. This is a necessity on several main levels:

1. In order to defend the state’s public services, workers right and freeze any processes of laying off and temporary suspension of workers. Indeed, the current caretaker Minister of Finance Mohammad Abazid did not explain his methodology or justifications to identify hundreds of thousands of such ghost employees. At the same time, some ministries such as education and health lack staff and need investments.
2. Similarly, until the public audit is terminated, all austerity measures and processes to end subsidies should be stopped. Ending subsidies can’t for instance be just about state fiscal savings, especially as no social compensation takes into consideration the structural consequences for the economy and society. As we have seen in the past, measures symbolically increasing salaries or granting bonuses on specific occasions do not compensate for rising living costs and the loss of purchasing power.
3. No privatization of state companies and assets should occur until the end of the audit and the election of a democratic government. These decisions do not solely have economic consequences but also impact the state’s sovereignty, particularly regarding ports, airports and key infrastructures, as well as socio-economic effects by increasing the cost of living through privatization of needed social services. In addition to this, the privatization of state companies impacts as well the working conditions of workers. Generally, labour laws regulating state public employment (Labour Law No. 50 of 2004) are more favourable to labour laws regulating the private sector in terms of salaries and incentives, including meal allowances, free transport, health and social insurance, pensions, and personal protective equipment.

An audit of the national debt, both national and foreign, should be considered as well. Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, declared that the state holds $30bn in debt to former Assad allies Iran and Russia. The change of the regime in Syria does not negate the legal responsibility of the Syrian state regarding its debt to Iran. Nor the authoritarian and despotic nature of the former regime cancels its responsibility towards the Iranian debt. However, any potential Iranian claims to Damascus to pay the debt should be suspended until the establishment of a committee in charge of making a full audit of its public debt, which includes its foreign debt to Iran. A large part of the debt accumulated by the former Syrian regime to Iran was indeed connected to maintaining it in power, through boosting its military and economic capacities. If the audit would confirm or provide evidence to such findings, a large part of the country’s public debt would therefore be illegitimate or illegal. In this perspective the debt, or at least large part of it, could be characterized as odious or illegitimate, and therefore should not be reimbursed. Indeed, according to the doctrine of the odious debt, two conditions should be met:

1) It must have been contracted against the interests of the Nation, or against the interests of the People, or against the interests of the State.

2) Creditors cannot prove they were unaware of how the borrowed money would be used.

A large part of the debt accumulated to Iran was clearly done against the interests of the vast majority of the population by maintaining the regime’s military and economic capacities to continue its repression and destruction of infrastructures in opposition held areas. At the same time, the creditor, Iran, can’t deny it was unaware of the purpose of the borrowed money as they participated in the regime's operations against large sectors of the Syrian population.

In addition to this, these loans did not have parliamentary approval as required by the constitution, or officially approved by the government.

Freezing privatization processes of state’s assets and companies and auditing all past privatization schemes. If irregularities are found this should lead to nationalization of these companies. Many privatization processes of state assets and companies indeed benefited businessmen affiliated with the former Presidential Palace, like the ones mentioned above for instance, while depriving significant incomes for the state. For example, major companies previously controlled by key businessmen affiliated with the Presidential Palace such as Telecommunication companies Syria Tel and MTN should be nationalized and their revenues benefit the state.

Similarly, oppose potential settlements by the new ruling authorities and businessmen involved in war crimes and directly connected to the former Presidential Palace. Instead, they should face trial and if found guilty, their companies and assets should be transferred to the state. For instance, rumours of a potential settlement between businessmen Muhammad Hamsho and the new authorities should be condemned and his assets and companies transferred to the state.

Other types of demands could be promoted serving public interests, such as the development of public transport networks, including buses and rail, within and between cities, and between periphery and urban centres, would reduce transport fees, which is particularly continuously affecting students and workers. More generally, initiatives, demands, and solutions should try to seek to help the interests of the country’s 99% and could evolve according to popular mobilisations and be more “offensive”. Most of the demands put forward above are indeed “defensive” and serve immediate needs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the building of a democratic society should be based on the needs and interests of the working and popular classes, which represent 99% of the population. In order to achieve this, promoting the democratic and social empowerment of the working and popular classes to manage their own societies is a crucial objective. Democracy is when the entire population participates freely, equally and directly to the elaboration of decisions regarding collective affairs and policies, including of the socio-economic sphere.

History shows that democracy is a transforming concept with no precise form, which has always been at stake in struggles. Any broadening of democracy to include social, economic, cultural and national rights has been the result of successful struggles from below including economic and civil rights, voting, unionizing, civil rights, gender equality, etc. Progressives and democrats must participate in the construction of united fronts against autocracy, exploitation, and oppression, and at the same time build a political alternative among the popular classes.

Indeed, in this project of democratic and social change from below, it must be understood that workers’ struggles alone will not, however, be sufficient to unite the workers and popular masses. We must champion the liberation of all the oppressed, raising demands of rights for women, religious minorities, and oppressed ethnic groups. For example today, it is important to oppose HTS’ violent and authoritarian security campaigns targeting civilians, rising sectarian and racist discourses and practices, defend women’s rights, and demand transitional justice. Failure to do so will prevent the unification of the working and popular class for the radical transformation of society.

In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’ perspectives, socialism and democracy were bound together from the very first struggles they were part of in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1848, in the Communist Manifesto they wrote: "the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle for democracy".