Boris Kagarlitsky on the Soviet Union, one-party states and the need for a new left bloc in Russia

First published in Russian at Rabkor. Translation and footnotes by Dmitry Pozhidaev for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Marxist sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky is currently in a Russian prison for speaking out against the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The following interview with Kagarlitsky was conducted by a Rabkor viewer. This is the first part of the interview which deals with questions relating to socialist democracy, one-party systems and the need to adapt party forms to the realities of today's working class.

Why did a one-party system develop in the Soviet Union?

The inevitability of establishing a one-party system was never theoretically justified, even within the framework of Soviet official ideology. But it was implicitly understood: if we have the most advanced party, armed with the most advanced ideology and theory, and supported by the entire people, why would we need other parties?

Although, interestingly, in the so-called “people’s democracies” (German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia), a semblance of multi-party systems was maintained. There were a few decorative parties formally in coalition with the Communists. This unexpectedly played a role in 1979 when leaders of these fictitious parties suddenly left the coalition and went into opposition. This led to a peaceful change of government in Poland by creating a new majority in the Sejm [parliament], including Solidarity.

But one way or another, by the 1920s, a one-party system had already taken shape in the Soviet Union, becoming the institutional foundation of the state. Meanwhile, the system also evolved. Throughout the 1920s, the Communist Party [of the Soviet Union, CPSU] gradually lost the characteristics of a political party, merging with the state administrative apparatus and then replacing it. In a literal sense, Soviet power was eliminated. Regional first secretaries essentially became provincial governors. CPSU regional committees had departments for industry, agriculture, and so on. The party dealt with everything from improving cow yields to stocking stores, handling almost everything except helping people.

Some believe the one-party system in the Soviet Union was a historical accident and that, if relations with the left Social Revolutionaries and other parties had developed differently, the political system might have been different. Do you think a two-party or multi-party system could have developed in Soviet Russia?

Certainly, in 1917 and even in 1918-19, [Vladimir] Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no plan to establish a one-party system. The Mensheviks, for instance, were at times persecuted, then allowed to work legally and elect their representatives to the Soviets.1 But I would not call it an accident.

If we look at other great revolutions — the English Revolution of the 17th century and the French Revolution of the 18th century — we see the same pattern: power concentrates in the hands of the most radical, consistent party, which establishes its own dictatorship. In England, it was the Independents; in France, the Jacobins; in Russia, the Bolsheviks. There is a clear process of logic here, moving through certain predictable phases. Then comes a conservative transformation of the regime (the Thermidorian and Bonapartist phases). Accordingly, we see the [Oliver] Cromwell regime in Britain, Napoleon [Bonaparte] in France, and [Josef] Stalin in the Soviet Union. This is followed by a period of restoration.

But here we see interesting differences. First, the Soviet system survived Stalin. Secondly, if we consider Perestroika and [Boris] Yeltsin’s rule as a Russian version of restoration (and I argued this back in the 1990s), then this phase occurred with a significant delay. The Soviet Union lasted more than 70 years, while the English and French revolutions took about a quarter of a century.

Recently, I have hypothesised that with the development of modern technologies (including communication technologies), historical processes are not accelerating but slowing down. But this requires further thought. For now, returning to our question, it is worth noting that the Soviet Union managed to create a solid institutional order in the 1930s that was not simply tied to Stalin’s personal power. Part of this process was transforming the Bolshevik dictatorship into a one-party system, as discussed earlier.

What role did Lenin and [Leon] Trotsky play in establishing a one-party dictatorship?

As mentioned, there was no plan in advance. But in 1921, amid the shift to the New Economic Policy [NEP], Lenin deliberately achieved a complete ban and elimination of opposition parties.2 His reasoning was simple: we are retreating on the economic front, [while] expanding freedom for the bourgeoisie, which might use this opportunity for political revenge. Therefore, economic liberalisation needed to be counterbalanced by tightening the political regime.

A paradox arises: during the Civil War and Red Terror, there was more political freedom and pluralism than during the NEP years, often considered a golden age of post-revolutionary Russia. In fact, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who were often imprisoned, were told it was temporary and that they would soon be legalised again. Lenin, in his last months, seemed to suspect something was wrong and began to ponder the threat of degeneration within the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky later defended the principle of multi-party systems in The Revolution Betrayed, but this had no effect on the Soviet system.

During the Soviet period, there were also attempts to reform political institutions. Immediately after the end of World War II, the German Communist Party adopted the so-called “Ackermann Thesis.” Ackermann was one of the party’s leaders and ideologists. He argued that the one-party system in the Soviet Union had developed under conditions of civil war, backwardness and hostile encirclement, while the situation in Germany was entirely different; therefore, socialism in Germany would be built under conditions of political freedom and a multi-party system. Essentially, the “Ackermann Thesis” anticipated what would later be known as Eurocommunism.

But in this case, what is important to us is that Ackermann’s statement was coordinated with Moscow, and Stalin was well aware of it. There was apparently a willingness, at least regarding Eastern Europe, to experiment with political regimes. However, with the onset of the Cold War, the countries within the Soviet sphere of influence were reorganised following the Soviet model. Ackermann was moved to a secondary position, and the fictitious multi-party system in East Germany (GDR) became the only outcome of those democratisation efforts.

In [Nikita] Khrushchev’s era, an unusual division emerged within CPSU district committees into urban and rural ones. Some saw this as preparation for creating a second party in the country — a peasant party. However, first, this conclusion is not obvious, and second, after Khrushchev’s removal in 1964, everything was returned to its original state.3

Finally, in 1968, the “Prague Spring” unfolded in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party carried out reforms and adopted a “Program of Action”. This document was published in Russian at that time in the journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, published in Prague. It significantly influenced the programs of leftist parties in Europe and Latin America. During the 1970–73 revolution in Chile, the parties of the Popular Unity coalition proclaimed the same principles. The “Prague Spring” envisaged a transition to a multi-party system (political pluralism), and the Communists were expected to return to being a political party that defended its right to leadership through free elections.

In The Long Retreat, you argue that no party can represent the interests of all workers today. Does this mean that different segments of the working class may have different parties?

The mass of wage labourers in today’s world is heterogeneous. Different groups may have conflicting interests (for example, wildlife reserve workers may not welcome mining developments in their area, even if it creates jobs). Workers should ideally be united based on their broader class interests. However, this process cannot be mechanical, imposed from above; it ultimately divides workers, creating new contradictions between the leadership and grassroots.

Reconciliation of interests is a complex, dynamic process. This embodies [Antonio] Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, where movement participants consciously follow a common line, even at personal sacrifice. Such a compromise is best expressed in a broad social coalition. And even if it takes the form of one common party, it will be a coalition-type party with different currents working together.

Can the heterogeneity of the working class be overcome within a common coalition or a single party? Different parts of the working class have different interests. Consequently, both now and during the construction of socialism, is it impossible to have a single political party that represents the interests of all workers? Does this mean that, under capitalism, the left needs a coalition of parties rather than a single party, and a multi-party system under socialism?

The question of optimal political organisation cannot be resolved once and for all. It is not only about the different social layers whose interests we aim to defend, but also about the history of the left movement, the political culture of each country, and its political system and legislation.4 In France, for instance, there is a long history of coalitions, while in Britain the left has to fight for influence within the Labour Party, known for being a “broad church” (though the right wing systematically reduces internal democracy to block leftist success).

In post-Putin Russia, I believe there is a need to build a broad leftist party from scratch. Not a mechanical coalition of different groups, many of which will bring with them their old sectarian habits and squabbles but a grassroots party-movement involving local activists and leaders. Currently, such a party-movement form looks more attractive than the bureaucratic structures typical of former democratic and Communist parties of the 20th century (and, to a large extent, of Trotskyists).

Here, oddly enough, ideological pluralism is less important than grassroots autonomy and local activism. Yes, we are talking about an organisation for struggle within the conditions of capitalism, but the very form of organisation we are creating to a large extent anticipates the socio-political forms that may develop — on this basis — under socialism. We are building new social relationships, including among ourselves.

But what should be done if certain groups, especially those with some influence, do not wish or are unable to work within such a party-movement, but are nevertheless willing to contribute to the common struggle? It makes sense that we would still need to establish relations with them as external partners, agreeing on some matters and engaging in principled debate on others.

Is a multi-party system preferable to a one-party system under socialism? Can bourgeois parties participate in governing the state under socialism? What problems might arise from a multi-party system under socialism?

If the fundamental principles of political freedom involve party competition, then a socialist society should preserve and develop the gains of bourgeois revolutions. Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg argued this in their critiques of the Bolsheviks. Even Stalin, in his last public speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, spoke positively about the legacy of bourgeois democracy.

Through party competition, people can express their will. But is the self-determination of the people truly reducible to a choice between parties? By limiting democracy to elections and the political sphere, we remain within the framework of a bourgeois understanding of freedom.5

In the future, we are likely to see new mechanisms allowing people to participate in decision-making in both political and non-political areas, with technology providing ample opportunities for this. It seems to me that as self-governance and economic democracy develop, the role and influence of parties will diminish. When choosing a representative to participate in the management of a company, will you primarily consider their party affiliation or their competence and ability to connect with colleagues?

As for bourgeois parties, the question boils down to how successfully new socio-economic relations develop. If society, its structure, and culture undergo deep changes, old parties will only have two options: they will either wither away or find a new social base and transform. There are many such examples in history. For instance, the British Tories (Conservatives) were once a party of landowning aristocrats opposing the commercial bourgeois Whigs (Liberals). The modern Tories are a party of big capital, while the descendants of the Whigs, the Liberal Democrats in England, represent the “progressive” middle class.

Clearly, we cannot and should not predict everything in advance. Utopianism is precisely the attempt to first paint a beautiful picture and then try to force reality to fit it.

If [Karl] Marx was right about the eventual withering away of the state, then parties would wither away with it. But for now, we can only guess. It would be nice to see something like the society described by the Strugatsky brothers — a “noon” free community of people oriented towards rational humanism. But that was, after all, science fiction. For now, let us stick to the prophecies of the young Strugatskys and Ivan Yefremov, and we will work on it and see what happens.6

Are there alternatives to political parties? Should something different from the conventional understanding of a party be intentionally created?

As mentioned above, various forms of self-governance and economic democracy can develop outside a party-based structure. Naturally, today we see the emergence of various public initiatives, non-governmental organisations, civil associations, and so forth. Moreover, broad social movements focused on specific issues (such as ecology, urban preservation, animal protection, etc.) play an important role.

But it is clear that, within the political system, parties are still the main actors for now. The left needs to engage with social movements, and we ourselves should aim to create a party-movement that avoids excessive centralisation. However, let us be honest: much will depend on conditions and circumstances. At certain stages, they may even require increased centralisation. The main thing is not to confuse tactics with strategy. Unfortunately, on a tactical level, various zigzags are possible. The question is — where will we steer?

Can you recommend any reading on how political parties represent the interests of different segments of wage labourers? And on forms of worker organisation relevant to the present day?

Back in the 1970s, there was a discussion in the journal Latin America about Latin American leftists, where these very questions were raised (albeit with adjustments for Soviet censorship, of course). There is also Maurice Duverger's classic work on political parties, which has been translated into Russian. In the Soviet Union, there was the Institute of World Labor Movement (later renamed the Institute of Comparative Politics), which published many works on Western leftist parties, analysing their social bases and, for instance, the divisions and shifts within social reformism.7

Of course, there are more recent works, but being in prison without access to the internet or my library, I am unlikely to be able to add anything further.

• 1

  After the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks formed a coalition with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs), who shared some revolutionary goals but differed on issues such as land distribution and peace terms with Germany. The Left SRs held significant influence, especially among the rural peasantry.

  The Soviets (local councils) initially included representatives from various socialist factions, including the Left SRs, Mensheviks, and some anarchists. These factions often debated policies in the Soviets, reflecting a brief phase of pluralistic socialist governance. By mid-1918, as the Civil War intensified, the Bolsheviks began suppressing other political parties systematically. The Mensheviks and Right SRs were marginalised, and many were imprisoned or exiled as the civil war intensified. 

• 2

  In 1921, the Bolshevik Party formally banned all internal factions within the party through the Tenth Party Congress' decree, which effectively centralised decision-making within the party and eliminated remaining political opposition, both within and outside the party.

• 3

  The decision to divide CPSU district committees into urban and rural branches was made in 1962 as part of Khrushchev’s broader administrative reforms aimed at improving economic management by aligning party structures more closely with agricultural and industrial sectors. The official justification emphasised the need to address the specific concerns of rural development separately from urban industrial issues, particularly given the emphasis on agricultural production in Khrushchev’s policy agenda. However, opponents within the CPSU argued that the division undermined party cohesion and ideological unity. When Khrushchev was dismissed in October 1964, this separation of committees was cited among the criticisms against him.

• 4

  This is a theme Kagarlitsky explores more thoroughly in The Long Retreat: “In the 21st century.., modern politics and society simply do not permit the construction of a united, ideologically motivated vanguard party able to formulate and put into practice the collective will of the entire movement… Political unity under the conditions of a heterogeneous society inevitably takes on the form of a coalition, even if in technical terms the representatives of various social groups and currents can be kept within the framework of a single party. More often, however, several organisations are formed simultaneously and in parallel.”

• 5

  This is another theme Kagarlitsky develops in The Long Retreat where he argues that Western bourgeois democracy has been hollowed out: “The problem faced by the Western corporate elite in the late twentieth century lay in its need to curtail, and if possible to end altogether, the participation of the masses in politics while preserving the formal institutions of parliamentarism, free elections and other conquests of liberal democracy. This task was achieved through combining market reforms with the technocratic adoption of decisions supposedly too complex to be understood by ordinary voters.”

• 6

  Boris Strugatsky and Arkady Strugatsky, along with Ivan Yefremov, were prominent Soviet science fiction writers who depicted utopian visions of a future communist society. In Noon: 22nd Century (1962) (this explains the reference to the “noon” community in the interview) and Far Rainbow (1963), the Strugatsky brothers envisioned a world where humanity has overcome poverty, exploitation, and social inequalities through technological progress and cooperative living. Their fictional world reflects principles of collective welfare, scientific exploration, and rational humanism, aiming for a harmonious society free from material need and oppression. Yefremov’s Andromeda: A Space-Age Tale (1957) is another iconic work in this genre, portraying a future Earth that has achieved communism and is now part of a peaceful, interstellar society. Yefremov’s vision is deeply rooted in Soviet ideals of human progress, presenting a world of intellectual freedom, scientific discovery, and cooperation across cultures. Both authors’ works serve as aspirational visions of a socialist future, emphasising the transformative power of a society committed to rational and humane values.

• 7

  Some notable works include: 

  1. “The Labour Movement in the Developed Capitalist Countries” (Рабочее движение в развитых капиталистических странах), published in 1975, offers a comprehensive analysis of labour movements in Western Europe and North America, focusing on their social bases and political strategies.

  2. “Social Democracy: Theory and Practice” (Социал-демократия: теория и практика), a 1980 publication, examines the evolution of social democratic parties in Western countries, analysing their ideological shifts and the social groups they represent.

  3. “The Crisis of Reformism in the West” (Кризис реформизма на Западе), published in 1985, discusses the challenges faced by Western leftist parties in the context of neoliberal policies, exploring how these parties’ social bases were affected.