Greg Yudin: ‘The challenge facing the left in Russia is that there is no alternative on offer’

[Editor’s note: The following is an edited transcript of the speech and responses to questions given by Greg Yudin on the “The situation for the left in Russia today” panel at the “Boris Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today” online conference, which was organised by the Boris Kagarlitsky International Solidarity Campaign on October 8. Yudin is a Russian philosopher, theorist of democracy and Research Fellow at Princeton University. Transcripts and video recordings of other speeches given at the conference can be found at the campaign website freeboris.info.]

The outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine ignited considerable global interest in the potential for significant social and political change in Russia. Expectations ranged from a palace coup that would help the elites to get rid of the president and his war that had caught them by surprise, to a popular uprising that would topple a government that sends millions of Russians into a meat grinder and destroys the future for the nation.

Nothing like that has materialised so far. This has led many to assume that in fact both the masses and the elites in Russia are quite satisfied with the government. After all, as the French pamphleteer Etienne la Boetie argued in the sixteenth century, if the people do not overthrow tyranny, it voluntarily chooses its servitude. I would like to suggest a different perspective. There can very well be general dissatisfaction and yet no political action.

This combination is not wholly explained by repression, although repression does play a significant role — after all, we should not forget that Boris Kagarlitsky is in prison today for a very simple reason: he opposes the government’s decision to prosecute this war and was publicly vocal about it. I want to make it very clear to those who may not closely follow events in Russia: the combination of these two things — opposing the war and saying it publicly — almost guarantees that you will be killed or jailed. In some cases, it takes time for them to reach you, but it is a safe bet that eventually they will. However, I believe that repression is not the most important factor for inaction. There are many people willing to risk and even sacrifice their lives for political change in Russia, and repression alone could never suppress them.

There is a more disturbing explanation, and it relates to the topic of this panel. There is no alternative on offer for Russia now and this is genuinely felt by both the masses and elites. Contrary to what some people could imagine, the current situation is not perceived in Russia as a political trade-off for the country, a fateful choice being made collectively that will entail significant consequences. In the absence of alternatives, the course of events is perceived as absolutely inevitable and predetermined.

A colleague from Chapel Hill, Graeme Robertson, recently presented a very illuminating study that demonstrates Russians are extremely keen to engage in what is called in psychology “system justification”. In other words, up to 80% of his respondents are likely to agree with statements such as “the government is bad but we deserve no better”, “the government is bad but all governments are like this”, “the government is bad but the other one is likely to be even worse”, “the government is bad but it has always been so”, and so on.

If you want a word to characterise the moral situation in Russia, it is despair. Despair, resignation and extreme cynicism — this all sounds familiar to many of you coming from various countries. In this sense, Russia is a quite typical case of neoliberal capitalism that imposes itself as a natural calamity that cannot be resisted, and generates resentment, acrimony and depoliticisation. I would argue that Russia is perhaps the extreme case of this disposition, one that makes people normalise war and destruction and distrust peace and progress.

Offering alternatives is, of course, the job of the opposition. However, in Russia’s case, we have an ideological problem. Since the invasion of Ukraine, foreign observers have learned the names of many Russian politicians and activists, most of whom are now in exile, who are usually termed the “Russian opposition”. While they have managed to maintain access to Russian audiences through social media, and many have shown personal merit, they have yet to articulate a political offer compelling enough to provoke change in their home country.

One of the important reasons why such a proposal was not made is ideological. Most of the figures familiar to foreign eyes represent a particular brand of right-liberalism that emphasises individual human rights, laissez-faire economy with extremely limited government and catch-up modernisation designed to copy the institutional design of Western liberal democracies. 

This agenda emerged at the time of the proclaimed “end of history” and is strongly associated in Russia with the transformational period of the 1990s, when brutal neoliberal reforms destroyed social safety nets, unleashed unprecedented inequality and elevated organised crime to commanding positions. Many opposition figures reinforce this association by promoting the narrative that in the ’90s, Russia was a democracy, albeit imperfect, but Vladimir Putin turned it into an autocracy. 

The intuitive plan is to go back to the ’90s and not allow power to slide away to authoritarians. But this agenda, no matter how attractive it may be to the West, is a non-starter with the Russian public.

Alexey Navalny was an important exception. He was the one to realise a genuine demand for an alternative, which was particularly palpable among Russian youth. While his early flirtations with nationalists were largely irrelevant for his political career, his later projects exploited the sense of extreme injustice widespread in Russian society. Now that Navalny died as a martyr, the task of formulating an alternative is on the shoulders of those who are to replace him.

In the remainder of this talk, I would like to make the case for what could be called a social-democratic alternative for Russia. In doing so, I will be relying on my own studies, which, although conducted before the war, still allow us to assess the direction political demand is evolving, and also on the studies of many colleagues.

• I will start with what Nancy Fraser has shrewdly noticed in her opening talk: a fresh look at regional and global security is urgently needed. Although the responsibility for unleashing this brutal genocidal war is solely on Putin who ignored even the advice of his own flunkies, NATO countries should share the blame with him for the deterioration of security arrangements with their irresponsible policies. Russians need an understanding that once this war is over, there will be no threats for Russia, no attempts to dismember or humiliate the country (which, of course, does not exclude the political responsibility for the destruction). The Russian government was not able to make its population love war, despite all the propaganda — there is a clear demand for peace, one that would be sealed with credible security guarantees. A left response is not to repeat “plague on both your houses”, but to craft a new security architecture, one that would overarch the current alliances. Russia should be part of these new arrangements and mutual security should be guaranteed by third parties, such as representatives of the Global South. Russia is objectively interested in reforming United Nations security bodies and power-sharing. Developing such reforms is the task of the left, and this is the area where cooperation is indispensable.
• In terms of global inequality, Russia is a leader among the big countries: the top 1% control 24% of its income and a whopping 48% of its wealth. The war has only exacerbated this inequality. Until very recently, Russia was among the very few countries who had a flat tax rate. What is needed is an offer of fair taxation, one that would answer the demand for solidarity that is certainly present in Russia.
• The welfare state has been gradually dismantled in Russia, and there is a strong demand for restoring it. The situation when treatment for cancer is basically available only in two largest cities is unacceptable. But more importantly, restoration of the welfare state starts with respect for teachers and healthcare workers. The neoliberal system that made 80% of their salaries depend on their loyalty to their bosses should be liquidated. Professionals’ motivation is trust and respect from society, and their work should be remunerated. Russia clearly has resources for that.
• There is an overwhelming request for decentralisation of the country — which is not to be confused with its disintegration. Reinventing federal structures and installing local self-government will help to let people rule their own land. The level of anger and hatred towards Moscow is excruciating, and profound federalisation will be met with enthusiasm.
• One particular aspect of decentralisation is building horizontal infrastructure. After 25 years of an oil shower, Putin presides over the country as disconnected as it was before him. Traveling between two Siberian cities often requires making a connection in Moscow. Building roads, railroads, airports is a natural way to draw large investments and unleash creative potential.
• There is a palpable demand for more democracy in Russia — which means more self-government. It cannot be answered solely with fair elections. Empowering local councils, introducing civic engagement as part of civic education, experimenting with lotteries — these are all things that are likely to be welcomed in Russia today.

I could go on, of course — I have not even started talking about the role Russia should play in the green transition, something it is very advantageously predisposed to do. Comrades from Feminist Anti-War Resistance have made a strong case for reproductive rights, and I would add there is a wide support in Russia for cracking down on domestic violence — something that is artificially suppressed by the current government. But my point is that without a clear and coherent social-democratic alternative, change is unlikely to come. On the other hand, developing such an alternative is likely to be met with enthusiasm and support.

Clearly, there can be no such thing as an isolated social-democratic alternative for Russia. Russia is in many ways a typical — even a radical — case of neoliberal capitalism. Developing an alternative for Russia is part of the job of developing a global alternative. But perhaps Russia is, paradoxically, a good place to start as it has a legacy to build on.