Today’s Uzbekistan and the left: An interview with three Uzbek Comrades

First published at LeftEast.

Following 25 years of Islam Karimov’s rule, on December 14, 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev became the second President of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. Though Mirziyoyev had been Karimov’s prime minister for thirteen years, his ascent to the presidency marked a sharp turn in the Uzbekistan’s political economy, away from the statism of the Karimov era, when various protectionist policies, resistance to privatization, price and mobility controls restricted the development of full-fledged market relations.

So far, Mirziyoyev’s presidency, now in its third term, has been marked by greater openness to foreign capital, foreign investment and thoroughgoing liberalization of the economy, though importantly not in the political sphere. International news has predictably valorized these reforms, touting the stably high GDP growth rates; the ubiquitous construction cranes over Tashkent; the arrival of luxury brands and foreign banks in the capital and the big cities; the deals with Lukoil, Total, Rio Tinto in the energy and mining sectors; the Chinese investments in agriculture, 5G technology, and Belt-and-Road-related transportation and infrastructure projects. Less widely advertised is the whole logistical economy established after February 2022 as a result of (and most of it meant to bypass) Western sanctions on Russia: since then, Uzbekistan has become a major exporter of electronics and other high-end machinery to Russia. Even less discussed is the process of primitive accumulation underlying this economic transformation. That, in turn, has led to a massive transformation in class relations: the emergence of a new class of oligarchs, especially through privatization of state assets, as well as precarization of working-class lives, both at work and at home, through increased poverty, household indebtedness, financialization, and a general housing crisis.

In the regional context, unlike Kyrgyzstan, for example, there is massive production in Uzbekistan, much of it left from the Soviet era. But unlike Kazakhstan, which experiences frequent wildcat strikes, especially in the oil and gas sector or Kyrgyzstan, where social protest is the norm (at least until Japarov’s recent restrictions), one rarely hears of open labor protest in Uzbekistan. Together with Turkmenistan, it is the only post-Soviet country whose labor law does not allow for the right to strike. Such a legal framework, combined with the great punitiveness with which the state treats labor unrest, has reduced the latter to highly localized wildcats meant to force the employer to pay unpaid wages or address some flagrant aspect of working conditions.

We spoke with three people from Uzbekistan’s leftist circles about the state of the country’s political economy under Mirziyoyev, the role of Soviet nostalgia, the conditions and potential for the fledgling Uzbek left. Given the repressive state of public politics in the country, we decided to keep them anonymous.

LE: Could you speak to some of Mirziyoyev’s policies (cumulatively known as “The Third Renaissance”)? How have they affected Uzbek society? In particular, has the massive entry of capitalism created any social/ labor unrest? What have been the impacts on working class/poor households and women’s work?

Comrade 1 (C1): Since 2016, there has been a massive upward concentration of wealth in Uzbekistan, as a result of which a new class of oligarchs has emerged. This is mainly done via the privatization of large industrial enterprises and the liberalization of market prices in the market. Inflation, price surges and gradual demolition of social benefits were the natural consequence of this economic liberalization. While it ushered in some macroeconomic progress, the working class and the intelligentsia, i.e. people of lower income, have to face the brunt of this change. For this reason, there is huge dissent against the government policies, which may imply the possibility that the government may lose its legitimacy if the situation doesn’t change.

Comrade 2 (C2): I would not talk about “massive entry of capitalism”. We have only begun to borrow more from international financial institutions. But there was no sharp increase in the level of foreign direct investment in the economy. Under government guarantees, individual companies, mainly from Russia and China, primarily in the mining and energy industries, have entered the market. Russian oligarchs have begun to divide the most profitable industries, primarily in the mining and energy industries, among themselves. At the same time, there was a relative liberalization of the economy. The private conversion of the national currency has become legal, and business conditions have improved.

I believe the “third renaissance” and the concept of “New Uzbekistan,” often associated with it, is nothing more than an attempt to increase the legitimacy of the new course, to mobilize the population and bureaucracy around the so-called reforms. The new leadership speaks to society: “Maybe in Karimov’s time it was not possible to come to ‘a bright future,’ as the first president [Karimov] promised, but now we will definitely reach it. Let’s build a New Uzbekistan! It will be the Third Renaissance in the history of the Uzbek people!” It is ironic that Karimov himself, in the beginning of 90s, spoke about a “New Uzbekistan”. It seems to me that now all rhetoric simply hides the idea of authoritarian modernization along the lines of East Asian countries like China, Singapore, Korea, etc. The difference with Karimov is that if the former relied on state paternalism as the “main reformer”, then today’s authorities rely on crony capitalism – in part on the division of the market among a narrow circle of people connected with the political elites – while trying to stimulate the entrepreneurial activity of the population. There was an initial accumulation of capital, which turned out to be deadlocked under Karimov. If Karimov said that we would not have oligarchs and repressed some of them (for instance Mirodil Jalolov, the former CEO of the Uzbek firm Zeromax or Mukhiddin Asomiddinov, the owner of Alp Jamol Bank), now we are openly moving towards an oligarchy that seems to be trying to capture the state. This is indicated by the investigations of Radio Ozodlik (Radio Liberty), for example.

It seems to me that, as part of this post-Karimov transformation of economic life, alienation and atomization are growing in society. People often talk about what once used to be a place of solidarity and social ties turning into “oqibatsizlik” – not caring about social ties. Today people are busy trying to make ends meet and can’t rely on extended social and family ties as was the case earlier. I see it even among my relatives and extended family members. The spirit of capitalism is in the air, you know. In Tashkent, where foreign brands are popping up, people are busy with uncontrolled consumption. You can find a lot of expensive foreign cafes, restaurants, and shops there. But in contrast, in the rural areas, the situation has not changed so much. Inequality is growing everywhere, and there is a lot of talk about it in society. In some regions, the real income rates are falling, and we have statistical data for that. From time to time, unrest arises in the regions due to a shortage of gas and electricity or at enterprises where wages have not been paid for months. But the latter is not reported in the local established media. You can read about it only on Tiktok, Instagram or on Radio Liberty.

C3: As for the reforms, today all of the symptoms are beginning to manifest, the genesis of which dates back 7 years. The gap between rich and poor has been growing, accompanied by rising social injustice. This has led to increased societal aggression, evident in a surge in violence and religious fervor.

Today, Uzbek society finds itself in a state of war of all against all, where the strong are those who possess significant capital or are affiliated with state structures. If we follow the propagated ideas of “liberalism,” there is no social contract. Society is deeply divided, with family-clan relationships strengthening, based on the principle “the closest people are family members.” Against a backdrop of increasing social injustice and a lack of security, there is a growing demand for religion, as the majority of the working class finds solace and a sense of belonging in it.

Oligopolies are forming and strengthening, subsequently merging with members of the country’s top leadership. The fusion occurs through clannish ties, particularly through the marriage of children. This introduces the neofeudalist principle of “insider versus outsider,” which inflects the variety of capitalism found in Uzbekistan.

LE: As we know, Uzbekistan in particular and Central Asia in general are sites of clashing geopolitical interests of Russia, China, and the West? What are the latest tendencies on this front and how do they affect local politics?

C1: There is a growing anxiety among the new capitalist class and intelligentsia about the Russian threat. It is true that Russia’s influence is growing on the political, cultural and economic fronts in Central Asia. Opinion on Russia’s foreign policy toward Central Asia is very mixed. Generally, there is a tendency for Soviet-born seculars to be largely pro-Russia, while young, new capitalists, religious and nationalist elements of the intelligentsia are anti-Russian.

In contrast to the topic of Russia, the West and China are not subjects of such heated discussion. Some may say that China and the West have no history of occupying Central Asia. Still, I can say that the situation in Palestine has caused religious individuals to become skeptical of Western values.

C2: To be honest, I don’t really believe in these stories about geopolitics and the clash of interests in the region. They are talked about as if they determine the internal dynamics of the countries of the region. I think this is a very orientalist view of the countries of the region, depriving them of agency. At the same time, of course, it is impossible not to notice China’s huge economic presence in the region, which will obviously grow, but Russia is not going anywhere either. Remember Russia’s ultimatum to Western countries before the invasion of Ukraine. Russia considers the countries of the post–Soviet space to be a zone of its interests, where the West cannot enter. But there wasn’t much of the West here anyway. It seems to me that there will be even less of it in the near future. The West has enough problems of its own.

But again, all that does not directly determine internal affairs in the Central Asian countries. Look at Kyrgyzstan or Kazakhstan – they are much more connected with Russia and China, but the internal politics is not determined by the external influence. Revolutions or upheavals take place without any outside influence. The same is true for us. Political elites have enough internal agency and independence.

LE: Can you describe the main oppositional forces, namely, the political Islamists and Western-oriented liberals? Have they profited from Mirziyoyev’s rule?

C1: There is only one organized opposition against the regime governing Uzbekistan today. It is political Islam. Political Islam is the only organized force of both peaceful and violent opposition. Since 2016, increased poverty levels helped radical Islamists widen their support base and disseminate their ideas among the public better. Privatization helped some of them get rich and establish their own separate community inside traditional communities. As a result, today there are diverse layers of political Islamists in the country, who have loose coordination and employ different techniques of civil opposition. This hasn’t yet transformed into a massive political movement yet, because the government still holds a monopoly over the army and the use of force.

I don’t think there is a liberal opposition. There were attempts to create liberal political parties, but, owing to the lack of public support, all have come to no avail. Still, there are intellectual and wealthy businessmen who identify themselves as liberals. They function mainly on the media or social media to stand up for their own agenda. But, most of them are disconnected from proper political arenas and have shown little appetite for real political struggle.

C2: There are no opposition forces inside Uzbekistan. Outside of the country, the old nationalist opposition, who have long lost influence inside the country, live and some die. And the Islamists as an opposition group have also been gone for a long time. Of course, there are various groups of influence conditionally conservative-religious and pro-Western-liberal, but they are not the opposition from a political point of view: they do not claim or fight for power. There is no public politics in Uzbekistan, but only some online criticism and activity. No more. Now, it seems, even that space is becoming less and less so and political freedom is shrinking every year. Of course, the new bourgeoisie class, consisting of the entrepreneurs and some parts of the bureaucracy, has emerged as the main beneficiary of the reign of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. But broad sections of the population are increasingly nostalgic for the past–whether a Karimov or a Soviet one– and are disappointed with the current policies.

LE: Tell us about the forms that workers’ struggles have taken to challenge the new neoliberal market reforms and their negative effects on the quality of life for working-class people. What are some of the examples and how have these forms changed in the new post-Karimov era?

C1: Economic liberalization led to the concentration of wealth at the hands of oligarchs. This is not unique to Uzbekistan. Russia, Korea, and Western Europe have undergone similar historical circumstances where wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a few capitalists. Essentially, naturally, this coincides with the reduction in social welfare because some of the free or subsidized provisions are now owned by the private sector. Second, the government opens up to the world, the soum is exchanged legally to other currencies. This has led to the price surges and inflation at the time of stagnant income for average households. People mainly express their dissent on social media platforms, such as telegram channels and Facebook groups. Except for specific cases, the government doesn’t respond to such dissenting opinions. The left has no role in this struggle because the left, as I said, is living on the campuses and in the memories of soviet nostalgists.

C2: We know very little about this struggle. All that we know is limited only to news in foreign media, primarily Radio Ozodlik, as well as individual online initiatives where people turn to the authorities, criticize them, or raise individual problems. On YouTube, for example, this is the grassroots initiative “Achchiq TV”, which highlights similar cases. They are now also under pressure. There are several channels on Instagram and Tiktok as well. The authorities are fighting them and several similar channels in the telegram were closed, which raised the problems of people in rural areas. We even had an attempt to create an independent trade union. Later, the creators were put under pressure and, as far as I know, the union ceased to exist. The local media in 2017-2019 raised many problems of ordinary people too, but now they all are censored and under control. They are not allowed to raise any issues which could lead to unrest in the population. In winter for instance it’s the problem of gas and electricity shortage. Especially after the protest in Karakalpakstan in 2022 as people took to the streets to protest the constitutional amendments depriving the autonomous region of its “sovereign” status and the right to potentially secede from Uzbekistan, the authorities strengthened control over dissent in the country. 

It may seem that there are no protests or unrest in Uzbekistan. But that’s not true. They take place quite often and regularly. The workers from the energetic sector protest quite often now, but that is not enough covered by the media. The Oxus Society (a Western think tank for Central Asian studies), for instance, tried to track those protests, their number and character. But the problem is that the protests don’t have any ideological, organizational, or even rhetorical base. They are not organized, but sporadic and local. In the current political environment, it is quite difficult to make anything more of these protests and discontent. Take a look at protesters from Karakalpakstan in 2022 – officially, 18 people were killed, but unofficially, about 70. Many protest leaders were sentenced to up to 16 years in prison. No one dares to take risks. In terms of political repression we have little change in comparison to the late Karimov era.

LE: What is the state of the Uzbek Left and its relationship to these struggles?

C2: There is no “THE Uzbek left”. I’m sorry for saying that, but we don’t have any organized groups or anything like that. Only some bloggers online who even don’t cover that unrest and protest I mentioned. We are just trying to criticize some policies, to argue with other segments of social media, such as nationalists, religious conservatives, or liberals on Twitter or Facebook. But we have no contact with the workers. We don’t have the language and infrastructure to communicate with them.

C3: Unfortunately, my views on the current situation of the left in Uzbekistan are not so optimistic.

Essentially, the labor movement in Uzbekistan is completely absent. Independent union activity was destroyed during Karimov’s reign. Currently, official trade unions serve an image-building role and operate under the auspices of the state in favor of big capital. Today, these organizations serve as cash cows for their leaders and officials.

The working class does not recognize itself and its position, adhering to the most repugnant neoliberal mantras transmitted by the current agenda: “poor because stupid”, “I can achieve success, I just need to work hard and focus on career growth no matter what”. Modern Uzbek society has been raised on the principles of social Darwinism. There is a demand for justice among the general public, but, owing to the lack of class consciousness, this demand is reduced to personal matters and takes on an individualistic character.

LE: We first met in an Uzbek-language Marxist chat on Telegram. What is the role of online groups in Uzbekistan’s Left? Are there any offline activities or other activist forms on the left?

C1: Left-leaning views are largely confined to social media. Those who identify themselves as on the left are either Soviet nostalgists or marginalised segments of intellectuals and academia. As both lack willingness for political struggle for the sake of their ideology, left views are living largely in nostalgic posts about Soviet glory or academic debates on social media.

C2: This is partly true. The Left is mostly found on Facebook in two groups and separate small channels. The telegram group you joined was also created recently. Offline initiatives are rare, only marginally leftist or highly secretive.

But who the leftists are is also an open question. In my opinion, these may be mainly individuals or segments of the population who are at the same time nostalgic for the Soviet era, have a strong sense of social justice, oppose capitalism and positively regard Putin’s Russia. There are some people who call themselves Marxists or Communists who are familiar with classical Marxism and Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet era. We have no reading groups (кружки), no ideological core, no organized groups.

C3: It is worth noting that in Uzbekistan, non-systemic opposition is strictly prohibited at the legislative level. There are artificial barriers such as registration and collecting signatures of government representatives on the ground. These procedures allow filtering out unwelcome elements and “putting them under a lid”.

Since 1991, in Uzbekistan, left-wing ideas have been actively destroyed by the state itself, persuading the working class that the ideas of socialism and communism are utopian and have no real basis in local tradition. For most people, left-wing ideas are associated with the Soviet period, a time of repression, shortages, and oppression of nationalities. Unfortunately, creating an active left movement in Uzbekistan today is not feasible for two key reasons: (1) The regime is not interested in allowing non-systemic public activity to form in the country (parties, movements, NGOs, activism), using both legal and illegal methods to combat them. (2) Society is very conservative, and the state itself is interested in reproducing its archaic characteristics. The working class lacks self-awareness and is unable to adequately reflect on the events directly affecting their position.

LE: Assuming there was a critical mass of leftists willing to go for it, how difficult would it be to establish a leftist political group/ labor union/ NGO/ Marxist university seminar given the restricted political conditions of contemporary Uzbekistan?

C1: I doubt there is such a critical mass, as there is a huge gap between the proletariat and the intellectuals who hold left-leaning views. Even in conditions of genuine political freedom, the left is highly unlikely to attract lower social classes due to huge discrepancy in viewpoints, perspectives and education levels. This is hard to explain, but the momentum currently belongs to reactionary forces, mainly religious groups and nationalists. Lower classes see the world through the paradigm of identity groups rather than social class.

C2: I don’t think there is a critical mass of leftists willing to go for it. And I’m quite sure that it’s nearly impossible to establish any kind of group in contemporary Uzbekistan with the state’s repressive political practices against any grassroots initiatives and self-organization. There was a case some time ago when a group of nationalists wanted to organize a meeting to discuss the establishment of the pan-Turkist movement “Yosh Turkistonliklar harakati”. The authorities banned that meeting. They now have an online community on social media.

On the other hand, three years ago, a group of people tried to establish a secularist, progressivist party, with the occasional social democratic slogan, “Haqiqat va taraqqiyot” (Truth and progress). And even though they were harassed and assaulted several times, and the party never got registered, the authorities did not go as far as arresting them. Maybe it’s important from the point of view that international organizations would condemn such a level of repression. Additionally, some prominent activists and outspoken journalists were already arrested and sentenced to 3 to 9 years. Nobody knows exactly where the red lines are, even if a few of them are obvious to everybody: one can’t criticize the president, his family, and the security services.

Back to your question, I think it’s not impossible, but quite risky, to try to organize any kind of offline initiatives today in Uzbekistan. There is nobody willing to take risks.

However, today’s neoliberal policies are rapidly accelerating class divisions. As the situation continues to deteriorate, people will undoubtedly seek answers, and by that time, we should be prepared to provide them.

C3: Of course, all the above may demoralize some comrades, but it is worth understanding one well-worn truth “The worse, the better.” That is, the sooner people realize their dire situation, and most importantly, its genesis, the sooner they will begin to organize.

However, this in no way diminishes the necessity of conducting agitational and educational activities among the general public, primarily so that they can obtain and master the tools to build a just and highly developed society.

LE: What is the relationship to the Soviet period in today’s Uzbek society? Is there much nostalgia? If so, in what sectors of society/ parts of the country is it concentrated? Do you see Soviet nostalgia as a force the left can work with?

C1: Due to decreasing quality of life, nostalgia for the Soviet Union is prevalent in Uzbek society, but it is restricted to workers and a minority of intellectuals, who were born before the 1980s. This is partly due to the decrease in the quality of life (which is caused by outdated infrastructure, corruption, inflation and unemployment) and partly due to the fact that most of these individuals have the identity, shaped during the Soviet times. However, I am not sure we can meaningfully collaborate with them, because most of them don’t understand the ideology of the left or why the left is necessary for the betterment of society. They simply display Soviet nostalgia due to their personal affiliation to Soviet times and as a conservative response to the current effects of sweeping changes that globalization is bringing. So it is no wonder why a typical Soviet nostalgist is at the same time almost always a pro-Russian conservative. It would be possible to align with them from leftist perspective once they understand why left ideology matters, rather than blindly longing for Soviet times.

C2: The attitude to the Soviet period in society is ambivalent. On the one hand, during Karimov’s era the regime established an informational monopoly and had strong control over public discourse which was critical of the Soviet period. It was necessary for the narrative of national independence to tell the people that now we are free and independent. We as a nation, the discourse went, dreamed about these times for centuries and now can build a bright future together. On the other hand, the broad depoliticised masses were and partly are, to a greater or lesser extent, still nostalgic for the Soviet Union. We don’t have much independent sociological data on the subject, but there are few academic articles as well as street polls confirming this sentiment. There are finally social media groups, which highlight the nostalgic public mood in their comments sections.

Unfortunately, this nostalgia is also problematic: in one package sometimes it is a longing for the Soviet Union, sympathy for Putin’s Russia, and support of the war against Ukraine. Today, two years into the war, people may be more inclined to see it end, but at the beginning of the war the majority of the population supported Russia and its invasion. Labor migration to Russia and Russian propaganda have certainly played a role in shaping these attitudes, as for many people Russian is the foreign language in which they watch and read the news, but in the first place – attitude towards the Soviet state which is positive and towards Russia as its successor – too.

I believe that nostalgia has a definite class as well as a generational basis. The poorer and older segments of the population, primarily those who came of age in the USSR, are the groups among whom it is felt most powerfully. Because there was some kind of stability, social welfare and job opportunities which have gone under the late Karimov and especially now. Millions of Uzbeks are now immigrants in Russia, Turkey, South Korea etc.

And we have those who are critical of those times – the intelligentsia, the so-called middle class, the younger generation, and the vast majority of public figures. We do not have a single major public intellectual or opinion leader who could at least acknowledge some positive aspects of the Soviet period. That is why the interests of broad layers of society remain unarticulated. There is a nationalist hegemonic public discourse and there are broad, subaltern layers of the population whose interests stay unarticulated. Even in my family, I observe this division as my uncle, who is a farmer and more pro-Soviet, while my father, with a university degree, is prone to criticize the Soviet Union.

I am also rather skeptical about working with these sentiments in any way. I’m afraid we will have to if we want to promote a leftist agenda. It will be very difficult not to slip into an apology for the Soviet Union – to critically rework the past in such a way as to recognise the achievements and make a positive programme out of them, but at the same time to recognise the negative aspects of that period – is a tough task. In part, the future of the leftist agenda in the country depends on how well we manage to process this experience. But again, who are we and who am I to claim such a thing – some kind of ruler of people’s minds who try to manipulate public opinion? We need more horizontal and democratic forms of communication, not a manipulative “vanguard.”

After Karimov’s death and the beginning of neo-liberal reforms, nostalgia for Karimov’s rule is now growing in society too. His authoritarian and paternalistic policies were not left-wing – he gradually reduced the social benefits that were available under the Soviet Union, but at the same time he retained control over the prices of basic products, subsidized electricity and gas so that the impoverished population did not take to the streets, as they did in the city of Andijan in May 2005, when his army shot several hundred protesters, following a crackdown on a local community of businessmen who had tried to organize an alternative social assistance network for the impoverished population. He was, therefore, somehow forced to “care” for ordinary people to keep the peace in society. But now, amid the post-Karimov transition to market relations, the living standards of different social classes are rapidly diverging. The slogans of the time are “Let everyone pull their own cart” and “Any business is good.” The first belongs to the president, the second to the former mayor of the capital.