Afghanistan–Pakistan war, militarism and a left response to the regional crisis

A version of this was first published at Alternative Viewpoint.

As cross-border strikes intensify and Pakistan’s defence minister declares “open war” against the Afghan Taliban government, the long arc of Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy appears under severe strain. Is this merely another episode in a volatile frontier relationship — or the blowback of decades of militarised strategy and proxy politics?

In this conversation, Pakistani left activist, academic and journalist Farooq Sulehria examines the crisis through a structural lens: the legacy of “strategic depth,” the Frankenstein logic of jihadist patronage, the ideological character of the Taliban regime, and the dangers of campism within sections of the left. Rejecting both state militarism and theocratic authoritarianism, Sulehria argues that the current confrontation reflects a deeper crisis of the regional order — one whose costs will be borne overwhelmingly by working people on both sides of the Durand Line.

Pakistan’s defence minister has declared “open war” on the Afghan Taliban government. Is this escalation a tactical rupture or does it mark the exhaustion of Pakistan’s long-standing Afghanistan doctrine?

It is neither a tactical rupture nor the exhaustion of Pakistan’s “strategic depth” policy. Instead, the recent declaration of war by defence minister Khawaja Asif reflects Islamabad’s frustration over the ongoing conflict.

Prior to declaring war, Pakistan would have made preparations. It was only after exhausting other alternatives that Pakistan ultimately designated the Taliban regime — which they had assisted in establishing — as an adversary. Ironically, Asif expressed gratitude to Allah Almighty on his X account when the Taliban defeated the US and regained control of Kabul.

Border clashes between the two countries have escalated into Pakistani attacks on Kabul and other towns since October. Qatar, Turkey and China have facilitated 65 rounds of talks between Kabul and Islamabad since then. However, the Movement of Pakistani Taliban/Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has intensified its terrorist activities in Pakistan, having been provided safe havens in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime.

The dispute between Kabul and Islamabad arises from the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. The TTP is targeting military and police forces in addition to civilians. Last year, nearly 1000 terror attacks were reported, the majority claimed by the TTP.

Since October, Pakistan has closed its border and halted trade with Afghanistan. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan relies on Pakistan for trade with India and has a significant dependence on Pakistani imports, particularly wheat, vegetables and medicines.

In the Balochistan province, nationalists have intensified their militant activities, occasionally attracting global attention. Pakistan accuses India of supporting these Baloch separatists. Furthermore, the Taliban regime has established relations with New Delhi, much to Islamabad’s frustration, to counter Pakistani pressure.

Domestically, Pakistan has justified the existence of safe havens for the Afghan Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11 under the concept of strategic depth. This concept suggests using Afghanistan as Pakistan’s “friendly backyard,” in the event of a conflict with the significantly larger India.

The concept of “strategic depth” has influenced Islamabad’s policy for decades. Has this doctrine now collapsed, and if so, what might take its place?

On the contrary, mainstream media commentators viewed as unofficial spokespersons of the Pakistani establishment have been talking of regime change in Kabul. At this stage, it is difficult to substantiate whether Islamabad is planning regime change in Kabul, especially given the lack of concrete evidence. However, such thinking cannot be ruled out.

Islamabad has been exploring the possibility of a coup or regime change that would benefit Pakistan. While such a coup or regime change would not solve Pakistan’s problems, such wild ideas reflect Islamabad’s obsession with strategic depth.

One may dismiss regime change as a conspiracy theory or conjectural fantasy, but the escalation to rein in the Taliban regime mirrors Islamabad’s desperation to pursue the idiomatic strategic depth.

Islamabad portrays the crisis as being centred on TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan. To what degree is this conflict a result of Pakistan’s historical engagement in proxy warfare and its support for militant groups?

This is a classic example of Frankenstein’s monster or the sorcerer’s apprentice, as expressed in the German idiom.

Pakistan is both the origins and a fertile breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism. Since the so-called “Afghan Jihad”, which was derisively termed the “Dollar Jihad” by domestic critics, Pakistan has fostered the Jihad industry.

Initially, the objective was to support the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation; later, it was directed against India. The state’s classification of some Taliban members as “good” and others as “bad” indicates that its policy remains unchanged.

At the same time, how should we assess the Taliban regime’s responsibility? Has Kabul failed — or refused — to restrain cross-border militancy for ideological or strategic reasons?

Yes, the Afghan regime appears to have done little to rein in the TTP. Commentators have noted the regime’s inability to exert control over this group. There are ideological reasons for such an outcome as well as practical considerations and geopolitical calculations. The Taliban regime has adeptly and strategically utilised the TTP, to garner support from New Delhi.

Should the current confrontation be viewed primarily as a clash between two regimes driven by security concerns, both influenced by decades of conflict, or as merely a straightforward instance of aggression and retaliation?

Neither side appears willing to pursue diplomatic avenues.

This raises questions about the nature of the Taliban regime, which has implemented policies akin to women’s apartheid and has effectively introduced slavery, demonstrating a lack of belief in contemporary diplomatic practices and norms.

The Taliban has a limited social base and maintains control through fear and intimidation. Their support primarily derives from extremist religious factions within the country.

Meanwhile, the military, which governs the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, approaches every issue through a lens of securitisation.

Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban have struggled with economic collapse, diplomatic isolation and internal factional tensions. How do these pressures shape their stance toward Pakistan?

As soon as they recaptured Kabul, they rebelled against Pakistan. It appears they recognised that Pakistan lacked the economic and diplomatic influence needed to provide the Taliban regime with legitimacy and stability.

They sought to establish relations with China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states, along with India, to Pakistan’s frustration. Islamabad was excluded from these developments.

Notably, immediately after the Taliban solidified their rule, second-tier officials began issuing statements critical of Pakistan. My Afghan comrades interpret these statements as attempts to garner social support within Afghanistan, where Pakistan is widely unpopular.

From a left perspective, how should one characterise the Taliban regime today: as a nationalist-Islamist formation seeking sovereignty or as a fundamentally reactionary project whose regional behaviour reflects its ideological core?

Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to characterise the Afghan Taliban as a form of nationalists. Tariq Ali’s work, The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold, exemplifies this view, as he seeks to portray the Taliban as Islamo-nationalists. Such perspectives reveal a profound misunderstanding of the Taliban movement, which represents one of the most extreme manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism.

Nationalism emphasises the concepts of nation and national identity, language, history and culture. In contrast, Islamic fundamentalism prioritises Sharia, aiming to return to a perceived Muslim (Arab) past, in which the nation is regarded as a fifth column that threatens to divide the Ummah. Culture is perceived as an impurity, with cultural practices such as music and dance deemed sinful under Sharia law.

Interestingly, some leftist perspectives have absurdly characterised the Taliban as an expression of class struggle. During the war against Iraq, the Ayatollahs in Iran incorporated and subsumed nationalism into their Sharia project. Similarly, in their conflict with Pakistan, the Taliban regime references the nation alongside religion. However, this does not fundamentally alter their character.

In my opinion, attempts to frame the Taliban as nationalists or as subalterns involved in class struggle were early indicators of campism emerging in the aftermath of 9/11.

The Taliban claims that it defends Afghan sovereignty against violations by Pakistan. How does one critically engage that claim without romanticising a deeply authoritarian regime?

The Taliban regime is framing the Pakistani attacks as a violation of sovereignty. However, Pakistan is framing the TTP safe havens and their infiltration as a violation of sovereignty. It is a clash of barbarisms. Neither side can claim any moral superiority.

From one viewpoint, the monster had legitimate grievances against Herr Frankenstein. From another viewpoint, one may express sympathy for Victor Frankenstein. Tragically, innocent civilians will bear the consequences.

Since 1979, Afghans have continued living under hellish conditions. People in Pakistan, particularly in the bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, have suffered greatly since 9/11. Thousands of lives have been claimed through senseless violence by the Taliban, military operations conducted by the Pakistani state, and endless tribal and sectarian disputes triggered by this conflict.

We should avoid reducing it to an Af-Pak affair, however. Western imperialism is the original sinner here.

Regional powers — China, Iran, Russia, and Gulf states — have moved quickly to call for de-escalation. What does this episode reveal about the fragility of the wider regional order?

A couple of days after Pakistan’s declaration of war, the US-Israel attack on Iran and the ensuing situation have overshadowed the Af-Pak conflict.

This conflict is not only regional, but underscores the growing number of nation-state wars. The United Nations has been rendered obsolete. No matter how hypocritical and problematic the global liberal order was, the Trumpist alternative is proving even more dangerous.

Incidentally, Trump has praised the Pakistani attack on Afghanistan.

Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are grappling with severe economic crises. How does the militarised escalation relate to the realities of class — including unemployment, displacement, and refugees — on both sides of the Durand Line?

Indeed, this situation will disproportionately impact the working classes. Life is set to become even more arduous. The continuing conflict in West Asia will exacerbate their suffering.

In a conflict between a militarised post-colonial state and a theocratic regime, what principle should the left adopt? How can it oppose both militarism and religious authoritarianism without sliding into geopolitical campism?

To defeat the Taliban, Pakistan must adopt a secular approach. This is a fundamental precondition. The Taliban regime should not be recognised. Nevertheless, it is crucial to express solidarity with the Afghan people, particularly Afghan women.

The Af-Pak conflict has fostered chauvinism on both sides, which undermines working-class solidarity. The left should not align itself with either Islamabad or Kabul.

We oppose the war and demand justice and democracy, as well as an end to the apartheid faced by women in Afghanistan. We must hold both the Taliban and their imperial or regional backers accountable for their war crimes, just as we did with their predecessors, the Mujahideen.

Ironically, I have observed social media posts from some Pakistanis, including self-proclaimed leftists, who support the Pakistani invasion, citing the Taliban’s barbaric and fundamentalist nature as justification. This mindset can be described as “internal Orientalism”, rooted in Pakistani chauvinism to frame this conflict within the narrative of a Clash of Civilisations.

Does this crisis create an opening to rethink security-state politics across the region and is there any realistic space today for cross-border progressive solidarity between Pakistani and Afghan civil society forces?

Rather than focusing solely on an Af-Pak cross-border solidarity initiative, I propose a broader South Asia-wide project. We can realistically rely primarily on the diasporic Afghan progressives, given the severe repression of Afghanistan's civil society.

In Pakistan, progressive voices are marginalised. However, we urgently need such a project. By extending our efforts to encompass South Asia, we can strengthen and consolidate these initiatives. The newspaper I co-edit, Daily Jeddojehad (Struggle), will be taking some modest initial steps in this direction.