Why is North Korea helping Russia’s war on Ukraine?

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Kim with NK troops

North Korea is an enigma in many senses of the word, but leader Kim Jong Un’s decision to send troops to fight in Russia’s war on Ukraine shocked many in South Korea and internationally. Many are asking why Kim chose to take North Korea down this disastrous and dead-end path? The answer lies in the various dynamics at play in crisis-prone Northeast Asia.

Russia-North Korea treaty

In June, Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russian President Vladimir Putin that was subsequently approved by Russia’s Duma on October 24 and North Korea’s Senate on November 6.

But the troop deployment preceded its ratification: 1500 troops were dispatched on October 8, with a similar-sized contingent sent a week later. It is estimated that by the end of the year up to 12,000 troops — including three generals and 500 officers — will be fighting for Russia. The elite troops belong to four Special Operation Forces brigades of the Korean People’s Army. Though well-trained, they have no combat experience. Russia and North Korea continue to deny their presence, but various reports indicate they are fighting on the Kursk front, inside Russia.

South Korean military intelligence believes North Korea proposed the military deployment and that, in desperate need of a reliable ally, Putin accepted the offer. Speculations abound as to what North Korea might obtain in return, from inter-continental ballistic missile technology, cutting-edge fighter planes and other military hardware through to economic aid. But nothing has been confirmed.

A knife in China’s back?

These developments, which also allows Russian troops to set foot in North Korea, has left China extremely upset. Taken without consultation, they have been received as a huge insult by China, which views North Korea as strategic to its military defence.

At the same time, North Korea has been increasingly upset with China in recent decades, particularly after reports emerged that China had developed plans to deal with a possible abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime. Chinese military pundits and internet analysts have claimed that should this occur, China’s North Army would cross into North Korea in order to block similar moves by South Korea and the United States. Though not official government policy, such speculation has angered Kim.

This only increases the potential for the uneasy relationship to turn sour at any moment. According to a widely-circulated rumour, Kim once stated that while Japan has been an enemy of Korea for 100 years, China has been an enemy for 1000 years. Whether true or not, such sentiments reflect the attitude of North Korean leaders’ toward China: officially a brother state with whom a special friendship was forged through the Korean War, China remains an unreliable neighbour viewed with suspicion.

A regime in crisis

At the end of 2023, Kim announced North Korea was officially discarding its national reunification policy, declaring the relationship with South Korea as one between two antagonistic states. This shift was largely motivated by internal factors, with voluntary isolation seen as the only way to save the regime.

Steps in this direction had already been taken, with the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) introducing a series of laws designed to strengthen its control over youth since 2020. These included the “law for rebuffing reactionary thought and culture” (2020), the “law to guarantee youth culture” (2021), the “law to protect Pyongyang cultural language” (2023), and the “law to protect state secrets” (2023). In January, BBC Korea reported that two boys had been sentenced to 12 years in a labour camp for watching and distributing South Korean dramas — an extremely harsh sentence intended to send a clear message to other young people. Reports of similar punishments have appeared from time to time. None of this succeeded in halting South Korea’s growing influence, so Kim decided to discard his father’s and grandfather’s reunification policy for good.

Though he cannot publicly state it, Kim knows that South Korea has won out over North Korea: South Korea’s population is twice as big, its economy 50 times larger and its military is far superior. Today, South Korea is among the top 10 advanced economies of the world while North Korea remains a rogue state relegated to the bottom rung.

Given this, North Korea’s regime views absorption by South Korea as highly probable. Therefore, even with its nuclear weapons, it constantly seeks ways to guarantee its survival. Cutting ties with the outside world and blocking the “evil” influence of the capitalist South is one such means.

Coming to power after his father’s death in 2011, Kim consolidated his position through purges, assassinations and executions. Most notoriously, he brutally executed his uncle and kingmaker, Jang Sung-taek, and assassinated his brother, Kim Jung Nam. But though internal rivals and enemies have been eliminated, Kim’s power is not secure as popular support cannot be bought through threats and bribery. Without any carrots to offer his people, Kim’s only option is more sticks.

The market generation

Despite being an extremely closed society controlled from above, North Korea has undergone significant changes.

The Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent aftershocks were a historic turning point for the country. Amid a severe food crisis in the mid-’90s, the regime ended its rations system and allowed people to buy food on the market. Since then, the capitalist market has grown to play a greater role. Markets not only became spaces for economic activities and the rise of a rudimentary form of capitalism; they also emerged as places where South Korean songs, movies and dramas, imported via China, were widely distributed.

Through this process a new generation emerged that had never experienced the state’s ration system and was increasingly individualistic. This new generation has no trust in Kim, the KWP or the North Korean regime. Their personal experience has led them to prioritise their own survival. As a result, Kim’s support base today is extremely weak, with repression and coercion the only means left to maintain his rule.

North Korean refugees

Rising numbers of North Korean refugees has also contributed to this shift in societal values.

The first wave of North Korean refugees migrated to northern China in search of means to send money home. Most left without ever considering moving to South Korea. But once exposed to the outside world, many began to discover the realities of South Korea’s advanced capitalism.

The China-North Korea border is home to many South Korean spies, as well as many Christian evangelicals seeking avenues to attract converts inside North Korea. Initially suspicious of these missionaries offering material aid and religious indoctrination, some North Koreans eventually turned to them for help.

What started as individual cases of people escaping North Korea soon turned into an entire industry, systematically organised and coordinated by professional people smugglers. North Korean refugees have become a hot potato for China. Its alliance with North Korea means the Chinese government officially refuses to provide aid to refugees or cooperate with South Korea on this humanitarian issue. North Korean refugees are forced to embark on long and dangerous routes to South Korea via China’s southeast neighbours, such as Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.

As of September, 34,259 North Korean refugees have officially entered South Korea since 1998, where they have formed their own community, struggling to survive inside the capitalist south.

Fighting Russia’s war

North Korea’s troop deployment might look like an abrupt decision taken on the whims of a dictator. But placed within the complicated scenario facing the Korean peninsula, it is clearly part of a well-planned strategy for regime survival.

The economic benefits derived from compensation received for every soldier’s death cannot be ignored in a country that desperately needs hard currency due to international sanctions. The real aim, however, is minimising the dangers of any potential intervention by China in what it views as a necessary buffer state. For Kim, China was the biggest threat to his regime’s survival; he therefore acted accordingly. Winning people’s hearts and minds, however, remains an uphill battle.

News regarding the death of North Korean troops has occasionally appeared in the media since October, though exact numbers are unverified. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky claims that as many as 3000 North Korean troops had been killed in battle, but South Korean military intelligence put the number at about 1000. Whatever the exact figure, the death toll will inevitably rise as these North Korean troops are not prepared for hyper-modern drone warfare or communicating with Russian troops.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency means the situation in Northeast Asia will become more precarious and unpredictable. It is too early to tell if we are entering a new Cold War or an era of multipolarity. But uncertainty about the future is growing. This will inevitably mean more instability and difficulties for the peoples of Northeast Asia.

Won Youngsu is an activist, Marxist and labour studies researcher. He is the Director of Pnyx – Institute of Marxist Studies in Korea.