From confrontation to engagement: The strategic logic of US rapprochement with Russia

First published at Elusive Development.

US re-engagement with Russia under the Donald Trump administration came as a shock to many, particularly its European allies. For decades (with a brief interruption in the 1990s and early 2000s), Washington’s stance toward Moscow had been defined by containment, sanctions and military deterrence. Yet, seemingly overnight, rhetoric shifted from hostility to engagement. Was this development truly so unexpected? Beyond Trump’s numerous campaign pronouncements — most notably his claim that he could end the Russo-Ukrainian war in 24 hours — what deeper strategic logic underpins this apparent tectonic shift in US foreign policy?

Far from an impulsive departure from tradition, this recalibration reflects a broader evolution in US strategic thinking. The US is moving away from the territorialist logic of power, which relies on costly military interventions and direct control, toward a more economically-driven and cost-effective strategy of influence. At the heart of this shift is an effort to reduce strategic overhead, leverage economic tools over military force, and pursue selective engagement where it serves US interests. More critically, this shift is tied to the global realignment of power, particularly the growing challenge posed by China. If rapprochement with Russia can weaken Beijing’s influence while securing US economic and strategic advantages, the move from confrontation to engagement becomes less of an aberration and more of a calculated response to shifting geopolitical realities.

This analysis was written before the February 28 White House meeting between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, a failed diplomatic encounter that laid bare the transactional nature, economic pragmatism and geopolitical concerns that define the current US administration’s approach to its partners — Ukraine included. While this text focuses on US-Russia relations, that meeting served as a stark illustration of how Washington’s foreign policy — often perceived as unpredictable — ultimately follows a consistent logic: prioritising strategic advantage over ideological commitments. This broader context helps explain why what some interpret as a “pivot” to Russia may, in fact, be part of a larger recalibration aimed at preserving US dominance in an increasingly multipolar world.

The declining utility of the territorialist logic

For much of the 20th and early 21st centuries, US global power was maintained through extensive military commitments, permanent alliances, and a vast security infrastructure spanning Europe, Asia and the Middle East. This territorialist logic, as conceptualised by Giovanni Arrighi, required substantial investment in military bases, overseas troop deployments and the upkeep of alliances like NATO. However, this approach has become increasingly costly and, in many cases, strategically inefficient. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the limits of military interventionism, consuming trillions of dollars with little to show in terms of lasting influence. Even in Europe, the expansion of NATO has imposed additional security commitments on the US without necessarily yielding proportional strategic advantages.

David Harvey argues imperial strategies have shifted from direct territorial domination toward more flexible forms of economic and geopolitical control, where coercion, financial leverage and market mechanisms replace the need for physical occupation. The US is increasingly relying on cost-effective instruments of influence, such as sanctions, trade policies and financial restrictions, rather than direct military engagement. This shift reflects not only the economic burden of territorial control but also the changing nature of global power competition, where economic and technological supremacy matter more than the sheer number of military bases or troop deployments.

Recognising these constraints, US policymakers — especially under the Trump and Joe Biden administrations — have sought to reduce direct military obligations and instead pursue influence through economic pressure, targeted diplomacy and the strategic use of threats and incentives. This approach is evident in Washington’s recalibration of its stance toward Russia: rather than attempting to contain Russia purely through military deterrence, there is an emerging interest in selective engagement that could serve US economic and geopolitical interests while reducing long-term costs.

Economic pragmatism: A key driver of US policy

Economic considerations play a central role in the US reassessment of its stance toward Russia. Several key factors contribute to this shift.

Access to strategic resources. Russia remains one of the world’s largest producers of oil, natural gas and critical minerals (including rare earth elements essential for high-tech industries). Russia holds the largest world reserves of gas and about 10% of the world’s total reserves of rare earth elements (twice as much as Ukraine). While the US has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian energy exports, there are indications that US businesses could benefit from selective economic engagement. For instance, recent statements by President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials suggest that US companies are welcome to participate in Russian aluminum production, the energy sector and rare earths extraction — sectors that are crucial for advanced manufacturing and military applications.

Beyond its resource wealth, Russia’s economic structure itself presents potential opportunities for US capital. Unlike China, Russia is not a direct competitor to the US economy but rather a peripheral economy structurally dependent on integration into the global system.

Boris Kagarlitsky (2008) describes how Russia’s capitalist development has been shaped by its role as a raw material exporter, with wealth concentrated in powerful business clans or oligarchs, who control resource exports. During the 1990s economic crisis, Russia paradoxically became a financial “donor” to the global economy, as vast amounts of capital were converted into Western currencies, primarily US dollars, and moved abroad. This trend of capital outflows persisted even during Russia’s relative economic recovery in the early 2000s, highlighting the structural dependency of Russian capitalism on external markets and financial systems.

The costs of sanctions and economic decoupling. While US-led sanctions have significantly impacted the Russian economy, their impact has not been as significant as expected as the report Russian Economy at the Time of War argues. The sanctions have also had unintended consequences for Western economies, particularly in energy markets and global commodity supply chains. Europe, in particular, has faced economic turbulence due to the loss of Russian gas supplies, leading to higher energy prices and inflationary pressures. Analysts estimate that European countries have spent between 1-7% of GDP shielding consumers and firms from rising energy costs, caused in part by building new infrastructure for energy security. But the US losses were not insignificant: according to some estimates, US companies have lost $324 billion by moving out of Russia. For the US, a more flexible approach — one that balances sanctions with selective engagement — could help stabilise global markets and prevent economic fallout.

Sanction enforcement also carries costs. Apart from the relatively small costs of monitoring and enforcement (most of which are transferred to Russian counterparties), there are geopolitical costs associated with maintaining compliance. By their nature, sanctions are only effective if they are enforced beyond the target country — that is, if third parties outside of Russia comply with them. However, as the number of sanctions grows, so does the number of foreign businesses affected, many of which operate in strategically important countries for the US, such as India, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. The imposition of secondary sanctions complicates US relations with these key partners, who may view such measures as an infringement on their sovereignty and economic autonomy. Moreover, even strategic adversaries such as China — which the US seeks to contain — become entangled in sanction enforcement, adding another layer of diplomatic and economic tension. The sanctions backfire, to borrow the title of Agatha Demarais’ book, which explains how sanctions reshape the world against US interests. The broader and more complex the sanctions regime, the more friction it generates in US global relationships, potentially undermining Washington’s ability to maintain a unified geopolitical front.

Beyond these immediate consequences, sanctions have also raised concerns about the long-term role of the US dollar in global trade. Treasury officials across various US administrations have cautioned that extensive use of financial sanctions could threaten the central role of the dollar and the US financial system. The sweeping sanctions on Russia appear to have accelerated efforts by various countries — including China — to reduce their reliance on the US dollar in international transactions, as well as on US and European cross-border payments infrastructure more generally. The US benefits economically and politically from the dollar’s status as the dominant reserve currency in the global economy. If de-dollarisation efforts gain traction on a broader scale, there could be adverse implications for US influence, financial stability, and economic leverage in global markets.

Repositioning Europe as a competitor rather than an asset. Europe has traditionally been seen as a key ally in US global strategy. However, recent policy shifts — particularly under Trump, and to a lesser extent Biden — have reframed the transatlantic relationship in more transactional terms. The US has increasingly viewed European economic power as a challenge rather than a complement to its own interests. This is reflected in Trump’s announcement of plans to impose tariffs of 25% on European Union goods, including cars and farm products. A further indication of this transactional approach includes disputes over defence spending within NATO, and Washington’s push for Europe to take on a greater share of its own security responsibilities. Such moves signal a departure from the traditional alignment between the US and Europe, instead treating the EU as an economic rival rather than an indispensable ally.

Branko Milanovic has argued that Trump’s tariff and trade policies signify the end of neoliberal globalisation as we know it. However, what if this is not the collapse of globalisation, but rather its evolution into a new form — one where US capital benefits disproportionately by securing privileged access to foreign markets for sales while also acquiring cheap raw materials under favourable conditions? From this perspective, the Western (European) policy of global fragmentation and “friend-shoring” — where supply chains are restructured to favour geopolitical allies — represents an even more isolationist shift than Trump’s rhetoric of “America First” economic nationalism (not to mention projected real GDP losses as a result of friend-shoring). Instead of an inclusive, integrated global system, the US is curating economic dependencies to sustain its own corporate dominance. The real divergence, then, is not between Trump’s vision of US global economic supremacy and Biden’s supposed return to multilateralism, but between two competing models of controlled globalisation — one overtly nationalistic, the other veiled behind strategic economic fragmentation.

By exploring rapprochement with Russia, the US may be signalling to Europe that it is not indispensable — and that Washington has alternative diplomatic options. This realignment could serve to pressure European governments to align more closely with US priorities while simultaneously reducing European influence in global affairs.

The China factor: Strategic realignment to counter a rising rival

Perhaps the most significant driver of US interest in improving relations with Russia is the broader strategic competition with China. In the past three years, Russia and China have significantly deepened their “no limits” partnership, particularly in energy trade, military cooperation and financial transactions. In 2023, bilateral trade between Russia and China reached an unprecedented $240 billion, a substantial rise from $147 billion in 2021. Russia’s pivot to China has accelerated due to Western sanctions, making Beijing Moscow’s largest trade partner and key financial backer.

For the US, this growing alignment between Russia and China represents a major long-term threat. Washington’s goal, therefore, is to prevent a full-fledged Russia-China axis by creating incentives for Russia to maintain a degree of independence from Beijing. This approach has historical precedents. During the Cold War, the US successfully exploited tensions between the Soviet Union and China, leading to Washington’s rapprochement with Beijing. This strategy weakened the Soviet position and reshaped global power dynamics.

Some US policymakers have suggested pursuing a similar approach today — this time by engaging Russia to create distance between Moscow and Beijing. President Donald Trump explicitly stated during his election campaign, “The one thing you never want is Russia and China uniting. I’m going to have to un-unite them.”

While the economic dimension of the Russia-China partnership is concerning for the US, the geo-strategic implications are even more pressing. Although there is no formal military alliance between China and Russia, the two countries have significantly increased the frequency and scale of their joint military drills. Recent activities include coordinated naval patrols and exercises in strategic areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, signalling a robust military partnership and mutual strategic interests. This growing cooperation presents a long-term security challenge to the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia is often perceived as a military threat to Europe, but not an economic competitor on a global scale, unlike China. The prevailing view in Washington is that Europe can contain Russia with limited US involvement, allowing the US to focus its strategic resources on countering China’s economic and military expansion. 

Some analysts have celebrated Russia’s growing dependence on China, believing it weakens Moscow’s ability to act independently. However, the greatest nightmare for US strategists is a China that effectively turns Russia into its economic and military backyard, securing a stable source of raw materials, energy and strategic depth. Such a development would make China virtually invincible, granting it the economic and military resilience needed to challenge US dominance in the long term.

The US pivot toward Russia can be explained through the offshore balancing framework developed by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. In a 2016 paper, they identified three key regions of US strategic interest — Europe, the Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific — where direct military entanglements are undesirable, but preventing the rise of new hegemonic powers remains a priority.

In these regions, direct military entanglements are undesirable, but preventing the rise of new hegemonic powers is crucial. Drawing from Britain’s pre-World War I balance-of-power strategy, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that China is the current rising power that requires counterbalancing. In this framework, Russia plays a crucial role due to its long land border with China, making it a potential counterweight to Beijing.

This “continental balance” means that a conflict with Russia over Ukraine or its NATO aspirations is not in the US interest. Furthermore, Europe today has enough economic and military strength to balance Russia on its own, unlike in 1945, when direct US intervention was necessary. This suggests that the US can step back, leaving a triangular dynamic where Europe keeps Russia in check, while Russia helps contain China.

Trump’s policies align with this logic: cooling relations with Europe while warming ties with Moscow. If the US can peel Russia away from China, it could achieve a double strategic win: gaining access to Russian resources and strategic positioning while weakening China’s ability to leverage Russia as an ally in a future geopolitical confrontation.

From a security standpoint, engaging Russia could also yield cooperation (or at least understanding) on issues like arms control, counter-terrorism, and regional conflicts. That is harder to achieve if Russia is fully aligned with China against the West. So, re-establishing a working relationship might pay off by reducing global polarisation — making it not just “the West versus a Sino-Russian axis,” but a more nuanced set of relationships.

The military-geopolitical dimension: US-Russia relations and the limits of Western military pressure

While economic and strategic considerations play a crucial role in shaping US-Russia relations, the military-geopolitical dimension remains equally significant. As the war in Ukraine continues, the scope of Western military pressure on Russia appears to have reached its limits — at least without crossing thresholds that could trigger direct confrontation.

Since the early stages of the war, the US and its NATO allies have incrementally increased the quality and quantity of weapons supplied to Ukraine — from light arms and Javelin anti-tank missiles to advanced artillery systems, long-range missiles and modern Western tanks. The latest phases of military aid have included F-16 fighter jets and ATACMS long-range missiles, signalling an attempt to offset Russia’s battlefield advantages without direct NATO intervention. 

However, as these arms transfers have escalated, the West now faces a dilemma: to continue the current trajectory of military aid “as long as it takes,” further depleting Western economic and military resources or engage in further escalation, such as allowing Ukraine to strike deep inside Russian territory with NATO-provided weapons or deploying Western troops, dramatically increasing the risk of direct military confrontation with Russia.

This escalation dynamic raises fundamental strategic questions for the US: How much further can Western support go before triggering a Russian response that escalates beyond Ukraine and what are the limits of US commitment to European security if the conflict spirals into a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation?

A key factor restraining unlimited escalation of Western military support is the risk of triggering a direct conflict between NATO and Russia. Under Article V of the NATO Treaty, an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all, necessitating a collective response. If the war were to expand — whether through direct NATO intervention, Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia using Western weapons, or Russian retaliation against NATO-linked supply lines — the US would be forced into a decision that could expose it to nuclear confrontation with Russia.

The burden of such a confrontation would overwhelmingly fall on the US, given its role as the primary provider of Europe’s security umbrella. While some European countries, notably Poland and the Baltic states, advocate for more aggressive policies toward Russia, their ability to sustain a direct military engagement with Russia without US backing is highly limited. This leaves Washington with two stark choices in the event of a major escalation: to engage in direct military confrontation with Russia, raising the risk of nuclear escalation, or recalibrate its approach, potentially negotiating de-escalation to avoid being drawn into a broader war.

How significant the risk of nuclear escalation is remains the subject of intense debate. Some analysts argue that Russia’s nuclear threats are largely rhetorical, aimed at deterring further Western involvement. Others caution that if the situation escalates beyond a certain threshold, nuclear use — whether tactical or strategic — cannot be entirely ruled out. Regardless, further military escalation and a potential direct confrontation with Russia  —a nuclear superpower possessing the world’s largest arsenal, estimated at approximately 5,889 nuclear warheads — cannot be taken lightly.

“You’re gambling with the lives of millions of people, you’re gambling with World War Three,” Trump told Zelensky during their February 28 meeting at the White House, a conversation that quickly turned tense and controversial. While this accusation may be disputed — some consider it an unfair characterisation of Ukraine’s defence efforts — it nonetheless reflects genuine US concerns about the risks of direct military confrontation with Russia. 

Trump’s remarks, regardless of political motivations, highlight a wider strategic anxiety in Washington: that continued escalation, particularly if it involves NATO’s deeper involvement or Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western weapons, could push the conflict beyond a manageable threshold.

As the US calculates the costs of its military engagement and risks of direct confrontation with Russia, its decisions are also shaped by economic considerations. The US increasingly perceives Europe not just as a strategic ally but as an economic competitor, particularly as trade tensions and protectionist measures intensify. Meanwhile, Russia, despite being a geopolitical rival, is not an economic competitor and remains an insufficiently exploited yet potentially profitable market for US corporations.

From this perspective, prolonging confrontation with Russia carries economic downsides for the US — disrupting global energy markets, blocking potential US corporate access to Russian resources, and forcing continued high military expenditures to sustain European security. In contrast, a selective rapprochement with Russia — or at least a de-escalation of direct confrontation — could allow the US to reduce its military burden, reshape its economic strategy and refocus its strategic priorities on China.

Given these risks, the US may find itself reassessing its long-term posture toward Russia. While Washington has been committed to weakening Russia through sanctions and military support for Ukraine, it also faces a broader strategic reality:

1. The US cannot afford to be drawn into a direct military conflict with Russia while simultaneously preparing for a potential future confrontation with China.
2. Europe’s security dependence on the US means that any escalation would disproportionately expose Washington to risks that European allies are reluctant or unable to bear.
3. A prolonged, high-risk confrontation with Russia undermines US strategic flexibility, forcing it to maintain a dual-front geopolitical posture against both Russia and China.

As a result, the US may ultimately seek to redefine its engagement with Russia — not as a shift toward accommodation, but as a way to manage escalation risks and refocus its strategic priorities.

This consideration further strengthens the logic behind exploring a recalibration of US-Russia relations, particularly in light of the growing challenge posed by China. Whether this shift materialises will depend on political will, strategic calculations, and the evolving situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. However, the limits of Western military pressure and the inherent risks of escalation suggest that a reassessment of US policy toward Russia is not only possible but increasingly necessary.

The constraints and risks of US-Russia rapprochement

Despite the strategic advantages that a recalibrated US-Russia relationship might offer, significant obstacles remain.

Deep-rooted distrust. Decades of confrontation, particularly since the Ukraine crisis, have left relations between Washington and Moscow highly adversarial. While pragmatic engagement is possible, there are deep institutional and ideological barriers to a true rapprochement. The US foreign policy establishment, particularly within the State Department, Pentagon and intelligence community, remains largely committed to a containment strategy toward Russia.

While Moscow publicly frames the US as hostile to its security and economic interests, its actual position is more complex. Russian capitalism has historically sought access to US financial markets, technologies, and investment opportunities (as discussed in the section on economic pragmatism). The pre-2014 US-Russia economic cooperation was relatively successful and widely accepted by both the Russian security apparatus and public opinion. What the Kremlin ultimately seeks is not a fundamental rupture but rather a restructured global order — one in which Russia and the US recognise each other’s spheres of influence, much like the post-World War II Yalta arrangements. In this sense, the depth of the US-Russia divide may at times be overstated, as Russia’s primary grievance is not with US power itself, but with Washington’s refusal to acknowledge Russia as an independent pole in the global system.

The Ukraine factor. US policy toward Russia remains heavily influenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Any attempt to improve relations with Moscow would likely face strong resistance from European allies, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, which view Russia as an existential threat. Additionally, Ukraine itself — heavily reliant on Western military and economic aid — would strongly oppose any engagement perceived as a concession to Moscow. A shift in US policy could also undermine transatlantic unity, weakening NATO cohesion at a time when Washington seeks to focus its strategic resources on China.

Domestic political opposition. Within the US, any move to ease tensions with Russia would be highly controversial. Both Republicans and Democrats have strong factions that view Russia as a hostile power and oppose any perceived concessions to the Kremlin. Additionally, the legacy of Russian election interference allegations and the broader narrative of Russia as an adversary have become deeply embedded in US political discourse. Any president advocating for engagement with Russia risks facing severe domestic backlash, particularly in an election cycle.

The risk of strategic overreach. If the US attempts to pivot toward Russia too aggressively, it risks overplaying its hand. Moscow may exploit Washington’s outreach to extract economic and political concessions without significantly distancing itself from China. Russia’s long-term economic trajectory is increasingly intertwined with China’s, particularly in energy exports and financial transactions. A poorly managed rapprochement could backfire, strengthening Moscow’s position without delivering meaningful strategic advantages to the US.

The military and nuclear dimension. As discussed, the risk of nuclear escalation remains a crucial constraint in US-Russia relations. Any shift toward engagement that appears to weaken deterrence or undermine NATO commitments could embolden Moscow, raising concerns among US allies. Additionally, if the Ukraine war escalates unpredictably — for example, through strikes deep into Russian territory or the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine — Washington could find itself trapped between escalation and retreat, undermining the feasibility of a diplomatic approach.

Conclusion: The future of US-Russia relations

The evolving US approach to Russia is not driven by idealism but by pragmatic geopolitical calculations. As the global balance of power shifts, Washington is reassessing its priorities: reducing expensive military commitments, ensuring access to critical economic resources and preparing for a long-term rivalry with China.

While deep-rooted antagonisms remain, selective engagement with Russia could serve multiple US objectives, from weakening China’s global position to reducing strategic burdens in Europe. However, the success of this approach depends on whether the US can navigate internal political resistance, European skepticism, and Russia’s own strategic calculus.

At the same time, the behaviour of the US administration, while outwardly shaped by Trump’s character, reflects deeper structural forces at play. The shifting US stance toward Russia is not just about diplomatic manoeuvering but a response to the ongoing crisis of capitalism, where the current model of accumulation in the US faces significant structural challenges. Mending bridges with Russia is not merely about geopolitical realignments — it is a strategy to expand the breathing space for US capitalism itself.

Trump claims that his “deals” with Russia and Ukraine will benefit the US, but it is clear that the primary beneficiary will be the US corporate sector. If everything King Midas touched turned to gold, then everything the US administration touches turns into more profits for US corporations. For US workers, any tangible benefits from this engagement will be minimal — if they materialise at all.

Ultimately, the future of US-Russia relations will be shaped by a complex interplay of economic incentives, geopolitical necessity, and global power realignments — with profound implications for the balance of power in the 21st century.