Syria’s ‘delayed revolution’: An interview with Asef Bayat
First published in English at Al-Jumhuriya.
On 30 December 2024, the Tehran-based reformist newspaper Ham-Mihan published an interview with Dr. Asef Bayat on recent developments in Syria. However, the newspaper censored important points related to Iran and the Islamic Republic from the final text of the conversation. Below is the revised and uncensored version of the interview with Dr. Asef Bayat.
Can the recent events in Syria be considered a result of the Arab Spring? Previously, you have viewed the events of the Arab Spring as a combination of revolution and reform, distinct from the revolutions of the 1970s and earlier. How do you describe the current events in Syria?
The recent developments in Syria represent a new form of political change, the characteristics of which we will better understand in the future as more detailed information becomes available. For now, based on what we know, there is no doubt that these events are part of the Arab Spring. Interestingly, a Palestinian friend even told me he considers this the third phase of the Arab Spring, following two earlier waves of uprising in the past decade. While it may be premature to use the term “third phase” for the events in Syria — since similar developments have not yet occurred in other countries — I think that the situation in Syria today is, in a complex way, a continuation of the revolutionary uprising that began in 2011.
This uprising began in the form of widespread popular and civil protests, where Syria’s people — men and women, young and old — rose up across its towns and cities, demanding political and economic reforms. However, several factors fragmented the uprising and transformed it into a tragic civil war: the brutal crackdown by Bashar al-Assad’s regime (reports of killings, imprisonment, and the torture of child protesters have been emerging in recent weeks), the regime’s release of Jihadi prisoners in order to radicalize the uprising, and the involvement of foreign powers (particularly Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and later the United States and Russia). The war resulted in the deaths of half a million people and the displacement of 14 million.
Nevertheless, the Syrian people’s dream of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime did not disappear. Over the past two years, even as various armed groups (often supported by foreign powers) took control of parts of Syria, popular protests like those in Sweida continued. In 2019, various armed groups came together under the initiative of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which had already split from Al-Qaeda and had even fought against it, to plan a military offensive against Assad’s regime. Their opportunity came as Assad’s foreign supporters grew weaker: Iran and Hezbollah were weakened by Israel, while Russia was distracted by its war in Ukraine. With Turkey’s support, they launched their assault to overthrow the regime.
Therefore, the claim that recent developments in Syria have from the very beginning been part of a plan orchestrated by foreign powers does not appear to reflect the reality. There is no doubt, however, that the current situation has created a relative vacuum in the power structure, which foreign entities such as Israel and Turkey are exploiting to try to create new territorial realities. But this phenomenon is distinct from the historical dynamics that have brought Syria to this point.
How do you analyze the current situation in Syria, considering its history of struggles, social movements, and the role of Syrian civil society organizations and activists? More precisely, do you consider the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime the result of a movement, a revolution, or a coup d’état backed by countries such as Turkey?
The rebel groups’ advance and capture of various cities was so rapid that it surprised even them, disorienting and crushing the Syrian regime army’s will to fight so thoroughly that thousands of soldiers fled to Iraq. It was at this point that the masses of people who, whether in Syria or in exile, had long been dreaming of overthrowing the Assad regime re-emerged and once again advocated for regime change. In other words, the Syrian people have been on a “revolutionary course” since 2011. By “revolutionary course”, I mean a situation where, even after a widespread uprising and subsequent crackdown, a large segment of society has continued to think, dream, and act based on a different future in a different polity. Their judgments about national affairs have been shaped by the echo of “revolution”, the lingering belief that “these people [the regime] will go” — so that any shortcoming is seen as the government’s failure, and every act of protest as a sign of impending revolution. In this political psychology, the status quo is considered temporary, and change inevitable.
From this perspective, the events in Syria might be described as a “delayed revolution.” After all, the former regime has been overthrown, the previous status quo disrupted, and a fundamental break with the past has been achieved, with most people seeming to support this departure from the old system. However, the problem is that the rebel groups, especially Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have yet to present a clear vision about Syria’s social and political future. People still do not know exactly what kind of social order will be established in the country, and various social groups are projecting their own aspirations for the future socio-political system. Certain segments of society, such as Christians, Alawites, and Kurds, are deeply concerned about what lies ahead. The coming months may reveal which vision will prevail and what political consequences will follow. For now, however, Syria is in the midst of a “revolutionary honeymoon.” As a Syrian friend said to me, “Let us rejoice in the moment. We deserve to celebrate the passing of a tyrant. Let us hope for the better.”
What has been the role of women in Syria’s recent events? How can we explain the limited presence of women in rallies in the first days after the fall of the regime?
To my knowledge, women were clearly visible in the popular and civil protests back in 2011. Participation in street protests, however, is only one part of the movement: many women were working behind the scenes, handling logistics, providing medical care, and contributing to media efforts. Even as recently as last year, during the demonstrations in Sweida, women played a noticeable role. The shift happened when the revolutionary uprising turned violent. In general, when political movements escalate into armed conflicts, women often feel reluctant to take part: the issue of gender in uprisings is one I have explored in depth in my book, Revolutionary Life: The Everyday of the Arab Spring. After Syria’s peaceful protests were crushed by the regime, foreign powers got involved and rebel and jihadist groups took up arms, the popular uprising evolved into a multi-layered civil war. This “masculine” war sidelined civil protests and drove women out of public spaces.
It is also important to note the role of ideology. The misogynistic views of many Islamist and jihadist groups do not accommodate women participating in public life alongside men. In contrast, areas in the Kurdish region — where the prevailing ideology was more inclusive — saw women not only in protests but also holding administrative and political roles.
Now that the Assad regime is out of the picture, there is understandable hesitation among many women about groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which currently leads the rebellion. HTS, under Ahmed al-Sharaa (or Muhammad al-Julani), has a history of collaboration with Al-Qaeda, even though they have since split and fought against it. Many women are reluctant to align themselves with such groups, especially given the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iran. Ahmed al-Sharaa is now trying to provide assurances that HTS is not about enforcing the hijab or engaging in religious or ethnic discrimination, but many are skeptical. They have seen similar promises before: from Ayatollah Khomeini before the Iranian revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood before Egypt’s 2012 elections, and the Taliban when they retook power in Afghanistan. The pattern looks familiar, and the results have rarely aligned with the initial assurances. For now, everything in Syria is in flux: let us hope that the Syrian experience will be different.
In its first official statement, this group spoke about the right of women to choose what they wear. At a time when all political and social aspects of Syria are undergoing transformation, why do you think such an announcement was made, why was it necessary, and was it meant to send a message to certain countries, including Iran?
As I mentioned earlier, when this group entered Damascus and took control of other cities and regions, it began working to project a new, more moderate and pragmatic image of itself. They were keen to distance themselves from the extremism of jihadism and Al-Qaeda ideologies, and to present themselves as champions of tolerance and inclusivity. HTS seems to recognize that Syria is a deeply diverse society, home to multiple ethnic and religious communities. They also know that the Assad regime deliberately fueled ethnic and religious divisions to maintain control. Ahmed al-Sharaa appears to understand that building popular consensus, promoting social peace, and avoiding factionalism are essential for stability, both for the group’s survival and for establishing a new political order. By making this announcement, he seems to be signaling that his vision is different from that of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which enforces compulsory hijab on women. Instead, he is trying to position his government as one that is tolerant and inclusive, rather than coercive and authoritarian.
How do you foresee Mr. Julani’s future? Can he become a national leader to form an inclusive government, or will religious fundamentalists prevail?
First, let’s be clear that the success of a revolution doesn’t automatically lead to freedom and justice. The outcome depends on the revolution’s nature, the quality of its leadership, its vision, and the strategy and programs it implements. When it comes to Syria, the future remains uncertain. As I mentioned earlier, HTS, which currently leads the opposition, seems intent on projecting a moderate and inclusive image. For instance, they have emphasized respect for religious denominations and the right of women to choose their clothing. Ahmed al-Sharaa (Al-Julani) has met with Christian church leaders and worked with politicians from the former regime to ensure a smoother transition. So far, there haven’t been reports of mass arrests, detentions, trials, or executions.
But this “moderate” approach isn’t entirely new: it has a history. In 2015, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the then-leader of al-Qaeda, wrote a letter to Al-Julani (who at the time led the Al-Nusra Front, an Al-Qaeda affiliate) offering strategic advice. He encouraged Al-Julani to integrate his group into the broader revolutionary movement, form alliances with other Islamist factions, and avoid turning Syria into a launchpad for attacks on the West. It’s easy to see how this advice might shape al-Julani’s current strategy, presenting himself as a “moderate” Islamist to both Syrians and the international community in order to gain legitimacy. So far, however, there has been little to no discussion about elections, democracy, or a constitution. Al-Julani might think it’s too early for those conversations. Since clarity on plans and programs is likely to cause division, he prefers to remain ambiguous.
So, where does that leave the revolutionary event in Syria? Regardless of the uncertainty, something significant has happened. An entrenched tyrannical regime has fallen. To evaluate the revolutionary event, we need to consider the nature of the old status quo and its ability — or inability — to allow for meaningful reform. It is true that a revolutionary event does not necessarily result in a just and democratic social order, but it is undoubtedly pregnant with new possibilities in which some good things can happen. While meaningful change was unimaginable under the Assad regime, the post-revolutionary landscape, however uncertain, can offer the possibility of something better. In fact, it is these unpredictable possibilities that have given hope to many concerned Syrians.
In your opinion, what factors led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and in what ways is the Syrian trajectory different from those of the revolutionary uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt?
I think several key factors set Syria’s path apart from Tunisia and Egypt’s, and led to what we could call a “delayed revolution.” Firstly, the opposition groups — whether Islamist, jihadist, secular, or Kurdish — were organized and had clear leadership structures. Secondly, these groups had enough military power to both capture and hold onto territories. For example, the Turkish-backed rebels controlled parts of the north, Kurdish groups held their areas, HTS and jihadists dominated Idlib, and other factions operated around Daraa. Holding the territory gave these groups the ability to govern locally, to establish political administrations, manage local economies, produce goods, and even manufacture military equipment. This control was crucial. Abu Hassan al-Hamawi, the head of HTS’s military wing, mentioned in an interview with The Guardian that their group was able to produce weapons, vehicles, and ammunition. This capability strengthened their positions and allowed them to expand into new areas. Finally — and perhaps most critically — these groups worked to forge coalitions, unite various factions, and coordinate their operations against the regime.
By 2019, HTS had recognized that the opposition’s biggest weakness was the fragmentation and infighting among its groups. When the regime’s military attacks pushed many rebels into Idlib, it created an opportunity for discussions about forming coalitions and improving coordination. This led to the establishment of a “united war room” that reportedly brought together commanders from about 25 rebel groups in the south to coordinate military efforts, including an operation to capture Damascus.
These three factors — organization and leadership, relative military power (through weapons and territorial control), and coalition-building with coordinated operations — set Syria’s uprising apart from those in, say, Tunisia and Egypt. But the cost Syria has paid is staggering: countless lives lost, cities destroyed, millions displaced, and the involvement of multiple foreign powers. It is a price far greater than what was seen in other Arab uprisings, and the future remains deeply uncertain. Still, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s unyielding regime has created a fluid situation, and while it is impossible to predict what will come next, this openness has introduced new possibilities — some of which could potentially bring positive changes for Syria and its people.
Should we expect similar events to change the political status quo in those Middle Eastern countries that are dominated by totalitarian political systems, or was Syria an exception?
This is an interesting question. It is tempting to view the fall of the Assads’ 54-year dictatorship as a sign that we might be on the brink of a “third wave” of the Arab Spring — especially if the outcome in Syria turns out to be positive. We might see large protests in countries that have already experienced uprisings but where regimes managed to cling onto power through repression or manipulation, often becoming even harsher in the process. For instance, Iraq seems particularly vulnerable to a new wave of popular protests. The muhasasah system (communal power-sharing) in Iraq and Lebanon has essentially devolved into a kind of mafiocracy, where power is carved up among communal leaders instead of being based on citizenship and democratic principles (muwatanah). Tunisia might also see renewed efforts to protect its fragile democracy from Kais Saied’s authoritarian moves. And then, there is the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where public discontent continues to simmer beneath the surface. If the growing conflicts and grievances in these countries aren’t addressed — not through securitization and repression, but by tackling the root causes — then widespread protests and demands for structural change seem extremely likely.