Venezuela: The imperialist threat and possible scenarios

A version of this was first published in Spanish at Luís Bonilla-Molina blog. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal. Edited and corrected for publication.

Much like a script written by English comic book writer Warren Ellis (creator of The Authority, Transmetropolitan, Planetary), rife with exaggerated plot twists, the past four months have featured an intense media and military offensive against Venezuelan sovereignty. The US administration’s double standards has seen it move between buying oil from Venezuela — under neocolonial conditions, due to US sanctions and the Maduro government’s subservience — to claiming Venezuelan state leaders are part of a criminal drug cartel to justify a military deployment and eventual attack.

The US is fully aware of the Nicolás Maduro government’s lack of internal and international legitimacy. It has a clear lack of democratic credentials (especially since the 2024 presidential elections), has undergone an authoritarian and neoliberal shift (even if keeping its leftist rhetoric), and has overseen a clear deterioration of working people’s quality of life (with a monthly minimum wage of less than US$1 amid triple-digit inflation and basic consumer prices double the regional average). Forced migration of millions of Venezuelans, for economic and political reasons, has torn apart families and eroded the government’s popularity, causing the Maduro government to fail to forge a national anti-imperialist front against the US offensive involving all sectors of the country. The right-wing lackeys of imperialism have formed a fifth column, justifying an invasion with arguments placing popular electoral sovereignty above territorial sovereignty, claiming that the lack of transparency in the July 28, 2024 elections justifies US intervention.

None of this, on its own, is enough justification for US, Latin American and world public opinion to accept a disproportionate military attack against Simón Bolívar's homeland. That is why the US seeks to portray as criminal the same government that has submissively handed over its oil to the US since the start of the Ukraine war — a propaganda operation seemingly inspired by the monsters created by the late [US comic book writer and artist] John Cassaday.

However, something is still unclear about this US military and media offensive. One day it bombs small boats, then escalates verbal attacks, then issues bombastic statements against the Venezuelan government, creating the impression of an imminent attack, only to then follow this with silence and inaction, fuelling a frenzy of rumours and speculation. To top it off, one weekend the US labels Venezuela’s government “criminal” while the next announcing the start of direct talks between Miraflores [Venezuela’s presidential office] and the White House.

The first question

The Maduro government is not a continuation of Chavismo; it has its own character, producing an eclectic mix of outdated socialist rhetoric — much like Josef Stalin or Mao Zedong — to hold onto the solidarity of its international supporters, while attacking the entire left at home (via legal interventions against its organisations); launching an anti-worker offensive against unions and labour associations (who seek to organise for fair wages and decent living conditions); and eliminating basic democratic freedoms (while implementing a neoliberal package justified with a sui generis leftist discourse). This does not stop it rhetorically attacking US imperialism — to appease its social base — while handing over oil to the US under terrible neocolonial conditions.

Before the 2024 election, a significant section of Venezuela’s left pointed out that Maduro was the US’ ideal candidate, because he had built a government that was effective in its authoritarianism — though not in economic, political or social terms — and that shamelessly handed over the nation’s wealth in exchange for keeping power, something that not even the María Corina Machado–Edmundo González Urrutia duo could do with such impunity, as their social base would question this.

Those who view Maduro's leadership as timid are wrong; on the contrary, he is extremely adept at clinging onto power amid an unprecedented level of popular discontent. The dictator Juan Vicente Gómez ruled at the start of the 20th century without facing the same amount of collateral damage, and the Marcos Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, while lacking in democratic freedoms, stabilised the economy through a capitalist development program under which the working class did not experience the same levels of poverty as now. The fact that Maduro has held onto power under such conditions implies a unique capacity for managing and controlling the balance of forces, which must be factored into any analysis.

But if Maduro was already engaged in open negotiations with the US since the Ukraine war, effectively turning Venezuela once again into a reliable oil supplier to the North, why then the unprecedented military deployment against Venezuela? Simplistic explanations, suggesting it is solely about guaranteeing absolute control of Venezuela’s oil reserves, are insufficient. While Venezuela's natural wealth makes it a target for global capitalist greed, especially for US imperialism, this disproportionate deployment seems to point to other underlying factors. So, it is worth asking ourselves this question in order to better understand what might not be apparent at first.

The facts

In mid-August, the US initiated a naval, amphibious and troop deployment in the Caribbean, particularly around the Venezuelan coast; one with no precedent since at least 1902–03, when President Cipriano Castro refused to pay Venezuela’s foreign debt. The US initially announced the mobilisation of 4000 military personnel, including parts of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) together with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, a guided-missile cruiser (the USS Gettysburg), a nuclear submarine (USS Newport News, SSN-750), a P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and Marine Corps helicopters. The armed group departed from Norfolk, Virginia, on August 15, after a prolonged period of inactivity in the region. The international media reported that the USS Newport News later joined the deployment (August 27), along with other destroyers and support units, to carry out surveillance and deterrence operations in the Southern Caribbean.

In response, Venezuela’s government launched a media offensive (initially blaming US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for the deployment and insisting he had deceived Trump); a political offensive to activate its dwindling social base and the militia, calling for national unity (though refusing to release all political prisoners, restore the legal status of leftist parties, and persisting with its neo-capitalist accumulation model); a military offensive (through designing a strategy of prolonged resistance, which in reality would require even broader social fronts); and a diplomatic offensive in various multilateral forums (from the United Nations to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC). After an almost childish attempt to sow division within Trump’s government, it shifted to denouncing the offensive as imperialist, while being careful not to close the door to dialogue with the White House.

Progressive governments have responded in different ways: Gabriel Boric (Chile) has insisted on highlighting the authoritarian and non-socialist character of the Maduro government; Gustavo Petro (Colombia) has emphasised the lack of democracy in Venezuela while saying this does not justify a military invasion; Lula da Silva (Brazil) has said this is a concern for the entire continent’s sovereignty; and the Mexican president (Claudia Sheinbaum) has prioritised an anti-imperialist discourse.

Operation Southern Spear was formally announced by the US on November 13, with a focus on eradicating what the US calls narco-terrorists with ties to Venezuela. But, the first military strike occurred on September 2, destroying a small vessel in the Caribbean allegedly involved in drug trafficking and causing 11 deaths in international waters. These attacks continued into mid-September, with three more deaths.

The Maduro government declared Venezuela on high alert on September 1, warning it would respond if US forces attempted to violate its national sovereignty. Maduro also threatened to declare an armed rebellion against any foreign aggression.

On October 10, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced the creation of the counternarcotics Joint Task Force (JTF) to coordinate maritime, air and intelligence operations against drug trafficking networks. This JTF is led by the II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF). Since October 11, maritime patrols have intensified, with the use of logistical support aircraft and Marine helicopters, and coordination has been strengthened with nations such as the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. More than 20 attacks on small boats had occurred by November 16.

In October, the Venezuelan government organised military exercises, mobilising its air force and anti-aircraft defences to respond to potential provocations. But anti-imperialist sentiment remains precarious among the population, a product of the terrible social exhaustion caused by 11 years of unprecedented economic crisis. This does not mean that a significant portion of the population — right-wing, non-partisan, and even left-wing — agrees with some kind of military aggression against the country; rather they are increasingly fed up with the current government. Faced with this, a segment of the population seems to prefer the “devil you don’t know”, holding illusions that this might provide a way out of a situation characterised by average incomes below the poverty line — as if history does not show that wherever the gringos invade, misery, chaos, and destruction ensue.

Although announced beforehand, on November 16 the US mission added the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and its strike group, along with long-range bombers and more air and sea patrols. This increased the troop presence to about 15,000. To date, the number of deaths from related military operations has reached 83. These are extrajudicial killings: human beings who could have been captured and tried with due process, as denounced by human rights groups.

Upon the US announcing the USS Ford’s arrival, Venezuela mobilised nearly 200,000 troops in a preparatory operation designed for any potential escalation. This coincided with increased propaganda emphasising the need for national unity and defence of sovereignty. This has undoubtedly helped cohere Maduro's social base, but has not been sufficient in building effective anti-imperialist resistance.

The so-called Cartel of the Suns was officially declared a criminal organisation on November 24. Despite a lack of evidence, it is allegedly composed of members of Venezuela's high military and political command, including Maduro. At the end of November, speculation increased and there were announcements about possible US ground operations against drug trafficking — a euphemism for a military attack on Venezuelan territory — while Trump himself discussed a possible meeting with Maduro. At the time of writing, the New York Times has reported that an initial telephone conversation took place, but no progress was made toward a non-aggression pact.

US imperialism’s neocolonial policy

Trump is not a “wild bull” leading the world’s most important imperialist nation; on the contrary, he reflects structural policies, albeit applied in his own eccentric and strident style, typical of illiberals. What is happening in the Southern Caribbean is part of a broader picture connected to restructuring the global capitalist governance system that emerged after World War II. China’s rise as an economic power, and Russia’s position as a nuclear military giant, as well as the relocation of a powerful innovation hub between China and India, and Europe’s diminishing geostrategic-military influence, are just a few signs of the radical transformation occurring within the capitalist order.

As always, the new order will be the result of negotiations or war — the latter being apocalyptic for humanity and capitalism itself — but the pieces have already started moving. The US is operating as an imperialist nation. Much of what is occurring today began with former president Joe Biden. Both Democrats and Republicans see that the US’ real interest lies in geopolitics: the US needs to show the world it is still the most powerful arms-producing nation, with large-scale destructive capabilities and an extraterritorial military presence in many countries.

Homeland Security's economic policy, formally known as Trade and Economic Security (TES), was announced under Biden in 2021 as part of a comprehensive strategy to integrate economic security into the government’s national security agenda. TES reports draw on assessments such as the 2020 Economic Security Annual Assessment, (published on January 11, 2021) and the DHS Strategic Action Plan to Counter the Threat Posed by the People’s Republic of China (January 12, 2021).

The central objective is to recognise that US economic prosperity depends on the uninterrupted flow of goods, services, people, capital, information and technology across borders. Therefore the aim is to mitigate risks to domestic economic security through coordinated activities — political, financial and military — across the government, and updating in a bilateral manner historical ties between each country and the empire. This includes strengthening military presence in some countries and establishing cooperative operations with others.

Key objectives are geared towards strengthening the US’s global economic position by: promoting policies to protect critical supply chains; reducing vulnerabilities to threats such as trade disruptions, cyberattacks or unfair competition (for example, from China); and integrating economic security with national security and using the “Homeland Security Enterprise” to respond to risks that affect economic stability, such as fluctuations in international trade or dependencies on essential imports.

TES’s practical actions have focused on conducting annual assessments to inform policy, promote secure trade, and collaborate with allies to diversify supply chains. This includes emphasising sectors such as manufacturing, technology and natural resources, with a focus on reducing economic risks “of foreign origin”. This security policy shift, presented as a carrot-and-stick approach, has been normalised. It is a shift toward a “whole-of-government” approach, combining economic diplomacy, trade regulations and international cooperation, compared to previous, more isolationist approaches.

TES policy has remained in effect as a state framework under the Trump government since January. Although specific Biden directives have been rescinded in sensitive areas around immigration and law enforcement (for example, the January 24 directive issued by Acting DHS Secretary Benjamin Huffman), TES reports continue to be an active reference in DHS publications. Other related documents, such as the ICE Pact Workforce Development Plan and Joint Statement of Intent, extend through to 2026, indicating continuity. It has not been formally replaced, but integrated into broader Trump-era initiatives.

Homeland Security’s economic/TES policy provides a conceptual framework for the current military deployment in the Caribbean, but marks an evolution in approaches: from Biden’s economic diplomacy with eventual military support, to the centrality of offensive military action under Trump. The Trump government argues that transnational drug trafficking — the focus of Operation Southern Spear — directly threatens TES goals by creating conditions to potentially disrupt supply and trade chains, since cartels such as the Cartel of the Suns control maritime routes in the Caribbean. This is said to affect the flow of legal goods (such as oil and agricultural products) and raise logistical costs, undermining the “border-dependent economic prosperity” highlighted in TES policy.

On the other hand, drug trafficking generates regional instability, especially due to its links with mass migration, as shown by the economic crises in countries such as Venezuela. Furthermore, drug trafficking fosters dependence on illicit imports and reduces trade cooperation with Caribbean allies, contradicting TES’s emphasis on alliances to diversify supplies. For the Trump government, all of this impacts domestic economic security, as fentanyl and other drugs flood the US, costing billions of dollars in public health and productivity — a situation TES identifies as a “homeland” risk requiring an integrated response.

Under Biden, TES prioritised non-lethal measures such as economic sanctions, intelligence sharing and assistance to regional partners, to dismantle the financial networks of drug cartels. In Venezuela’s case, Biden prioritised ensuring the supply of Venezuelan oil to the US under neocolonial conditions. This year, the Trump government has escalated via a huge military deployment, in what appears to be an adaptation of TES — in this case to “protect economic stability” through military containment.

Oil market

OPEC and International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates place Venezuelan oil reserves at 303 billion barrels, the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world (ahead of Saudi Arabia and Iran). TES policy makes it a strategic area for the US economy’s future, meaning a covert strategy to establish US military bases on Venezuelan soil makes sense. The US — in the fierce competition with China and Russia for oil markets — wants to secure the world’s largest reserve, located within its immediate sphere of influence. It can only achieve this through direct military control.

Washington has been unsettled by Chinese and Russian company announcements they have commenced operations to explore and exploit Venezuelan oil. It appears to be seeking coercive mechanisms to avoid the loss of direct influence over this important energy reserve. Therefore, the Southern Caribbean military deployment not only seeks to change the government in order to secure oil supplies; it also seeks to create the conditions for direct military control, which represents a violation of national sovereignty exceeding what occurred during the Cold War and the Fourth Republic [which existed prior to former president Hugo Chávez].

Contrary to shifts in oil markets during past US offensives against oil-producing countries, nervousness has not affected price indicators. Throughout 2025, oil prices have trended downwards (from $78 in January to $64 in November), indicating the market anticipates an agreement between the Maduro and Trump governments (which could involve a permanent US military presence on Venezuelan soil) rather than a direct military operation. Since the start of the US military deployment in the Southern Caribbean, oil prices have varied slightly when tensions between the White House and Miraflores escalated, but have kept falling. Such market behaviour must be factored in when exploring potential scenarios. While the oil market does not seem to expect a military offensive against Venezuela in the short term (and so has not reacted nervously by raising prices), a rise in the cost of black gold would benefit crude oil traders, including Trump himself.

Trump and Latin America and the Caribbean

Since the start of his second term, Trump has focused significant efforts on the US’s military presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a continuation of the TES policy, with a greater emphasis on expanding US military presence in dependent countries.

Some of the most relevant initiatives include the memorandum of understanding signed by Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino and announced by Hegseth, involving the “rotational use” of former bases, airfields and naval stations that the US had in Panama before the 1977 handover of the Canal. In Puerto Rico, the US Roosevelt Roads Naval Base has reopened and operations reinforced, with military exercises on the island of Vieques. Ecuador’s parliament approved a constitutional reform to allow the expansion of US military presence on its territory; however, a popular referendum rejected the measure. In November, the Dominican Republic authorised the use of local bases (Isidro Air Base and Las Américas International Airport) for counternarcotics logistics operations, and the Trump government has promoted the intensified use of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) in El Salvador, Curaçao, Palenque/Apiay/Malambo, and other airfields (Colombia). Within just a few months, it has successfully repositioned the US military in the region.

The US has long sought to establish military bases in Venezuela. They tried it in the 1960s, but faced opposition from the social-democratic Rómulo Betancourt government of, which agreed to military cooperation but rejected the permanent stationing of troops. The US seems to want to change this situation, paradoxically with Maduro, whose policies are considered the antithesis of Betancourt’s. Given this, military pressure on Venezuela appears aimed at not only controlling oil but securing US military deployment on Venezuelan territory, either through an agreement with Maduro' s government or a potential succession government led by Machado, who recently hinted at this possibility. This would partly explain why, despite Venezuela supplying oil to the US under neocolonial conditions in recent years, the US is pushing a disproportionate military offensive against it and the Maduro government.

Imperial predictive control regime

Class struggle is the driving force of history, as Karl Marx once said. Constructing an empire — imperialism — is a constitutive part of that struggle; in this case, by the capitalists, as a social class, on a global scale. Class oppression is carried out through the capitalist state and its institutions, which have taken various forms that include biopolitics (Foucault) and psychopolitics (Chul Han) in the liberal and neoliberal periods.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution’s technological developments, especially the internet, data harvesting, metadata analysis, artificial intelligence and large-scale, multi-level information management systems, has helped develop an imperial predictive control regime. There is particular interest in mass data collection to understand behaviours, segment and locate them, and construct future scenarios to help make them a reality. This is especially useful for new forms of oppression and imperial control over territories.

We have seen this in action now for almost four months, where we have seemed to be on the constant brink of large-scale military action against Venezuela. This has generated reactions of sympathy or rejection, disbelief or optimism, and support or opposition from the population, not only in Venezuela but in the region and the world. It has also generated a huge volume of information of predictive value, which, due to the impunity with which it has been collected, marks a very important victory for US imperialism. Now the US has more information about the potential behaviour of the population and politicians in the face of potential interventions in the region, including the genuine probabilities of winning support or facing resistance. This is all processed using automated open intelligence methods.

OSINT

Military operations began the moment the US deployment to the Southern Caribbean was announced. I am not talking about firing missiles, as in conventional warfare, but the implementation of a phase of a new kind of hybrid warfare, which may not be immediately apparent. I am referring to the military’s use of multiple technologies, of which I will focus on analysing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).

OSINT first emerged as part of military intelligence in the 1940s and ’50s (radio, press), but became widespread with the rise of the internet in the 1990s. Between 2015–25, with artificial intelligence (AI) and big data, OSINT entered into its automated era, enabling near real-time analysis.

Automated OSINT is a method to collect and analyse public information (news, social media, satellite images, official documents, maritime/air traffic, forums, open databases, etc), where specialised software automatically performs tasks previously requiring hours of human work. Automated trawling (web scraping) of thousands of pages and open source generates automatic classification (by topics, geography, sentiment, relevance) using AI models, detecting patterns in real time (military movements, media campaigns, economic changes), producing alerts based on key events (naval deployments, speeches, sanctions announcements), and generating integrated reports from multiple sources. Examples are systems monitoring maritime routes and detect unusual ship movements, platforms analysing satellite images to identify military activity, tools correlating official speeches, sanctions and logistical movements, search engines tracking news in dozens of languages ​​and produce automatic summaries, and bots following hashtags or political narratives on social media.

OSINT is used to assess risks of conflict or military escalations; monitor drug trafficking, smuggling or organised crime; anticipate political or economic crises; analyse disinformation campaigns; and measure the impact of sanctions and diplomatic tensions.

As tensions escalated in the Southern Caribbean, OSINT appears to have been used in four main ways. The first involves maritime traffic monitoring (AIS + satellite OSINT), tracking military, commercial, and fishing vessels using the Automatic Identification System (AIS). This involves pinpointing anomalous routes near Puerto Rico (with a reactivated military presence), Curaçao, Trinidad, La Guaira, and the Gulf of Venezuela. It detects logistical patterns, such as resupply, approaches to exclusion zones, behaviour in response to restrictions, and repetitive patrols, among other things. Also, work is underway to exploit potential AIS blackouts for covert operations, optimising the use of available military technology in the region.

The second is the use of automated satellite imagery. Through the use of automatic detection systems (machine vision), information is obtained on the deployment of destroyers or aircraft carriers, activities at US bases (especially Roosevelt Roads, Mayport and Key West) and unusual movements at Venezuelan bases (La Orchila, Punto Fijo, Sucre, Puerto Cabello, Guárico, Maracay, and the border areas), which together enabled the successful increase of P-8 Poseidon or MH-60 helicopter surveillance flights. These satellite images allow for real-time detection of “pixel” changes and raise alerts when new vessels, thermal shadows, logistical columns, stored fuel and active radar equipment appear — information that is especially useful when escalating military operations.

The third involves automated monitoring of speeches, coercive measures and official statements. Bots trained in natural language processing scan media releases and directives from the DHS, Southern Command and the State Department, as well as reactions from public authorities and the Venezuelan armed forces, detecting keywords such as “unusual threat,” “strategic response,” “violation of territorial waters,” and “activation of militia.” They then calculate the implicit and explicit risk based on the tone of the discourse, its frequency, historical precedents of escalation, and the veracity of claims made on previous occasions, as well as the actors involved and their presence in different scenarios.

The fourth is automated monitoring of social media and weak signals. Algorithms track videos of military movements uploaded to the internet by civilians, posts from fishing communities, criticisms or expressions of support posted or sent via text messaging, unidentified flights (aviation OSINT), as well as leaks from military personnel, allowing for the detection of movements before they occur or are announced.

The combination of OSINT with predictive geopolitical risk models enables measuring the probabilities of escalation — though they can not predict specific events — through three main techniques: correlation and time series models (ARIMA, VAR, Granger); risk models of the "odds ratios" type and logistic probabilities; and simulation models (Monte Carlo + geopolitical game analysis).

Correlation and time series models integrate the frequency of naval movements and official announcements, oil prices, tensions within the country, activities along shipping routes (such as drug trafficking), and the potential and actual intensity of sanctions, weighting each factor and assessing their interactions. These models seek to determine whether one factor can anticipate another, according to Granger causality principles.

In logistic risk and probability models, regression estimates the risk of incursions, confrontation and military escalation due to miscalculation. They do not predict which event will occur, but their probability.

Simulation models develop scenarios based on the distance between military units, the intensity of rhetorical hostility ( including election periods where exaggerations are likely), oil production, and actions by non-state actors, especially cartels. Each scenario indicates the probability of an incident leading to a direct confrontation, targeted attack, escalation or sanction.

OSINT requires a great deal of information to be effective. That is why the Southern Caribbean deployment, which has been going for more than three months without any concrete attacks on Venezuelan territory, has been important for generating responses from the population and governments. The military operation’s communications offensive has involved days with more frequent attacks on vessels (Mondays) and strong statements (Wednesdays) to gauge the resulting behaviour, gather huge amounts of information, and inform potential scenarios.

The war has already begun without a single missile fired at Venezuela. A key element in gathering intelligence is understanding the local population’s stance towards the ongoing offensive, the US military presence and its evolution. Sympathies and resistance are being identified and analysed.

NOTAMs

Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs, formerly Notices to Airmen) are official mandatory notices issued by a country's aviation authority. In the US, they are issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to inform pilots, air traffic controllers, airlines and air navigation services about conditions or restrictions that may affect flight safety.

In Venezuela’s case, the FAA issued a NOTAM (A0012/25) on November 21, noting increased military activity, recommending extreme caution due to potential risks when flying over Venezuela. This includes the flight, layovers, takeoff, landing and ground movement phases of the aircraft.

On November 29, Trump announced the complete closure of Venezuela’s airspace, even though he lacks the authority to do so. This had a significant impact on public opinion. Airlines such as Iberia, TAP and others temporarily suspended their flights, although as of November 30, airlines such as Copa, Laser and Wingo are flying normally to Caracas.

In the context of escalating tensions between Caracas and Washington, the NOTAM and Trump’s subsequent announcement must be viewed in three dimensions. First, it effectively intensifies the blockade and siege of Venezuela, further crippling the local economy and seeking to accelerate regime change. Second, it continues exerting pressure on the ongoing negotiations. Third, it generates more volumes of intelligence for the predictive intelligence regime.

ODDS

ODDS (Odds and Differences)1 is a system or methodology for establishing the probabilities of different scenarios, and is widely used by the business sector and news agencies. While there is a background of a high risk of military intervention, belligerent rhetoric and alarm on both sides, direct action does not yet appear likely, based on all the available information.

Although there are no official ODDS, using its construction technique we can infer that the probability of a US military intervention in Venezuela in the short term (24–160 hours) is only 5–12%. We can expect that more days or weeks will pass before the probability of military intervention increases (or dissipates).

Madurismo in its labyrinth

I want to insist on this point: those who underestimate Maduro’s political abilities make a mistake. Maduro is clearly not an intellectual, but a politician with exceptional skill for holding onto power, especially because he is more pragmatic than ideologically driven.

Maduro is also not Chávez, nor is Madurismo similar to Chavismo. Chávez did not share leadership — he never operated as part of a collective leadership, even with the Movement for a Fifth Republic (MVR) or the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Possessing enormous empathy with the common people, and aware that his power depended on connecting with the majority, Chávez used polarisation as a strategy to build a base around the project he embodied. He made many mistakes, but was deeply committed to creating a new multi-class system (to replace the Fourth Republic’s multi-class system), with his actions guided by his notion of social justice.

Madurismo is the result of an abrupt leadership transition from Chávez (after his illness and death) to Maduro, who lacked both the charisma and the favourable balance of forces that characterised Chavismo. Madurismo is an alliance of second-tier leaders and groups (Diosdado Cabello, the Rodríguez brothers, and others), which has expanded to compensate for Maduro’s lack of military experience (to include Padrino López and the new post-Chavista military-police leadership). These groups accept Maduro’s leadership but have their own economic and political interests. While Chavismo advocated for a civic-military alliance, Madurismo’s authoritarian turn has expanded this into a civic-military-police alliance.

In its efforts to build an identity and consolidate power, Madurismo has distanced itself from Chavismo’s allies. This has created a Chavista opposition to Madurismo, though it remains weak. Madurismo also generated left-wing opposition due to its confrontation with every authentic left group (Communist Party of Venezuela, Homeland for All, and others), by stripping them of their electoral registration. Coordination between dissident Chavismo and the critical left remains very weak.

Consequently, any negotiation on a transition can not be limited to just Maduro, but has to take Madurismo into consideration, and cannot disregard the Chavista and leftist opposition, which is anti-Madurista. This is a strategic error of the more radical right wing and the Machado–González leadership, who want to sweep away the entire past and view Chavismo as the same as Madurismo.

As I explain in the book Venezuela y el Chavismo (2025), Madurismo represents a break with Chávez’s multi-class project. It seeks to consolidate a new capitalist class, which emerged from the business dealings and corruption of the past 25 years and whose interests are temporarily opposed to those of the old capitalist class, but with whom they share a strategic horizon.

The only thing Madurismo has kept from Chavismo is its socialist and popular-communal rhetoric, which it holds onto to keep its diminished social base united. Even if it is unable to win free, fair and transparent elections in the short term, it still represents about four million voters, which is not insignificant when discussing a democratic transition.

Maduro's regime has so far had four stages. The first, between 2014–17, featured the crushing and legal intervention into right-wing and traditional pro-capitalist political parties, as well as coopting a significant part of the opposition leaders, who still present themselves as the opposition but who, in Venezuelan parlance, are seen as alacranes (scorpions, capable of turning against their own people). The second, between 2018–2024, involved legal intervention into and stifling of the pro-Chavez political left, destroying trade union rights to organise, mobilise and go on strike, and the start of negotiations with the US to rebuild bilateral relations. This was largely aided by the Ukraine war, which again transformed Venezuela into a reliable oil supplier for the US under conditions of neocolonial dependence worse than during the pre-Chávez period, openly devoid of any trace of nationalism. I reiterate, Venezuela and the US, regardless of the bombastic pronouncements typical of each country's political class, had significantly improved their relations between 2020–25, until the start of the US military deployment in the Caribbean.

The third phase, between 2024–25, featured a shift from formal democracy to de facto cancelling the democratic process — even if elections, the National Electoral Council (CNE) and participatory rhetoric persist. This occurred through escalating selective repression via the detention of hundreds of social movement activists, which has placed Madurismo in a defensive position, nationally and internationally. The fourth phase, which started with the military siege (2025-), is one in which anything goes and survival in power is the leitmotif.

The inability to provide credible results for the July 28, 2024 election generated an unprecedented international crisis for Madurismo, of which the US military offensive in the Southern Caribbean is the most significant escalation. The US is using this situation, under the guise of combating drug trafficking, to advance its TES strategy in the region with the clear objective of establishing military bases on Venezuelan territory, as part of a global political reordering.

This is an unprecedented challenge for Madurismo. Negotiating with the US now not only implies discussing a transition — which could be delayed for years if they yield to the US’s strategic intentions of establishing military bases — but also accepting a sword of Damocles hanging over its head, as they relearn how to maintain a minimal relationship with the US. The US would find it easier to intervene in local politics if it had a military presence in the country.

In other words, Madurismo’s political life insurance is a kind of “Russian roulette”. Extending its stay in power, in such a scenario, implies definitively abandoning its ideological discourse and shifting to new rhetoric more aligned with the US. That is, something like a Venezuelan version of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former terrorist with a price on his head who is now a US ally accepted by Trump after breaking with his jihadist past.

The other alternative is radicalising its pseudo-ideological rhetoric, hoping to replicate the Cuban experience, where political leaders have remained in power for decades. However, this is difficult for Madurismo, given the class nature of the Venezuelan government and its desire to consolidate a new capitalist class, which Madurismo not only represents but is structurally part of. The interests of this neo-capitalist class demand building a future where they can use and enjoy the wealth accumulated (under Madurismo), and continue as part of Venezuela’s rentier accumulation economic model.

Madurismo is not suicidal, but driven by the need to cling onto power to continue accumulating wealth. It has not yet achieved a transitional formula that could inspire confidence and reassure the US. If this mutation process is not carried out quickly enough, it could precipitate a US military aggression.

To make matters worse, recent weeks have changed Madurismo’s geopolitical landscape. The New Democratic Party (NDP) in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has just defeated Ralph Gonsalves’ United Labour Party (ULP), a Maduro ally. In Honduras, all indications are that the left candidate, Rixi Ramona Moncada Godoy, lost the November 30 elections, a further setback for Madurismo. Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS), another Maduro ally, was virtually wiped out in the August elections.

Furthermore, relations with friendly governments have shifted: Lula and Petro remain distant, calling for greater democracy in Venezuela, while the progressive candidate in Chile, Jeannette Jara (of the Communist Party), views Madurismo as a dictatorship. To make matters worse, the newly elected mayor of New York Zohran Mamdani has declared Maduro is a dictator and said his vision of socialism is radically different from examples such as Madurismo.

But Madurismo’s labyrinth is not ideological, it is pragmatic. The question is whether it will manage to construct a formula that allows it to remain in power, with US approval — even if not explicitly.

Machado-González: Leadership is not the same as governability

Machado’s leadership is undeniable, as is her ability to lend this to González, an utterly opaque and secondary figure. Machado garnered support in the 2024 presidential elections far beyond the traditional base of the right-wing opposition to Chavismo and Madurismo. Even a significant part of those who still support Chavismo, as well as sectors of the left fed up with Maduro’s authoritarian drift, voted for González — not because they have become right-wing voters, but to facilitate change in the face of the disaster caused by Madurismo. Those of us on the left maintaining our independence from Maduro and Machado are a minority — I emphasise this not to indicate that we are morally superior, but to highlight the political tragedy of the moment.

The problem is that Machado-González envision a transition in the style of [Grand Inquisitor] Tomás de Torquemada: launching a political inquisition against those who took part in the recent past of Chavismo (which they do not differentiate from Madurismo), the social movement upholding the 1999 Constitution, and the entire military leadership. This would be impossible to achieve without a civil war.

Their illiberal agenda — as expressed in their 2024 government program2 — also proposes continuing with Madurismo’s anti-working-class policies, while further incorporating local capital into the dynamics of financialisation without any sign this would follow a period of recovering people’s living standards. Their free market recipe is based on the premise that it will make everyone prosperous. In a potential post-Maduro scenario, this would instead generate deep social discontent, which would lead to instability and precarious governability.

This is so obvious that it seems to align with US interests in consolidating their political and military influence in the country, by shaping leaders and representatives completely aligned with their strategic objectives. The post-Maduro chaos that Machado-González would generate is entirely functional to the US’s neocolonial interests in Venezuela.

How long could a potential transition capable of achieving minimal stability in the country, and restoring working people’s material living conditions and political freedoms for its organisations, last? That is the question that interests us. This is impossible to achieve if we stand passive by; rather, it requires organisation, discarding illusions in the post-Maduro capitalist class and US troops, and preparing for struggle.

Simplified scenarios

This all leads us to several possible scenarios, which I will outline in a simplified way:

Scenario 1: The US launches a classic invasion in the short term (less than three months). Military personnel numbers currently available are insufficient for this type of operation in a country with such rugged geography, extensive borders and potential for organised resistance. Such an operation would be lengthy, undermine the Trump government, and generate a backlash in Latin America and the US. The likelihood of a US defeat would be very high, making this scenario highly improbable.

Scenario 2: The US launches an air attack on Venezuela’s power infrastructure, accusing it of supporting drug trafficking. This would include attacking some military installations. Its purpose would be terrorising the population, sowing division within the armed forces and triggering an internal shift in the political regime, facilitating a negotiated transition overseen politically and militarily by the US. Machado and González would only have a transitional use in this scenario. The ultimate goal would be to establish military bases in Venezuela, militarily secure control of Venezuela’s oil, gold and rare earth production, and establish a US military presence in this part of the Southern Caribbean. This scenario is highly improbable because Madurismo has a tightly cohered command structure united by shared interests; they know a split would lead to their collective downfalls.

Scenario 3: The US combines psychological operations, media manipulation and targeted military operations to produce an anti-Maduro popular uprising, justifying a large-scale US military operation to “support democracy.” For example, it could say that Maduro has moved his command centre to a poor working-class neighbourhood (Petare, La Vega, El Valle, etc), then launch targeted military actions there, causing civilian casualties. The aim would be for the population – already fed up with the economic situation, the precariousness of the healthcare system, the wage crisis, and the impact of mass migration on families — to take to the streets demanding Maduro’s resignation with the slogan, “We have suffered enough, now they are killing us because of you: Resign!” Prolonged chaos would serve the US’s purposes (the Haiti model), with a democratic transition led by Machado-González merely a pretext, and its duration short-lived due to the lack of governability. The ultimate goal would remain the same: establish military bases on Venezuelan soil, direct control of oil production, and maintain a strategic military presence in the Southern Caribbean. Such a scenario has a medium probability.

Scenario 4: US targeted attacks on military and political objectives in Venezuela, similar to its recent attacks on Iran. This would aim to eliminate part of Madurismo’s leadership and force the Madurismo’s civic-military-police alliance to surrender or start a short-term transition. This would risk backlash from US and global public opinion, from the collateral damage in human lives and the possibility that the regime will not surrender. The transition would be preceded by the deployment of US military forces (which would initiate establishing military bases) under the pretext of guaranteeing a return to democracy. The real objective would be controlling access to and use of Venezuelan natural resources (oil, gold, rare earth elements) and consolidating a geostrategic presence in the Southern Caribbean. The likelihood of this happening in the short term (within three months) is moderate; if this happens after more than three months it would likely require a unified political vote in US Congress, which is unlikely for now.

Scenario 5: Internal destabilisation through activating US intelligence within Venezuelan territory, generating mobilisations and chaos to foster a Latin American version of the Arab Spring. This would justify a subsequent direct military intervention under the guise of restoring democracy. The ultimate goal is the same: establish a permanent military presence in Venezuela. The problem with this scenario is that Madurismo’s civilian-military-police alliance has built an effective apparatus and network of social control and repression, instilling fear in the population and limiting people’s willingness to take to the streets. Furthermore, the most rebellious section of the opposition and the youth, who could be expected to protest in the streets, are currently living outside the country. The effectiveness of such a scenario is impossible to predict, meaning it has a low probability.

Scenario 6: Successful negotiations between the Trump and Maduro governments, preventing military action on Venezuelan territory. In this scenario, Madurismo authorises installing US military bases in Venezuela, under the guise of a memorandum of understanding for the joint fight against drug trafficking, while also committing to an orderly democratic transition within the next two to three years. The key achievement for the US would be authorising a US military deployment in Venezuela. The collateral effect would be the displacement of Machado-González as the driving force behind the transition, leading to a new axis of democratic openness emerging within the opposition (a new leadership built from those in the opposition who engage in dialogue with the government — the “scorpions”), and guaranteeing Madurismo that there will be no persecution. The problem in this scenario would be for Madurismo, which would have to accept that losing power was a serious possibility. This implies a re-engineering of the balance of forces (both within Madurismo and the various oppositions) to make such an agreement possible, and is highly probable.

Scenario 7: A combination of the previous scenarios, resulting in a political regime change in 2026. This scenario would require at least three months of preparation, so its implementation would begin in February or March. The ideal time for this scenario would be after the Colombian elections, where the US seeks to displace the progressive movement from power, creating the conditions for establishing a multinational force that could intervene from the Colombian border with US air and missile support. The ultimate goal is establishing a permanent US military presence on Venezuelan soil. The probability of this scenario, in the short term, is low to medium.

Scenario 8: A false flag attack against US military or civilian targets, unifying the US political class behind initiating targeted operations in the short term. In this scenario, the purpose would be to bring about Madurismo’s swift fall, buying time to prepare conditions for a multinational intervention in the medium term. The probability of such a scenario is medium.

Scenario 9: Maintain the military siege for the next three months, escalating psychological and technological warfare, to weaken Madurismo and initiate a negotiated transition, which included deploying military forces on Venezuelan territory. This scenario has a medium probability.

Scenario 10: Maintaining the current situation for a few more months, with the aim of creating the political conditions (consensus in the US Congress), military conditions (formation of a multinational force), and economic conditions (total crippling of the Venezuelan economy), which would enable the deployment of multi-level operations to remove Maduro from power. Machado and her Nobel Peace Prize would play a central role in the transition in this scenario, though she would be replaceable in the medium term. This is a highly probable scenario.

Scenario 11: Trump withdraws quietly. In this scenario, the US demobilises its military infrastructure deployed since August, under any pretext. This would be viewed as a victory for Madurismo, allowing him to consolidate his power. Such a scenario is very improbable.

Scenario 12: The US intervenes in Venezuela and is surprised by the level of armed resistance, conscious of a likely prolonged popular struggle. This scenario is unlikely because most of the population blames mistakes by the Maduro government for their material living conditions, and therefore has a very low probability.

These twelve scenarios are hypothetical and constructed from existing multi-referenced information. A factor can evolve in different directions, modifying the possibilities of each scenario. Such scenarios and their probability must be monitored daily.

Anti-imperialism and a culture of peace

We can have many differences, of various kinds, with the Maduro government and Madurismo, but these do not justify a US intervention on Venezuelan soil. Progressive, democratic, nationalist, popular and socialist forces across the continent and the world must denounce the Trump government’s attempts to violate sovereignty. A military attack on Venezuela is an attack on the sovereignty of all Latin America.

We must combine this with denouncing the anti-democratic, anti-working-class and neoliberal nature of the Maduro government, which masquerades behind left-wing rhetoric. Madurismo and Maduro are neither socialist nor revolutionary; they are the political representatives of a new capitalist class that has emerged in the past 25 years, which continues to disagree with US imperialism only until it demonstrates that they can ally to achieve common goals.

The Venezuelan people have suffered terrible misery for the past decade, with families torn apart by migration, social institutions destroyed, and with wages disappearing as a source of survival. They do not deserve to die under the bombs and bullets of an invasion force that disregards their interests like Madurismo. Therefore, any initiative that prevents the military escalation of the conflict should be welcomed from the perspective of the people.

Reality is often richer than any analysis, so we will keep paying close attention to what happens in the coming days.

Luis Bonilla-Molina is a visiting professor at the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil, as part of the CAPES Solidaridade program. He is a researcher in the fields of politics, technology, education, and communication.

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  The earliest records of probability calculations come from games of chance and betting in Greece and Rome during Antiquity and the Middle Ages. But these did not express formally established mathematical models. Formal odds theory emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries, thanks to the contributions of two key figures — Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat — who analysed gambling problems and laid the foundations of probability theory. Later, Huygens, Jakob Bernoulli, and De Moivre formalised the concept of expected value through compound probability and the theory of errors. In the 19th century, modern bookmakers in England established bookmaking systems, combining fractional odds with empirical statistics. In the 20th century, odds began to have political and military applications, especially during World War II, with Bayesians (who analyse their beliefs based on probabilities whenever new information arrives), intelligence analysts, and military statisticians (who used probability models to anticipate attacks, predict movements and assess strategic risks). Through this, the discipline of quantitative geopolitical risk analysis was born. In the 21st century, advanced models have been developed for predicting wars, assessing country risk, automated open intelligence (OSINT), machine learning, prediction markets and financial analysis. Today, organisations such as the Good Judgment Project, Metaculus, the RAND Corporation, and the Swift Centre publish geopolitical probabilities based on expert analysis and mathematical models. Odds and Differences (ODDS) offer advantages over traditional probability because they allow for direct comparison — for example, an event is three times more likely to occur than not — integrate qualitative signals effectively, and are intuitive for measuring rapid changes. ODDS are not certainties, absolute predictions, evidence of secret decisions, or non-public intelligence; they are simply probability tools based on observable and historically comparable data.

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  See “Who is María Corina Machado?”, which I wrote with Leonardo Bracamonte https://luisbonillamolina.com/2024/09/21/venezuela-quien-es-maria-corina-machado/