Syria after Assad: Hope and uncertainty
A significant and rapid transformation is unfolding in Syria. Anti-regime forces have swiftly seized control of the capital, Damascus, and captured all the major cities in less than two weeks. The speed in which regime forces collapsed has surprised everyone.
Key forces on the ground
The leading rebel group in this movement is Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), originally established as an affiliate of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, in 2011. Under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, HTS has emerged as one of the most formidable and lethal groups opposing former president Bashar al-Assad. The United Nations, the United States, Turkey and various other nations have designated HTS as a terrorist organisation, but Turkey has been its main supporter in Idlib, committing some 15,000 troops to sheltering the jihadists from the former Syrian government forces. Al-Jolani has more recently publicly dissociated himself from al-Qaeda, dissolving Jabhat al-Nusra to form HTS, following a merger with several other similar anti-Assad groups.
Among the groups that fought against the Assad regime in Syria is also the Syrian National Army (SNA), backed and controlled by Turkey. The SNA was founded in 2017 and comprises a diverse range of Arab and Turkmen groups and fighters. In recent days, the SNA launched an offensive against Kurdish groups and made gains around Manbij, a strategic town in the north. The Turkish government’s primary goal is to prevent Kurdish groups from establishing a regional government on the Syrian side of Turkey’s southern border. Turkey wants to administer the zone to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from nearby Turkish towns and Gaziantep. Turkey also pursues demographic engineering. For example, jihadist militia backed by the Turkish army pushed out the Kurds in the north-western area of Afrin, re-settling Arabs and Turkmen there. Turkey has concrete designs to resettle more than 3 million Syrian refugees in majority Kurdish areas in northern Syria.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is a Kurdish-dominated alliance that controls a vast swathe of territory in north and east Syria. It is backed by the US. Importantly, it controls Syria’s main oil resources in Deir ez-Zor, as well as most of the country’s arable land.
There is also the Southern Operations Room, a newly formed coalition of rebel groups in southern and south-eastern Syria, drawn mainly from Druze communities and opposition groups.
Finally, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), despite having earlier been defeated by a coalition of forces, has remained active, particularly in central Syria, and is periodically targeted by US warplanes.
Imperial and sub-imperial actors
It is evident that Assad’s fall was not just due to the rebel groups; outside powers also played an essential role, in particular Turkey and Israel, as sub-imperial actors linked to the main imperial power, the US. During the Syrian Civil War, which began with the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime, the US, Turkey and Gulf monarchies poured billions of dollars into various anti-Assad Islamist militias.
The rapid fall of key Syrian towns underscores the weakened state of the Assad regime, which was entirely hollowed out and reliant on external support from Iran and Russia. The surprising success of the anti-Assad forces is directly related to Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon, which disrupted the fragile equilibrium in the Middle East and pulled a thread that has begun to unwind the region's fabric. Notably, elite Hezbollah units played a crucial role in fighting the jihadi opposition until many were redeployed to Lebanon to participate in the conflict with Israel.
With Hezbollah significantly weakened, Iran was preoccupied with its defences against Israel. Meanwhile, Russia was reallocating many of its forces from Syria to support its military operations in Ukraine, providing the rebels with their opportunity.This dependency highlights the extent to which Syria has been devastated since 2011.
Human and economic costs
The human toll of Syria’s conflict is profoundly devastating. More than half a million lives have been lost, leaving a deep scar on the nation’s collective consciousness. Millions more have been uprooted from their homes, forced to flee in search of safety and stability. The social fabric of Syrian society has been irreparably damaged, with communities sharply divided along sectarian lines, creating an environment of mistrust and animosity. Entire generations are growing up in a landscape dominated by the echoes of war, their childhoods overshadowed by violence and loss. If sectarianism persists and the new power arrangements in Damascus fail to integrate all social, ethnic and religious groups, then disintegration of the country is very likely.
Economically, the country has suffered catastrophic losses, with Syria’s economic output shrinking by as much as 60% since the conflict began in 2011, according to a new report released by Chatham House. This economic collapse has resulted in staggering unemployment rates, which among adolescents is close to 75 per cent and is significantly higher among women, leaving countless families struggling to survive.
The infrastructure that once supported daily life — roads, schools, and hospitals — has been systematically destroyed, rendering essential services inaccessible. Over the years, Israel has systematically targeted Syria’s infrastructure and military facilities, a campaign it is now intensifying to prevent critical infrastructure from falling into the hands of unpredictable HTS anti-Zionist factions.
The UN humanitarian chief has stated that Syria’s decade-long conflict pushed 90% of its population below the poverty line, forcing them to subsist on less than £2 a day. This grim reality is compounded with rampant hyperinflation, fuelled by stringent US sanctions and a banking crisis in neighbouring Lebanon — also a by-product of those same sanctions. Consequently, millions are ensnared in a cycle of poverty, with minimal hope for a better future.
Highlighting the extent of decay, the production of captagon — an addictive, amphetamine-type stimulant mass-produced in Syria — became one of the primary sources of hard currency for the Assad regime. Since 2011, the Gulf region has witnessed a notable escalation in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking, particularly with an increase in the availability of Captagon. Under Assad, the Syrian regime exploited Captagon trafficking as a means to apply pressure on Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. The production and distribution of this drug are closely linked to the interests of powerful factions within Syria, including high-ranking members of the Assad leadership.
Since 2010-11, a significant portion of the Syrian population has become deeply demoralised by the dire conditions within the country. As a result, the Assad regime was transformed into a mere shadow of its former self, increasingly reliant on support from its Russian and Iranian allies.
Hope and uncertainty
The prevailing sentiment in Syria today is jubilation, reflecting a widespread perception of Assad as a ruthless monarch and brutal dictator who would never willingly relinquish power. There is growing hope among the population that Syria now has the chance to advance towards democracy and protect the rights of all its citizens, including ethnic minorities and previously marginalised communities. The streets are vibrant with celebrations as the people rejoice at Assad’s Assad. But this is only one side of the coin.
There is also growing concern that the current situation may descend into chaos, resulting in even greater suffering for ordinary Syrians, Kurds and other ethnic minorities. While Assad’s dictatorship has been a significant contributor to the difficulties in Syria, the problems extend beyond the previous regime. Deep-rooted sectarian divisions and ethnic tensions have existed for a long time and will not be easily resolved. Additionally, those who have recently assumed power in Damascus have a recent history of brutalising local populations.
It is also worth bearing in mind that two sub-imperial powers, Israel and Turkey, have their own plans for the region. The former will do everything in its powers to prevent the Palestinians from having a truly independent state; the latter will do everything in its powers to prevent the Kurds from having a truly independent state. The main imperial power, the US, oversees the planning of these processes, but the key issue is whether these dynamics are sustainable in the medium-to-long run.
There is a possibility that Syria could encounter a scenario similar to that of Iraq after 2003 or Libya after 2011, potentially leading to increased chaos and destruction. The various factions that have emerged might further fragment the country based on their own interests, and engage in conflicts for greater dominance. The positions of the rebel forces regarding power-sharing and the likelihood of democratic elections remain uncertain. Concurrently, the Israeli army has initiated a ground operation in southern Syria, near the occupied Golan Heights, which aims to establish a significant buffer zone and strengthen their foothold in the region while checking the HTS.
The situation is currently characterised by a high level of unpredictability, complicating efforts to deliver definitive forecasts regarding potential outcomes. This climate of uncertainty appears to align with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's broader ambitions of a Neo-Ottoman revival in the region. During the ongoing civil war, the Turkish government provided considerable support to various factions identified as Islamist rebels operating in Syria. This support network enabled Turkey to effectively position itself as a direct participant in the conflict. The SNA has been increasingly transformed into an extension of Turkey’s own security apparatus, further complicating the dynamics of the civil war and illustrating Turkey’s deepening involvement in the region's turmoil.
Winners & losers
Turkey will play a unique and influential role in the ongoing conflict and reconstruction efforts in Syria. Its economic, diplomatic and military resources offer substantial leverage in shaping Syria’s future. In 2017, the reconstruction bill for Syria was estimated at $360 billion. Today, it is obviously much higher. Turkish companies are well placed to actively participate in integrative economic efforts uniting Gaziantep, Tal Rifaat and Aleppo. Additionally, Turkey maintains strong ties with a significant segment of the Syrian population, which further strengthens its involvement in these crucial processes. Add to this, Turkey’s aforementioned demographic engineering and the picture is complete.
What has happened in the past few weeks in Syria has been described by Steven Simon as “essentially a Turkish coup.” According to Simon, “the Turks and Qataris have constituted an axis since the early days of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and they have finally achieved their objective of overthrowing Assad.” However, these efforts will only be advantageous if the political situation in Damascus advances peacefully and in a power-sharing agreement that is all-inclusive and fair. Otherwise, the disintegrative tendencies will prevail, and the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity will loom large, generating further conflict. From this perspective, Turkey could emerge as a key winner in the post-Assad era, provided that the scenario of the country’s disintegration fails to materialise.
Concerning Russia and Iran, Assad’s downfall signifies a notable shift for both powers. The swift collapse of his regime has left these two nations with limited options for maintaining their influence in the region. Russia appears to have decided to focus on Ukraine, dealing significant blows to Western interests if the US chooses to escalate the conflict.
Recent events have rapidly shifted the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of Israel and against Iran. Supply chains and networks connecting Hezbollah with Iran and the Assad regime have been severely weakened if not completely broken. There is no doubt that Israel is another undisputed winner from the developments in Syria, although it remains vigilant regarding the HTS and other Islamic anti-Zionist forces.
The implications of all these changes and regional power shifts are expected to unfold in the coming years across the entire conflict zone, from Russia’s western frontiers (the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus) down to the Suez Canal, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The conclusion of Assad’s brutal regime heralds the onset of a new phase of upheaval and instability in the Middle East. Syrian territory has been transformed into a battleground for competing geopolitical interests, with various actors vying to extend their influence.
It would be premature to claim that a stable system will emerge from these turbulent developments. The most likely scenario in the coming years involves a protracted, albeit potentially more contained, conflict characterised by an increased military presence and business expansion driven by Turkish and Israeli sub-imperialisms.
Bülent Gökay is professor of international relations at Keele University, UK, and editor of the Journal of Global Faultlines (Pluto). Vassilis K. Fouskas is professor of international relations at the University of East London, UK, and editor of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (Routledge)