Venezuela: Trapped in an authoritarian maze

First published in Spanish at Nueva Sociedad. Translation by Richard Fidler for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Following the July 2024 presidential elections, and the official refusal to release disaggregated results, Nicolás Maduro’s regime has intensified repression against the opposition, as well as against social protests over dire living conditions. After the regime’s failure to defend its votes, the May 25 legislative and regional elections once again divided the opposition between participation and boycott. How should we consider Venezuela’s situation almost a year after Maduro’s “re-election”?

Following the presidential elections, Maduro entered a new era: one of a government without electoral legitimacy. Without ever revealing the results, the ruling party claimed a “hard-to-believe” victory. But the opposition has failed to capitalise on the electoral support for its candidate, Edmundo González, who ultimately left the country, and today finds itself divided once again. 

To discuss the current situation in the Trump 2.0 era, Pablo Stefanoni spoke with Yoletty Bracho and Manuel Sutherland. Bracho is a professor of political science at the University of Avignon and a member of the Interdisciplinary Group for Venezuelan Studies (GEIVEN). Manuel Sutherland is an economist, PhD in Development Studies, professor, and coordinator of graduate studies at the Centre for Development Studies (CENDES), Central University of Venezuela (UCV). He directs the Center for Research and Worker Education (CIFO) in Caracas.

After the elections, Maduro seemed to consolidate his hold on power. Although the ballots never appeared, the opposition failed to call for large-scale mobilisations, and González’s departure from the country ultimately undermined the movement. How would you describe the current state of the government?

Yoletty Bracho: The authoritarian consolidation of Maduro’s government has been a long process in which the ruling coalition has learned to overcome the obstacles presented by consolidating political, economic and military alliances at the national and international levels. The social and political repression that intensified after the elections managed to cool popular mobilisation, in a context in which the leadership of the traditional opposition, although it managed to coordinate a great electoral effort, was unable to accompany the spontaneous mobilisations of the popular classes that were the main target of the repression. 

Today, it is understood that a de facto government exists in Venezuela, and that it is capable of organising new parliamentary and regional elections. These elections once again allow[ed] the forces that still support the Chavista government (whether through allegiance, coercion or self-protection) to unite, while dividing the opposition — including left-wing dissidents — over the strategy to adopt in response to the call to vote. 

In my opinion, this shows that the Maduro government remains in control of Venezuela’s political landscape, which is undoubtedly a demonstration of strength and even stability. However, the stability of the de facto government comes at a high cost to the Venezuelan people, since it is built on the precept of a state that is strong in its coercion but provides little (or no) protection of social rights and life. 

Thus, on May 1st, an emblematic date for the labour movement, the monthly minimum wage in Venezuela was estimated at $1.50. This wage is accompanied by a series of “war bonuses” (due to the so-called “economic war” against Venezuela) or “family protection” bonuses for public employees, which can amount to up to $120, and food stamps that can reach up to $40.1 This, in a context in which, according to calculations, the basic basket is between $500-700 a month.2 

The repression continues. Recently, on May 4, the Mothers in Defense of the Truth collective denounced the death of Lindomar Bustamente, who was imprisoned in Tocorón prison as part of the post-election repression.3 His death, presumed to be a suicide by hanging, is not the first among those arrested after the past presidential elections. These tragedies confirm the costs of authoritarian stability that Venezuelans must deal with on a daily basis.

Manuel Sutherland: The current political regime is absolutely convinced that it must never relinquish power, no matter what must be done to retain it. It spends most of its time developing extremely harsh tools of social control. 

There are around 900 political prisoners in very precarious conditions. Many have been treated as enemies of war, meaning they are held incommunicado, without their own lawyers, without seeing their families, and in very serious health conditions. So much so that there have been six deaths in custody, among prisoners from the events following July 28 of last year. 

The regime treats civil society as an entity to be subdued by force, and anyone who disagrees is seen as an enemy to be neutralised. There is a very strong self-censorship and a fear of expressing political opinions. 

The people voted for radical change, but the election results were not even published in a disaggregated form. So far, the National Electoral Council (CNE) has not released detailed results by state, party, municipality, and so on, and there is a terrible sense of failure and the impossibility of political, and consequently, economic, change. In this regard, Chavismo does not seem to offer anything new. Resignation, obedience or punishment seem to be the alternatives for people who simply want to be able to work, express their opinions and eat with dignity. 

How much has Donald Trump’s return to the White House affected Chavismo? And what are the political impacts of deportations?

YB: We have seen ups and downs in the relationship between the Maduro government and the White House. 

At the end of January 2025, we saw the arrival in Caracas of Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, and the release of US prisoners in an agreement that included the reception by Venezuelan authorities of migrants deported from the United States.4 The Maduro government actively participated in the deportation policy by sending planes from Conviasa, the Venezuelan national airline, to US territory to pick up migrants. 

During this period, Maduro even spoke of a “new beginning” in relations between the two countries. The Venezuelan government’s goodwill toward the Trump administration was evidently motivated by the oil issue and the sanctions. Indeed, the prospect of a transactional and mutually functional relationship between the two governments seemed possible for several weeks. 

But such a prospect was stymied by Marco Rubio and his arrival at the State Department. Rubio, a representative of the so-called neoconservatives, would be unlikely to pursue the path of stabilising relations with Venezuela, in view of his historical rejection of Chavismo.5 

More recently, Venezuelan migrants in the US have become one of the main targets of the White House’s deportation policy. The bogeyperson of the Tren de Aragua, the criminal gang hatched in the prisons governed by Chavismo, has been used to legitimise the expulsion of Venezuelans, hundreds of whom were taken to the inhumane prison in El Salvador through agreements between Nayib Bukele and Trump. 

These events lend a foothold to the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Maduro government, which can present itself as a guarantor of the dignity and security of Venezuelans, while continuing to send planes to the US and Central America to pick up deportees. In both cases, what we see is a clear instrumentalisation of Venezuelan migrants for political and economic purposes on an international scale.

MS: After the de facto, but informal, elimination of various sanctions in October 2023, within the framework of a number of sessions of agreements and dialogue, the regime was supposed to allow the opposition to run in elections without disqualification, political prisoners would be released, and electoral cards would be returned to legally recognised parties. This lasted about six months, and the regime failed to comply with almost everything agreed upon. 

However, this breach of the agreement did not destroy the relationship between the US and Venezuela, and the Joe Biden administration opted for oil licensing policies that allowed a wide opening for certain transnational corporations (US, Indian and European) to increase oil extraction and make substantial profits with barely any tax payments, since the licenses expressly prohibited the payment of dividends, royalties and taxes.

After July 28, the Biden administration again ignored the Maduro government and said it would speak with González starting January 10, 2025 [inauguration day]. From then on, there was a further distancing, and individual sanctions and some threats followed, but nothing significant. The generous oil licenses were maintained, and the multibillion-dollar lobby of Chevron and other companies imposed the thesis of business continuity, regardless of the country’s political or humanitarian situation. 

But the rise of Trump changed the aforementioned landscape. His cabinet and top advisors comprise the most anti-Communist wing. The most vociferous enemies of Chavismo reached the White House and won seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives. From the state of Florida, these politicians have built their careers by frontally combating the global left. They promised to fiercely attack the triad of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The harshest measures against the Bolivarian government are just beginning.

Deportations are a source of discontent — rejection and fear — for Venezuelans and represent a direct reduction in income for many, due to the remittances received from there, which are set to further decline. The elimination of protection programs has been seen as a direct attack on Venezuelans and has forced María Corina Machado’s opposition to try to offer complicated explanations to please their compatriots without upsetting her main ally, Rubio, who has now accumulated enormous power with the departure of Mike Waltz as National Security advisor. 

For many Venezuelans, the American dream has catastrophically ended overnight, but they still hope the Trump administration will fiercely combat Chavismo.

What kind of reshuffles are taking place within the opposition? How has Machado fared?

YB: On Saturday, February 8, the far-right European Parliamentary group Patriots for Europe met in Madrid under the slogan “Make Europe Great Again.” This meeting was attended by the leaders of national parties that make up the group, including Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Santiago Abascal. 

During this meeting, Machado spoke via livestream to thank “the work of the Patriots for Europe group within the European Parliament, which has always been at the forefront of the fight for the freedom of the Venezuelan people.”6 Her participation in this meeting is consistent with the historic alliances between the leader of the traditional opposition and international reactionary political forces.7 

In this sense, we saw Machado legitimise the expulsion and imprisonment of alleged members of the Tren de Aragua in the Terrorism Confinement Centre (CECOT), claiming a link between the gang and the Maduro government that has been denied by various analysts.8 This discourse is precisely the argument the White House has used to declare the Venezuelan criminal gang a terrorist organisation and treat as such those accused of being part of it for reasons as trivial as having a crown-shaped tattoo.

It is clear that González’s situation in Venezuela became untenable given pressure from the Maduro government. Many signs suggested that his departure from the country and his refuge in Spain were the result of agreements reached in the coercive context following the elections. 

However, beyond the figure of “president-elect,” the traditional Venezuelan opposition is sharply divided between those who are returning — for many, involuntarily — to the international arena as a space for political action and those who seek to gain ground within Venezuela. 

A clear source of division was the parliamentary and regional elections held in May. Indeed, the parties that decided to participate in these elections, such as Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time) and Movimiento por Venezuela (Movement for Venezuela), were expelled from the Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (Democratic Unitary Platform). 

Furthermore, we saw a clear clash between the positions against participation of Machado and Julio Borges (from exile) and those of Henrique Capriles and Manuel Rosales, who decided to participate. Let us keep in mind that Capriles’ participation was made possible thanks to his reinstatement as a candidate, following his 15-year ban from running in 2017 by the Comptroller General’s Office. At the moment, the exchanges or agreements that led to this reinstatement are unknown.

We can also look at Juan Requesens, who, after being released in 2023 — he had been jailed in 2018 for participating in a drone attack against Maduro — ran as a candidate for governor of Miranda state. Requesens called for “redefining the vote” as a tool of struggle for Venezuelans, breaking with the abstentionist strategy of the traditional opposition wing linked to Machado.

Among the left-wing opposition and dissidents, the discussion about the elections was put together from a perspective that is critical of electoralism, pointing out that the electoral issue should not sideline the construction of politics from below and through social struggle. In this regard, the Comunes movement, for example, questioned the relevance of participating in an election when the events of July 28 remain unclear, and when hundreds of people who mobilised after the announcement of Maduro’s supposed victory remain in prison. 

For its part, the Centrados (Centred) party — which includes former Caracas Metropolitan District mayor Juan Barreto, who was a member of Hugo Chávez’s government — decided to participate in the elections, while denouncing the incarceration of Enrique Márquez since January, who was its presidential candidate in 2024. 

Organising and expressing oneself politically in today’s Venezuela is extremely difficult, but there are also those who manage to mobilise in a highly adverse context, for example, for workers’ rights and against the destruction of wages.

MS: According to all the studies and analyses of the CNE tally sheets that have been published, the opposition came away with a landslide victory in the presidential elections. If we add the votes of anti-Chavez supporters abroad, who were prevented from participating, we are talking about 85-90% of the vote in favor of any kind of change. This surge was the result of an almost spontaneous movement. 

The opposition parties have been devastated by legal action, persecution, imprisonment and the exiling of their leaders, and by its divorce with a business community that stopped supporting them due to the crisis and fear of being punished by the state. Machado’s party does not exist as such; it had never participated in elections before and was never formally registered with an electoral ticket. The old opposition guard fought fiercely against Machado and subtly supported González, trying to distance him from her. 

This old guard suffered a rupture in 2016 and a very profound one in 2019, which materialised in the rise of “judicialised” opposition parties, whose legal status was granted by the government to leaders who formed factions that rebelled against the traditional leaders of those parties to make tacit alliances with Chavismo. This translated into unanimous votes in the National Assembly and total silence in the face of the events of July 28. 

Popularly known as “alacranato” [scorpion pit], this opposition obtained less than 1% (combined) in the past elections, according to the CNE’s published tally sheets.9 It has radically supported key Chavista projects and served as a balm for political normalisation and docile compliance with the most arbitrary government policies. 

The remaining old guard, which has not been persecuted, imprisoned or exiled, has tried to tone things down and seek spaces for dialogue and rapprochement with Chavismo. Thus, they decided to participate in the early elections scheduled for May 25, definitively breaking the fragile unity of the Unitary Platform and the independents who supported González in the elections. 

Machado has been astute and has seen that around 75% of the population does not want to vote and that a call to vote/fight ignored by a large majority would be counterproductive in the struggle to demand the vindication of the results of July 28. 

After the final disappointment of January 10, 2025, when Maduro was inaugurated for another term, the leadership of the majority opposition has been devastated and is almost in hiding. This is also a key factor that prevented it from conducting a halfway serious electoral campaign. 

Another issue is the impossibility of raising campaign funds, organising meetings and creating a team of polling station monitors to defend the vote. The level of repression is severe, and social media is filled with testimonies from polling station monitors who had to leave the country due to intense harassment. 

Thus, by calling early elections for positions that will not be filled until January 2026, the government has driven a powerful divisive wedge into the weakened opposition. Currently, there are internal fights over positions, over voter registration cards, over the scarce resources available for propaganda, and over whether to vote or not. Accusations of traitors and “sellouts” abound on social media. 

The government offered a broken toy to distract the opposition, and it has been a success. From a vast majority due to scandals, the opposition is experiencing its weakest, most disorganised, and most defenseless moment.

How do you assess the economic and social situation following the government’s recent attempt to say “everything is normal,” when scarcity has turned into abundance for a segment of the population?

YB: The return of inflation is once again raising concerns for Venezuelans who had learned to live — and survive — with the precarious stability of recent years. Forecasts are once again circulating with triple-digit figures for 2025, as well as sharp disparities between the official and parallel dollar prices. Clearly, the country’s economic outlook is worsening with the intensification of US sanctions under the new Trump administration. 

The government once again appears to be seeking solutions through its ties with China. On May 9, Maduro met with Xi Jinping in Moscow, while [vice president] Delcy Rodríguez toured China days earlier announcing possible energy agreements between the two countries.10 

Meanwhile, in Venezuela, there is still a civilian and military elite that manages to weather the ups and downs of the economy thanks to the facilities granted by the government, which promote savings on imports of consumer goods and exports of subsoil resources extracted under terrible environmental and human working conditions. 

As for the large portion of the Venezuelan population, which has grown accustomed to living in a country where the exception has become the norm, it stays afloat through informal work, remittances sent by migrants abroad, bonuses and other “aid” delivered through what remains of the social mission system and territorial participatory mechanisms, which make it possible to make ends meet for a very precarious daily life.

MS: The government insists that there have been 16 consecutive quarters of economic growth and that Venezuela is the fastest-growing country on the planet. This is not supported by the Central Bank’s own figures, since GDP data stopped being published after the first quarter of 2019. 

This narrative contradicts the narrative about the sanctions as a destructive tool for the economy and responsible for wage stagnation for more than three years. From April 2022 to March 2025, cumulative inflation hovered at about 1600%. The inflation containment policy based on wage, financial and credit suffocation has completely failed, and stability has been nothing more than a vague promise. 

Salaries, that is, the amount that counts toward calculating social benefits (retirement, vacation, and severance pay, among others), as already noted, is barely $1.50 a month and has lost 99% of its value in just 13 years, a situation that has driven an exodus of nearly eight million people, about a quarter of the total population. 

On May 1, the government was expected to raise salaries, but it failed to do so. It instead increased the so-called “war bonus”. This bonus, along with the food bonus, amounts to about $160 as the “legal minimum income.” This is a direct transfer from the national government to those working in the public sector. However, pensioners barely receive $1.50 a month and $50 a month for the “war bonus.” 

The policy of permanent currency overvaluation has turned Venezuela into an extremely expensive country — a basic food basket for five people costs about $530 a month. Therefore, a working family with two minimum incomes cannot even cover 62% of the basic food basket and, therefore, would fall below the extreme poverty line; to survive, they must “invent” or “kill a little tiger.” 

Even in the private sector, a worker’s salary (almost all of which is bonuses with no impact on social benefits) is around $220 a month; therefore, a couple can not even cover the most limited food costs. 

The path of devaluations, rock-bottom wages and widespread poverty has many people hoping to emigrate or for a miracle to pull them out of the abyss. There seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel. The economy is following a zombie path. Many businesses are closing, and those that open seem to embrace fads that quickly fade into oblivion.

• 1

  “Maduro aumenta los bonos y deja el salario mínimo igual,” in Efecto Cocuyo, 30/4/2025.

• 2

  “Un venezolano necesita 97,4 dólares al mes para cubrir gastos de alimentación, según ONG,” in Swissinfo, 22/3/2025.

• 3

  “Madres en Defensa de la Verdad: ‘El Estado está matando a nuestros muchachos, exigimos libertad’,” in La Izquierda Diario, 4/5/2025.

• 4

  “Venezuela libera a seis estadounidenses tras reunión entre Maduro y enviado de Trump,” in RFI, 1/2/2025.

• 5

  “Los pronunciamientos de Marco Rubio sobre Cuba, Venezuela y Colombia,” in CNN en español, 13/11/2024.

• 6

  “Full speech of @MariaCorinaya for the #MakeEuropeGreatAgain Summit in Madrid,” on X, 8/2/2025.

• 7

  For example, María Corina Machado and Edmundo González were awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Conscience through the allied votes of the European Right and Far Right.

• 8

  Rebecca Hanson, David Smilde and Verónica Zubillaga: “This Is Not the Right Way to Curb Migration,” in The New York Times, 4/4/2025.

• 9

  Alonso Moleiro and Florantonia Singer: “Los ‘alacranes’, la oposición acusada de colaborar con el chavismo en Venezuela, también lanza una candidatura única,” in El País, 27/4/2024.

• 10

  José Luis Granados Ceja, “Venezuela’s Vice President Touts New Energy Investment Following Trip to China,” in Venezuelanalysis, 1/5/2025.