‘Neoliberal and authoritarian’? A simplistic analysis of the Maduro government that leaves much unsaid

Gabriel Hetland’s article “Capitalism and authoritarianism in Maduro’s Venezuela,” published in New Labor Forum and reposted at LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, presents a one-sided and decontextualised view of Venezuela under President Nicolás Maduro. According to Hetland, the Maduro government is virtually devoid of any redeeming characteristics. Hetland refers approvingly to the claim made by Maduro’s harshest critics on the left, that his government and the right-wing opposition are “two sides of the same coin”. 

Yet any serious examination of Venezuela under Maduro needs to incorporate the impact of US-imposed economic sanctions into its analysis and not simply make passing reference to them. The Washington-engineered economic war significantly undermined the effectiveness of potentially sound policies initiated by Maduro. To dismiss these policies as evidence of incompetence — or to ignore them altogether, as Hetland does — is misleading. 

Rather, the negative effects of the interface between Venezuelan government policy and Washington’s acts of aggression has to be placed at the centre of analysis. Hetland’s black-and-white approach does a disservice to the complex and, in many respects, unique experience of Chavismo. A more nuanced and critical examination is essential if we are to draw the necessary lessons from the nation’s unfolding political process.

War on Venezuela

To begin with, the same criteria cannot be used to evaluate governments such as those of Venezuela (or Cuba), as to analyse progressive governments such as Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, or Argentina under the Kirchners (Néstor and Cristina). The illegal and semi-legal actions undertaken by Washington and Venezuela’s right-wing opposition have been numerous and relentless almost since the start of the Hugo Chávez presidency in 1999. They were in many ways intensified under Maduro. 

These include: abortive coups; assassination attempts, one involving drones1; recognition of de facto governments; open appeals by top US officials urging Venezuelan military officers to intervene; invasions by paramilitary forces from Colombia; covert and public international campaigns to isolate Venezuela; foreign funding of opposition groups on a scale far exceeding that provided for neighbouring nations; widespread and protracted street violence aimed at regime change; and sweeping secondary sanctions to pressure corporations and governments around the world to avoid commercial dealings with Venezuela, amounting to a de facto embargo. All these actions have been extensively documented.2 

The full scope of the war on Venezuela has to be brought into the picture. Yet Hetland’s readers are left unaware of what the Maduro government is up against. The impacts of the war on Venezuela are far more than a matter of academic interest. They are an essential element in the debate over whether the Maduro presidency should be deemed an outright failure, a view defended by the right and segments of the left, including Hetland. Far from recognising the multifaceted nature of the aggression against Venezuela, this perspective reduces it to the issue of sanctions, which are considered no more — and in many cases far less — responsible for the nation’s economic misfortunes than Maduro’s errors and alleged incompetence. These Maduro critics underestimate the devastating effect of the war on Venezuela, especially given that Maduro’s errors were, in many cases, overreactions to Washington-backed provocations. 

Furthermore, Washington has systematically countered every initiative undertaken by the Maduro government to address economic difficulties facing the nation. For example, when the Maduro government attempted to renegotiate its foreign debt in response to the sharp decline in oil prices, in August 2017 US President Donald Trump prohibited the trading of Venezuelan bonds in US markets. Maduro then responded to Washington’s measures against the Venezuelan oil industry3 by turning to gold exports, but Trump issued an executive order in 2018 banning the purchase of Venezuelan gold. Simultaneously, the Maduro government launched a crypto currency, the Petro, to bypass the US-controlled SWIFT system that had caused numerous banks to avoid transactions involving Venezuela — what Maduro called a financial “blockade”. Trump responded with another executive order prohibiting the use of Petros under US jurisdiction. 

Now, the second Trump administration has refused to renew “licenses” the Biden administration granted Chevron and other corporations to operate in Venezuela, just when the nation’s oil industry was beginning to enjoy a slow but steady recovery of levels of production. Maduro had reformulated oil policy to facilitate the granting of these licenses. 

These are just a few examples of how Washington thwarted Venezuela’s initiatives. They illustrated the extent to which Maduro’s options were limited and raise the broader question of what options were available. 

Advances and concessions

Certainly, Maduro’s rapprochement with the private sector — what Hetland refers to as an “inter-bourgeois pact” involving traditional business interests (grouped in Fedecámaras) and the emerging business sector (pejoratively labelled the boliburguesía) — should be debated. In my opinion, however, the discussion should centre on the concrete terms of these alliances, not on whether such alliances are justified under current circumstances. Claiming that Maduro sold out is not conducive to open, dogmatic-free debate on the matter. Hetland acknowledges prevailing conditions did not allow Maduro to advance toward a “socialist transformation,” as advocated by some groups further to the left.4 But if he opposes alliances with the private sector, one is left to ask: What course of action does he support? 

The strategy of developmentalism — which in Latin America has been based on an alliance between left-leaning governments and business sectors — may represent a viable non-socialist option in an acute situation such as that faced by the Maduro government. Hetland alleges Maduro “has not presided over developmentalism in any way,” yet offers no evidence to support the claim. Maduro, however, in his 2025 annual Speech to the Nation announced that 85% of the food sold in supermarkets is now “Made in Venezuela,” the inverse of the situation 10 years earlier. If accurate, this shift is largely due to a “strategic alliance” between agricultural interests and the government, currently coordinated through the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry and National Production. A rigorous critical analysis would acknowledge Maduro’s claims and present empirical evidence to challenge them, or identify specific shortcomings in the implementation of developmentalism. But Hetland leaves much out of the picture and fails to confront certain positions on the left that do not coincide with his. 

For instance, Hetland makes no reference to the government-promoted communes (community production units), whose existence contradicts the notion that Maduro is really a neoliberal in leftist disguise. Although Maduro had downplayed the communes for several years, more recently he has injected energy into them, declaring 2023 “the Year of the Communes.” Chris Gilbert explores this revitalisation in Commune or Nothing! Venezuela’s Communal Movement and its Socialist Project, drawing extensively on personal observations and interviews throughout the country. Gilbert’s work shines light on the position of critical support for Maduro, a perspective that came to the fore at the founding congress of the Communard Union in March 2022. That point of view was articulated by Angel Prado, the head of El Maizal, the nation’s most successful commune, which hosted the event.5 

The following year, Maduro appointed Prado as Minister of the Communes. Despite his history of confrontations with the Venezuelan government and ruling party, Prado continues to view the state as a contested arena, where remnants of the “bourgeois state” are pitted against the communes and other popular forces. The experience of Prado and the communes is clearly at odds with Hetland’s interpretation of the Venezuelan government under Maduro. Hetland makes no mention of critical supporters among writers and political figures, Venezuelans and non-Venezuelans, but refers extensively to the recently formed group Comunes, composed of leftists who supported Chávez and now demonise Maduro. 

Repression and contextualisation

Similarly, in his discussion of the protests that followed the July 28, 2024 presidential elections, Hetland fails to take into account a viewpoint on the left that runs counter to his own. He writes: “The government responded to the largely peaceful protests with brutal repression, arresting around two thousand protesters.” There is a different side of the story coming from the left, although the two sides may not be totally mutually exclusive. 

Following the two days of protest on July 29-30, Attorney General Tarek William Saab presented extensive evidence alleging that on those two days delinquents, in cahoots with the Venezuelan right, carried out attacks on symbols of the state: 11 Metro installations, 28 metrobuses, 27 police vehicles, 27 statues, 57 educational institutions, 10 National Electoral Council facilities, and 10 headquarters of the governing party. Prior to Chávez’s rise to power, Saab was a leading champion of human rights and his denunciations of violence instigated by the opposition deserve to be considered seriously, even if they are ultimately refuted.

Another example of Hetland’s lack of objectivity is his accusation that I justify political repression in Venezuela — an assertion he fails to substantiate. Given the gravity of the charge, there is no excuse for making it without carefully examining the facts. Hetland cites my use of the term “taking the gloves off” in reference to Maduro: “Therefore, while it may be regrettable that Maduro has engaged in repression (‘taking the gloves off’), this [according to Ellner] is more or less justified.” Yet my statement conveyed something quite different. What I actually wrote was: “Some left analysts fault Maduro for taking off the gloves and not abiding by the norms of liberal democracy. In some cases, the criticisms are valid but they have to be contextualised.” 

Contextualisation is not the same as justification. To take an extreme example, one may point out that NATO’s eastward expansion has long been a source of great concern for Russia’s leaders. The statement, however, does not necessarily signify support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. 

In fact, I criticised important aspects of Maduro’s “playing hard ball” and “taking the gloves off” strategy. I called the government’s official recognition of a small splinter faction of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) — rather than the main party that included all the principal Communist leaders — “a minus for the Maduro government.” I also noted that the same tactic had previously been used against other opposition parties, which I stated “undeniably… flouted the constitution.”6 

Critical support

Hetland’s portrayal of my views reflect a broader trend in writing on the left that polarises discussion on the Venezuelan government — in which Maduro is either demonised or viewed uncritically. This binary framing leaves little room for other positions, such as that of critical support for Maduro. 

At the outset of his article, Hetland alleges that I defend Maduro but with “caveats.” He then poses the question: “Is Maduro an anti-imperialist revolutionary with democratic legitimacy?” The very framing of the issue precludes a nuanced analysis. Rather than identifying the “caveats,” Hetland attempts to refute my central arguments by labelling the Maduro government anti-working class and corrupt. The “caveats” in my writing on Venezuela that he ignores include my critique of Maduro — and, to a lesser extent, Chávez — for failing to seize favourable moments to deepen the transformation process and deliver decisive blows against corruption.7

Hetland would do well to take off the blinders and read Mao Zedong’s On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People to grasp the distinction between “secondary” and “antagonistic contradictions”. In my view, the tensions between Maduro and the PCV were initially of a “secondary” nature, and Maduro’s sectarianism contributed to the eventual rupture, which is now clearly beyond repair.8 The failure of analysts (and political actors in the case of Maduro and the PCV) to appreciate the importance of nuances and assimilate Mao’s principle on enemies and allies obstructs serious discussion and debate. This, in turn, leads to errors and a missed opportunity to draw invaluable lessons from more than a quarter-century of Chavista rule. 

In summary, the errors and shortcomings of the Maduro government cannot be pushed under the carpet or justified, but they nevertheless must be understood in context. There is a direct correlation between the intensity of imperialist aggression and the ability of a government committed to real change to achieve its social, political and economic goals. Chávez recognized early in his rule that forging alliances with business sectors was necessary to offset the aggression waged by domestic and foreign adversaries. What should have been clear to everyone within the movement was that such alliances were conducive to corruption and would generate pressure from allies to halt or reverse the process of change. 

Since then, criticism that identifies the downsides of the policies of the Venezuelan government and defines political opportunities has been essential. But critics need to appreciate the fact that the challenges faced by Maduro are in many ways greater than those Chávez encountered, at least in the years following the regime change attempts of 2002-03. These included the plummeting of oil prices (beginning in 2015), Obama’s 2015 executive order (which signaled an escalation of hostility from Washington), and the erosion of public enthusiasm that inevitably occurs in prolonged periods of sacrifices and hardship. 

Within this context serious errors were committed. But, due to the extreme polarisation that has characterised the Chavista period, the struggle to rectify errors had to come from within the movement; that is, from the governing party and its allies. This would not have necessarily been the case in a more relaxed political environment. Any frontal, unqualified attack on the government from a leftist perspective, particularly one that fails to grasp the severity of the current challenges, will ultimately be counterproductive. 

• 1

  Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, in his The Room Where it Happened: A White House Memoir, hinted at the fact that the U.S. was behind the drone attack. Bolton wrote that after the incident, “Trump said to me emphatically… ‘Get it done…This is the fifth time I’ve asked for it.’” https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2022/07/14/trump-john-bolton-coup-venezuela/

• 2

  Among the relatively recent books that document the Washington-engineered war on Venezuela are: Joe Emersberger and Justin Podur, Extraordinary Threat: The U.S. Empire, the Media, and Twenty Years of Coup Attempts in Venezuela (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2021); Anya Parampil, Corporate Coup: Venezuela and the End of US Empire (New York: OR Books, 2024); Timothy M. Gill, Encountering US Empire in Socialist Venezuela: The Legacy of Race, Neocolonialism and Democracy Promotion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2022); Alan MacLeod, Bad News from Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting (New York, Routledge: 2018).

• 3

  The trade journals clearly indicated that the August 2017 executive order “targeted” the Venezuelan oil industry. That same year, The Economist pointed out that the oil sector had “suffered from disinvestment” and predicted that the Maduro administration would not remain in power beyond 2019. At the time, Hetland himself recognized the devastating impact of Washington’s measures on the Venezuelan economy. He wrote: “Beyond supporting the hardline opposition, U.S. actions have directly exacerbated Venezuela's crisis. The United States has pressured American and European banks to avoid business with Venezuela, starving Venezuela of needed funds... U.S. sanctions (increasingly supported by other countries) have also exacerbated the crisis.” The issue of the adverse effects of Washington’s actions against Venezuela between Obama’s 2015 executive order — which declared Venezuela a “threat” to U.S. national security — and the August 2017 order is important. The standard position of the Venezuelan right, supported by analysts including some on the left, is that the country’s economic crisis preceded the main U.S. sanction which was issued in January 2019 and was designed to cripple Venezuelan oil exports. This claim lets the U.S. off the hook for the hardship inflicted on the Venezuelan people and blames it entirely on Maduro’s misguided policies and corruption. Yet even John Bolton admitted that the U.S. sanctions under Trump were aimed at “driving the state-owned oil monopoly’s production as low as possible,” in an attempt “to crash Maduro’s regime.” Hetland, “The Promise and Perils of Radical Left Populism: The Case of Venezuela.” Journal of World Systems Research. Vol 24, no. 2, 2018, p. 289; The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Forecast Venezuela November 2017 Updater. Country Forecast, Venezuela.” New York, November, 2017.

• 4

  Steve Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela: Maduro’s Defensive Strategy and Contradictions Among the People.” Science and Society, vol. 87, no. 3, p. 389.

• 5

  Chris Gilbert, Commune or Nothing! Venezuela’s Communal Movement and its Socialist Project (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2023), pp. 126-139.

• 6

  Ellner, “Maduro and Machado Play Hardball.”  NACLA: Report on the Americas, Spring, 2024, pp. 9, 11. 

• 7

  Ellner, “Class Strategies in Chavista Venezuela: Pragmatic and Populist Policies in a Broader Context,” in Ellner (ed.), Latin America’s Pink Tide: Breakthroughs and Shortcomings (Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020), pp. 180-184.

• 8

  Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela,” pp. 401-402, 408, 410.