Frustration and anger on Syria’s streets

First published at Tempest.

Since the beginning of the year, demonstrations and strikes have continued across Syria. Demands range from increased political participation and democratic rights1 to condemnation of the actions and violations committed by Israeli occupation forces in the Quneitra region, and the right to education in Suwayda.2

Journalist Zeina Shahla documented nearly eighty demonstrations across the country between February and April, most of them motivated by social and economic grievances.3 The newspaper Kassioun subsequently recorded 34 rallies and demonstrations in 21 locations across several Syrian governorates, cities, towns, and universities between May 18 and 24, 2026. Protests are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Since the beginning of 2026, discontent with socio-economic problems has intensified. Polling in different areas of Syria has been showing growing dissatisfaction regarding socio-economic issues. According to the website Syria in Transition:

Yet by April the mood had changed (towards the ruling authorities). The most serious deterioration was in attitudes toward the economy and the state’s capacity to manage it. Only 13 percent of respondents now believed the government was doing enough to tackle soaring energy and food prices, while 66 percent said its efforts were insufficient.

This has been reflected as well with rising labor strikes and protests denouncing worsening working and living conditions.

Syrian ruling authorities have deepened a political-economic orientation favoring a commercial model focused on short-term profit, to the detriment of Syria’s productive sectors. This economic orientation was already at play during the former Assad’s regime. The majority of the investment projects offered by Damascus to foreign investors demonstrate this pattern, and so does the nature of the investment promises made to Syria since December 2024 into tourism, real estate, and financial services. Most of these promises, however, still await their implementation.

Meanwhile, no protection has been provided to national production, particularly manufacturing industry and agriculture, against foreign competitive products. Quite the opposite. Accelerated trade liberalization is threatening their existence even more. In late January 2025, Damascus reduced customs duties on more than 260 Turkish products. Syria’s trade deficit with Turkey reached an all-time high of $3.26 billion in 2025, according to data from the Turkish Statistical Institute. This represents an 86.5 percent rise in comparison to 2024, when the deficit stood at $1.74 billion.

At the same time, Syrian officials announced on several occasions since their arrival to power their willingness to start the process of privatization of state assets, or at least to encourage a public-private partnership model to manage them. This includes essential services such as education and health. More recently, rumors of potential privatizations of state-owned banks have also emerged.

The Syrian ministry of finance has also drafted a new tax system that should come into force at the beginning of 2027, which will probably diminish the state’s financial capacities and revenues even further. Indeed, with a unified and non-categorical tax structure, and a similar corporate tax applied equally across all business entities, regardless of their size, this weakens the ability to expand the revenue base and is fundamentally unequal.4 Similarly, the new investment law enacted by presidential decree in June 2026 provides large concessions to investors, such as permanent exemption from income taxes for agricultural and educational projects, reductions of up to 80 percent of income taxes in export-oriented and priority industrial sectors, and wide customs exemptions. In addition, full ownership rights are allowed for foreign investors, as well as renewable residence permits, and unrestricted profit repatriation.

Syria’s new tax system and investment law reflect the ruling authorities’ prioritization of investment from large foreign companies and high-net-worth individuals, as well as promoting dynamic consumption, rather than strengthening the country’s productive capacities.

This dynamic is also reflected in the reliance on foreign capital and assistance, as well as local businessmen, to promote Syrian reconstruction and economic recovery through foreign donations or donation campaigns, such as the Syrian Development Fund and other initiatives for specific regions and cities.

Accompanying these policies favoring economic liberalization and interests of big capital, the ruling authorities have promulgated a series of decisions and measures boosting dynamics of concentration of power in the Syrian economy.

Strikes and popular protests

The protests have mobilized various segments of society, including transport workers, laborers, farmers, teachers, students, lawyers, and bakers, reflecting growing discontent across the country with the continued erosion of purchasing power and the deterioration of public services. They also targeted corruption, nepotism, and a lack of transparency and participation in decision-making processes.

The protests erupted in mid-May, initially in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Daraa, and then spread to other parts of the country, after the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Industry set the price of a ton of wheat for the 2026 harvest at 4,600,000 Syrian pounds (approximately $333.30 at the unofficial exchange rate of May 27). This decision sparked widespread discontent among farmers, as the cost of producing a ton of wheat currently fluctuates between $340 and over $530. Following these protests, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Legislative Decree No. 120 of 2026, granting a subsidy of 900,000 Syrian pounds (SYP) per ton of wheat delivered by farmers to the Syrian Grain Company. Thanks to this increase, the price of a ton of wheat reached approximately (SYP) 5,500,000, a price still lower than the protesters’ demands.

Other demonstrations took place during the same period, notably in the Hasakah Governorate against the reduction of diesel fuel allowances for agricultural projects, and in the Tarhin region, a rural area near Aleppo, where owners and employees of oil refineries protested the decision to permanently close them. The demonstrators also demanded fair compensation to guarantee a minimum standard of living, emphasizing that thousands of families depend on this sector as their primary source of income.

In June, strikes broke out at the privately owned Zanobia Ceramics company5 and at the Madar Detergent Company’s facilities and factories in the Kisweh region, near Damascus, employing 4,000 and 4,500 people respectively. The demonstrators demanded higher wages and better working conditions. After a week-long strike, the workers of the Zanobia company obtained satisfaction on several of their main demands, including an increase in their wages (which includes a rise of SYP 500,000, in addition to SYP 200,000 of cost-of-living allowance, for a total of SYP 700,000 (equivalent to $51.20 at the end of June)) and guarantees in terms of health coverage, including health insurance, the presence of a doctor in the factory, the provision of an ambulance and safety equipment at work.

Workers at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing in northern Idlib protested in late June against the administration’s imposition of a 24-hour shift system and unfair working conditions. Despite the administration’s threats of mass layoffs and replacements to break the strike, the workers — some with 14 years of service — maintained their demands for a more flexible work schedule. According to the website Al-Hal Net, the administration has already hired new employees, but about 90 percent of them resigned immediately, unable to continue due to the grueling working conditions and endless hours.

The city of Qamishli also witnessed several days of protests in late June, denouncing rising prices and poor living conditions, as well as power outages caused by fuel shortages. For example, protesters staged a sit-in to demonstrate against the rising price of diesel, demanding the reversal of this decision and an improvement in their living conditions, as the region experiences soaring prices for goods and services, along with increased transportation and production costs. Dozens of retirees held a sit-in outside the city’s Social Security office, at the invitation of the Retirees’ Group, to demand the expedited payment of their monthly pensions and an end to the delays and postponements affecting their entitlements. Following these mobilizations by retirees, the Retirees’ Group was officially announced at the end of June, with the aim of defending retirees’ rights to a decent standard of living, particularly by resolving issues related to their salaries and payment delays.

These sit-ins and demonstrations are taking place against a backdrop of runaway inflation plaguing the Syrian Jazira region (northeast Syria), with rising transportation and agricultural production costs, alongside a rise in commodity prices — as well as persistent complaints about deteriorating services and frequent power outages. For example, in mid-June, social unrest erupted in the Raqqa Governorate due to wage delays and their continued status as “irregular” workers — lacking legal protections and job security. These protests led to further strikes that affected the sanitation sector in several areas of the governorate.

Unfair dismissals and persistent austerity measures

Meanwhile, dismissals continued in several ministries throughout 2026, sparking further protests. In mid-June, laid-off workers from the General Cotton Yard Company in Idlib staged a sit-in to demand justice and their reinstatement.

The Syrian government has still not established clear, legal, and precise standards and procedures for dismissals or suspensions, fueling accusations of arbitrary dismissals. The human rights organization “Syrians for Truth and Justice” has expressed that it is deeply concerned about the compliance of these procedures with the legal safeguards stipulated in the Unified Fundamental Law for Workers No. 50 of 2004 (Articles 132 to 139). Furthermore, in June 2026, the organization published a report describing cases of arbitrary dismissals and forced transfers based on “sectarian, political, or gender backgrounds, or to criteria related to the individual’s stance on the Syrian uprising (in 2011), or regional and social affiliation” raising serious concerns about the use of the state restructuring process as a tool for exclusion and the reshaping of the public sector on unprofessional grounds.

More recently, the government also increased salaries for specific jobs, generally in the higher strata of the administration or in positions considered as more “prestigious,” while the overwhelming majority of employees did not benefit from similar measures. Furthermore, salary disparities persist within the same ministries for similar jobs, with employees, often previously affiliated with the group Hay’at Tahrir Sham6 or allied with it, appointed by the new authorities receiving higher salaries (often in US dollars).

Damascus authorities have continued to reduce the number of subsidized loaves of bread they distribute, from ten to eight per household daily, while maintaining the price at SYP 4,000. The ministry set the weight of a loaf of bread at 1,000 grams, down from 1,050 grams previously. As a reminder, in December 2024, the price of subsidized bread was SYP 400 (for 1,100 grams). These measures have exacerbated food insecurity among the most vulnerable populations.

Opposition to luxury real estate projects and population displacement

At the same time, several protests have erupted against real estate projects that have led to the displacement of local populations and the loss or erosion of their property rights. In Homs, inhabitants of the Qarabis neighborhood successfully pressured the Kuwait-based al-Omran Real Estate Development Company to cancel the element of its “Boulevard of Victory” plan affecting the neighbourhood, which would have threatened their properties and displaced them from their homes. In the beginning of May 2026, a protest was held in Damascus by the residents affected by Decree 66 of 2012 from the Mezzeh, Kfar Souseh, and Basateen al-Razi neighborhoods. This reflects the ongoing social and legal tensions surrounding major urban development projects, most notably the Marota City project. At the same time, in the Aleppo countryside, the inhabitants of Jabal Aqil demonstrated against the seizure of their land by the Turkish military base.

That same month, a demonstration took place in northern Raqqa to protest the local authorities’ plan to demolish housing north of the railway line, under the pretext of “reconstruction and investment.” This situation is all the more concerning given the rumors circulating about Saudi investment and the construction of housing by a Chinese company on the land. Official statements claim that the land is “state property,” a claim disputed by residents, who assert they possess official deeds of transfer and other legal documentation. During the demonstration, protesters chanted slogans demanding the resignation of the governor, who has refused to cancel the reconstruction plan affecting approximately 3,000 families, most of whom are low-income and living in poverty. They reaffirmed their determination to find a just solution that guarantees their housing rights and puts an end to the evictions and demolitions.

Overall, these real estate projects often aim to serve an elite class able to afford new and expensive housing projects and accumulate capital, rather than building housing schemes and infrastructures seeking to fulfill the interests of large segments of the population — who now suffer worsening living conditions and low purchasing power in the face of very high rents and expensive property prices. For example, one of the most emblematic real estate projects is “Yaafour 963,” launched by Overseas Investment Group, owned by Syrian-Emirati businessman Muwaffaq al-Qaddah, where apartments are offered starting at $300,000. Similarly, the “Abyat Hills” project, launched by the Saudi Abyat Real Estate Investment and Development Company in the Damascus suburbs of Qudsi and al-Bajaa, is estimated at over $2 billion and plans to build 22,000 homes in secure residences with modern amenities.

Moreover, the country continues to suffer a deep housing and infrastructure shortfall that threatens the processes of stabilization and recovery — which frustrate the expectations for safe and dignified living conditions and the prospects for both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to return. According to the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), “one-third of the country’s housing stock has been damaged or destroyed, while critical infrastructure, including roads, water networks, electricity, and sanitation systems, remains largely non-functional.”

The cost of living continues to rise

The growing anger of the population reflects the disastrous economic situation in the country.

The poverty rate in Syria fluctuates between 80 and 90 percent, and 16 million people are in need of emergency aid to survive. This is in a country of about 26 million. More than 7 million people face severe food insecurity. Furthermore, due to a significant funding shortfall, the United Nations World Food Program announced in mid-May 2026 that it would scale back its operations in Syria by halving its emergency food assistance, from 1 .3 million to 650,000 people, and ending its national bread subsidy program, which supported millions of people daily.

This is a context of a labor market very much disrupted, and high unemployment, particularly among the youth in a context of a lack of economic opportunities. While there are no clear rates for the size of unemployment in Syria, estimates ranges from 14 percent at the World Bank in 2025 to 60 percent according to the Syrian Minister of Economy and Industry, Nidal al-Shaar. In addition, 83 percent of the Syrian labor market is reported to be informal, meaning a lack of social security and legal protection, leaving millions of workers vulnerable to exploitation or sudden income loss. The returns of Syrians, both refugees and IDPs to their original regions, have also further strained the labor market, which lacks the capacity to absorb them. The International Organisation of Migration in May 2025 also underlined that the “lack of economic opportunities and essential services pose the greatest challenge for Syrians returning to their communities.”

The rise in prices of key commodities and services has also contributed to increasing inflation, pushing the cost of living higher still for Syrians. While the authorities raised public-sector salaries and pensions by 200 percent in July 2025, and by a further 50 percent in March 2026—bringing the minimum wage to SYP 1,256,000 per month (approximately $96.6 at the end of June according to the black exchange rate of SYP 13,000) — this remains far from enough to guarantee dignified living conditions. According to the Syrian Center for Policy Research, “the abject poverty line for a household reached 3.34 million per month in April 2026 (approximately $252 according to the black exchange rate of SYP 13,250 at the end of April), while the lower poverty line reached SYP 5.26 million ($397), and the upper poverty line reached SYP 7.26 million (548$).” Large segments of society rely on remittances from relatives abroad amounting to around $4 billion annually, according to estimates from earlier this year.

From this perspective, what the Syrian people lack is not just job opportunities, but jobs that allow them to live with dignity and meet their daily needs. In this context, reducing subsidies and increasing the prices of basic necessities will only worsen the situation and negate the effect of wage increases.

Limitations of protest movements

The protest movements and attempts at worker self-organization are positive developments, especially after years of war and dictatorship. For example, workers at the Zanobia factory established a strike committee, composed of four members elected by the strikers to negotiate on their behalf.

Despite the positive aspects of these demonstrations, their impact remains limited. First, these protests remain geographically confined, lacking coordination between regions, with the partial exception of demonstrations related to wheat prices. There is no close cooperation between workers in the same sector — for example, between public school teachers demonstrating in different governorates. This allows the authorities in Damascus to manage each movement separately and limit its influence on the political landscape.

Second, the protest movements lack political channels and means of expression, primarily due to the absence of political parties or mass political networks capable of relaying their demands and calls to action. Furthermore, with the exception of a few left-wing parties that observe these demonstrations without playing an influential role, political actors and civil society actors are not giving them the attention they deserve.

In this context, it is important to emphasize that worker self-organization and the struggle for democratic, independent, and mass unions — in order to foster coordination between workers and unions autonomous from the government — are essential for improving the living and working conditions of the population and, more broadly, for defending democratic rights.

Furthermore, it is essential to build and rebuild grassroots organizations — from trade unions to feminist and women’s rights organizations, including local associations, progressive political parties, and national structures — in order to unify them.

The collective and democratic organization of the working and popular classes is also the best way to confront and oppose the sectarian and ethnic tensions that continue to impact society. These tensions are often encouraged or fueled, or at least not radically addressed, by the central government and/or its political allies to divert attention from the social, economic, and political problems affecting the population. For example, recent demonstrations demanding justice for Assad-era crimes in Syria coincided with an escalation of attacks by civilian groups and incitement to sectarian hatred between June 13 and 17, 2026. Syrian authorities have so far failed to establish a mechanism to promote a comprehensive transitional justice process that would bring to justice all individuals and groups involved in war crimes. Such an approach could have played a crucial role in curbing reprisals and mitigating the escalation of sectarian and ethnic tensions.

Conclusion

Whatever political force came to power after Assad’s fall, it inherited a multitude of political, social, and economic challenges. However, the policies of the current Syrian authorities have exacerbated these difficulties instead of resolving them. Economically, the approach of the new ruling class has failed to improve the living conditions of a large segment of the population and has negatively impacted the recovery of the economy’s productive sectors.

The increasing number of demonstrations since the beginning of the year, fueled by deteriorating living and working conditions as well as socio-economic problems, demonstrates the shortcomings of current economic policies and could serve as a warning to Damascus.

Any successful economic recovery and reconstruction process must be based on a comprehensive and democratic political transition that empowers the various sectors of society — political parties, social actors such as trade unions, professional associations, the Farmers’ Union, human rights and feminist organizations, local associations, and so on. The means to participate in decision-making processes, including in the economic sphere, must be created. This would create the necessary conditions for integrating their collective interests and establishing the political stability essential for the sustainability of these policies. Therefore, free and transparent elections must be organized within trade unions, professional associations, and agricultural federations so that these sectors can choose their representatives and defend the interests of their members.

Finally, the processes of capital accumulation and distribution, as well as economic policies, should be the subject of collective debate within society, and not the prerogative of a small elite in power.

Joseph Daher is a Swiss-Syrian academic and activist. He is the author of Syria After the Uprising: The Political Economy of State Resilience (Pluto, 2019) and Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (Pluto, 2016), and founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He is also co-founder of the Alliance of Middle Eastern and North African Socialists.

• 1

  One example is the two sit-ins organized by the “April 17 Gathering” in Damascus in April and June, under the banner “Rights and Dignity.” Their demands included: a commitment from the transitional authorities to fulfill their duties and exercise their powers in conducting the transition process; working towards a genuine political transition based on an inclusive national dialogue leading to elections; activating the transitional justice process and bringing perpetrators of crimes to justice; rejecting the perpetuation of the Assad regime and the rehabilitation of its figures; broadening political participation through free elections to local councils and trade unions; strengthening the role of political parties and rejecting the monopolization of power by any one entity or faction; establishing good governance based on competence, integrity, and transparency; ending the chaos surrounding appointments and the distribution of power; combating corruption; criminalizing sectarian speech; and guaranteeing an independent, transparent, and fair judicial system.

• 2

  A campaign was launched in May 2026 in the Suwayda Governorate to guarantee the right of thousands of students to take their secondary school leaving exams in the governorate, in a safe and stable environment. The authorities in Damascus have so far opposed this, demanding that students travel to Damascus to take their exams.

• 3

  From Zeina Shahla’s article: “Over the past three months, we have documented nearly 80 vigils of protest, averaging one per day, in Damascus and its surrounding countryside, as well as in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Idlib, Latakia, Hasakah, Quneitra, Daraa, Hama, and Homs. These vigils were organized by students, taxi drivers, organ transplant recipients, families of missing persons, street vendors, residents of devastated areas awaiting reconstruction, lawyers, teachers, and traders from certain markets. Furthermore, some vigils brought together different segments of society around common demands: the cancellation of the electricity price hike, improved living conditions, respect for the rule of law, the resolution of security issues, the fight against corruption, and the commemoration of key moments in the Syrian revolution and war.” Furthermore, the governorate of Suwayda, in particular, has been the scene of frequent vigils following the massacres of last July, with demands such as the right to self-determination, the return of displaced persons, and the revelation of the fate of the disappeared.

• 4

  There will be no tax to pay for agriculture, bank deposit returns, and stock trading. A 2 percent rate will apply to supplies and services by non-residents. There will be a 10 percent rate in the health, technology, education, and industrial sectors, while other sectors—including trade and services—will pay 15 percent. Income tax will only kick in after the first Syrian pound (SYP) 60mn—around $5,310. Thereafter, there will be a 6 percent rate for the first SYP 5mn ($442.5) and 8 percent over SYP 5mn ($442.5). Exemptions are envisaged on transfers of company shares, revaluation of fixed assets, returns and interest on bank deposits, local exports of goods and services, the agricultural sector and its associations, children’s medical expenses, education, rent, and interest on housing loans. For corporate donations to good causes, there will be a special tax deduction. At the same time, a sales tax has been introduced, which could serve as a precursor to a VAT, at a 5 percent rate on essential goods.

• 5

  Zanobia is a private company specializing in the manufacture of ceramics, granite and construction materials. It owns two industrial complexes: one in Al-Kisweh, a southern suburb of Damascus which houses many factories, and the other in the industrial zone of Adra, on the outskirts of Damascus.

• 6

  This is the new name of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was founded as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2012. The group took its current name when it dis-affiliated from al-Qaeda in 2017. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, became Syria’s president after leading a coalition of rebel forces to bring down the Assad regime in late 2024.