The French left after the parliamentary elections: A new beginning or a return to the past?
First published in French at Regards. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.
French voters are, to say the least, curious. Since 2017, the left has been trapped in an electoral quagmire, accounting for little more than 30% of the votes cast. After [former Socialist Party (PS) president] François Hollande’s disastrous five-year term, the unexpected [current president and former minister in Hollande’s cabinet] Emmanuel Macron stripped the PS of part of its electorate. Macron wanted to be “both left and right” and the manoeuvre succeeded, despite [France Unbowed leader, LFI] Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s excellent result in the first round of the presidential election [in 2017].
Elected as president Macron was quick to reverse his promises of remaining balanced and unceremoniously swung to the right. So, the left thought it could win back the voters it had lost. It certainly won back a handful of voters in 2022, but infinitely fewer than Marine Le Pen’s party [National Rally, RN]. Up until June 30, this phenomenon had continued to repeat itself at every election. That day, the left got the same vote as in the previous legislative elections, while RN grew spectacularly, gaining 20% points in seven years!
It was at the moment, when an inevitable RN victory and the collapse of the traditional right seemed inevitable, that a united left found itself in the lead on the night of the second round [July 7], while RN fell sharply to third place. It did win about an extra forty seats — more than fifty if we include the support of Les Républicains (LR) — but this was nothing compared to the absolute majority expected a week earlier.
Its balance sheet was painful: the New Popular Front (NFP) got 185 deputies, the presidential camp held up better than expected with 172 deputies, while RN tripped up, its contingent being only 143 deputies, which was less than even the worst polling on the eve of the vote had suggested. As with the European elections, RN had, of course, come into the second round leading in the largest number of constituencies. But less than 400,000 votes separated the RN bloc from the NFP. At the end of the first round, some fifty constituencies were in the balance, meaning just a small shift one way or the other would be enough to ensure that either political force won (or lost) big.
RN sustained its carefully managed political dynamic. It benefited from the process of de-demonisation implemented by Marine Le Pen within a favourable European context. But it had two elements against it that could weaken it at any moment. The “de-demonisation” had decreased, but not erased, the level of opposition provoked by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s legacy. Moreover, despite its efforts, RN has not managed to overcome the political isolation that forced it into an uncomfortable position on the “extremes”. The contribution of [LR leader Éric] Ciotti and his friends [who broke with the LR to form a bloc with RN] was not insignificant, but only modest, in terms of the aim of regrouping as broadly as possible within a society and public that is bitterly split. RN has faced a declining but consistent level of opposition and persistent political isolation.
A crazy week
The high turnout and its effects on the 12.5% threshold for advancing to the second round in each constituency suggested, for the first time in a long while, the possibility of a considerable number of three-way races. Three-way races are often considered to favour the candidate with the most votes in the first round. In principle, RN could be happy that for months now the political discourse had focused on denouncing the danger posed by the “two extremes”, including the left, which ended up appearing as the more dangerous of the two. In short, the demonisation of LFI was supposed to serve to de-demonise a little more those who have always found it difficult to overcome the memory of collaboration with the Nazis.
However, within 48 hours, the expected three-way races melted like snow in the sun, despite the insistent invocation of the "neither-nor" position by some, with [former prime minister] Edouard Philippe in the front line, and despite the ambiguities expressed by Macronist leaders. One might have thought that the disappointment of not being able to compete in the second round would once again fuel the trend towards disengagement and limit the shift of votes from the right to the left and vice versa. Obviously, this was not the case.
The mobilisation of the RN vote was strong in the 285 constituencies where it was present with its “Ciottist” allies. But it could not compensate for the coming together of forces that, although opposed in the public arena, united once again to confront what was ultimately recognised as the greater danger.
Nevertheless, the immense relief of Sunday’s result should not blur our vision. One round does not eliminate the other nor the lessons of the European and legislative elections. Until the decisive second round, the electoral dynamics had favoured the extreme right.
RN has consolidated its historical base in the north and east of France and on the Mediterranean coast. But it has also extended its reach into territories that were previously resistant to it, such as the west of Normandy, the south-west (the Dordogne), Champagne, Burgundy and even the most peripheral part of Ile-de-France. There are now 48 departments with an RN deputy. In a dozen of them, often marked by an old industrial and working class history, it exercises a certain modest hegemony. In a manipulative way, it uses to its advantage the sociabilities that for so long were the bread and butter of the workers’ movement and the Socialist and Communist left.
This is less the case for the NFP. The map of constituencies where the NFP won deputies unsurprisingly maps closely with those where the historic left was strongest. But its vote is more concentrated than it was in the past: three quarters of those elected are in 25 departments and a good third are in Ile-de-France.
The left, in the end, knew how to take advantage of the government’s attrition, the rejection of Macron and the anguish provoked by an imminent RN takeover, which seemed so distant not so long ago. But magical conjunctions and popular reaction are nothing if all this is not part of a sustainable political strategy, from below and above.
Everyone is now waiting to see what the left will do, but it will not be enough for it to appeal to voluntarism and promise that we will do what is necessary, whatever the cost. Or to believe that it has a good program and that all that remains is to popularise it and convince public opinion. We cannot pretend to be unaware that people no longer believe in programs or trust those who draw them up. More than words, the main thing now is to show in practice that the left is ready to take responsibility for moving forward, at least as much as possible. The left respects the programs it commits itself to, but it cannot forget that it has not always been able to see its projects through to the end, and not simply because part of it did not really want to.
In fact, no dynamic can be established in a sustainable way if it only mobilises the institutions and not society. In the first round on June 30, 28% of votes supported the NPF and its proposals. This is not insignificant and may have a bearing on what is to come. But this percentage does not constitute a majority, especially since the civic act of voting in the first round gave way to something else in the second. We all know the famous formula: in the first round we vote for what we want and in the second we vote against what we do not want. Never have elections so closely followed this principle.
Women and men of the right and left voted the same way: not for a program, but to stop a threat that they had not necessarily perceived as so serious and close at hand. It is to the credit of all components of the French left, without exception, that it did everything possible to make this happen. But it should not draw the conclusion that it now holds all the cards.
We know that for a long time we have been cruelly experiencing the contrast between working class combativeness and political constructions: this gulf cannot be filled overnight. We know that the people are capable of great things but that they no longer really believe in politics and institutions. Doubts will not disappear with the wave of a magic wand.
And how can we forget that deep-seated causes — sometimes circumstantial but more often structural — have led to a political crisis that is concerningly worsening. It will not be enough to improve on what we know how to do or to use existing tools differently. We will have to invent new tools and new ways of being able to work together politically, of thinking, deciding and acting. We will have to give up the old habit of hugging each other when facing the prospect of a difficult election and turning our backs on each other as soon as the storm has passed. We will also have to truly convince ourselves that political competition between family members is not war, that influence does not come through arm wrestling, that coherence does not imply subjection, and that efficiency does not require us to dream of the discipline of armies in campaigning.
In short, we have no right to lose each other.
Roger Martelli is a historian and former leader of the French Communist Party (PCF). He is a co-chair of the Copernicus Foundation and co-director of the magazine Regards.