Ukraine: The peace that cannot come

First published at analysis and critique.

For my grandparents, it took three years, ten months, two weeks, and three days of horror and sacrifice from the moment the first bombs fell on Belarusian and Ukrainian cities until the aggressor capitulated. Today, the war that Russia is waging in our country is about to enter its fifth year with neither victory nor defeat in sight. Nearly 20 percent of Ukraine's territory is already occupied, but less than one percent of that was gained in the last year.

To the relief of many peace enthusiasts, Kyiv's efforts have shifted toward seeking diplomatic solutions, with European capitals following suit. Yet as Trump's deadlines have passed, the deal remains nowhere closer. Optimistic claims that 95 percent of terms are agreed upon, with only a few thorny questions left, make one wonder how this differs from the infamous Istanbul communiqué, which "almost brought us peace" but was similarly full of deferred disagreements.

Negotiations now revolve primarily around the positions of Ukraine and its allies, with those of the US, which in turn holds talks with Russia. The latest proposals maintain symbolic figures — an 800,000-strong domestic army, Article 5-like guarantees valid until Ukraine fires on Russian territory unprovoked — while leaving control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and territorial concessions unresolved. Kyiv agreed to presidential elections and even suggested a referendum to validate the peace agreement, provided an armistice would make them possible. All in vain: after a phone call, both Putin and Trump agreed that an immediate ceasefire would only prolong the conflict.

In the meantime, Russia continues “solving the problems by military means”. Early January strikes at energy infrastructure caused total blackouts in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, leaving nearly 800,000 without electricity as temperatures dropped well below zero. Then the power was cut to over 500,000 in Kyiv. Moscow even fired a nuclear-capable hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic missile that reportedly hit an underground gas storage near the Polish border.

Russia's idée dixe

Andriy Movchan argues in Counterpunch that many severely underestimate the ideological component of the Kremlin's invasion. All of Russia's foreign actions have long been subordinated to one goal: the subjugation of Ukraine, which has become an idée fixe. If this cannot be achieved militarily now, Russia will embed conditions in any peace process that allow it to continue under more favorable circumstances. Preventing the recurrence of aggression is key for both Ukraine and European security.

This explains Moscow's harsh reaction even to cautious discussion of possibly deploying multinational forces in Ukraine: of limited size, only after a comprehensive ceasefire, away from the contact line, and if nothing endangers their safety. The Kremlin perceives any potential hindrance as a threat to its ambitions and warns that any such units and facilities will be treated as legitimate military targets.

If Russia were indeed looking for compromise in good faith, a hypothetical international police mission in a demilitarized neutral zone along the entire contact line could lift the siege from Kherson, ensure freedom of navigation on the Dnipro, secure the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, reinstate access to Pokrovsk's coking coal mines, allow refugees to return, and physically separate the forces. Unlike military formations, such a mission could focus on civilian protection and surveillance rather than force projection. It could even allow Moscow to declare victory: no NATO troops in Ukraine, a buffer zone secures "the people of Donbas", their land link to Crimea is maintained, while EU accession obliges Kyiv to respect minority rights and equips them with grievance mechanisms. The fact that nothing alike is even considered is further evidence that all these are no more than excuses.

At the Defense Ministry meeting in December 2025, Putin was explicit: Russia would "unconditionally" achieve its war aims and "liberate its historic lands", predicting European "little pigs" backing Kyiv would eventually lose power.

The peace wing

The spokespeople of Peace from Below, Alexei Sakhnin and Lisa Smirnova, also dismiss in Jacobin the idea that Putin seeks an amicable settlement. Russia's regime goals are to crush Ukraine completely, leaving it defenseless and in political turmoil, to justify the costs of the "special military operation" and to avoid any possible future threats. Yet they believe that a genuine call for immediate and unconditional force from the people's movements would, when refused by the Kremlin, delegitimize the regime in the eyes of its sympathizers.

This stance is beyond naive. It could even cause harm if taken seriously. Undermining support for Ukraine's defense effort only weakens Kyiv's negotiating power. It is completely unclear what such a call could offer different from previous Ukrainian proposals without delivering the Kremlin exactly what it wants. Over the past year, Kyiv has submitted multiple ceasefire proposals, all of which were rejected outright. Yet there were no protests by angry peace activists worldwide outside Russian embassies. While massive pro-peace rallies condemning domestic militarism were held in the West which Russian media reported on extensively, nothing of the sort was seen on the streets of Russian cities.

While desertions occur and fatigue grows, Moscow reports exceeding its recruitment quota for mercenaries. Hundreds of thousands of Russians continue going armed to Ukraine, voluntarily, to escape sentences, earn money, or advance careers. Historic experience shows it takes more than positive vibes from abroad for people to rise. Food shortages triggered riots in 1917, and heavy battlefield losses and distrust of incompetent leadership drove Prigozhin's insurrection in 2023.

Ukraine's mission impossible

The latest public opinion figures show consistent resilience: over the year, the share of those who categorically oppose territorial concessions stands still, at a simple majority. At the same time, more than two-thirds could accept the frozen conflict, yet 74 percent continue to reject the Moscow terms. Still, 17 percent admit they could live with Russia's version of peace, and another nine percent remain undecided — enough people to refer or appeal to for those willing to take a chance. As resources dwindle and exhaustion deepens , these numbers could rise, which could lay the grounds for internal political conflict.

The fiscal reality is brutal. Ukraine's 2026 budget requires $49 billion in external support – without which the country would be financially non-functional. Last year's trade deficit doubled to $42 billion, increasing dependence on Western cash flows. Public debt has reached $186 billion, with servicing already consuming 18 percent of domestic revenues. Instead of seizing frozen Russian assets, the EU's € 90 billion loan for 2026-2027 adds to this debt pile, but at least repayment is supposedly postponed until Moscow pays reparations. Even if the frozen assets were used:, without peace in sight, the debt trap tightens, and reconstruction costs mount.

Military exhaustion compounds fiscal crisis. The AWOL epidemic reached record levels in 2025, prompting the government to restrict statistical data and announce yet another Defense Minister change. Kyiv still controls nearly 20 percent of the disputed territories with heavily fortified urban areas. Withdrawing is both unpopular and strategically dangerous, as it moves the frontline closer to neighboring regions with harder-to-defend positions. Russian troops advance slowly with heavy losses, but Moscow appears ready to wait and pay the price.

This grim situation forces an unavoidable question I would have dismissed years ago under the pretext of not being a military expert. What is the goal of Ukraine in this war? Hold until gathering strength to expel the occupants? But where will such resources come from? Wait until Russia's economy crashes? Ilya Matveev's research points out that while state-directed mobilization helped Russia weather initial shocks, its economy has settled into long-term stagnation — but no imminent collapse is in sight. Maintain independence and future prospects? But protracted war undermines both.

Support for people is not the same as support for the government. The latter can be awful and disgusting, but those in Ukraine can hardly afford to move on and step aside because the aggressor's rule is far worse. Few indeed are willing to risk dying fighting, but even fewer would choose to live under occupation. The best options from an individual perspective would be for the war to stop or, at least, for there to be an opportunity to escape. But neither is on the table for the country as a whole.

Russia is prepared to bear the costs of the war, condemning Ukraine to an unenviable choice: yield now or fight as long as support continues. Calling to withdraw resources to force Ukraine's capitulation in "an unwinnable war" is a curious policy choice, but many on the left seem content with it. Sooner or later, such an outcome may indeed become reality. But to the disappointment of the peace wing, the world in which this becomes possible doesn't bring heaven.

The New World Disorder

The broader context offers a glimpse of the future. On January 3, the United States conducted a military operation to capture Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro. This wasn't even dressed up as a humanitarian intervention. The justification was blunt: control over oil.

Buoyed by success, Trump revived his push to acquire Greenland and openly mocked international law in the process. The signal was unmistakable: power decides, rules follow if convenient. Against this backdrop, it's unclear how durable Washington's interest in Ukraine really is, what price it will demand, and whether any security guarantees would bind the US once circumstances change. For Europe, still coming to terms with the necessity to confront Russia, which is ready to assert its interests by force, this looks less like leadership and more like betrayal. Suddenly, talking about Ukraine as a shield no longer sounds like a figure of speech. Putin's reassurances should offer no comfort — he is a man of his word in the narrowest sense: he gives it and takes it back.

Ukraine may have to swallow a bitter pill, but so will any other country not interested in, or not capable of, imperial conquest. Whoever reduces peace or justice to moral categories will never be able to achieve either. Rather than condemning the wrongs, it's time to ask what makes them possible. Should smaller nations or communities accept a world where great powers dictate what they want? And if not, what tools are actually available to resist when someone stronger is twisting your arms?

Oleksandr Kyselov comes from Donetsk. He is a left-wing activist and research assistant at Uppsala University.