Kurds in Syria: ‘We don't want to draw new borders’, says Democratic Union Party
Salih Muslim, president of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, interviewed by Thomas Schmidinger
January 29, 2014 – Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal -- Salih Muslim (pictured above) shares the presidency of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitîya Demokrat, PYD) with Asya Abdullah. The PYD is a sister party of the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK and shares the same ideological background as its leader Abdullah Öcalan. The party is the ruling force in the Kurdish areas of Syria and took over three enclaves with Kurdish majorities in 2012.
In an interview with Austria-based political scientist Thomas Schmidinger, Salih Muslim tells about the present and future project of Kurdish self-rule in Syria.
First I want to give my deepest condolences on the death of your son Sherwan, who was recently killed at the age of 17 while fighting against jihadist groups.
Thank you. If we are fighting for freedom we have to pay a price. This was my price I had to pay.
What was the political project your son died for? What does your party fight for?
We struggle for democratic self-rule within Syria, which is a specific sort of autonomy. We want democratic rights and a constitutional recognition of the Kurds. We don´t want to split from Syria and we don´t want a Kurdish national state. We also presented that concept to the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NBC) and the Arab parties there agreed with us on that.
But you know, nothing is settled now and if you talk about autonomy each
country has different forms of autonomies and federal systems. It is different
in Germany, Switzerland or in the United States. There are different models and
we will see what model would be the best for Syria. We want to rule ourselves.
The name is not important, but it should be according to human rights and
But we are sure about one thing. We don´t want to draw new borderlines. We are not separatists. We will not separate Kurdistan from Syria.
And the details can be negotiated?
Everything else can be negotiated. We have managed self-rule for a bit more than one year now and we still have a lot of difficulties. We are under pressure from a lot of different forces. It is also a problem that everybody says that the PYD is doing this and that, but we are not ruling alone.
These problems are very understandable but until now there are no democratically legitimised structures in the region of Kurdish self-rule. Will there be elections soon?
The PYD only gave a proposal for self-rule. We really don´t want to rule alone and we are preparing for elections in the areas of our control. We want other parties to join. In fact both Kurdish councils, the Kurdish National Council and the People’s Council of West Kurdistan agreed to do it that way. There is a committee for the preparation of elections and this committee decided to create three cantons for the election and the election law should be ready soon. So we hope that we can vote soon.
In the last months there have been heavy conflicts between your party and some other Kurdish parties, especially the Azadî Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria, the sister party of the ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan. Will these parties also participate in these elections?
Some parties cooperate with us, but these two parties, the Azadî Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria don't. They are welcome to run in the elections but until now they refuse to do so. They always attack and criticise us. They say that the militias of the PYD are doing this and that, but they don´t realise that these are not our militias. They are the Kurdish militias.
You can’t deny that your party founded the Asiash, the security forces, and the People’s Defence Forces (YPG) as an army.
No, I don´t deny that. Of course our party founded the Asiash and the YPG because we realised that they are necessary. But that does not mean that the Asiash and the YPG are the forces of our political party. We want a single armed force of the Kurds and we refuse the idea of having party militias.
I understand the idea that parties should not have party militias. But the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also has a guerilla army.
Yes, but we are not the PKK. That is also one of the misunderstandings about the PYD. We are an independent party.
I know that you are not the PKK but you are a sister party of the PKK following the same ideology and the same leader, Abdullah Öcalan.
Yes, you can call us a sister party but we have our own structures in Syria that are not just the structures of the PKK.
In November you also officially declared self-rule of the Kurds in Syria. How did the regime react on that?
There were different reactions from the side of the regime. But let me talk also about the opposition. The regime and many parts of the so-called opposition both accuse us of being separatists. Both do not want to us to give us our right to self-rule. So we have to fight for it against both, the regime and the armed opposition.
As long as you don’t want to leave Syria you will have to deal with somebody who rules in Damascus, either with Assad or somebody from the opposition who could win the war. How would you interact with them?
From the beginning we coordinated with the secular leftish opposition. We established the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NBC) and we really want to cooperate with these opposition forces who accept our demands, but not with the Islamists and other anti-democratic forces.
Could you imagine Assad staying in power? With the recent military successes and the latest views from the West, this might be a question.
We have always said that Assad has to leave. This is still our position. We want a negotiated peace but we can’t imagine that he stays in power. We really need an end of the regime and a new democratic beginning. But it is not only a personal question of Assad. The problem is not the person, but the regime. Now there are many Alawis who fear that they could become victims of vengeance if Assad leaves. So it is a much larger problem now. So we have to negotiate to stop the bloodshed and to change the system.
Could the idea of a regional self-rule also be a model for other minorities in Syria, for example for the Alawis?
The Alawis are a different case because they are a religious and not an ethnic group. But the model of self-rule could be a model for the whole Middle East. Decentralised self-rule could be model for all of us.
About 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from all over Syria are at the moment in Rojava (Kurdistan in Syria). When I travelled to Rojava last winter the situation of these IDPs was really bad because they were not getting help from international NGOs. How is the situation of these IDPs from the regions destroyed by the civil war?
At least the lack of diesel fuel has been solved. People are heating with diesel and last winter they did not have any. But concerning food and other important supplies, the situation is still very problematic. It is already difficult for the people living in our areas and it is much harder for the refugees. There is still no international help at all. The big NGOs are not present at all and the International Red Cross is co-operating with the Syrian Red Crescent. But the Syrian Red Crescent is an Arab organisation co-operating with the regime and not with us. As you know the regime did not completely withdraw from Rojava. It still controls the Qamishli airport and if the Syrian Red Crescent has anything to offer they are working with the officials from the regime and not with us.
Not only the Qamishli airport is in the hand of the regime. In the last few months the regime presence in the capital of self-rule, Rojava, has definitely got stronger. On November 14, supporters of Assad’s Baath Party could protest in Qamishli and could shout their slogan, “We sacrifice our blood and our soul for you Bashar”. The regime’s security forces have returned. In November they arrested the Kurdish singer Sharif Omari. On December 18 five people and a taxi driver were arrested in Qamishli and on December 26 two activists of the independent Kurdish Youth Movement (TCK) were also arrested. Who controls Rojava, the Kurds or the regime?
As I told you, the regime never disappeared. The situation in Qamishli is very complex. Not only is the airport is under control of the regime, also some Arab districts of the city. There is an Arab tribe in Qamishli called Tai with about 35.000 members who are all still supporting the regime. They are all still supporting the regime and in their parts of the town the regime is still present. We do not control their districts. This demonstration of the Baath Party was in their quarter.
Our main goal is to prevent ethnic conflict. We belief in the brotherhood between peoples and we don’t want to have fights between Kurds and Arabs. And because we don’t want to fight with the Tai tribe the situation in Qamishli is complicated. We could prevent a situation like in Serê Kaniyê, where we had a war in the city. To prevent that, we have to find a form of co-existence with the Arab tribes.
The situation in al-Hasaka is even more difficult. We control the Kurdish quarters, a part of the Arab quarter is controlled by the regime and a part by the Islamist opposition. In such a situation we can only try to prevent fighting inside the cities.
In Qamishli and in most of the towns of the east of Syrian Kurdistan there are also many Syrian-Aramaic and Armenian Christians. Who controls their quarters?
The Christians are on our side. Their quarters are controlled and defended by our troops. There are also Christians fighting with us. In Rojava, there is definitely no conflict between Muslim Kurds and Christians.
Christians and Yezidi -- adherents of an independent Kurdish religion -- are afraid of the jihadist influence. They prefer to live under Kurdish control rather than under the Islamists. What about other Kurdish parties? In the last few months some of the other Kurdish groups criticised the PYD for installing an authoritarian regime and for co-operating with Assad.
These are the same accusations we here from Turkey and the Islamist groups. I want to insist that the Asiash (Kurdish for security) and the YPG are not the armed forces of our party but of the Kurdish self-rule. Our enemies always present stories that it is the fault of our party if somebody gets arrested. But therefore we have the Asiash as the police of our Kurdish self-rule and independent courts. If some criminal gets arrested they always accuse the PYD of kidnapping him. So many of these stories told by Kurdish parties who are cooperating with Turkey or with Massoud Barzani are not brought up against us.
Many of these other parties say that they do not dare to demonstrate against the PYD anymore.
If they organise peaceful protest and if they give the Asiash the information in advance where they want do demonstrate, we assure you that they definitely have the right for peaceful protests.
 An alliance of pragmatic left-wing opposition groups, the PYD and 12 smaller (mainly Arabic) left-wing Syrian political parties and independent political activists. The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NBC) has the position of negotiating with the ruling regime of Bashar al-Assad and is therefore strongly criticised by other parts of the Syrian opposition. In particular, the Islamist opposition groups accuse the NBC of being a “front organisation” of the regime. Other than the Free Syria Army, SNC and the various Islamist organisations the NBC opposes the armed struggle against the regime and favours a non-violent resistance against the regime. It also strongly opposes any international military intervention against the regime.
 An alliance of most of the non-PYD Kurdish parties of Syria. Some of them have close relations to the Kurdish parties of Iraq.
 The self-rule structures of the PYD.
 The president of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.
In 1990 Osman Sebrî wanted to pick himself up from his sickbed in Damascus to greet his guest standing.
He was eighty-five years old, and in no condition to walk.
His guest, Abdullah Öcalan, leaned toward his bed, embraced and saluted him.
Arrested along with his uncle during the Sheikh Said Rebellion, set free and then rearrested in 1928, Osman Sebrî was one of the most prominent Kurdish youth forced to flee Turkey and migrate to Syria under pressure from the Turkish state in 1929.
When he arrived in Syria, Sebrî joined Xoybun—an organization founded in Beirut by Kurdish intellectuals in exile.
A living witness to Kurdish history from 1925 into the 1990s, Sebrî—also known as Apê Osman—and Öcalan talked about Xoybun for hours on end during Öcalan’s visit.
At one point in the conversation with Öcalan, tears came to Apê
Osman’s eyes, and he told Öcalan: “You are realizing our dreams. I have
never been so proud at any time of my life. Now there is an organization
to liberate Kurdistan.”
Öcalan responded in agreement, “We are merely following in your footsteps. This time we will prevail.”
Three years after this conversation, Osman Sebrî passed away at the age of eighty-eight.
Apê Osman now rests in the Berkevir graveyard—a village administratively tied to Dirbesiyê. On either side he is flanked by his fellow travelers: Mele Evdılahê Timok of Batman on one side and Rustem Cudi, one of the most prominent leaders of contemporary Kurdish movement, on the other. A large Kesk-Sor-Zer flag flutters over the graveyard.
Influenced by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Southern Kurdistan (in Iraq) and conceived as its successor, Rojava’s first Kurdish political party was founded in 1957 under the leadership of Osman Sebrî and Hemîdê Hecî Derwêş: the Democratic Kurdish Party of Syria, or El Parti for short. In an era characterized by intense political turmoil and rapid transformation, El Parti—which had been forced to continue its activities illegally—together with other Kurdish political formations in Rojava was greatly affected. As a result of the political polarization experienced in Southern Kurdistan in 1966, Celal Talabani broke off his alliance with Mele Mustafa Barzani and formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (the Yeketî Niştîmanî Kurdistan, known by its acronym “YNK”). This political reorganization in Southern Kurdistan directly affected Rojava: Hemidê Hecî Derwêş, a close ally of Talabani, left El Parti in Rojava and founded Partiya Pêşverû. To this day he serves as the leader of the party and spends most of his time in Suleymanieh.
Osman Sebrî also left the party, having deemed its merely nationalist
line unsatisfactory. Instead, he focused on social and writing
projects. The literary and political works he has left behind are the
fruits of this period. Without compromising its political alliance with
the Barzani family in Southern Kurdistan, El Parti has continued on its
path until today. Abdulhakim Beşar is the current leader of the party.
When the Southern Kurdistan Revolution took a serious blow due to the
1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, which cut off some Iranian
supplies to Iraqi Kurdistan, Rojava’s political structures also
experienced further fragmentation.
Taking advantage of the situation, the Baghdad government initiated the formation of a new party under the leadership of Salahê Bedrê, who had been in communication with Yasser Arafat in Lebanon and Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Bedrê founded a party with the name of Partiya Yekgirtina Gel, or The People’s Unity Party. Having declared that “Southern Kurdistan was being crafted into a second Israel” and having committed every defamation imaginable against the Barzani family, Salahê Bedrê not only left the leadership of the party, but also started serving as an advisor to Mesud Barzani for the next ten years. Even after his career as an advisor to Barzani came to an end, his relationship with Barzani never deteriorated, and Bedrê configured all of his subsequent political activities around an opposition to the PKK. Once Bedrê left the leadership of the Party and started serving Barzani as an advisor, one of Bedrê’s closest friends, Mustafa Cumo, assumed the leadership. The party’s name was changed to Azadi. Not long after the name change, however, internal disagreements and power struggles surfaced once again, and a group under the leadership of Mustafa Ose broke off and founded another party, also named Azadi, in the early 2000s.
Due to these internal disagreements, Rojava is now home to two
parties named Azadi, both of which are politically aligned with the KDP.
The main interlocutor of the KDP in Rojava, however, remains El Parti,
even though another splinter group under the leadership of Nasreddin
Ibrahim formed the Kurdish Democratic Party. It would be no exaggeration
to suggest that the fragmentation that has resulted from these internal
disagreements was directly related to the allocation and sharing of the
financial support that Southern Kurdistan received in the early 1990s.
With the PKK movement establishing a political base in Rojava as well as in greater Syria, three political lines became pronounced in Rojava in the 1990s: the PKK, the KDP, and the YNK. Öcalan, Barzani, and Talabani would hold meetings from time to time to discuss the national framework. There were other parties formed during this period as well. The Yekiti (or Kurdish Union in Syria) Party, from its inception, declared its independence from all three party lines under the leadership of İsmail Hemê.
Subsequently, İbrahim Bıro and friends broke off from the party and formed another Yekiti. At present, the Leftist Party, liberal formations, and other splinter groups populate Rojava’s political landscape. When the revolutionary process began in 2011 in Syria, Kurds of various political inclinations mobilized and formed Encûmena Niştimanî ya Kurdên Surî, or the Kurdish National Council of Syria. Sixteen political parties and lesser institutional political formations that had endorsed the political line of the KDP and the YNK (including those mentioned above) came together under the auspices of this Council. Only the Partiya Yekîtuya Demokrat (the Democratic Union Party of Syria, known by its acronym “PYD”) was not among them.
The PYD and The People’s Council of Rojava
Abdullah Öcalan crossed from Suruç in Northern Kurdistan to Kobanê in
Rojava. According to his own account of the cross-border journey, when
he crossed the border with the help of smugglers from the border
villages who knew the border area extremely well, a Turkish soldier on
duty told him, “Hurry up, hurry up, my friend!”
Last year I conducted interviews with people in the area who remember those times. A middle-aged man and a contemporary of Öcalan recounted that period and his encounter with him as follows:
Leader Apo [short for Abdullah] would constantly read, be it in the
room given to him, or under that tree over there. We knew him as a
fugitive. We had no idea that he was the Leader. We had only been told
that he was an important person. One day, we village youth gathered in
the coffeehouse, playing cards. He came to watch us. We invited him to
join the game. He kindly accepted our invitation. We realized that he
did not know how to play cards very well, so we played a little trick on
him. A few days later, he was nowhere to be found; he had disappeared.
It was only in 1984 that we learned he was the Leader. In 1988, a
one-hundred-person delegation was formed in Kobanê to go and meet with
the Leader in Bekaa’. I was among the delegation. He greeted each and
every one of us individually. Although there were approximately ten
people between us, he addressed me by my name. Smiling, he asked me to
come closer. He remembered and embraced me. ‘I knew that you played a
trick on me that day when we played cards, but I didn’t want to
embarrass you,’ he told me. We saw each other a few more time after
that. It was as if he never forgot anything. He had a very strong
relationship of fidelity with the people. My only expectation in life is
to be able to see him once more.
Abdullah Öcalan made this landscape his home for over twenty years. He maintained constant and systematic communication with people throughout the area.
According to PKK sources, between the years of 1984 and 2012, five thousand men and women from Rojava lost their lives in various parts of Kurdistan among the ranks of the PKK guerillas. That said, the PKK did not, and could not, undertake any open operations in Syria. When Öcalan left Syria, anyone and everyone who had saluted the PKK found themselves under increasing surveillance and pressure from the Syrian state. Since then, Syria has handed dozens of PKK guerillas over to Turkey. However, the PKK also left its indelible mark on this landscape. A very deep spiritual connection was established between the PKK and Rojava. The PKK might have been absent, but its political stance and soul lives on in Rojava. Even those who remained distant from the politics of the PYD and the PKK had an Öcalan portrait hanging in their homes.
The PYD formed itself on these lands and declared its official founding in 2003. Not unlike other Kurdish political formations in the region, it carried out its activities illegally. A number of its high-ranking leaders have been arrested and executed. It proved itself by leading the March 2004 Serhildan (Resistance) in Qamışlo. The PYD never became or claimed to be the PKK, yet as the honorary representative of the twenty-year-old struggle of the PKK it entered almost each and every home in Rojava. When the revolutionary process began in 2011, it was the strongest and most prominent political organization in Rojava, capable of taking part in the process.
While many parties have endorsed a policy of wait-and-see, or joined
the Syrian opposition, the PYD supported neither the regime nor the
opposition. Instead, they abided by the following stance: “Let’s
organize and protect our own region first, and subsequently lend our
support to the opposition if the rights of our people are recognized.”
With this policy the PYD turned to the Rojava streets.
It is obviously a very difficult task for a single party to meet the demands of a people’s revolution. In order to meet these demands, the Rojava Democratic People’s Council was formed. Its administration and representatives were established through elections, whereby the Women’s movement Yekitiya Star, the Democratic Society Movement (Tev-Dem for short), as well as youth, professional, and student organizations found their voice in the Council. The PYD also partook in the formation of the Council. Consequently, two umbrella organizations that represent all political parties and organization in Rojava came into existence.
The ENSK—the Kurdish National Council of Syria, which is comprised of sixteen political parties and organizations—and the Rojava Democratic People’s Council came together in July of 2012 to form the High Kurdish Council, which is comprised of ten members. Both the ENSK and the Rojava People’s Council are represented by five delegates to the High Kurdish Council, where the co-presidents of the People’s Council and one of the PYD co-presidents serve as members. The High Kurdish Council managed to build remarkable synergy in Rojava, even though their activities came short of meeting the people’s demands. While other parties found themselves embroiled in internal disagreements, the political organization formed under the umbrella of the Rojava People’s Council has so far led the revolution, acting in large part under the auspices of the PYD.
The Fundamental Differences among Rojava’s Political Parties
One of the most fundamental reasons for the respect and support the PYD enjoys among the people of Rojava is its adherence to Öcalan’s political vision. When the revolutionary process began, many parties and other political formations struggled to remain in the political arena and to compete with the PYD. The stance endorsed by the parties closely aligned with the KDP led to disappointment among the people of Rojava—who easily discerned the disconnect between political rhetoric and concrete action. Moreover, the PYD endorsed and followed a society-focused political program. For instance, it is impossible to see women in the higher leadership roles in any of the other parties, where the average age of the representatives is well above forty. Taking the co-presidency of the party beyond a rhetorical formality, the PYD implemented a forty-percent quota for woman representatives across its party ranks. While most party leaders retreated and remained in Hewler, the PYD leadership hit the ground more than any other party. While others struggled to send their children abroad, the PYD members built defense barricades shoulder to shoulder with their children. The people, in other words, saw very clearly who did what on the ground. As far as these ground operations are concerned, one of the most prominent figures among the PYD ranks had been Isa Hiso, who was recently killed in a bombing attack in Qamışlo.
The media in Southern Kurdistan and Turkey, having endorsed a political stance akin to that of the KDP, indirectly strengthened the PYD’s position in Rojava. The propaganda emanating from outside of Rojava aimed at defaming the PYD redounded to the benefit of the organization, because people actually living in Rojava were able to see for themselves that the situation on the ground was the opposite of its “bleak” representation by these media outlets. The PYD actively campaigned among the people to reveal the intentions behind such media representations. As a result, the PYD’s support base doubled, and even those who do not agree with the PYD’s political stance in Rojava now respect the party for its consistency. Since the PYD was in no position to lead the revolution due to its internal structure and limited resources, the formation of the People’s Council proved to be a crucial strategic gain. It is also important to mention, however, that the PYD’s occasional sectarian stance and its hasty reactions to provocations has led to criticisms. Most parties and other political actors, having endorsed a policy of wait-and-see, had assumed that the PYD would be harmed by its activist stance. Despite all of its shortcomings, however, the PYD emerged stronger than ever from the revolutionary process. By reflecting on the party’s shortcomings themselves, and listening to the criticisms and problems of Rojava’s people in open forums, the PYD also marked its difference compared to the other political formations in Rojava.
In his last meetings with BDP representatives in Imrali, Öcalan suggested the formation of a political organization based in Qamışlo, which would serve as a forum for not only the PYD and the Kurds, but also for all social groups and political formations in Rojava. The PYD drew up plans for the formation of such an umbrella organization based on Öcalan’s suggestions and presented them to other parties. Subsequently, both councils came together in September 2013 and endorsed a historical agreement regarding Rojava’s future. They have also decided to form a sub-committee charged with the task for preparing for elections. The Rojava Parliament, which is intended to come out of the elections, aims not only to form a transitional government, but also to create a legal framework for the people of Rojava.
The ENKS has recently applied to join the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) on the condition that the Coalition recognizes Kurds’ basic rights. The SNC leaders’ declarations on the one hand and the ENKS demands on the other so far appear irreconcilable, but a final decision has not yet been made public as of this writing. Representatives from both councils in Rojava claim that whatever the decision is, it will not affect the plans to form a transitional government. That said, the process promises to be painful, as the people of Rojava themselves continue to press on all political formations to work together and address people’s demands.
The Rojava revolution, however, has already surpassed the PYD or any
political council. The parties aligned closely with the KDP continue to
suggest and impose a Southern Kurdistan model. In other words, they want
the two major political factions to come together and govern in a
power-sharing framework. The YNK and PYD insist on the participation of
everyone based on election results. Although the KDP’s power-sharing
framework finds support abroad, it lacks any social support in Rojava
Could Southern Kurdistan be a model for Rojava? Or has Rojava itself emerged as a model for the whole of Kurdistan?
Concluding Remarks: Models and Gains of a Social Revolution in Rojava
It is important to flag in passing that there are important differences between Southern Kurdistan and Rojava that must be examined before we can address the possibility of the former serving as a model for the latter. At present, Rojava is divided into three parts, and intense fighting rages on in areas that cut these three parts off from one another. These areas that sever the connections between the three parts of Rojava are populated mostly by Syrian Arabs—themselves mired in internal power struggles among their ashirat (tribes). Although political authorities in Rojava work in a coordinated framework, the geographical separation remains a very serious issue to tackle in the future. Southern Kurdistan, on the other hand, is a contiguous geographical entity, even though it is not wholly under Kurdish control: while the Kurdish regional government controls fifty-six percent of Southern Kurdistan, oil-rich areas such as Kirkuk remain under the control of the central government in Baghdad. Even though the oil-rich areas of Rojava are currently under Kurdish control, their future remains uncertain at best, given that oil serves as the focus of almost all power struggles and a significant motivation for prolonged war in the region.
It is also crucial to remember that culturally speaking, the people
of Rojava are much closer to those of Northern Kurdistan. It would be no
exaggeration to suggest that they are like relatives living on the same
street under two states, where the only Kurdish dialect spoken remains
Kurmanji. Since 1966, two political formations (the KDP and the YNK)
have dominated Southern Kurdistan politics. Even though other political
organizations have been recently budding there as well, the region is
characterized by a power-sharing framework, both in terms of military
force and of geographical organization. Even though a staggeringly
diverse group of political parties finds footing in Rojava, there is
only one military force. Even though some Kurdish parties have suggested
forming a second army, the idea lacks any support in Rojava. The KDP
has proposed to create a power-sharing framework with the PYD, yet the
latter rejects the formation of such a framework prior to elections. It
is due to this disagreement that the KDP closed the Semalka border
Southern Kurdistan’s and Rojava’s political economies also complicate any suggestion of using the latter as a model for the former. While most families and peshmergas rely on monthly salaries distilled from oil revenues in Southern Kurdistan, life in Rojava is not predicated upon financial interests at all. Rojava’s political economy is characterized rather by community-based production and large-scale cooperatives. Despite the fact that one could possibly argue that this difference is merely a result of the current material conditions, I would suggest that cultural differences constitute an important factor not to be dismissed as well.
Hence, Southern Kurdistan might not serve as a model for Rojava, but rather Rojava for the rest of Kurdistan, if not the whole of the Middle East. Political conduct in Southern Kurdistan, if not in the whole region, is characterized by social engineering schemes, which are then refracted though the initiatives of various social classes. Despite all of its shortcomings, politics in Rojava remains squarely focused on the society as a whole, whereby the status of politicians is measured against their success in meeting people’s demands on the ground, and financial interests and calculations are relatively marginal. Perhaps this is simply a result of the severely limited financial resources on the ground. It should suffice at this point to say that the material conditions in Rojava do not allow for a financial interest-based politics to emerge. Most importantly, however, and contrary to other global and regional examples, a social revolution preceded a political one in Rojava. The gains of a political revolution could be easily lost due to false strategic pretensions; yet social revolutions open up countless possibilities for multiple political revolutions. What has been happening in Rojava is therefore better approached as the culmination and articulation of social organization and political activity over the course of the past thirty years
* First published in ANF Turkish page
Revised by the author and translated from Turkish by Emrah Yildiz for Jadaliyya