‘The left should not be making concessions, but dictating its terms’: Boris Kagarlitsky on the far right threat, British Labour, and the French left’s chances of success

Published
Protest in France against Le Pen and Macron

[Editor's note: In the interview below, Russian Marxist Boris Kagarlitsky responds to questions sent by Sasha from Rabkor to his cell in a Russian prison, where he currently finds himself serving a five-year jail term for his anti-war views. You can support the campaign to free Kagarlitsky by signing a petition here.]

First published in Russian at Rabkor. Translation by Renfrey Clarke for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

The left and liberal mass media in Europe and the US have increasingly been writing and talking about the new threat posed by the far right. This threat is also evident in the successes registered by far right parties in Europe, where these currents have good prospects of challenging for power or even taking government. How real, and how pressing, is the danger now of a fascisation of society and politics? Will today’s far-rightists actually be able to do away completely with the remnants of democratic structures and build a new totalitarian system, as occurred during the past century?

For a number of years I have been saying that we should not panic at the growth of right-wing populism in Europe, or for that matter in the US. In essence, the bugbear of the “right-wing threat” has been used by the liberal centre in an effort to force members of the left to abandon their own agenda, even if this is reformist, and to throw their support behind liberals and the moderate right in the name of “saving democracy”. The left has followed to the letter the instructions coming from the liberals, and what have we finished up with? The influence of the left has been reduced to a historic minimum, and its forces have been turned into a mobile reserve for the “progressive” bourgeoisie, which on economic questions is even more reactionary than a lot of hardened conservatives.

At the same time, the influence of the far right has kept growing in precisely the degree to which the left has retreated from its previous class politics. An outsized proportion of workers and the poor now vote for the far right, because they can see that the left has sold them out. Meanwhile, the successes of the national-populists are creating a situation in which a section of the bourgeoisie is starting to see these people as a force with a future, and is putting money into them. It is true that this is going to cause the rightists to abandon their social populism, which in theory could allow the left to win back this electorate. But this is only a possibility, and in the meantime, the situation is getting worse.

In France the far right Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN) has been riding high in the polls. Just before the parliamentary elections called by [French President Emmanuel] Macron, it seemed as though the far right would win an absolute or relative majority, but in the event, they finished up in third place. The front-runners turned out to be the Nouveau Front populaire (New Popular Front, NFP). What do you think — will the New Popular Front be able to achieve at least the successes of the old Popular Front, or is the alliance already doomed to defeat?

In my book Between Class and Discourse, I predicted some aspects of what is happened in France — notably, that Macron and his policies would allow the far right to take on the appearance of an anti-systemic alternative in the eyes of an important sector of the masses, and that this would make the far-rightists real contenders for power, or at least, would see them emerge as the largest single current. I also wrote that the left populism of Mélenchon offered an alternative, but that other left organisations would do everything they could to stop this alternative — to both Macronism and the far right — from coming into being.

Various lessons from past failures are still influencing Mélenchon in his choice of electoral alliances, but in political terms, unfortunately, the earlier line of joining with the centre persists. This is a catastrophic approach, but one that is very hard to overcome so long as the radical left is not confronting the moderates with a powerful grassroots mobilisation. The outcome of the electoral struggle will also depend on whether this mobilisation is successful. For the moment, Mélenchon is being forced to make concessions, since the extent of the upsurge is not sufficient. It exists, but it is inadequate. In essence, Mélenchon has tried to force his way into the Hôtel Matignon on the shoulders of a demoralised centrist electorate. Nevertheless, the debacle of the centre has not been complete — the corpse is still showing certain signs of life. Even after going down to defeat, the centrist agenda is being imposed on the left. This is despite the left scoring a victory, though not a complete one.

Do you think the radical left, led by La France Insoumise (France Unbowed, LFI), has any chance of turning the situation to its advantage?

The “unbowed” are not just capable of turning things to their advantage — it is essential for them to do it. But will this work? From my distant position, I cannot say with certainty.

In Britain, elections have brought the Labour Party to power. Will the moderate rule of Keir Starmer lead to mass disillusionment of the population and a possible growth of [Nigel] Farage’s far-right Reform UK party, which scored more than four million votes at those elections?

Predicting the imminent downfall of Keir Starmer is a commonplace for left-wing analysts, and not only for those on the left. This is because Starmer has neither a precise agenda nor a clear program, and in the words of the comrades from the TG-Canal program “The Wheatfields of Theresa May”, he is “as dull as non-alcoholic beer”. Quite likely, these forecasts will be borne out. But at least for the sake of intellectual balance, let us try to analyse another variant.

The fact that Starmer has no distinct political identity, that he lacks his own ideas and program, could turn out to be not just a weakness, but also a sort of advantage — it may be that, like a weathercock, he will turn in any direction. Since coming to power he has “purged” the left, since they were preventing him from consolidating his control over the party and achieving positive coverage for his activity in the bourgeois press. If for some reason he finds he needs to turn to the left, he will do that with the same unconcern and lack of principle as he showed earlier in turning the party to the right. I remember that while [Jeremy] Corbyn was leader, Starmer was completely loyal to him, not for ideological reasons but simply because it suited him better. So it is not about Starmer’s personality or his program, which does not exist, but about the general circumstances. Might something, like the pressures of a social and economic crisis, force the opportunists who head the party to change course to the left?

There is also a second question: just who are these 410 Labour MPs who have just been elected? In most cases they are unknown quantities. But most important is the fact that they themselves do not know who they are. How will they interact with their constituents, and how will they build their careers? The success of [former Labour leader] Tony Blair did not prevent the later return by the left to the leadership of the Labour Party, or stop the rise of Corbyn.

In theory, a shift to the left is possible even under Starmer, and especially after he goes. Is it going to be necessary to wait until the Labourites fail, to win changes in the party? What if some kind of turnabout starts on the municipal and regional level? We should not forget the revival of Labour in Scotland (my grandmother Anna Kolinz would have been very pleased by this). In Britain today there are interesting openings in regional politics. And can we really ignore the success of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland? From being Catholic nationalists, they have transformed themselves into left populists, and their prospects depend on whether they can win the trust of worker-Protestants. In short, there are opportunities for left politics in Britain even now, and it is not obligatory to wait for three to five years.

And finally, let us return to Starmer. He is an apparatchik and a managerial type — more than likely, a capable one. The question is whether he will be able to cope with the tasks of government, which are completely different from weaving intrigues in the party. But perhaps he will cope, so on the whole, let us give this boring individual the benefit of the doubt. I am not at all sure that the possibilities I have sketched out will come to pass, especially since there are many countervailing factors. I simply call on everyone to be more attentive to detail, and when chances appear, not to let them slip.

Some time ago, the New York Times published an article by [former Democratic US presidential candidate] Bernie Sanders entitled “Joe Biden for President”, in which Sanders supported Biden and urged Democrats not to call for him to be replaced during the election campaigning. As a general thing, should members of the left think in terms of “lesser evils” in the run-up to elections? In the face of a far-right threat, is it correct to insist on the selection of a single bourgeois candidate?

Sanders has tried again and again to save the Democratic Party by making concessions, but the results have been unimpressive. In 2016 he capitulated before the party apparatus and Hillary Clinton in order to prevent a [Donald] Trump victory — with the result that Trump won. Bernie has also refrained from criticising [Joe] Biden, which has not helped Biden any. Bernie has set out to prove to the Democratic Party establishment that he is a loyal supporter, and that there is no need to be afraid of him. Nevertheless, they have not let him anywhere near power. We will see how that works now.

It is possible they will treat him more graciously, but they will not be less hostile to his agenda. Whatever the case, the same logic is at work here as in France and to some degree in Germany — the left is moving to the centre, while the centre is losing influence and the support of society. The need is for something quite different, for radical mobilisation. The left should not be making concessions, but dictating its terms. When you are at war, you act like you are at war. If democracy really is in danger, then there is all the more need to be tough and strong.