By Stephen O’Brien
Towards the end of 1975 a movement of young radicals
organised in the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) took charge of Zimbabwe’s
liberation war. ZIPA’s fusion of inclusive politics, transformational vision
and military aggression dealt crippling blows to the white supremacist regime
of Ian Smith. However, it’s success also paved the way for a faction of
conservative nationalists led by Robert Mugabe to wrest control of the
liberation movement for themselves.
The fact that
Mugabe, a former rural school teacher, and his cronies would become the ruling capitalist
elite of Zimbabwe by crushing a movement of young Chavista-style revolutionaries doesn’t
sit well with their anti-imperialist self-image.
The ZIPA cadre emerged from the wave of young people
who, experiencing oppression
and discrimination in Rhodesia, decided to
become liberation fighters in early 1970s. Unlike many of the first generation
of fighters, they volunteered
to join the respective military wings of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union
(ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)[i]
key nationalist leaders -- such as Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, Ndabiginini
Sithole, Jason Moyo, Herbert Chitepo, Abel Muzorewa, James Chikerema and Josiah
Tongogara -- had become entangled in factional rivalry and long-running and fruitless
peace talks with the Smith regime. The young recruits who would shortly form
ZIPA sought to reinvigorate the struggle as the war stalled and as the old
leaders became marginalised.
A group of
ZANU officers based at training camps in Tanzania consulted widely among the
liberation forces. They approached President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel, soon to be
president of newly liberated and independent Mozambique, for support to restart the war
against Smith. Both Machel and Nyerere had initially supported peace
negotiations and the resulting ceasefire with Rhodesia, but by October 1975 had lost
patience with the whole process, and listened with sympathy to the ideas of the
officers also sought unity with ZAPU, the long-standing rival organisation from
which ZANU had split in 1963. ZAPU agreed and in November 1975 ZIPA was formed
with a combined High Command composed of equal numbers from both ZAPU and ZANU.
The alliance with ZAPU disintegrated after a few months partly because ZAPU
leader Joshua Nkomo had continued to negotiate with Smith. Nevertheless, it was
an important attempt at unity which defied the prevailing trend of division.
nominal head was Rex Nhongo (later known as Solomon Mujuru he would become head
of the Zimbabwe Army under Mugabe), but strategic and tactical leadership came
to be held by his young deputy, Wilfred Mhanda.
been a typical recruit to ZANU and its military wing, the Zimbabwe National
Liberation Army (ZANLA). He had been involved in school protests and on leaving
his studies helped form a ZANU support group. Like many who were to become part
of ZIPA, Mhanda had been influenced by the youth radicalisation of the 1960s.
In 1971, with the special branch in pursuit, Mhanda’s group skipped the border
into Botswana and joined ZANLA. He took the war
name of Dzinashe Machingura. He was later sent for training in China and progressed through the ranks to
became a military instructor, political commissar, commander of the Mgagao camp
in Tanzania and then member of the High
ZIPA theory, tactics
influenced ZIPA’s tactics. Its fighters were not regarded as cannon fodder,
lines of retreat and supply were secured, counter-offensives anticipated and
strategic reserves made ready. Senior ZIPA commanders visited the front. ZIPA’s
aims went beyond winning democracy, to the revolutionary transformation of Rhodesia’s social and economic relations.
The previous conception of the old-guard nationalists had tended to regard armed
struggle as a means to apply pressure for external intervention to end White
People’s Army relocated its troops from Tanzania to Mozambique and in January 1976, 1000
guerrillas crossed into Rhodesia. The entire eastern border of Rhodesia became a war zone as the guerillas
launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on mines, farms and communication
routes, such as the new railway line to South Africa.
established WampoaCollege to help institute its vision and
ran Marxist-inspired courses in military instruction and mass mobilisation for its
fighters. It educated its cadre against the sexual abuse of women and sought to
win the support of the Zimbabwean peasantry through persuasion rather than
David Moore’s study of ZIPA notes: ``The students made their political
education directly relevant to the struggle, so that Marxism could better
direct the war of liberation.’’[iii] ZIPA’s
political approach lead to it becoming known as the Vashandi, a word which means worker in the Shona language, but
which, according to Mhanda, took on a broader meaning as the revolutionary
front of workers, students and peasants.
regime reeled under the offensive. Repression was intensified, ``psychopathic’’
counter-insurgency units such as the Selous Scouts were deployed, so called ``protected
villages’’ intensified control over the population and raids were launched against
refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Rhodesia
was forced to borrow 26 helicopters from apartheid South
Africa, and in
order to deploy 60% more troops, increased the military call-up for whites. In his memoirs, Ken Flower, head of
the Central Intelligence Organisation under Smith (and later under Mugabe), recalls
that by July 1976 ``Rhodesia was beginning to lose the war.[iv]
about the growing influence of the young Marxists in Zimbabwe, Henry Kissinger, the United States’ Secretary of State, sought to
resume the dormant negotiations by organising a round of talks in Geneva in October 1976.
basis for the talks centred around Rhodesia’s technical status as a British
colony. Rhodesia had made a Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) in 1965, partly to quell the nascent nationalist movement
and to forestall any British demand that ``legal’’ independence include guarantees
for equal rights for the black majority.
proposals centered around a supposed timetable for a transition to black majority
rule (these days they say ``road map’’) with the intention that the talks would
provide an opportunity to sideline or eliminate the radicals.
opposed to negotiations. On numerous occasions, especially after Portuguese
colonialism collapsed in 1974 and Frelimo started to take control of Mozambique, Smith had used talks to exploit
divisions and ideological confusion in the nationalists’ ranks.
leaders were also wary of the old leadership. When Samora Machel pressed them
to nominate the political leader with whom they most closely identified, in a
decision which was to have fateful consequences, they nominated Robert Mugabe. In
his struggle to depose the ZANU president Ndanbiginini Sithole, Mugabe was
careful to identify with the guerillas, unlike Sithole who unsuccessfully
attempted to place them under his control. This influenced the ZIPA leaders and
they thought that, although they did not support Mugabe, they could work with him.
had long plagued the nationalist movement. When ZANU had split from ZAPU in
1963 the acrimony turned violent in the
townships at a certain point and Smith’s police stood by while it took its
course. Since then, guerilla revolts against what were perceived to be
incompetent leaders, such as ZAPU’s March
11 Movement (1971) and ZANU’s Nhari Rebellion (1974-1975), had been brutally
during the fallout from the Nhari rebellion that Herbert Chitepo, the ZANU
chair, was assassinated in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. In response, Kenneth Kaunda, the
Zambian president, who had hosted the liberation forces in Zambia, banned Zimbabwean nationalist
organisations and detained hundred of their leaders and supporters, including Josiah
Tongogara, the ZANU military commander.
that they could attend the Geneva talks, these leaders were
subsequently released along with Mugabe, who had also been in detention. Mugabe
had fled from Rhodesia to Mozambique in April 1975 after his release
from ten years in Smith’s jails to participate in an earlier round of talks. Mozambique, along with other pro-liberation
states, had initially regarded Mugabe with suspicion because of his opposition
to Sithole and had placed him in open detention.
nationalist delegates to Geneva included Nkomo and Bishop Abel
Muzorewa of the Rhodesian based United African National Congress. The ZIPA commanders
treated the whole Geneva negotiations with suspicion and
issued a statement which declared: ``None of the Zimbabwe delegations there represents ZIPA’’.[v]
was in effect the central ZIPA figure, explains that ZIPA members regarded many
of the old leaders as being out of touch. They thought that leaders such as
Mugabe and Nkomo, having been in jail for many years, did not fully understand
changes brought about by the youth radicalisation and the Vietnam War. Where
the older generation was motivated by a desire to force negotiations that would
usher in ``one man one vote’’, the ZIPA comrades were ``fighting for the total
transformation of the Zimbabwean society’’.[vi]
Some of the
young radicals had experienced and even sought out Marxist ideas during their
training. Mhanda describes the delight he and a group of comrades felt when
they discovered Marxist classics in the library at their training camp in Tanzania.[vii] Making
the most of the opportunity they ran study classes on Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, polemics and historical materialism. In contrast, while a few of
the old guard had encountered communists, and even Trotskyists in South Africa,[viii]
many of them had little direct experience with Marxism. The socialist tradition
in Rhodesia was fleeting. During its brief
existence, the Rhodesian Communist Party had been a tiny white enclave.
Britain was anxious that the ZIPA
commanders attend Geneva, and thus be away from their
troops. Recent research in British archives has revealed that Britain offered an interest-free loan of
£15 million to Machel’s government to ensure that the ```young men’ controlling
Mugabe attended Geneva’’.[ix]
dependent on the support of Machel for access to the supply lines and infiltration
routes through Mozambique, the ZIPA leadership had little
choice but to attend.
In Geneva, ZIPA unsuccessfully tried to unite
the various nationalist delegations. They sought to create a united front
against Smith and demand that the racists unconditionally surrender power. However,
the various nationalist delegations were incapable of uniting and rejected this
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his part, allied with the recently released military chief Tongogara, and
Solomon Mujuru. The nominal head of ZIPA, Mujuru had never really shared the
strategic vision of his deputy political commissar Mhanda. He also blocked with
ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo and his deputy Jason Moyo to create the Patriotic Front.
This helped strengthen Mugabe against the right (Abel Muzorewa and Ndanbiginini
Sithole) and against the left, the increasingly politically independent ZIPA.
Moore has suggested that Mugabe was not really committed to the talks at Geneva as he first needed to deal with
ZIPA and gain control the army before he entered serious negotiations. The
talks adjourned indefinitely just before Christmas 1976.[x]
collapse of the talks, the ZIPA leaders were sidelined into undertaking
solidarity duties in Europe. Mugabe, Tongogara and Mujuru rushed back to Mozambique. In January 1977, with Machel's
support they started to impose their control. The radio and print media were
taken over, Wampoa closed and ZIPA officers placed under arrest. When Mhanda
and the rest of the ZIPA delegation returned from Geneva they were faced with a changed
reality. Mhanda and other leaders who refused to be co-opted joined their
comrades in prison.
of the war took second place while Mugabe continued to impose control. Pawns, a novel about the war by Charles
Samupindi, describes the new atmosphere:
The Vashandi, the young kids as …[Tongogara] …calls them,
are now all safely behind bars in Frelimo prisons in Beira. But, he says, some of them are
still among us. Some may be with us here at the parade. He wants to know who
they are. Things are never the same again.[xi]
least August 1977, there were mass denunciations, torture and beatings. Three-hundred
junior Vashandi were executed.[xii]
enquired what had happened to the prosecution of the war, Mugabe was evasive
and avoided Machel’s suggestion that the jailed leaders be allowed to fight.
most experienced commanders out of action, ZANLA failed to learn from previous
lessons and Smith launched another devastating attack on the camps in Mozambique. On November
23, 1977, the
ZANU base at Chimoio in Mozambique was razed leaving more than 1200
suppression of the radicals, the old leaders maintained, and even stepped up,
the left discourse popularised by ZIPA.
Mugabe `lays the line’
1977, Mugabe felt strong enough to call a special ZANU congress and have
himself appointed party president. In his congress speech, later published as ``Comrade
Mugabe Lays the Line’’, Mugabe made it clear that henceforth the ``given
leadership’’ was in control.[xiii]
trappings of a personality cult started to emerge. One of his biographers
writes that in his Maputo office, Mugabe’s ``subalterns
…would click their heels or stamp a foot to attention when they went to see him’’.[xiv]
Party documents were now embellished with the slogan ``Forward with Comrade
President Robert Mugabe’’.[xv]
habits among ZANU apparatchiks, which had been a factor in the Nhari rebellion,
re-emerged. Machel had to complain to Mugabe about the ``heavy drinking and the
womanising that some senior ZANU men indulged in at the capital’s nightspots,
like the Polana Hotel’’.[xvi]
weakened as the preoccupation with ``dissidents’’ meant that there was
inadequate ideological and military training. Sexual abuse became common and
even pro-ZANU historians mention the ``rampant raping’’ carried out by senior
During 1977 to 1979 some observers even expressed concerns that the
deterioration of the guerillas’ behaviour in certain areas could cause a ``collapse
of rural support’’.[xviii]
leadership was especially needed when the political situation became confused.
Smith took advantage of the disunity of the nationalists. He cut a deal with
the conservative wing of the nationalists, represented by Ndabiginini Sithole,
James Chikerema and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, to establish the puppet state of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe
under nominal black majority rule.
the ``internal settlement’’, the pact prolonged white domination by two more
bloody years. During this time both Sithole and Muzorewa set up their own
armies and fought ZANU and ZAPU, while white Rhodesians and mercenaries,
especially in the Selous Scouts, massacred at will while masquerading as
the weight of popular discontent, international presssure and ZANU and ZAPU’s
military pressure eventually forced Smith, on behalf of the tiny white
minority, to return to the negotiating table.
1979, at the Lancaster House talks in Britain, Smith finally surrendered. In the
elections held for the black seats the following February, ZANU won 57 seats,
ZAPU 20 and Muzorewa’s United African National Council, three. While the end of
white political domination was achieved, the radical transformation as
conceived by ZIPA certainly wasn’t.
Origins of ZANU elitism
formally adopted ``Marxism-Leninism-Mao TseTung thought’’ at its 1977 Chimoio
Congress, this left talk ``was ultimately a disguise for classically
orientation can be traced back to the intellectual formation of many members of
the 1950s and 1960s generation of nationalists. At this time the vast mass of
the people was restricted to the rural areas and had little access to
education. A significant number of the first nationalists were educated at church
and colonial schools which had been designed to create a tiny educated layer
who would ``lead’’ the black masses on behalf of the white minority. They later
found work in intellectual occupations such as teachers (Mugabe), preachers
(Sithole and Muzorewa), journalists, clerks, social workers and trade union
them adopted the view that their role, and that of the black middle class, ``was
to aid the government in its `civilizing’ programmes of development and
was reflected in the fact that trade union officials and the educated elite
played an ambivalent role in such popular struggles as the general strike in
1948, the bus boycotts of 1956 and the mass protests which thwarted the
undemocratic Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals of 1971.
had been involved in the liberal multi-class and multi-race organisation, the
He only joined a nationalist party in 1960 when he was 36 years old, after
having worked and studied abroad. Mugabe maintained his liberal contacts and
could call on them to support his wife while in exile in Britain and petition the British government
to grant her residency.
numerical strength, at least half a million by 1948, the organised working
class did not play a central role in the later stages of the liberation
As a result, there was no significant social counterweight to the educated
intellectuals who came to dominate the leadership of the struggle.
and rivalry was common among the middle-class nationalists. By the time the
young ZIPA radicals arrived on the scene the divisions in the nationalist ranks
were deep. Divisions existed between those who had been in jail,
those who had fled into neighbouring countries to direct the guerilla war, such
as Chitepo and Moyo, younger party members who had studied abroad and the generally
more conservative Rhodesia-based nationalists, such as Muzorewa, who had
remained ``legal’’ and largely out of jail.
Differences were reflected in questions of
tactics, such as when and how to apply military pressure and to what extent
outside powers be allowed to broker talks. Opposition to white rule was one of
the few things that they had in common, and even that was negotiable for some.
ZANU in power
complete military victory, and subject to pressure from their war-weary allies,
in particular Mozambique and Zambia, the nationalists made significant and arguably
generous concessions during the Lancaster House negotiations. Responsibility
was accepted for paying the foreign debt the Smith regime had accumulated buying
arms and mercenaries in contravention of UN sanctions. Even today Zimbabwe continues to accept and pay debts for
which it has no moral obligation.
independence, rather than being dismantled and transformed, the white state was
merely taken over as it was. The first government included former supporters of
Smith who were willing to help apply many of the same economic policies.
One of their
first acts was to demobilise the ZANU committees and support groups, which had
helped the party organise the rural population. The new government suppressed a
spontaneous strike wave unleashed by an increasingly confident working class.
broke the Patriotic Front, his nominal alliance with Nkomo, shortly before the
1980 election and both ZANU and ZAPU went to the vote separately. The split
with ZAPU was to have dire consequences.
members were increasingly purged from senior positions in the army and from government
ministries. The army, having been retrained by British military officers, ``embraced
the ideas, training, organisation and forms of force of the Rhodesian settler
It had absolute loyalty to Mugabe above all and regardless of any constitutional
and democratic considerations.
brigade, the Fifth, composed exclusively of Shona speakers and ZANU veterans,
was established and trained by North Korea. The Fifth Brigade was to unleash a
brutal war of terror on Ndebele people, who were assumed to be ZAPU supporters
and therefore dissidents. In what became known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1985, at least 5000 people died in
the Matabeleland and Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. At Nkomo’s funeral in 1999, Mugabe
himself was to refer to the experience as a ``moment of madness’’.
paternalistic and authoritarian state kept the popular classes in their place.
Significant spending on education and health in the early years of the
government was matched by corporatist trade union structures. The cities were
also kept under control and thousands of urban dwellers and squatters were
regularly evicted from black townships. In the rural areas land reform was
forever promised but not delivered, while rural wages were kept low to
subsidise cheap food, and therefore lower wages, for the cities. As one commentator
observed ``poverty was structural; all the post-independence state did was
with the popular classes under control, ZAPU severely weakened, the old-time
allies conveniently dead or purged (Tongogara
had died in an accident on the eve of independence)[xxv]
and with the armed forces and police under his control, Mugabe changed the
constitution and appointed himself executive president.
increasing orientation to international capital, the country slipped further
into corruption and debt. Nonetheless, ZANU continued to pretend that it sought
``to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist
started to realise that the fruits of the liberation struggle had been
appropriated. In Echoing Silences, by
Alexander Kanengoni, a war veteran suffering post-traumatic stress disorder has
a dream in which Chitepo and Jason Moyo are discussing how the struggle has
lost its way and wondering ``how the politics, wealth and the economy of the
entire country was slowly becoming synonymous with the names of less than a
according to Moore, had ``hoped that full electoral
freedom would enable them to mount a radical challenge to Mugabe's empty
However, the patterns and tools of political repression, established with the
suppression of ZIPA, were too well entrenched to make this a possibility.
detained ZIPA members were only released from detention in Mozambique, and allowed to return to Zimbabwe, after independence. When former
ZIPAs publicly advocated unity with ZAPU, they were promptly arrested again, and
only freed on the intervention of Nkomo.
Mhanda was warned
that his presence in Zimbabwe was dangerous and he was obliged to
spend several years studying in Europe. The ZIPA movement was
effectively dispersed. In 2000, along with other
ex-combatants, Mhanda helped form the Zimbabwe
Liberators’ Platform to organise and fight for the rights of the country’s
genuine war veterans.
proven to be apt in suppressing the threat from the left and employing the language
of people such as Mhanda's ``to practice the worst of Third World socialism – and then the worst of Third World neo-liberalism’’[xxix]
essentially to allow his cronies to enrich themselves with the ``privileges and
subsidies that white exploiters had enjoyed’’.[xxx]
before the end of the first decade of independence, it was clear that Mugabe’s
version of patriarchal nationalism had exhausted any progressive content and
the first steps towards a political break between the people and the ZANU elite
again it was young people, university students who had grown up under
independence, supported by a new general secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trade Unions, Morgan Tsvangirai, who began to challenge the dominant system of
inequality and repression and open up a new phase in Zimbabwe’s
still unresolved struggle for national libereation.
[Stephen O'Brien is a member of the Democratic Socialist Perspective, a Marxist tendency within the Socialist Alliance of Australia. He writes on Zimbawean politics for Green Left Weekly.]
[i] Up until the early 1970s nationalists had
to forcibly conscript Zimbabwean youth to fight against Smith. See Chung, F. (2006) Re-living the second Chirumenga.
Memories from Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Stockholm:
The Nordic Africa Institute in cooperation with Weaver Press, p. 77
[ii] Mhanda, W. (2007) Interview with Wilfred Mhanda by Stephen O’Brien August 2007. Harare
[iii] Moore, D. (1990) The Contradictory construction
of hegemony in Zimbabwe: Politics, ideology and class in the formation of a
new AfricanState. PhD
dissertation YorkUniversity, Toronto. p. 335.
[iv] Flower, K. (1987) Serving secretly. An
intelligence chief on record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981.
London: John Murray. p. 131. Flower also admits that the
Selous Scouts attracted ``psychopathic killers’’, p. 124.
D. (1990) p. 359
D. (1990) p. 309
[vii] Julius Nyerere, the then leader of Tanzania, had close ties to China and pursued a Tanzanian version of socialism.
[viii] For example See Nyagumbo, M. (1980) With the
people. Salisbury: The Graham Company. p. 78-86 and Bhebe, N. (2004) Simon
Vengai Muzenda and the struggle for and liberation of Zimbabwe. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, p. 49-68
D. (2008) ``Todays' imperialists were those who nurtured Mugabe’’, Sunday
Independent, 20 January.
[x] Moore (1990) p. 361 suggests that Mugabe
deliberately stalled as Geneva as he needed to deal with ZIPA and gain control
the army before he entered serious negotiations with Smith.
[xi] Samupindi, C. (1992) Pawns. Harare: Baobab Books, p. 97.
[xii] The figure of 300 executions is cited by Astrow, A.
(1983) Zimbabwe, a revolution that lost its way?London; Totowa, N.J.: Zed Press, p. 107. For more information on the
suppression of ZIPA see Moore
(1990) p. 367 and Nhongo-Simbanegavi (2000) For
Better or Worse: Women and Zanla in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle. Harare : Weaver Press, p. 102.
[xiv] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I.
(1981) Mugabe. Salisbury:
Pioneer Head, p. 99
[xv] Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. (2000) p. 202
[xvi] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I.
(1981) p. 106
[xvii] See Bhebe, N. (2004) p. 224, Chung, (2006) p.
125-128. For women’s testimonies see Musengezi, C. (Ed.) (2000) Women of
resilience. The voices of women ex-combatants. Harare: Zimbabwe Women Writers and Nhongo-Simbanegavi, (2000) and
Tekere, E. (2007) A lifetime of struggle. Harare: SAPES Trust, p. 94.
[xviii] Kriger, N. J. (2002) Zimbabwe’s guerilla war peasant voices. Harare :
Baobab Books. p. 128.
[xix] Bond, P. (1998) Uneven Zimbabwe A study of finance, development and underdevelopment (PDF version) Trenton: Africa World Press, p. 339.
D. (1990) p. 124
[xxi] Smith, D., Simpson, C., & Davies, I.
(1981) p. 18
[xxii]Low wages, import substitution industries
and sanctions busting during UDI helped further develop railways, mines, light manufacturing and
agricultural processing and contribute to the growth of the working class.
H. (2003) Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The
exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation.Trenton, NJ. Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press. p. 273
[xxiv] Tandon, Y. (2001) Trade unions and labour in the
agricultural sector in Zimbabwe. In B. Raftopolous & L. Sachikonye (Eds.) Striking
back: The labour movement and the post-colonial state in Zimbabwe 1980-2000
(pp. 221-249) Harare: Weaver Press, p. 229.
Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala and Edgar Tekere, who had supported Mugabe in deposing
Sithole, all fell out with Mugabe. Tekere (2007) p. 84, a key Mugabe henchman,
was to later admit that ZIPA was ``absolutely correct’’. In 1978 a group of
ZANU ``radicals’’, lead by Henry Hamadziripi and Rugare Gumbo, appearing to
have had second thoughts about ZIPA, unsuccessfully tried to challenge the ZANU
leadership. After being sentenced to death by ZANU they were detained by Mozambique.
[xxvi] The ZANU (PF) and PF ZAPU Agreement. Appendix 1.
Cited in Sibanda, E. M. (2005) The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961-1987. A political history
of insurgency in Southern Rhodesia. Trenton: Africa World Press.
[xxvii] Kanengoni, A. (2001) Echoing silences. Harare: Boabab Books. p. 87
D. (2001) How Mugabe came to power. London Review of Books, 5 April, p. 23.
H. (2003) p. 272.