The Venezuelan working class under Maduro (2013-24): Part IV — The 2024 presidential elections and Madurismo’s authoritarian turn

[Editor’s note: Below is part four of an extensive essay written by Venezuelan Marxist Luis Bonilla-Molina, originally published on his blog as “ La situación de la clase trabajadora en Venezuela (2013-2024)”. Due to its length, we are publishing the translation in fourth parts: Introduction; The first Maduro government (2013-18); The second Maduro government (2018-24); and The 2024 presidential elections and beyond, which is below. While parts II and III have not yet been published, we are publishing Part IV, which deals with the July 28 presidential election and its aftermath, in light of Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration for a third term on January 10. Translated by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.]

The most acute problems facing the working class in the first half of 2024 were: wages, with those who make a living from their labour being forced to live in misery; the de facto elimination of constitutional rights (even if they continue to formally exist); social welfare, especially the lack of access to adequate public healthcare and decent pensions; the complete denial of union and political rights; and the social, economic and emotional impacts of migration, which have affected every working-class family.

As previously discussed,1 the [US-imposed] Unilateral Coercive Measures (sanctions) have brutally affected the national economy, but Maduro’s anti-working class and pro-capitalist conciliation policy is responsible for structurally worsened the working class’s material living conditions. Nevertheless, government propaganda gained traction among broad sections of the working class and popular sector but was interpreted in a way they never expected: “If the sanctions are to blame for our wages and living conditions, then we need a government that can ensure they are lifted.” While the inter-bourgeois agreement pursued by the government sought — and had in part started to achieve — a relaxation and lifting of US economic sanctions, Madurismo ran out of time to complete this political operation before the July 28 presidential vote.

The working class was unable to run its own candidate in the 2024 presidential election. None of the available candidates stood on a working-class program. Every left-wing parties had been intervened into by the courts, leaving the left divided behind five different positions going into the election.2

As I wrote before the election, the Venezuelan government was never going to accept defeat as this would have mean: the arrest and jailing of Madurismo top leaders (Maduro, Cilia Flores, Diosdado Cabello, Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez), who already face US sanctions and have warrants out for them over accusations of human rights violations; the end of any chance that the new bourgeoisie connected to Maduro’s government could continue as a social class (and as social sciences show, the bourgeoisie has never had a suicidal vocation); and the failure to reach a definitive agreement between bourgeois sectors [allied to the opposition and the government] over distribution of funds, percentages of capitalist accumulation, and mechanisms of political representation acceptable to all parties, including alternating power.

I anticipated these possible scenarios:

• A deepening of the government’s authoritarianism, with a refusal to accept any adverse result, and the closure — even if only temporarily — of any chance for a political agreement on a transition of power;
• Moves towards a national unity or “broad-based” government involving bourgeois sectors that Maduro had already achieved agreements with, thereby lending some legitimacy to Madurismo’s ongoing control;
• A government of national agreement (including María Coria Machado-Edmundo González Urrutia, MCM-EGU), which would develop the legal and institutional foundations for a future transition, with new elections scheduled for two or three years’ time. This appeared to be the preferred option — albeit with their own imprint — of presidents [Luiz Inácio] Lula [da Silva] (Brazil), [Gustavo] Petro (Colombia) and perhaps AMLO [Andrés Manuel López Obrador] and Claudia Sheinbaum (Mexico). The problem for the working class is that this would have been an inter-bourgeois agreement that excluded trade union and working-class party representatives. Any such agreement would be based on implementing anti-worker measures that would continue and deepen the ones Maduro has already implemented. While a Maduro government or a MCM-EGU government would be terribly unstable, a government based on an alliance between Maduro and MCM-EGU would be united in its opposition to workers and labour justice.

I ruled out the scenario of a “tripartite” government, involving both bourgeois sectors and their political representatives along with the working class, via its autonomous unions and (genuine) left-wing parties. This would be the only possible means for achieving a multi-class solution to the current situation, but would face problems as autonomous unions would oppose such a plan.

Faced with such difficult scenarios, I wrote that the main tasks facing the working class are: developing unprecedented levels of unity from below; defending the constitutional framework of democratic freedoms in the 1999 Constitution; fighting for a general amnesty for political prisoners; repealing Memorandum 2792 and the Onapre Instruction3 as first steps towards regaining working-class union and political freedoms; and restoring electoral registration for left-wing parties and ensuring others could be registered.

Election day

The July 28 elections occurred normally from dawn until 6pm. It seems the two sides with the greatest chance of winning (MCM-EGU and Maduro) were both certain of victory. Only a few minor incidents were reported during the day. But when polling booths started to close, complaints regarding party scrutineers being evicted from numerous polling centres grew exponentially. By the end of the day, an atmosphere of triumphalism had taken over the streets, most particularly among the opposition’s ranks. As night fell, however, rumours started to circulate that the results would not reflect what people were perceiving in the streets.

At 6.23 pm, just as polling booths were closing in Venezuela, the US vice-president and Democratic Party candidate for US president, Kamala Harris, posted a message on X: “The United States stands with the people of Venezuela who expressed their voice in today’s historic presidential election. The will of the Venezuelan people must be respected. Despite the many challenges, we will continue to work toward a more democratic, prosperous, and secure future for the people of Venezuela.”

The message was immediately interpreted as a radical departure from the White House’s usual position. In prior elections, Washington had expressly demanded that the government respect the election results and even recognised the interim government of [former National Assembly president Juan] Guaidó. Evidently, this shift was the successful outcome of Maduro’s policy of seeking — and achieving — a lowering of tensions in relations with the powerful nation to the north, using oil as an attractive lure.

The message was also interpreted as accepting Maduro’s victory, done so in diplomatic language that did not mention Maduro by name and cloaked in appeals to the people’s will. “The will of the Venezuelan people must be respected” came across more like a message to the White House’s former opposition allies than to the Venezuelan government.

The final phrase — “despite the many challenges” — was eloquent, referring to Maduro’s victory in imperial terms. But it was followed by the statement that “we will continue to work toward a more democratic, prosperous, and secure future for the people of Venezuela.” This is similar to a saying we have in Venezuela: “es lo que hay” (“it is what it is”). In sum, Maduro won, but we will continue trying to bring about democratic alternance of power in Venezuela.

Harris’s message also demonstrated that the Venezuelan government kept open lines of direct and real-time communication with Washington, informing the White House of its assessment of the election based on information received from scrutineers and the tallying of results (which were never published). In other words, it demonstrated how US-Venezuela relations had evolved: beyond the bombastic rhetoric in the media, they represented the rebuilding of a dependent and neo-colonial relationship.

Several hours later, amid the confusion caused by Harris’s message, the opposition held a media conference to denounce the fact that party scrutineers were being prevented from observing the vote count at polling centres and that official opposition scrutineers were being denied access to the National Electoral Council (CNE) counting, tallying and monitoring rooms. Not long after, spokespeople for the opposition’s Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (Unitary Democratic Platform, PUD) reported they had collected voting tally sheets from 40% of voting centres; this low percentage indicated its organisational weakness, with scrutineers struggling to quickly obtain 100%. Images also began to appear on social media — I cannot verify whether they are real or not — of tally sheets showing Maduro had even lost in historic bastions of Chavismo and Madurismo.

The atmosphere on social media contrasted sharply with the messages being transmitted by official government and opposition spokespeople. The new Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela [United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV] political bureau, composed of Cabello, Jorge Rodríguez, Héctor Rodríguez and Delcy Rodríguez, held an improvised media conference, stating that while they could not mention the election result, viewers could get an idea by looking at their faces as they smiled. They talked about celebrations. Evidently, they were seeking to influence public opinion ahead of the CNE announcing a government victory, and to counter information circulating on social media networks.

Shortly afterwards, military leaders, headed by Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López, Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) commanders, the military leadership of Plan República (in charge of election security), the Strategic Operational Command and other high-ranking officers announced that the option that opposed the US blockade had won —- clearly a favourable reference to Maduro. These statements by PSUV leaders and the military high command sought to lend credibility to a result that ran counter to what people were perceiving in the streets and on social media.

The PUD, led by MCM and which backed EGU, held a follow-up media conference to reiterate allegations that national and local scrutineers were stopped from participating in the counting and tallying of votes. They criticised government statements that sought to give the impression they had information indicating Maduro had won. They also said they now had more than 50% of voting centre tally sheets and would continue collecting more.

Led by CNE president Elvis Amoroso, four of the five CNE directors (Juan Carlos Delpino was missing) announced at the stroke of midnight that with 80% of the votes counted, Maduro had won with 51% of votes cast. Amoroso declared the voting trend irreversible, despite there still being two million votes to count with the difference between Maduro and González less than 800,000.

Unlike other electoral processes, especially those conducted under former CNE president Tibisay Lucena, no state-by-state results were provided. The full results were also not published on the CNE’s website (the page was supposedly “down” due to a hack, but remains offline [months] after the elections).

The opposition then held a new media conference, announcing they now had more than 70% of tally sheets and that, according to them, EGU had defeated Maduro by a margin of 3-to-1. They said they would not recognise the CNE’s results and demanded respect for the popular will. They added that their strategy would not be based on calling mobilisations but demonstrating to Venezuela and the world they had won.

The working class after the elections

July 28, 2024, marked the start of a new phase within Madurismo (the first phase lasted between 2013-18, the second from 2018 to July 28, 2024). In this phase, Madurismo needs to demonstrate that it is in full control of the situation, even amid the lack of transparency over the election results, which some people have pointed to as evidence of electoral fraud.

Madurismo must now show its strength and control over the situation in order to not undermine the progress it has made towards an inter-bourgeois agreement and stabilising its bourgeois regime. For her part, MCM believes she has the strength and legitimacy to break those agreements and initiate a period of supremacy of transnational capital, economic financialisation and waves of privatisation. The aim is to reconfigure the existing capitalist class while resolving the crisis of capital accumulation and political representation that started in 1983. MCM is overestimating the genuine possibilities for achieving this, but ultimately the facts will determine it. An inter-bourgeois agreement, involving sectors aligned with Maduro and MCM-EGU seems to be the option preferred by the US, and the one being pursued by the governments of Lula, Petro and AMLO.[4]

This article was finished just one month after the elections, therefore I can only begin to outline the most important features of this new stage below.

Democracy and 21st century socialism

The Bolivarian project was built on a basic political pact: the transformation of Venezuelan society within a democratic framework, through a radicalisation of democracy and attempts to move from representative to participatory and protagonistic democracy. In other words, democracy was a substantive element of the Bolivarian project. In fact, between 1998-2024, more than 20 elections were held. This is not to say that the tension between authoritarianism and democracy were not present within the Bolivarian project from the start; rather, it is a reaffirmation that its conceptual vision was, ultimately, always one of more democracy.

In every election, transparency via the publication of results broken down by state, municipality, voting centre and voting booth, was a democratic achievement that vindicated the Bolivarian project. This may no longer be the case if Maduro and the CNE refuses — as they have until now — to publish disaggregated electoral results. This would imply a break with the democratic ideals of Bolivarianism (putting to one side criticisms made by opponents who failed to recognise this commitment of the Bolivarian project).

Independently of the dual projects fostered within the Bolivarian movement’s multi-class political project (creating a new bourgeoisie and promoting popular power), which ended up tending towards the former, the democratic vocation of the socialist project was reaffirmed with the shift towards 21st century socialism in 2004. In fact, that same year, a recall referendum was held for the President of the Republic (at the time Chávez).

Within 21st century socialism, popular power was conceived as developing and deepening democracy. It was never counterposed to bourgeois electoral rules; on the contrary, the CNE acted as arbiter of many processes to guarantee transparency, equity and electoral justice.

What happened in the early hours of July 29 was unprecedented, with a winner being declared with only 80% of the votes counted, despite more than 2 million votes to count and the difference between the two leading candidates being less than 1 million.

This declaration was attributed [by the CNE] to three factors. First, an “irreversible trend” that was not backed by disaggregated results, as is customary with elections, meaning the results fall outside the realm of verifiable facts. Second, an alleged cyber attack that supposedly affected the CNE’s website where disaggregated results are published alongside the tallying process and other mechanisms that allow voters to see the results in detail. Third, a supposed unfolding coup plot, in which Maduro losing the elections amounted to a coup d'état (copying the discourse and actions of [Donald] Trump and [former Brazilian president Jair] Bolsonaro).

On July 29, the CNE proclaimed Maduro the winner and president-elect, without showing any disaggregated results. This generated doubts in the population. Government spokespersons announced that full disaggregated results would be published in the next few hours, but this has still not happened [several months] later and the CNE website remains offline.

The MCM-EGU bloc launched its own website, where it has published what it says are copies of voting booth and voting centre tally sheets. A few days after the CNE announced Maduro’s victory, the opposition website claimed to have published 81% of the supposed tally sheets, giving EGU a 3-to-1 victory margin over Maduro. The government said the tally sheets had been adulterated or falsified, but refused to show its own copies or the original tally sheets.

The TSJ usurps the CNE’s powers

Facing national and international pressure for electoral transparency, Maduro manoeuvered like a typical union bureaucrat when they see their permanence in power threatened. He filed a legal appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) to protect his rights, though the content of the appeal was not disclosed. The appeal was evidently a manoeuvre to transfer the power to decide on election results from the CNE to the TSJ, which not only changed those responsible for making the decision but also the procedure. The aim, above all else, was to ensure the government would not need to comply with the obligation of publishing results.

The TSJ accepted the appeal and requested all parties (pro-government and opposition) provide copies of their tally sheets. The MCM-EGU aligned opposition argued the appeal was unconstitutional, as the process involved usurped powers from another branch of the state (the electoral branch). The TSJ carried out an expert appraisal of the tally sheets it was given, without involving independent experts selected by the opposition. In the end, it declared Maduro the winner, and placed the tally sheets used to justify its decision under its own custody (meaning they cannot be scrutinised by others).

It also ruled that its decision was final; that is, it considered all avenues for appealing the result as exhausted. Opposition sectors not aligned with MCM-EGU, in this case represented by the Frente Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Front, FDP), which includes the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Party of Venezuela), announced it would appeal the decision and request the TSJ’s decision be reviewed before September 15.4

What is at stake here are basic minimum democratic norms: if disaggregated results are not published, it is not just Maduro’s government but Venezuela’s democracy that will lose legitimacy. Sustained over time, this will undermine the legitimacy of the presidential mandate that begins on January 10, 2025, and create an ambiguous situation regarding the country’s democratic framework. This would affect the working class’s chances of regaining, winning and expanding rights and achievements within a democratic framework accepted by all parties.

Protests

The international capitalist media — as well as much of the alternative, and especially campist, media — portrayed the popular demonstrations on July 29-30 that largely occurred in poor working-class neighbourhoods in Caracas and some cities in the interior, as a right-wing attempt led by MCM-EGU to destabilise the government. This falsehood served as a justification for those who promote the view that there are only two sides in this dispute: Madurismo (sometimes confusingly presented as Chavismo) and the MCM-EGU-led right.

There is no doubt that important protests occurred in poor working-class sectors during those two days, in particular July 29. But they were spontaneous in nature; there was no political leadership — from the right or left — coordinating these protests, even if activists of different ideological persuasions participated.

The spontaneity was a result of two basic factors. The first was frustrations felt by broad sections of the population who saw the collapse of hopes that had been fostered by EGU that, if he won, Venezuelan migrants would be able to return home in the short term, wages would rise and public services would improve.

The second was accumulated anger against the Maduro government’s anti-working class practices that, with the announcement of another six-year term, exploded among sectors that did not necessarily vote for or support EGU-MCM. On the contrary, large sections of the Chavista social base actively participated in protests in places such as La Vega, Petare, El Valle and other former bastions of Madurismo.

The July 29-30 protests were efficiently isolated by security and specialised counter-mobilisation forces, who ensured that protests in different neighbourhoods did not connect. The end result was more than a dozen dead, hundreds detained and a reign of psychological terror in the form of Operación Tun Tun [Operation Knock, Knock]. This succeeded in halting the protests, but not the discontent. Maduro and Cabello announced that those who had participated in protests would be subject to “knock, knock”, meaning their homes would be raided and searched, and they would be arrested, despite the protests having ended, simply for dissenting.

Mass arrests

A month later, between 1800-2400 arrests have been reported by sources including human rights defenders, social movements and political activists. Most of those arrested were from poor working-class sectors and areas where the working class live. More often than not, the arrests were carried out without a court order and in the absence of public prosecutors by unidentified officers dressed in black and wearing balaclavas, with arrestees transported in vehicles without official identification. The purpose was to generate further terror within society.

Among those arrested were 115 minors, detained under the same conditions as adults. Eighty of them were only released several weeks later, while about 30 remain in prison.

The detainees — adults and minors — have been accused of terrorism, a charge that carries the possibility of more than 10 years in prison. Only 100 of the detainees have been clearly identified as political activists; the vast majority are men and women from poor working-class sectors.

Keeping those arrested in prison without any reasonable legal excuse and laying disproportionate charges against them is part of the government’s strategy to spread terror and repress social protest. The initial spontaneous protests have practically disappeared. The four rallies called by MCM have only managed to mobilise a few hundred supporters. But this in no way means that social discontent has disappeared.

Blaming social media

As part of its strategy to discourage and dissolve social protest, the government launched an offensive against social media networks, the means by which poor and working-class sectors expressed their discontent. Maduro publicly uninstalled WhatsApp from his mobile phone and encouraged his followers to do the same. The government suspended X for 10 days (though this censorship continues, most people are able to connect via a VPN). Maduro also denounced that his TikTok account had been suspended — despite his alliance with China. All this has turned social media into a central focus of political debate.

A significant portion of arrestees did not participate in demonstrations or protests, but simply posted comments critical of the government, referring to electoral fraud or making fun of government politicians. For this, they became targets of the government’s “knock, knock” policy. Many are still in prison, accused of terrorism for social media comments.

Police continue patrolling the streets, demanding citizens hand over their phones for checking. Those found to have posted anything against the government are arrested. It is now customary for citizens to go about their daily business without their phones, in order to avoid being declared a terrorist.

The authoritarian idea that social media incites hatred and is therefore bad has been installed in society, with punitive laws announced regarding their use. We should expect new mechanisms of control, censorship and punishment for social media use.

The Ven App application

In June 2022, the Venezuelan government launched Ven App, a digital network created to receive and process complaints regarding the delivery of public services and to monitor the CLAP [Comites Locales de Abastecimiento y Produccion or Local Committees for Food Distribution and Production] food bag program.

After the elections, this useful and progressive mechanism was converted into a mechanism for anonymously reporting government opponents. Those reported via the app have been subject to the “knock, knock” policy, making up the bulk of the more than 2000 people arrested since July 28.

This use of the app has created something akin to a police state, which has been widely denounced. It is part of Madurismo’s deepening authoritarian turn.

Creation of two prisons

Just days after the election, and in light of widespread protests on July 29-30, Maduro announced he had prepared two prisons for detaining those arrested of terrorism — a generic accusation thrown at those who protested in the streets or on social media against the lack of electoral transparency. This represented a break with the idea of justice enshrined in the constitution.

Hundreds of detainees have been transferred to these two prisons, with the aggravating factor that they are subject to exceptional norms that deny them visits as well as receiving communications from family members and accessing medicines. They are also denied access to a lawyer of their choosing, and are instead assigned a state lawyer.

This repressive policy seeks to end protests and criticisms over the lack of electoral transparency. Working-class and revolutionary left sectors have called for a general amnesty and an end to the repression implemented since the July 28 elections.

Criminal requests for sanctions

Just days after the July 28 elections, Guaidó called for more economic sanctions on Venezuela in an interview on CNN en Español. Immediately after, a legion of spokespeople for the Venezuelan right living abroad issued similar statements. Neither MCM nor EGU have done so to date, but nor have they requested that they be completely lifted within a negotiated framework.

This makes it clear that, when it comes to elections in Venezuela, it is not a question of choosing a lesser evil — as some see MCM-EGU. In reality, neither the MCM-EGU opposition nor the Maduro government is willing to moderate or attenuate its ambitions in order to avoid inflicting more pain on the people; rather, both place their interests above those of the working class. The solution lies neither in an MCM-EGU government nor in Madurismo’s continuity.

The Anti-fascist Law

On August 13, Cabello — at the time a member of the PSUV parliamentary faction — proposed starting a national public consultation on a draft Law Against Fascism, Neo-fascism and Similar Expressions. First presented on April 2 by vice-president Delcy Rodríguez, the draft law was re-introduced to parliament after the July 28 elections as a legal-institutional mechanism to silence dissent.

Maduro seeks to use the “trend” of the international left fighting against the neo-conservative right’s global rise to construct a rhetoric that conceals his government’s social repression and containment of protests and dissent.

The four chapters and 30 articles in this law are so broad that they practically cover any form of dissent. For example, responding to a statement published by the CLACSO steering committee on August 1 requesting the publication of disaggregated election results to guarantee democratic freedoms, government spokespeople accused the authors of promoting fascism, a charge that can mean a prison sentence for Venezuelan citizens.

Today, the Venezuelan working class has the sword of Damocles hanging over its head whenever it protests or criticises a government that defends the interests of the bourgeoisie and not its own. Such criticisms can (and have) led to accusations of fascism, which have landed people in prison.

The law against NGOs

Amid a deepening deterioration of the Maduro government’s credibility due to its refusal to publish disaggregated voting data, the pro-Maduro majority in the National Assembly approved the Law on Supervision, Regulation, Actions and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organisations (better known as the Law regulating NGO activities) on August 15.

This legal instrument, which consists of 39 articles, has been denounced by Amnesty International. It aims to punish human rights and civil society organisations that question the Venezuelan government’s actions. [Americas Director at Amnesty International] Ana Piquer explained: “This law jeopardises the very existence and functioning of community, humanitarian and human rights organisations.”

NGOs have been issuing complaints over extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, systematic torture and violations of the rights to protest, association and free expression. This law could jeopardise such activities in a country where all public powers are under the control of Madurismo.

This law is of particular concern to the working-class movement, which has found it difficult to promote the cause of and find institutional means to obtain freedom for jailed workers and union leaders. The new anti-NGO law will make it much more difficult to disseminate information on the situation of the working class.

Cabinet restructuring

A month after the elections, Maduro announced changes to his cabinet on August 27. Some changes were swapping people around, others just cosmetic, but some were substantive. The latter include:

• The appointment of Cabello — the man behind the “Con El Mazo Dando” [Going at it with the Club] TV show, a parliamentarian and the most important PSUV leader after the President of the Republic — as Minister of the Interior, Justice and Peace. Cabello, the main propagandist of the government’s repressive “knock, knock” policy and other initiatives to persecute dissidents, is now in charge of the police, a clear message to the national and international community of the government’s intention to deepen its policy of military-police repression as a means to impose its authoritarian control over the post-electoral situation.
• Naming vice-president Delcy Rodríguez — architect of the agreement between the government and the main business federation, FEDECAMARAS — as president of [the state oil company] PDVSA. This represents a continuation of the government’s effort to promote and reach agreements with both sectors of the bourgeoisie (the old one that existed before Chávez and the new one that has emerged since), on the basis of maintaining the oil rent-based model of capital accumulation. Delcy’s appointment seeks to further isolate MCM-EGU from the rest of the old bourgeoisie or, failing that, promote an agreement based on common economic interests with the MCM-EGU bloc, with the repercussions this could have on the political terrain.
• The incorporation of Héctor Rodríguez — until then governor of Miranda, a key state in terms of containing the opposition — who was part of the PSUV team that hinted through their smiles that Maduro had won prior to the CNE announcing the result and who has emerged as a potential successor within Madurismo. Héctor created a party to support Maduro’s candidacy without abandoning his positions in the PSUV.
• The ratification of Padrino López as Minister of Defense, a portfolio that he has held since 2014, despite the tradition in Venezuela of that office being annually rotated.

These four appointments represent the main substantive changes to a cabinet whose main task is pacifying the country and constructing political, military and social stability that can allow Maduro to assume a new presidential term on January 10, 2025.

Fractures in the international progressive alliance

The historic international alliance that Chávez formed after the defeat of the FTAA [Free Trade of Americas Agreement] involved: Argentine Peronism (Kirchnerism); Uruguay’s Frente Amplio (Broad Front), and in particular Pepe Mujica; the Cuban government; the Partido de los Trabajadores (Workers' Party, PT) of Brazil, with its historic leader Lula; the Sandinistas and [Daniel] Ortega-[Rosario] Murillo couple in Nicaragua; the political front led by [Manuel] Zelaya (and now Xiomara Castro) in Honduras; the FMLN [Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional or Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] of El Salvador; and Evo Morales and the MAS [Movimiento al Socialism or Movement Towards Socialism] of Bolivia. Chávez also forged ties with resistance forces in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and other Latin American nations.

Over time the situation has changed, as the balance of forces in the region shifted. Furthermore, Maduro has helped fracture this international alliance. Maduro was unable to sustain the strategic relationship established with Cristina Kirchner and the Peronist wing aligned with former president Alberto Fernández, to the point that Kirchner — who supported Maduro in 2013 against right-wing opposition criticisms of fraud — on this occasion pointed out that the CNE was betraying Chávez’s legacy by refusing to publish results. Fernández had his official CNE invitation to be an international electoral observer revoked on July 23 after he responded to Maduro’s statements that “vamos a ganar por las buenas o por las malas” (we will win, through fair or foul means”) by saying “ in a democracy, whoever wins, wins, and whoever loses, loses.”

In terms of Mujica and the Broad Front in Uruguay, relations started to sour after the events of 2017 [in Venezuela], when dozens of young people died in street clashes with security forces. The break in relations between Mujica and Maduro is so deep that Mujica was not even invited to be an election observer.

In Bolivia’s case, Maduro has opted for a rapprochement with [current president Luis] Arce over the historical links with Evo, amid infighting between the two for leadership of the MAS. The political shift in El Salvador under President Nayib Bukele has left Maduro’s relationship with the FMLN increasingly weakened.

As for Colombia, government-to-government relations have been normalised, but differences over national and international policies have become increasingly evident between the Casas de Nariño [Colombia’s presidential palace] and Miraflores [Venezuela’s presidential palace] .

With Brazil, one of Chavismo’s historical allies, the relationship between Itamari [Brazil’s foreign ministry] and Casa Amarilla [Venezuela’s foreign ministry] has increasingly become merely diplomatic, mainly due to Maduro’s mistakes. Maduro also failed to build a close relationship with Mexico’s AMLO, despite the Mexican president’s repeated defence of Venezuela’s sovereignty.

Despite his vast experience as Venezuela’s foreign minister, Maduro has behaved more like a political leader than a head of state when it comes to his government’s international relations.

Given the lack of transparency surrounding the July 28 elections, this progressive front has fractured; on one side is the bloc composed of Cuba, Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega accused Petro and Lula of being pawn’s of the empire for requesting that election results be published), Honduras, Arce’s Bolivia, and some Caribbean islands; on the other side is the critical bloc, which includes Peronism, the Broad Front, and the Chilean government, which has no qualms denouncing Maduro as authoritarian.

Finally, there is the bloc involving Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, which wants to avoid the impacts of an authoritarian disaster in Venezuela while seeking to help facilitate an agreement between the bourgeois fractions in dispute and their political representatives. However, Lula’s statement that the Maduro government was unpleasant (August 16) and had disappointed him (September 6) shows that this mediator role has not been comfortable, much less easy. Chile, in contrast, has preferred to take the middle road, with President [Gabriel] Boric questioning the democratic character of the Maduro government.

Today, the international progressive alliance has broken down. Governments such as those of Brazil, Colombia and Mexico may end up further distancing themselves from the Maduro government.

EGU’s exile and the siege of the Argentine embassy

On September 2, an arrest warrant was issued for EGU. The move only heightened tensions and was unanimously rejected by foreign governments, including progressive ones. EGU had taken refuge in the Dutch embassy. Under pressure, he accepted political asylum in Spain, where he was received by the president while the Spanish parliament recognised him as president-elect.

This was preceded by the encircling of the Argentine embassy in Venezuela, where opposition leaders close to MCM have sought refuge. As relations between Argentina and Venezuela are frozen, Brazil received diplomatic approval to assume custody and protection of those seeking refuge inside. At one point, the Venezuelan government announced it was revoking that power; however, with EGU’s exile, tensions around the embassy have reduced. All this has negatively affected views towards and support for Madurismo at the international level.

High-ranking government officials had conversations with (or attempted to pressure?) EGU in the days before his exile, the contents of which were later revealed. The former candidate said he left the country out of fear for his personal safety and that the letters he handed to Maduro officials were signed under duress. He also expressed interest in continuing his work from Spain.

This scandal regarding political freedoms in Venezuela ended up acting as a further pressure on the working class to not mobilise. It was part of the general framework of restricting worker’s political and union rights.

Defending democracy

For a section of the [left] intelligentsia, defending bourgeois democratic legality is nothing more than a mere formality to be complied with or tossed aside depending on the results of an election. If progressives or the left win, the results must be accepted without hesitation; if the right or extreme right win, any legal trickery justifies refusing to recognise the results.

The fundamental issue for them is, ultimately, defeating the extreme right and fascism. But they fail to realise that such actions simply mirror the fundamental axis of conservative and reactionary thought. For fascism, public freedoms are merely formal details to be used or swept aside depending on whether they benefit it. Adopting the same stance is not a leftist position.

Revolutionaries are committed to deepening direct democracy, but this in no way means dispensing with democratic gains won by the working class and people over decades. In general terms, it means more democracy and participation in decision making, participatory planning and social oversight of state activities (including elections).

When we talk about the need for transparency in terms of publishing the results, we do so from the logic of a working class confronted with the need to re-win a minimum basic framework of freedoms within which to organise and fight. If the result of an election in which two representatives of the bourgeoisie faced off is not recognised, then it will be even harder to make any progress towards restoring the minimum democratic conditions that the working class requires to continue fighting for its rights.

Author’s note: I am grateful for the critical reading of the draft, as well as the comments and observations (partial or extensive) of Adelmo Becerra, Antonio Cunha Neto, Rose Mary Hernandez, Luz Palomino, Raul Gil, Oswaldo Coggiola, Pedro Fuentes, Ana Cristina Carvalho, as well as the contributions of Pedro Eusse, Manuel Sutherland, Victor Alvarez, Roberto Lopez, Tony Navas, Maria Alejandra Diaz.

Luis Bonilla is a university professor and researcher in pedagogy and social sciences. Member of the CLACSO Steering Committee and of the Latin American Campaign for the Right to Education. Research director of Other Voices in Education. Militant of the Fourth International.

• 1

  Translator’s note: This is covered in Part II (forthcoming)

• 2

  See Las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela el 28J-2024: una situación inédita de Luis Bonilla-Molina (2024). Translator’s note: the five tactics advocated by different sections of the left were: voting for EGU as the most viable candidate for defeating Maduro, which was advocated by some former Chávez ministers; supporting one of the other candidates in the election, as advocated by the Communist Party of Venezuela who supported Enrique Márquez; casting a null or blank vote, which was supported by some smaller revolutionary groups; casting a critical vote for Maduro, which was promoted by some marginal groups; and those grouped around La Otra Campaña (The Other Campaign), which argued that “its candidate is the social struggles, that no candidate represents the interests of the working class and that what needs to be done is a campaign denouncing the loss of democratic freedoms that opens the possibility of a class regrouping after the elections.”

• 3

  Translator’s note: Memorandum 2792 and the Onapre Instruction are covered in Part III (forthcoming). 

• 4

  Translator’s note: Since the publication of this article on September 22, several events have occurred: AMLO withdrew from the joint initiative with Petro and Lula to facilitate a negotiated solution; Maduro and MCM-EGU made clear they rejected any such negotiation; and Petro and Lula have largely dropped the initiative in practice, though maintaining their public stance of being willing to act as facilitators. At the same time, Lula and Petro have maintained their position that they will not recognise a winner unless the results are published, and both the outgoing Joe Biden administration and incoming Donald Trump administration have recognised EGU as “president-elect”.