Is Russia imperialist? A response to Renfrey Clarke

In his article, “The sources of the Ukraine conflict: A reply to Chris Slee,” Renfrey Clarke disputes my contention that Russia is imperialist. Clarke says:

As analysed by Lenin early in the last century, imperialism is a characteristic of the richest and most developed capitalist countries.

However, he acknowledges that Vladimir Lenin regarded Russia as imperialist, despite the fact that the Russian empire of his day remained a “primitive and dependent state”. Clarke recognises that Russia was “a ranking military power, able to keep large non-Russian populations in subjection and to throw millions of soldiers into its wars.”

Clarke also notes that:

In his writings, Lenin never fully untangled this conundrum. But he left us a definite pointer to his views. In articles in 1915 and 1916 he described the Russian imperialism of his time as “feudal” and as “crude, medieval, economically backward”. Clearly, he did not include it in the same category with the modern imperialism of the advanced Western countries.

Instead, the Russian empire was a relic of an earlier, pre-industrial imperialism, based not on finance capital and advanced productive methods, but on peasant rents, handicraft production and merchants’ profits. For Lenin, it may be said, the Russian empire despite its military power belonged in a historical category with such empires as that of the Ottomans.

Military power and foreign interventions as indicators of imperialism

Certainly tsarist Russia was backward and semi-feudal. But some of Lenin’s writings indicate that he regarded military strength and interventions in foreign countries as indicators of imperialism, regardless of the economic system. For example, Lenin wrote:

The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital not of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc, partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital)

Note the reference to Japan, which at that time was capitalist, though with feudal remnants, and where the development of finance capital was still limited. Despite this, Lenin highlighted its military power and interventions abroad (Lenin mentions China, but Japan had also invaded Korea). Clearly, Lenin regarded military power and foreign interventions as important factors in judging if a country is imperialist.

I am not aware of any writing by Lenin where he gives a full explanation of his views on this question. Lenin’s pamphlet Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism is often quoted as the definitive summary of his views. But Lenin himself noted its limitations. In his preface to the April 1917 edition, he said:

This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, particularly economic, analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in an allegorical language — in that accursed Aesopian language — to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a “legal” work.

Thus, Imperialism only deals with the economic aspects of imperialism. But Lenin’s other writings make clear that imperialism is not just an economic phenomenon. Political and military aspects are also important.

Clarke says:

Russia’s “feudal, medieval” imperialism perished in 1917. To characterise the country today using the tsarist regime as a historical reference is far-fetched.

Russia today is not semi-feudal, as it was in 1917. But its military strength makes it a great power. Lenin wrote: “The epoch of imperialism has turned all the 'great' powers into the oppressors of a number of nations…” This applies to Russia today.

Modern Russia

Clarke notes that:

The return of capitalism to Russia from 1991 saw the Russian Federation emerge as a typical “upper tier” country of the Global South; part of the “semi-periphery” of world capitalism along with countries such as Brazil, Mexico, or Türkiye.

Lenin never used the terms “Global South” or “semi-periphery”. Global South is an imprecise concept, while semi-periphery comes from World Systems Theory, which divides countries into the “core” and “periphery”, with semi-periphery as an intermediate category. This theory implies that the world capitalist system has a single “core” (or centre), ignoring the fact of inter-imperialist rivalry. 

In my view, Turkey, which intervenes militarily in Syria, Iraq and several African countries, is imperialist, even if on a much smaller scale than the United States.

Clarke says:

While Russia in 1991 inherited an industrial economy from the Soviet Union, the level of its technology in all but a few sectors was decidedly backward.

One sector, however, in which Russia was NOT backward was its military industry. This sector is crucial for Russia’s ability to intervene beyond its borders.

Clarke writes:

Entry to the “gated community” of the world’s rich states is effectively locked and barred; the list of genuinely wealthy countries, which apart from mini-states number about 20 in all, has barely altered since Lenin’s time.

Yet imperialism is not static. Japan, once a formerly poor country, is today an imperialist power.

Clarke says:

Imperialist states, if we read Lenin correctly, are marked by a surfeit of underused capital, seeking employment at the rates of profit its owners think they deserve. But the data cited above show that, compared to undoubted imperialist countries, Russia is strikingly capital-poor. Russian industry and infrastructure, the military sector aside, suffer from a severe lack of investment.

Meanwhile, the country is home to legendary natural resources that, in normal times, command high prices on world markets. To the extent that Russian entrepreneurs have capital to invest, they have the opportunity to draw very agreeable rates of profit at home, without the obloquy and vast expense of invading foreign countries.

This assumes that capitalists and their governments always act in a rational manner, avoiding unnecessary risks. In fact, they often act in a reckless and potentially self-destructive manner. Capitalists always want more wealth, and capitalist governments often seek to expand the territory under their control, even if it is unwise to do so. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an example.

Clarke writes:

The charge that Russia launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine from an imperialist drive to territorial expansion is therefore absurd. If we discard (as we should) the “crazed dictator” narratives current in the West, that leaves us compelled to accept that the reason for Moscow’s “special military operation” is exactly what the Russians say it is: a defensive response to determined, persistent Western menaces.

Andriy Movchan has convincingly refuted the idea that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was defensive. Movchan points out that Putin showed little concern when Finland and Sweden joined NATO, even though Finland is very close to St Petersburg.

He argues that Russian chauvinist ideology played a key role. I agree that ideology is important, but would add that this ideology is not simply the result of Putin being a “crazed dictator”. It has a purpose: to unite Russia’s population on a nationalist basis under Putin’s leadership, and thereby suppressing dissent.

Clarke writes:

The World Beyond War site puts the number of US military bases on foreign territory in 2025 at 877, in 95 countries. According to the same source, Russia has 29, the great majority of them inherited from and located in countries of the former Soviet Union. Several more Russian bases are in Syria. Moves by Russia to secure a naval station on Sudan’s Red Sea coast appear to have stalled.

This pattern does not suggest the pursuit by Russia of world hegemony, but rather, a focus on its own security. All of Russia’s military bases, actual or mooted, outside of the former Soviet Union are in the Middle East — a strategically sensitive area of Russia’s “near abroad”.

Many imperialist countries have few, if any, foreign military bases: for example, Japan, Germany and Sweden. Russia has more foreign bases than these countries.

Clarke explains the presence of Russian bases in the Middle East by saying it is “a strategically sensitive area of Russia’s ‘near abroad’.” But the US could say the same about Latin America.

Should the left just accept Russia’s peace terms?

Clarke says:

In any war, after victory has ceased to be a realistic prospect, there comes a point where the implications of continuing to fight approach national extermination. The killing in the Ukraine conflict has been monstrous. Now it must stop, on whatever terms might plausibly be enduring. For the international left that means, in practice, calling for acceptance of the peace terms, outlined above, put forward by the Russian side.

There is no guarantee that such an agreement would be “enduring”. Putin's ideology, which says that Ukraine is not a real nation but a part of Russia that was artificially separated from the rest by the Bolsheviks, implies that he may renew the war when he judges conditions for victory are favourable.

Peace is essential, but there need to be guarantees that Russia will not renew the war. Perhaps an international peace-keeping force sponsored by the United Nations should be considered. This could be combined with referendums in the disputed areas to ascertain which state the people want to join.

Putin would probably reject such a proposal, unless subject to strong pressure from within Russia. The best guarantee of peace would be a strong anti-war movement in Russia, combined with democratic rights enabling such a movement to organise and express its views.