Syria: Sharaa’s authoritarian centralisation stumbles in Suweida

First published at The New Arab.

Violent clashes and tensions have been ongoing in Suweida since Syria’s self-proclaimed president Ahmad Al Sharaa announced the transfer of the responsibility of maintaining security in the province, to local armed factions and Druze religious dignitaries. Yesterday’s decision comes a day after an agreement was concluded between the Syrian ruling authority led by Hayat Tahrir Sham (HTS) and Druze religious dignitaries in Suweida.

Currently, security forces are preparing to re-enter Suweidawith the claim from the Syrian interior ministry that they seek to quell fighting between Druze and Bedouin fighters.

This all follows previous attacks by armed groups supportive of the current government in both Suweida and near Damascus in April and May, which left over 100 people dead.

In reality, the recent move by Al Sharaa is clearly an attempt to consolidate his power over a fragmented Syria, undermine Suweida’s autonomy, and break democratic dynamics from below.

Controlling Suweida

Suweida has a predominantly Druze population and gained some level of political autonomy during the Syrian uprising. Following the fall of the Assad regime, most Druze local armed forces and religious dignitaries maintained discussions with the new ruling authorities in Damascus. Nevertheless, they had refused to lay down their arms, because of the lack of a democratic and inclusive political transition, and absence of guarantees for Suweida.

However, on July 13 the area was effectively transformed into a war zone, was attacked at a checkpoint by Bedouin armed factions. This resulted in rising tensions and fights between Druze and Bedouin fighters. In response, the interim leadership sent armoured vehicles from Damascus to try to control the province.

Within five days, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented that more than 200 people have been killed (including Druze and Bedouin civilians), and several hundreds have been injured.

People’s houses and businesses have been looted and destroyed, and sectarian hatred has spread in abundance — an example of this was filmed Druze local inhabitants being forced to have their moustaches cut or shaved off by fighters as an attempt to humiliate them.

While not reaching similar level of cruelty, the actions of the armed forces supportive of the government in Suweida reminded many of the massacre that had taken place in Syria’s coastal areas against the Alawites.

This armed operations against Suweida must be seen within the wider strategy by the Syrian government to consolidate its power over a fragmented country.

Whilst initially the HTS-led authority pursued a strategy based on gaining external recognition and legitimacy to foster its domination over Syria, it has been progressively taking control of state institutions, the army, and social actors. And sectarianism has been weaponised in order for the leadership to control the population.

Syria’s sectarianism

To be clear, sectarian tensions in Syria are not due to ancient religious divisions, nor have they been something intrinsic to the people of the region – contrary to what is often portrayed in Western media. They have deep political roots in Syria.

The rise in sectarian rhetoric and violence by both the new ruling authority, and armed forces supportive of them, has been directed towards the Alawite populations at first, and progressively also the country’s Druze communities.

There’s been a heavy instrumentalising of the “Mazlumiya Sunniya” (Sunni victimhood) narrative to try to unite large segments of the Arab Sunni community around Al Sharaa’s government, despite the many political, social and regional differences that exist within it.

Sectarian tensions also serve to break the potential for democratic spaces, or movements from below. It is therefore no surprise that Suweida has been a target by the government given that for many years it has been (and continues to be) a symbol of popular resistance against the Assad regime. Under the former dictatorship, demonstrations and marches continued, there was a vibrant local civil society, as well as attempts to create alternative trade unions and professional associations.

It is clear so far that the new ruling authorities quickly understood that sectarianism is a useful political tool to consolidate their domination over any territories where resistance to their leadership exists.

Israel is exploiting the situation

To add to the horrific tragedies in recent months, and divisions being sown, Israel is also exploiting the current tensions.

Human rights violations being committed by pro-government armed forces against Druze populations are being used by Israel stir up sectarian tensions. The Israeli government is attempting to present itself as the defender of the Druze in southern Syria and threatening to militarily intervene for their “protection”.

Aside from the Druze religious dignitary Hikmat al-Hijri’s calls to the Israeli government, large segments of the Druze population in Suweida and elsewhere have overwhelmingly rejected any Israeli intervention, and reaffirmed their loyalty to Syria and the unity of the country.

Ultimately, Israel has no interest in helping the Druze, it is simply using the opportunity to increase divisions within Syrian society, and moreover send a message to the HTS led government, that they will not tolerate any military presence in southern Syria, including the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa and Suweida.

This was exactly the point of the Israeli occupation forces’ recent strikes on Damascus and elsewhere.

Through its attacks, the Israeli government seeks to gain more concessions from the Syrian state — which has already showed a willingness to normalise with the occupation. Al Sharaa’s government confirmed that negotiations and discussions with Israeli officials have already taken place. This is despite Israel’s continuous attacks of Syrian territories (particularly in the occupied Syrian lands), and the destruction of agricultural lands and civilian infrastructures.

This is also why Damascus did not condemn Israel’s strikes in Iran. The Syrian government is in favour of the weakening of Iran, as well as of Hezbollah in Lebanon. This position is not only connected to Iran’s role in supporting the Assad regime during the uprisings, but also to Al Sharaa seeking to root the country in a US led axis to consolidate power internally.

Indeed, from seeking good relations with Western powers and their regional allies, to the potential normalisation with Israel, the Syrian government is ruling with the one goal in mind: consolidating HTS-led rule over the country. The interests of the masses, and their democratic aspirations, are being ignored and undermined in the process.

The latest events in Suweida therefore demonstrate, once again, that Syria is not witnessing a democratic and inclusive political transition. Instead, there is an attempt — which is far from complete — to build a new authoritarian regime led by HTS that is establishing itself under the façade of institutional and international legitimacy.

Joseph Daher is an academic and author of Syria after the Uprisings, The Political Economy of State Resilience; Hezbollah: the Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God; and Marxism and Palestine.