‘A “black swan” will inevitably alight’: Boris Kagarlitsky on why the left movement will have to be constructed afresh
First published in Russian at Historical Investigation. Translation by Renfrey Clarke for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.
From a Russian prison, the prominent scholar, Marxist theoretician and political detainee Boris Kagarlitsky replies to questions from Historical Investigation, putting forward his view on the reasons for the left's crisis. He suggests that members of the left have been unprepared for a systemic crisis, and that as a result, the left movement will have to be founded anew. He also discusses the collapse of the left-wing Utopia, neoliberalism, the Soviet heritage, the idea of a “universal basic income”, the fate of European social democracy and Latin American “Socialism of the 21st Century”, the danger to democracy posed by the extreme right, and the possibility of nuclear war. In his view, the left has a sound theoretical basis, but needs practical successes to demonstrate the feasibility of the socialist project.
Boris Yulyevich Kagarlitsky is a Marxist sociologist, Soviet-era dissident, social activist, and political prisoner convicted under Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“Public appeals for the carrying out of terrorist actions, public justification of terrorism or propaganda in support of terrorism”). He is currently imprisoned at Corrective Colony 4, Torzhok, Tver Province, Russia.
‘The left movement will have to be constructed afresh’
Axel Honneth notes a paradoxical phenomenon — the crisis of the left has appeared against a background of disillusionment with capitalism. Do you agree that the left is in crisis? What are the reasons for this crisis?
Honneth is unquestionably correct in speaking of a crisis of the left, something that I too discussed in my books Between Class and Discourse and The Long Retreat. This crisis is visible to the naked eye. But there is also the seeming paradox that the crisis of the left is occurring in the context of a crisis of capitalism, and of declining confidence in it in most societies. In reality, there is no particular paradox here. We might recall the collapse of the Second International (not just [Vladimir] Lenin’s article by this name, but also the collapse itself). Just as generals always prepare to fight the previous war, politicians and especially left-wing politicians prepare themselves to confront the previous crisis. Their tactics and strategy always* lag behind the changes in society. Revolutionary overturns are not just linked to the radicalism of various projected measures, but always reflect a radical shift in tactics and strategy, which “catch up” with reality. Meanwhile, it’s important to note that almost all significant revolutions have been criticised as “incorrect” by whichever left forces were orthodox at that particular time. Here it is worth remembering the title of the once-celebrated book by Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution.
It would, of course, be wrong to argue that the tactics and program of the left have not changed over the past twenty years. But unfortunately, these changes have not been aimed at developing a program designed to counter the problems and contradictions of present-day capitalism. Instead, the aim has been to adapt to capitalism, to find a place for the left within capitalism, so that supporters of the left can settle down comfortably within the system. Basically, this aim has been achieved. But now we have been hit by a systemic crisis, and the left has found itself not just unprepared, but superfluous, an element in a disappearing landscape. As a result, the left movement will have to be constructed afresh, and not for the first time. The decisive thing, however, is the need for practical successes, not on the level of electoral victories but on that of genuinely successful and meaningful social changes, which can be pointed to as examples. The people who can achieve this will shape the political model of the movement for the years ahead.
Where does the world stand at present? Is it correct to say that we are in the epoch of neoliberalism? And what is neoliberalism? How is it connected to the transition from an industrial to an information society?
Unfortunately, the term “neoliberalism” is all too often used without paying heed to its content. We could, of course, refer to David Harvey’s excellent book A Brief History of Neoliberalism. But in short, what is involved is the dismantling of the institutions of the welfare state that were established in the twentieth century, and the turning into commodities of goods and services that used to be produced and distributed on a different basis. In this way, capital is creating new markets for itself and is counteracting the tendency for profit rates to decline, while at the same time winning back social positions it had earlier surrendered. The trouble is that the resources included in the field of private market distribution are being exhausted and this is giving rise to a systemic crisis. The system’s supporters emphasise the freedom of the market, but this is correct only up to a point. Removing the limits on market practices has the effect of strengthening the large corporations that are best able to take advantage of this situation. In sum, we are witnessing monopolisation and the subjugation of small and medium business to the corporations. Of course, we all know of contrary examples, of successful individuals such as Pavel Durov and Elon Musk. But these people ceased long ago to belong to the category of small entrepreneurs; the point about them is that they founded corporations.
Is all this tied up with the appearance of new technologies? Yes, but only in part. Any serious changes in capitalism, and in the economy in general, always occur against a backdrop of technological shifts. The question is whether these technologies can be used differently, in a non-capitalist manner, and this is something fraught with struggle. The conflicts around open program codes in the computer industry, around intellectual property and so forth, show that there is indeed an alternative, and it is interesting that there is now a noticeable influx of IT specialists into the left movement. Earlier, this milieu was inclined mainly to liberalism, but now the trend has changed. The milieu is not only moving to the left, but is becoming radicalised.
‘There’s nothing more pointless than trying to imagine a shining future’
The “actually existing socialism” of the 20th century brought the left movement into disrepute. After the “gulag archipelago” many people became convinced that implementing any project aimed at creating a society based on the principles of social justice would inevitably lead to a new gulag. How should members of the left relate to the tragic experience of the USSR? How can we convince people that to talk about socialism is to talk about the future, and not about the history of the Soviet Union? After all, there are many people today who do not distinguish between the neoliberal market economy and democracy, just as native American peoples once imagined the horse and the conquistador to be one and the same animal. As a result, people regard socialism as a threat to democracy. Is a socialism based on democratic principles possible?
To compare public opinion with the view of the Aztec who failed to differentiate between the horse and its rider strikes me as rather apposite. The answer to the problem, however, does not lie in theory but in experience; the same native Americans learnt through living practice not just to understand horses, but to ride them. Dozens of highly persuasive texts, beginning with the early criticisms of the Soviet experiment by Rosa Luxemburg and the left Mensheviks, have set out to show that socialism without democracy is impossible, and that the collapse of the Soviet Union was linked to the fact that the system was not democratic — that the USSR could not bring the socialist project to fruition, but was limited to modernising society and carrying out industrialisation, before settling back ultimately onto the rails of capitalism. All this, however, alters nothing. What is needed is practical success, and as soon as it occurs the discussion will cease of its own accord, just like the discussion about whether heavier-than-air flying machines were possible. As soon as the first aircraft took flight, the discussion ended. In our case, all the “flights” have so far ended in crashes. Not immediately by any means, as we see in the history of the USSR, but the crashes have occurred nonetheless. This is the experience that supporters of the right will invariably cite. We have used our theory to refute their arguments many times, but to no avail. We need to prove our case in practice.
Zygmunt Bauman wrote that modern society is incapable of imagining a world better than the one of which it is currently part. Is it correct to consider that the declining popularity of the left reflects its lack of an attractive vision of the future? What should the socialism of the 21st century be like? How do you regard the idea of a universal basic income?
Bauman, of course, was correct in what he stated. Only, the answer is not to be sought in the field of theory. There is nothing more pointless than trying to imagine a shining future. What we need is practical solutions to concrete problems. Is a universal basic income such an answer? I am convinced it is not. In essence, the idea of a UBI is a short-term attempt to lessen the crisis of demand brought about by neoliberal policies (or more precisely, by the exhaustion of the resources that neoliberalism used to create new markets). A UBI involves giving people more money so that they can buy more. In the long term, this solves nothing even within the framework of neoliberalism — the stimulus provided by the extra injections of money will be exhausted, and we will encounter the same problem on a higher level. Most importantly, a UBI does not presume any structural changes, either in the field of production or in that of distribution. All that will happen is that the system of social payments and benefits will be simplified and reorganised. Bureaucrats will find their work a little easier. Wages will most likely decline somewhat, since business will reassign part of the cost of reproducing labour power to the state. No, this is a complete dead-end, as I have written repeatedly. The left supports this idea out of impotence, including intellectual impotence. A genuine left-wing perspective concentrates on reforming and expanding a renewed (and democratised) social sector, one that features decommodification, something on which Patrick Bond has written at length. Various areas of life such as health care, education, housing, transport and so on are gradually set free from the market, so that the results of activity cease being commodities. The process may take a certain time, and it will not always be simple, but the important thing is the direction of the changes. The reproduction of human existence, of everyday life and relationships, must not be reduced to a sum of market transactions. Meanwhile, the new social factor represented by democratic planning is a special topic, one that on the whole has been quite well explored. Here I can cite various works from the 1960s (those of Ota Šik, Włodzimierz Brus and others), my own book The Politology of Revolution, and so forth. All in all, it is clear what needs to be done, but the question is one of political will.
‘The fundamental mechanisms of the economic and social system in Russia and the US, in Iran and Italy, are completely identical’
The twentieth century was marked by a confrontation between capitalism and socialism in the course of which a “convergence” took place in the West, leading to the appearance of the welfare state. Today the crucial conflict is between the homelands of neoliberal democracy (conventionally described as the West), and supporters of so-called “traditional values”. What do you think might arise out of this confrontation? What position should the left take on it?
There is no basis today for talking of a systemic confrontation. The fundamental mechanisms of the economic and social system in Russia and the United States, in Iran and Italy, are completely identical. The different ideological forms reflect the peculiarities of the political process in these countries, and the traditions of the local bureaucracies. We should recall that in Russia, most of the champions of “traditional values” began as liberals. In the Middle East, meanwhile, it was precisely Islamists who implemented many of the neoliberal economic reforms. What is hidden behind these ideological screens? First of all, a desire to control society (in this regard it is completely unimportant what the authorities encourage, whether it is a gay parade or a crusade — the main thing is that there is a set of practices through which loyalty to the system is ritualised). In second place is the ambition of the elites of various countries of the periphery and semi-periphery, through taking advantage of a favourable conjuncture in the raw materials markets, to raise their status in the world-system and to establish their own spheres of influence, protected against competition from the West. If policies of this kind are successful, former allies will immediately take to tearing each other’s hair out. Most likely, however, there will not be any successes, because the stakes are not being placed on socio-economic progress or on technological and industrial development, but on raw materials markets and military strength. In other words, the type of development remains thoroughly peripheral, and a comprehensive modernisation of all aspects of life, such as occurred in the USSR, does not take place.
It is clear that the left has nothing to gain from involving itself in such contests, just as it made no sense for workers to distinguish between “good” and “bad” imperialists during the First World War. It does not follow from this that there are no differences whatever — there are. But from the point of view of left strategy, these differences are not the main thing. We have to take them into account, but we cannot construct our politics on this basis.
Why is the left not playing a key role in today’s regime changes, which people have grown used to calling “revolutions”? Is this proof of a rejection by the left of revolutionary forms of struggle? Or are classical revolutions a holdover from the epoch of industrial society, that is, the Modern epoch, and something that no longer meets the requirements of the information civilisation that is coming into being?
The truth is that so-called “colour revolutions” have nothing in common with revolutions in the political or historical sense. Obviously, democracy is better than dictatorship. But a transition to democracy, however conducive it might be to the development of society, is not the same thing as a revolution. Here the problem is different. Many genuine social revolutions have also started out with quite superficial political changes, with democratic overturns, and even with reforms from above. But subsequently, the process has grown deeper and wider, beginning to affect the social structures, economic relations, key political institutions, culture, and so forth. This is when the changes or the overturns spill over into revolution. It is significant that the leaders of the so-called “colour revolutions” understand this perfectly. So right from the outset they do their utmost to restrict and control the process, to stop it developing further. Everything has to be limited to a change of leadership, or at most to a partial restructuring of the elites beneath the slogan of democratisation. The trouble is that as a result, even the formal democratic gains made during the initial stage are very quickly lost. If the process is not deepened, it goes backwards. The politics of the left has to be built precisely on the struggle to deepen and broaden the process. Without social transformations, democracy will not succeed either. And if in just a single locality, in a single country, the process bursts through the bounds of a mere reshuffling of the elites, then we get to see something completely different — what political science calls a “revolution”.
In Latin America in the early 21st century, the “left turn” associated with Hugo Chávez caused a surge of enthusiasm. But it is hard to describe today’s Venezuela as a successful country — it is marked by economic crisis, inflation, and problems with its democracy. Has this “left turn” come to nothing? Do the governments of Brazil, Chile or Colombia have the potential to revive it?
The “socialism of the 21st century” proclaimed by Hugo Chávez was a beautiful slogan, a pledge that unfortunately could not be fulfilled. The “left turn” in Latin America is still far from exhausted, but for the present we cannot talk of its success. Left-wing governments usually rest on broad but unstable populist coalitions that soon disintegrate after winning elections. Also, it is often the case that left-wing presidents do not have a parliamentary majority. All the same, there have been some successes. In Colombia, Gustavo Petro unexpectedly managed to get his pension reform bill through parliament, after his health system reform was defeated. In Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum was elected president, while at the same time winning a strong majority in the parliament. In general, Sheinbaum deserves to be paid very careful attention. Her predecessor [Andrés Manuel] Lopez Obrador left a contradictory legacy. On the one hand, wages underwent record growth, but on the other, noticeable authoritarian tendencies appeared. Will Sheinbaum be able to deepen the social reforms, while at the same time maintaining democratic institutions? I certainly hope so. But the general conclusion is that for the present, the Latin American left has not managed to overcome the crisis of strategy that appeared following the collapse of the Chávez experiment in Venezuela.
‘The extreme right is filling an emotional and political vacuum that has appeared since the left abandoned class politics’
In Europe in recent years we have seen growing support for the ultra-right. In some countries a so-called ‘sanitary cordon’ has been breached, and right-wing radicals have entered governments. The European Parliament elections forced us once again to speak of a fascist threat. Although the ultra-right only increased its representation in the European Parliament by an insignificant amount, their successes in France and Germany came as a shock. Is there a danger that right-wing dictatorships will come to power in Europe? Can today’s ultra-rightists be compared to fascists? What should the left be doing to counter the threat from the ultra-right?
The threat posed to democracy by the ultra-right is real, but for the present, I do not see any cause for panic. Today’s right-wing radicals are not the fascists of the 1920s — they have parasitised off the crisis of neoliberalism, but they are more like populists playing with slogans and emotions. There is no sign that the representatives of big business have put their stake on these forces, which have no strategy for rescuing capital. The extreme right is filling an emotional and political vacuum that has appeared since the left abandoned class politics, understood either in the social-democratic or Communist sense, and instead put its stake on political correctness, on minorities, and so forth. The working class has felt betrayed, and has in fact been betrayed — this is what the right-wing populists are playing on. There is nothing here that is fundamentally new. What is genuinely interesting is the fact that, with the growth of right-wing populism, a section of the liberal bourgeoisie has started to panic. This is opening up certain opportunities for the left, with people looking to left-wing forces as a counterweight to the ultra-right. It is in France that this shift has been especially noticeable, but there are also some signs of it in the US and Germany. A window of opportunity is opening up, and it is essential to take advantage of it. What is needed in this case, however, is not politically correct slogans or populist speeches, but specific proposals that in the new* circumstances will return the trust and support of workers to the left. Let us look to the policies of [Jean-Luc] Mélenchon in France, and of Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico. Nothing has been decided as yet, but some interesting turns are possible.
Why have social-democratic parties become champions of neoliberalism, and why are they more and more often playing the role of junior partners of the neoliberal political forces?
Since the 1990s the politics of the social democrats have been reduced to the principle “if you can’t beat them, join them”. The point is that while the Soviet bloc, with its repressions, of course discredited socialism, it also exerted pressure on the West and created favourable conditions there for social reforms that served workers’ interests. After 1989–91 the situation changed, and for the social democrats, the relationship of forces became more adverse. If the social democrats were able to win back government, or hold onto it, this was through reaching a compromise with the neoliberals while, at the same time, promising to soften the social consequences of the neoliberal reforms. The social democrats became hostages of their neoliberal partners and of their own earlier decisions. Protests by the party rank and file against these policies took the form of revolts that finished up being crushed — we might consider the fate of Jeremy Corbyn in Britain, and also the attempts, using similar methods, to smother Mélenchon. The trouble is that a victory for the apparatus over the activists turns into a political void. The apparatus lacks the ability to develop long-term strategies, meaning that the revolts will be repeated.
‘However many wonderful books we write, we will not find an answer to the main question, which is: who is going to achieve a decisive breakthrough in social development, and where, and how?’
We are now hearing a great deal about decolonisation and neocolonialism. What dangers does neocolonialism present to the world?
The term “neocolonialism”, like other items of political vocabulary, is emotionally fraught while at the same time being exceedingly obscure. What we need to look at is not the slogans, but the strategies for economic and social development in the countries of the periphery. It is no accident that I keep repeating the word “strategy”, perhaps to the point of being tiresome. We simply have to take account of the consequences of the decisions we make and accept responsibility for them. What policies are Global South governments implementing with regard to their own populations? That’s the main criterion, and everything else is just rhetoric. It is true that there are global constraints. But when we try to overcome them or mitigate them, we first of all need to formulate our goals and tasks, before setting out to understand who and what stands in our way.
What works by left-wing thinkers that have appeared in the past decade, in your view, present the most interesting models for a future that differs both from the “real socialism” of the last century, and from present-day neoliberalism?
As I said earlier, it is not a question of theory. The left has no problem with its thinkers. If we simply need suggestions for interesting reading, then I recommend the books by Nick Srnicek. There is also the extremely useful English-language blog by the Marxist economist Michael Roberts. From the Keynesian left, there are works by various supporters of Modern Monetary Theory. They are often misunderstood as arguing that it is simply necessary to print more money, but this is not in fact what they are talking about. What they are really saying is that it is necessary to use financial resources to mobilise material and labour resources for the good of society.
The founders of world-system analysis — [Immanuel] Wallerstein, Samir Amin and André Gunder Frank — have all now died, and there is a noticeable crisis in that area. Still, it seems to me that the potential of that school has not been exhausted. It is also worth keeping in mind the recently-deceased Singaporean economist Martin Hoare. In short, there is plenty to read. Even since I have been in prison new books have been coming out, and I am at risk of falling behind the discussion. The main questions, however, are not in the field of theory but in that of political practice. However many wonderful books we write, we will not find an answer to the main question, which is: who is going to achieve a decisive breakthrough in social development, and where, and how? Reading and thinking are necessary not just for their own sake, but so that we can act, and act politically.
‘If we feel that events are repeating themselves, it’s because we’re thinking in terms of analogies with the past.’
More and more often, politicians are saying that the epoch of peace is drawing to a close. Does humanity have any chance of avoiding a Third World War and a nuclear armageddon? What should the left be doing to prevent this outcome?
Let me be quite blunt — if the world’s ruling elites are intent on starting another world war, we are not going to be able to stop them. In just the same way, the Second International could not prevent the First World War, despite embracing the concept of revolution and holding congresses. When Jean Jaurès tried to do something, they killed him.
All the same, I am an optimist. The global conflict is now developing along lines quite different from the experience in the 20th century. If we feel that events are repeating themselves, it is because we are thinking in terms of analogies with the past: if China and the US fall out over Taiwan, that means they will inevitably go to war; if Russia gets into a fight with the European Union, the conflict will necessarily start spreading. None of this is obvious at all. It seems to me that all of today’s main international conflicts are now reaching their peak, and the basic concern of the elites is how to escape from them. But that is where the problem lies — the elites not finding convenient solutions that allow them to de-escalate. In all the countries that are involved in conflicts, getting out of these disputes inevitably comes associated, directly or indirectly, with domestic crises. Someone has to be branded as guilty, and someone has to be made to provide compensation to the victims. Someone has to pay in order to change the relationship of forces within the ruling groups, and someone has to come up with solutions, not just compromise measures but workable settlements.
So far, nothing has worked. The historical process is bogged down. Sooner or later, though, something will happen, and the “catastrophic equilibrium” will be destroyed. A “black swan” will inevitably alight. I do not exclude, incidentally, that this “swan” — an absolutely unanticipated phenomenon, that confounds all preconceptions — alighted long ago and is sitting somewhere not far off, while we simply fail to notice it, or refuse to see it.
So what is the task for the left? To carry on with our usual routines is pointless. When a social process of huge dimensions appears on the scene, we have to involve ourselves in it, trying to shape it politically, turning the needs* of the masses into concrete demands*, their moods into slogans, and their expectations into a program. Political work cannot be done in advance, and there is no way a program can simply be prepared ahead of time and laid on the table while we wait for a suitable moment. When that moment arrives, the program will, at a minimum, need to be amended. And the program cannot simply reflect abstract values or ideas. While based on our values, it has to answer the questions that emerge at a specific moment marked by a definite — but changing — relationship of forces.
For left politics — that is, for a successful, transformative and liberating politics — certain conditions are necessary, conditions created by a crisis of the elites and by a revitalisation of the masses. This is a topic that Lenin addressed, and we should note how he called attention to the fact that the masses of the population are drawn into politics by the masses themselves. In France, for example, the elections to the European Parliament didn’t play a big role—the population was passive. But President Macron, alarmed by the growth of the extreme right, called early elections for the national parliament, stimulating a public discussion that politicised society.
We’ll see what new opportunities open up before us in the coming period. I’m sure that great events, involving massive numbers of people, lie ahead.