Leninism versus Stalinism: The debate in the Communist Party of the Philippines

[Editor’s note: This article was originally published under the headline “Leninism versus Stalinism: Current debate in the Communist Party of the Philippines” in Issue 1 of LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, April-June 1994 (pp. 29-56). It is only now appearing for the first time online. LINKS is uploading this article. with the help of a reader, as it provides some important history and background to the Philippine left. Filipino socialist activist Merck Maguddayao, from the Partido Lakas ng Masa, will be speaking at Ecosocialism 2025, September 5-7, Naarm/Melbourne, Australia. For more information on the conference visit ecosocialism.org.au.]

Several units of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) declared independence from its national leadership over the last half of 1993. The Manila-Rizal Regional Committee (MRRC) declared autonomy from the CPP centre on July 10, 1993. A number of regional units and national bureaus of the CPP, including its provincial commission in the Visayas; the regional committees in Negros, Panay, Central Visayas, Central Mindanao, and Western Mindanao; the national peasant secretariat; and the national united front commission followed suit between September and December last year.

These opposition units have collectively denounced the CPP centre headed by Armando Liwanag, alleged pseudonym of Jose Maria Sison, as both “illegal” and “absolutist”. Previous to this, they rejected the Liwanag/Sison document Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the Errors.

Reaffirm claimed that the erroneous line of quick military victory and insurrectionism was the main cause of the party’s decline over the last decade. It called for a “rectification movement” to reaffirm so-called basic principles of the party which included: the class analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the theory of people’s war, the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, the repudiation of modern revisionism, among others.

Those opposing the Reaffirm document came to be called the “Rejectionists” and those who conform to the Liwanag prognosis of the party’s errors and shortcomings, the “Reaffirmists”.

This political disagreement within the party could have been settled through an ideological debate focusing on the merits and demerits of the Liwanag document. Instead, the national leadership pushed through with a punitive rectification movement that led to the expulsion of some opposition leaders and the dissolution of various opposition units within the CPP.

In order to maintain their ranks, the opposition units — from here on referred to collectively as the Opposition — tenaciously fought back by declaring independence from the CPP centre. They called for the convening of a unity congress (which would be the second ever held in 25 years of CPP existence) in order to prevent a total split and to resolve the party disputes within democratic processes. The leadership replied that they were not going “to deliver the congress to the dogs” and would only convene a congress after the rectification process has been concluded.

Central to the Opposition’s call for a unity congress is the need to elect a new CPP leadership. The Opposition have pointed to the illegal nature of the party leadership since 1973, that is, after the lapse of the five-year term of the elected leadership at the CPP’s founding congress in 1968. Since the party’s foundation, all changes in the leadership have been through cooption, that is, in total violation of the electoral mandate stipulated in the CPP constitution. The present leadership itself, headed by Liwanag/Sison, has just been reconstituted by a so-called 10th Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) held early last year. The Opposition calls this a “bogus” plenum since only eight regular members of the 30-odd CC members of the previous plenum participated in the assembly. This bogus plenum also adopted the Reaffirm document.

The Opposition describes the illegal and authoritarian character of the CPP leadership as “Stalinist”.1 The MRRC has referred to it as the “absolutist” and “ultra-centralist” system of leadership that has transformed the CPP into a monolithic party engaged in a fanatical defence of bankrupt views and strategy, and the cultism of a few leaders who dictate the party’s ideological and political line. The MRRC’s indictment of the central leadership’s “Stalinism” encompasses not just the authoritarian system of rule practiced by the CPP leadership but also its methodological distortion of the Marxist-Leninist character and spirit of the party. This article expresses some of the arguments of the Opposition, especially the MRRC, although the overall argument expresses the author’s personal point of view. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate in the Philippines. It seeks to open up areas of further study and debate on the question of organisational principles. In a future article, the author intends to take up the programmatic and strategic debates in the CPP.

A Leninist or a Stalinist party?

The debate on the CPP’s organisational principles has been described by the MRRC as a fundamental struggle between the Leninist concept of the party and the Stalinist distortions of it, as propagated and practiced by its national leadership. This explains why in its declaration paper, the MRRC calls itself the “Leninist Opposition” to the “Stalinist Centre” of the CPP.

The debate revolves around the theory and practice of democratic centralism. Officially, the CPP, through its constitution and by-laws, upholds the organisational principle of democratic centralism, which is defined as a “centralism based on democracy and democracy under centralised leadership”.

The CPP constitution states that the basic conditions for the functioning of democratic centralism within the organisation consist of the following:

• election of all leading organs at all levels;

• paying attention to the reports of the lower organs;

• regular and special reporting by the lower organs;

• principle of collective leadership at all levels; and

• after “free and thorough discussion”, implementation of party decisions shall be done through the following mode of subordination: the individual is subordinated to the organisation, the minority to the majority, the lower to the higher, and the entire membership to the Central Committee.

It has to be stated at once that these basic conditions do not represent the entirety of the Leninist conception of democratic centralism. The CPP constitution is a copy of the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution which is in turn a copy of the rules of the Stalinised Soviet Communist Party. The basic conditions omit the question of the rights of minorities within the party and do not provide for any mechanism that would allow an individual to present contrary views or to put up alternative proposals for the party’s deliberation. This has been replaced by a “collective rule” where the individual is restricted even more, operating within a highly compartmentalised organisation of the party.

All the stated basic conditions, except the one which provides for the election of the leading bodies of the party, refer more to the “centralist” aspect of the party rather than its democratic aspect. But even that democratic condition has been repeatedly violated all through the years of the party’s existence. There has never been an election within the CPP hierarchy since its founding congress in 1968. Hence, it is the height of hypocrisy for the Liwanag/Sison leadership to claim that it represents the party’s “collective wisdom” when it does not even enjoy the collective consent and confidence of the membership as shown through elections.

In reality, it is only the centralist aspect of democratic centralism that has been practiced by the CPP leadership. It mainly revolves around the absolute authority of the centre, which is in turn imposed through the rules of subordination of the individual, the minority, the lower organ, and the entire membership to the CPP leadership. These four rules of subordination have become matters of principles rather than guides to effective implementation of a decision which has gone through “free and thorough discussion” within the party.

This has been the case in the past, including the political debacle in 1986 when the executive committee decided against participating in the snap presidential election, thereby isolating the CPP and its mass organisations in the February uprising against the Marcos dictatorship. This has also been the case recently, when the Reaffirm document and the rectification movement were foisted on the party through a bogus plenum without the benefit of free and thorough-going discussion.

Passing off democratic centralism as mere adherence to the four rules of subordination is itself traceable to Stalin’s distorted definition of Leninism on the organisational question. In Foundations of Leninism, a catechism which has transformed Leninism into a set of absolute dogmas, Stalin reduced the Leninist principle of democratic centralism into an “unswerving application” of “the principle of the minority submitting to the majority” and “the principle of directing work from the centre”.

Stalin himself elevated the famous “four rules of subordination” as the organisational principle of a Leninist party. These rules actually refer to the norms of hierarchy that the party follows in order to ensure discipline, unity, solidity and security of the organisation in waging revolutionary struggle. But in elevating these rules to the level of principles, party discipline which should be a conscious one becomes blind obedience, and party unity which should be forged at a higher level of understanding becomes superficial.

The Liwanag/Sison faction within the CPP propagates and implements the same reductionist line. In his latest pronouncement about the debate in the CPP, Critical and Creative Tasks of the Rectification Movement, Sison explains the meaning of democratic centralism in the way the CPP “rectification documents have been arrived at, how they are being implemented and how they are being further enriched”.

Sison surely knows that the appearance, implementation, and enrichment of the rectification documents, which contain the most draconian measures against those allegedly opposing the “basic principles” of the party, point to the handiwork of a centre which did not bother to conduct deliberations and consultation with the party membership. They are clearly impositions coming from above!

In the same speech, Sison had the gall to twist facts in his favor. He railed against those opposing the rectification documents for trying to replace democratic centralism with “democratic pluralism”. He charged that all those criticising the authoritarian rule of the CPP centre are operating “beyond the ambit of party discipline”, which for him simply means the obligation to blindly obey what the party centre decrees.

In the same vein, Sison boasted that “all lower party organs and organisations are encouraged to make further summings-up and criticism and self-criticism”, and that all cadres and members are “encouraged to participate in decision-making and to engage in criticism and self-criticism”. He hides the fact that according to the rectification documents, this can be possible only if the party member accepts hook, line and sinker the basic principles laid down in Reaffirm, that is, all that is allowed is summing-up within the framework of kowtowing to all these principles, and a criticism and self-criticism for sins of omissions and deviations to the basic line of Reaffirm.

The CPP leadership, under Sison, has been misrepresenting democratic centralism as a bureaucratic and ultra-centralist system of rule. The chief architect of democratic centralism himself — Lenin — had always stressed that democratic centralism runs counter to bureaucratic centralism, which is a centralism maintained not through the democratic process but through the absolute authority of a party centre, or the bureaucratic authority in general.

Fundamentals of Leninist democratic centralism

Democratic centralism evolved through the practice of the Bolshevik Party during the time of Lenin. From the Third Congress in 1905 to the Unity Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) in 1906, Lenin had written extensively about the major organisational principles that should guide a revolutionary working-class party. This came to represent “democratic centralism,” which was adopted and put into practice by his party.

During the Third Congress of the Comintern in 1921, Lenin called for the adoption of democratic centralism in the organisational principle of Communist parties around the world. The Comintern Theses stated that this should be a “real synthesis” or “fusion” of “centralism and proletarian democracy”. By this, it meant that the party’s centralisation “does not mean formal, mechanical centralisation, but the centralisation of Communist activity, that is, the creation of a leadership that is strong and effective and at the same time flexible.”

Hence, the fusion of centralism and proletarian democracy entails that the party “must develop and maintain an effective network of contacts and links both, on the one hand, within the party itself between the leading bodies and the rank and file of the membership and, on the other hand, between the party and the proletarian masses outside the part.”

This is why democratic centralism should be seen as the organisational principle serving the functioning of a proletarian revolutionary party. The fundamental aspect of this principle revolves around the need for concrete unity of action that positively strengthens the party’s work and its capacity to fight. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the party’s unity in words should always be transformed into unity in action.

The centralist spirit of this principle evolved in opposition to the “autonomism, nihilism and localism” of party organisations which existed during the initial formation of the RSDLP. This was also opposed to “ultrademocracy,” “circle spirit,” and “anarchism” in the organisation, which were prevalent at that time. Lenin’s centralism proceeds from the interests of party unity and, in that sense, upholds the principle of hierarchy in the organisation.

At the same time, Lenin stressed that the party’s centralism, which requires utmost discipline and a higher level of unity of action, should be one that is democratic: a centralism that is based on and affirmed through the dynamic processes of democracy within the organisation. As to what this democratic centralism entails, Lenin said during the Unity Congress of the RSDLP in 1906:

We were all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on guarantee for the rights of all minorities and for all loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every party organisation, on recognising that all party functionaries must be elected, accountable to the party and subject to recall. (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 314.)

Lenin sees the observance in practice of these principles of organisation “as a guarantee against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the party can and must prove fully consistent with strict organisational unity, with the submission of all to the decisions of the Unity Congress.”

These organisational principles comprising democratic centralism were concretised in the RSDLP rules, which enabled the party to function “centrally” and yet “democratically”. Lenin’s writings all throughout this period provide us with the following major organisational principles that came to comprise the fundamentals of Leninist democratic centralism. It is elaborated at length here to contrast with Liwanag/ Sison’s distortion of democratic centralism.

1. Principle of election, accountability and recall of the elected leadership of the party

Lenin stressed the democratic functioning of the party where “all party members take part in the election of officials ... discuss and decide questions concerning the political campaigns of the proletariat, and ... determine the line of tactics of the party organisations”. He advocated not only the principle of election but the principle of accountability and recall of the leadership where “all officials, all leading bodies, and all institutions of the party are subject to election, are responsible to their constituents, and are subject to recall”.

Even in the condition of autocracy during his time, Lenin consistently battled for congress election:

Although the full assertion of the elective principle ... is unfeasible under the autocracy, nevertheless, even under the autocracy, this principle could be applied to a much larger extent than it is today. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 8, p. 409.)

Contrast this now with the CPP’s repeated violation of the electoral principle and the electoral mandate as stipulated in its very own rules. The leadership justifies this by harping on the “emergency situation” (for 20 years!) and the lack of summing-up reports (now the problem is passed on to the lower units!). These excuses fly in the face of a recent pronouncement by the CPP centre that it intends to call a congress only after the conclusion of the “rectification movement”. Meaning that they can call a congress anytime, except that they want not a genuine congress but a rubber-stamp one!

2. Right to exist and freedom of expression of party minorities

Contrary to Sison’s tirade against factions, caucuses and platforms within the party, Leninist democratic centralism upholds the right of minorities to exist and to express themselves within the party. This includes the right to present minority views to the entire membership of the party, and the right to defend and maintain these views as long as these “do not lead to disorganisation... split our forces, or hinder the concerted struggle against the autocracy and the capitalists.”

Reflecting on the imminent split within the RSDLP (after its Second Congress in 1903) due to the maneuverings of the Menshevik “centre”, Lenin said:

... the entire experience of the post-Congress struggle compels us to give thought to the juridical position of the minority (any minority) in our party. That experience shows ... that it is necessary to include in the party rules guarantees of minority rights, so that the dissatisfactions, irritations and conflicts that will constantly and unavoidably arise may be diverted from the accustomed philistine channels of rows and squabbling into the still unaccustomed channels of a constitutional and dignified struggle for one’s convictions ... (Lenin, CW, Vol. 7, p. 452.)

Contrast this now to the CPP leadership’s punitive measures against the “factionalist” Opposition which, at this stage, has led to the expulsion from the CPP of some of its cadres, the dissolution of entire opposition organs, and the trial under a so-called people’s court of five opposition leaders.

Recently, the CPP centre has been misrepresenting the Opposition’s demand for the convening of a unity congress by playing a non-existent demand for “federalism” or the principle of “equal status for all trends” within the party. It has cited the RSDLP’s total split between a Bolshevik Party and a Menshevik one in 1912 where Lenin ruled out “federalism” within the organisation. The CPP centre could have argued too that Lenin had banned factions in a resolution adopted by the 10th Congress of Communist Party of Russia in 1921.

In the first instance (the 1912 split), Lenin said that although “the principle of federation” shall be rejected, and that the only principle to be recognised shall be the submission of the minority to the majority, he clarified that the right of the minority shall remain, although it shall be subject to certain restriction. “Certain restriction” here means that the opposition can only publish their views in a discussion journal intended for this purpose, and not in any “rival newspaper.” Nowhere did Lenin advocate the complete rejection of opposite trends within the party (for him, the point was to wage a “constitutional and dignified” struggle around these trends).

In the second instance, the 1921 ban on factions was a result of a congress decision deliberated by several trends and factions themselves. It was also an “emergency and temporary measure” designed to secure the solidity of the party in the face of an on-going civil war in Russia. In fact, when one delegate proposed that the resolution be turned into a permanent ban on factions, Lenin criticised it as both “excessive” and “impracticable”. He argued that if there were “fundamental disagreements” during the next congress, “the elections may have to be based [too] on platforms”.

The entire dynamics of the Bolshevik Party, its never-ending polemics and ideological struggles between different trends and platforms that are continually being formed within the party — even after the 10th RCP Congress — belie the allegation that Lenin wanted a total ban on factions. It was Stalin who stamped out the dynamism of the party, and outlawed factions as an unchallengeable rule of “Leninist” party organisation, in order to build a thoroughly bureaucratic apparat that several Communist parties now blindly copy.

The existence of factions has clearly become a dirty word in Stalinist parties, but the Leninist conception of it is an extension of, or even synonymous with, the right of the minority. The right of the minority to exist and defend its own ideas allows the formation of factions, though they are also subject to certain restrictions. Factions here are not permanent groupings with their own organisational discipline competing against a duly constituted party centre (the meaning of “factionalism”). They are temporary minority groupings, sometimes in the form of caucuses and platforms drawn together by shared convictions. In Lenin’s time, these groupings held open meetings, published their ideas, and put them to a vote in party congresses and meetings.

3. Principle of broad autonomy for organisations that comprise the party, including local (and regional) party committees

Autonomy of party units is affirmed under the spirit of democratic centralism. The RSDLP rules stated that “all party organisations are autonomous with respect to their internal activities”. The basic assumption is that the whole organisation is built “from below upwards” on an elective basis. Hence, Lenin clarified this to mean that:

... The party rules declare that the local organisations are independent (autonomous) in their local activities. According to the rules, the Central Committee coordinates and directs all the work of the party. Hence it is clear that it has no right to interfere in determining the composition of local organisations. Since the organisation is built from below upwards, interference in its composition from above would be a flagrant breach of democracy and of the party rules. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 11, p. 441–442.)

Autonomy here exists in two spheres: in the local activity and in the composition of the local organisation. The CC could not intervene in local activities that are consistent with the basic decisions of the party congress. In the second sphere, the autonomy of local organisations takes the form of party conferences which elect their own local committees. As in the party congress, the party conferences group together elected delegates of the entire local organisation. Through local party elections, each member is assured the right to send their chosen delegate to the congress or conference.

In the system adopted by the RSDLP, local conferences were convened twice a month, with the election of their local committees every six months. The central organ did not have the right to meddle in the composition of the local organisation (by appointing the members of the committee for example), nor the authority to unilaterally dissolve an elected body.

Contrast this now to the CPP Executive Committee’s dissolution of entire regional organs without even the benefit of prior consultation with them! The CPP centre may argue that these organs were never elected by a conference in the first place. But this is blaming the car for a crash, instead of the driver. The entire party central leadership was never elected and therefore has no mandate to rule the organisation. The whole thing actually boils down to the absence of any democratic system of election within the organisation.

4. Universal and full freedom to criticise and debate

This has been one of the hallmarks of a Leninist party. For Lenin, the principle of democratic centralism implies “universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action”. He said that it is the duty of every party member “to ensure that the ideological struggle within the party on questions of theory and tactics is conducted as openly, widely and freely as possible”, although on no account must it “disturb or hamper the unity of revolutionary action of the Social-Democratic proletariat.”

For Lenin, the freedom to criticise decisions of a party congress could be done not just at party meetings but at public meetings as well, and this freedom even includes agitation in public meetings:

Criticism within the limits of the principles of the party Program must be quite free ... not only at party meetings, but also at public meetings. Such criticism, or such “agitation” (for criticism is inseparable from agitation) cannot be prohibited. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 442-443.)

He added:

If we have really and seriously decided to introduce democratic centralism in our party, and if we have resolved to draw the masses of the workers into intelligent discussion of party questions, we must have these questions discussed in the press, at meetings, in circles and at group meetings. (Lenin, CW, Vol. 10, p. 380.)

In 1921, however, Lenin reconsidered the criticism of party decisions “in public”. The theses adopted by the Comintern’s Third Congress cautioned that when appearing in public, all party members should act at all times “as disciplined members of a militant organisation”:

If there are disagreements on the correct method of action on this or that question, these should, as far as possible, be settled in the party organisation before any public activity is embarked upon and the members should then act in accordance with the decision made. (Comintern Theses, p.257.)

While Lenin’s writings in 1906 may have stretched too far the freedom of criticising party decisions by allowing public debates, these should be put in the context of the Menshevik centre’s continued refusal around that time to undertake an ideological struggle over party disputes within the organisation. Lenin’s “reconsideration” in 1921 does not at all restrict the freedom to criticise and debate within the party organisation. The Comintern Theses even argued that “in order that every party decision is carried out fully by all party organisations and party members, the largest possible number of party members should be involved in discussing and deciding every issue”. Criticising party decisions in public may well have been the “last resort” to a failed functioning of democratic centralism in the party.

This leads us now to Sison’s denunciation of the Opposition’s demand for criticism and debate as “ultrademocratic” or “the freedom to do whatever they please without going through the proper channels.” “Proper channel” here means “one’s own collective” and not the rudiments of a constitutional and dignified process that resolves party disputes through the mandate of the entire membership in a congress. By rejecting a congress, the Sison/Liwanag leadership has actually lorded it over the party and has practically compartmentalised freedom of criticism and debate within the bounds of “coopted” collectives. The entire process becomes an exercise of bureaucratism, with the criticism bound to get lost in the maze of the CPP’s compartmentalised system.

5. Principle of unity of action

What could then be the limit to the widest and freest exercise of criticism and debate within the party? Lenin answered categorically that only those which hamper the party’s unity towards concrete political action constitute the limits to it. He said, “The party’s political action must be united. No ‘calls’ that violate the unity of definite actions can be tolerated either at public meetings, or at party meetings, or in the party press.”

Lenin gave two examples of definite actions which may not be violated by calls for contrary action. One was the call for participation sounded out by the RSDLP in the Duma election in 1906. Lenin said that every member is free to criticise the call “even in public” before the period of the election campaign. But during the period of the campaign, when everything has been deliberated on, criticism or call of another nature shall not be allowed as it will run counter to the agreed-upon action.

Another example is the call for an uprising or an insurrection. Lenin said: “Here unity of action in the midst of the struggle is absolutely essential. In the heat of battle, when the proletarian army is straining every nerve, no criticism whatsoever can be permitted in its ranks. But before the call for action is issued, there should be the broadest and freest discussion and appraisal of the resolution, of its arguments and its various propositions.”

Sison and the CPP leadership misrepresent this to mean that the party centre wields absolute power at all times. They harp on the so-called life-and-death situation of the party (if not on its perpetual state of war) to justify the absence of criticism and debate within the organisation. They spread the malicious lie that the Opposition wants to turn the party into a “debating type of organisation” or a “marketplace of ideas” that completely paralyse unity of action. They confuse ideological struggle, and decisiveness and firmness to the proletarian line, with authoritarian rule that brooks no opposition.

But unity of action does not run counter to the need for criticism and debate within the organisation. On the contrary, Lenin always argued that the widest and freest climate for criticism and debate even on questions of theory and tactics of the party are essential to attain the clearest unity of action. While no attempt to paralyse the political unity and action of the party is admissible at all times, the broadest and freest discussion within the organisation should be upheld at all cost.

Finally, it should be pointed out that it is precisely the bureaucratic functioning of the CPP — with its illegal centre and ultra-centralist rule — that gets in the way of the party’s united action. It is the irony of bureaucratic organisations that much as it aims for centralism, discipline and united action, it breeds discontent, hypocrisy, and unprincipled unity within the organisation.

Discontent has manifested itself in the CPP in a number of “samizdat” writings deluging the party since the last half of the 1980s when the members started to question the “wisdom” of the centre given the political blunders of the organisation. Due to the absence of a democratically centralised structure, criticism of party policies could only be outside “official channels”; hence, the perceived situation likened to a “marketplace of ideas” within the party.

Hypocrisy manifests itself in the CPP’s denunciation only today of the Kampanyang Ahos, where as many as a hundred party members were ordered killed in the party’s campaign to flush out deep penetration agents, when any penetration could have been exposed a long time ago had the CPP leadership been open enough to discuss it with the membership. It also manifests itself in a number of regional units of the CPP having not discussed the Reaffirm documents nor carried out its major decisions, like the dismantling of NPA’s [New People’s Army] company units into squads and platoons.

Unprincipled unity manifests itself in the argument of some party cadres and units that although they have criticisms too against the Reaffirm document and they believe that the CPP centre has been violating the organisational principles of the party, they must uphold the “unity” of the party at all costs.

The question posed is not whether the party needs more democracy than centralism. The question is whether it needs a bureaucratically centralist organisation or a democratically centralist one. This is the gist of the CPP’s debate between a Stalinist party and a Leninist one.

Sonny Melencio was the vice-president of Makabayan, a mass socialist organisation in the Philippines, when this article was first published. Today he is chairperson of the Partido Lakas ng Masa (Party of the Labouring Masses, PLM).

References

Lenin Collected Works (1972 edition), Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (1983), Pluto Press, London, second edition.

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  The Liwanag/Sison leadership of the CPP expressly supports Joseph Stalin. Stalin, says Liwanag/Sison, had a historical record of 70 per cent “greatness” and 30 per cent “excesses” and the collapse of the Soviet Union was the result of “revisionism” introduced after Stalin’s death.