The meaning of the Mecca Pact

By Michael Pröbsting
Published
Mecca Pact signing

Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, also called the Mecca Pact, on August 7. It is a political-military agreement between the three regional powers. While the full agreement has not yet been published, it specifies, among other things, that “any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.”

At first glance, the Mecca Pact looks impressive, involving three regional powers with different strengths. Türkiye, with a population 86 million people, has a strong army (the second-largest in NATO behind the United States) and a relatively developed arms industry (including powerful armed drones, such as the TB-2 Bayraktar, and the fifth-generation stealth warplane TAI TF Kaan). Pakistan has a population of 242 million people and is the only Muslim country that possesses nuclear arms (about 170 warheads). Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab Gulf state with 33 million people, is one of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters —an “energy superpower” — and has huge financial resources.

To understand the Mecca Pact’s relevance, we need to look at the background to its formation.

Background

The process behind the Mecca Pact is characterised by three developments: a) the US’ decline as the hegemonic power; b) the Zionist state’s unrestrained expansionism, particularly after October 7; and c) the consequences of the Iran War. The three factors are interrelated.

The most important factor is US imperialism’s decline as the global hegemonic power. The US’ decline — which went hand in hand with China’s rise as a new imperialist power — resulted in its increasing inability to resist the emergence of rivals and dominate allies. The Trump administration’s new foreign policy doctrine — outlined in its National Security Strategy document — recognises this decline and concludes that Washington should no longer attempt to be the global hegemon, but rather focus on fully dominating the Western hemisphere.1

A consequence of this new foreign policy doctrine has been deprioritising the Middle East. Despite being where US imperialism fought most of its wars since 1991, the Trump administration has always emphasised its desire to reduce its military presence in this key region. This reorientation has been challenged from within the ruling class, with significant sectors (particularly those closely connected to Israel) opposing it.

The US and Israel losing their war against Iran was not so much the result of the White House’s strategic plan but rather conjunctural factors — most importantly, Trump’s desperate desire to have a “small, victorious war” given his huge unpopularity and manipulations by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Zionist lobby.2

Israel’s unrestrained expansionism is related to the US’ decline. The Zionists want to exploit the sympathy they enjoyed in the US establishment after October 7 to advance their position in the Middle East. They also want to stop Washington’s retreat from the Middle East by involving it in their local wars of aggression.

However, the failure to defeat Iran — in fact, Tehran, which now controls the Strait of Hormuz, emerged strengthened from this war — has shattered Washington’s prestige globally, and particularly in the Middle East. US troop withdrawals from Syria and Iraq (by September 2026), and the likely reduction of US military bases in Gulf states (which were hit hard by Iranian missiles and drones), will damage the US’ standing in the region even more.3

The Iran War was a sobering experience for US-allied Arab states. Despite its local military bases, impressive navy and air force, and superior military technology, the US has been incapable of defeating Iran and even defending its allies’ territories. These developments have pushed several Arab allies to look for additional security guarantees and a compromise with Iran.4

Likewise, pro-US Arab regimes are increasingly worried about Israel’s forever wars, which are destabilising the region. Israel’s incessant attacks against Palestinians, Lebanon, Iran and Syria, its (failed) attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar, and its projects to expand its military presence (for example in Somaliland), all ensure that the region is a constant trouble spot.

While these corrupt dictators do not care much about the Palestinian people or other victims of Zionist aggression, their populations do. They despise coward Arab rulers who do not dare to lift a finger to support those resisting the US-Zionist monster. An open letter by hundreds of Jordanian high-profile figures calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Jordan, despite the regime’s harsh repression, is just the latest example of the Arab masses’s sentiment.5

The Arab rulers are also worried about Iran’s rise as a regional power. Tehran has demonstrated its military power and gained huge political prestige among the masses as a state that withstood US-Zionist aggression.

For these reasons, the Arab regimes understand things cannot go on as they were. The US is obviously no longer in a position to guarantee their territorial safety (even less so under Trump, who lacks any ability for strategic planning), restrain Israel or defeat Iran. Hence, they want to increase their political weight and create additional security guarantees, such as the Mecca Pact.

The three signatories want other countries to join. Türkiye hopes that Egypt — the most populous Arab country — will sign up. However, Saudi Arabia has opposed this for now, because it considers Cairo as too close to the United Arab Emirates, which Riyadh sees as allied with Israel and with whom it has had rising tensions since last year (over their sphere of influence in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, etc).

Specific motives and problems

What are the specific motives and driving factors for the Mecca Pact? Saudi Arabia certainly played a crucial role in this process, for the reasons mentioned above. It desperately wants additional security guarantees, as it has directly suffered the consequences of the Iran War with Tehran hugely impacting Saudi Arabia’s oil exports through its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on infrastructure. The country’s real gross domestic product fell 4.8% in the second quarter compared to the same period last year. While Riyadh seems to have found a modus vivendi with Iran for now, it has reopened the conflict with the Houthis (officially Ansar Allah) in Yemen.6

The Trump administration recently tried to reconcile Saudi Arabia by offering a deal for the civilian use of nuclear power. However, it combined this offer with the condition that Riyadh sign the Abraham Accords — that is, establish official diplomatic relations with Israel. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is fully aware that such a move would be extremely unpopular among his people and could endanger his dictatorship. Hence, he rejected Washington’s demand and the deal has collapsed (at least for now).

Bin Salman hopes the Mecca Pact will have a deterring effect against future Israeli or Iranian attacks. He also expects support from its allies in its conflict with the Houthis.

Türkiye has been less affected by the Iran War and played a pro-active role in limiting US-Zionist aggression. The US president publicly claimed in late June that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had considered entering the conflict on Iran's side but ultimately refrained after Trump urged him to stay out:

You know, he was a leading candidate to go into the war with Iran, maybe even on Iran's side, because he is not a big fan of Israel, as you know. I asked him to stay out of it, and he stayed out of it.

The reason was that Israel had pushed for the military participation of Kurdish militias in the US-Zionist war against Iran. If such an attack against Iran had been successful, it would have likely resulted in Iran’s fragmentation and the creation of a (semi-)independent Kurdish entity under US and Israeli protection. This, in turn, could have had huge consequences for Kurdish forces in Syria and Türkiye. According to Israeli public broadcaster Kan, Turkey threatened to provide Iran with air support if Kurdish forces invaded the country as part of Mossad's ground operations.7

Türkiye feels increasingly threatened by Netanyahu’s expansionist Greater Israel policy. An increasing number of Israeli officials and public figures call Türkiye “the new Iran” and a major threat to Israel’s security. This is hardly surprising as Türkiye is a “natural” enemy of Israel, given it is a strong Muslim state and, as such, inevitably comes into the Zionist monster’s crosshair. This is even more the case as: a) Erdoğan has publicly expressed solidarity with Hamas and denounced Israel’s wars of aggression (albeit he was slower and inconsistent in joining the economic boycott of the Zionist state); and b) Ankara is closely aligned with the Al-Sharaa government in Syria, where the Zionists occupy territory in the south.

Türkiye is interested in the Mecca Pact because it would help expand its political influence in the Middle East. Ankara expects the new alliance will also provide its arms industry with an expanded market. All in all, one could say Türkiye is the strongest part of the new alliance.

In contrast, Pakistan is probably the weakest part, despite the fact it is the largest of the three in terms of population and the only nuclear power. At the same time, it is also the most “desperate” state in the alliance. Pakistan is the poorest of the three countries, with many of its citizens working as migrant labour in Gulf states. The country is wracked by huge social, political and ethnic divisions, including civil wars in two provinces (Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

In itself, Pakistan has no interest in intervening in Middle East politics. It wants its migrants to continue working in the region so they can send remittances home. Pakistan also desires stable relations on its western border with Iran. This is why it wants the Iran War to stop as soon as possible. Its main motivations for joining the pact are: a) the need for new loans (from Saudi Arabia), and b) the hope it may receive support from these new partners in terms of its own conflicts with India,8 Afghanistan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).9

The Mecca Pact’s impact

In the short-term, the Mecca Pact will probably not have much military impact. It is no accident the text says any armed attack “shall” be regarded as an attack on all three countries, rather than must. This means signatory states are not obligated to intervene in a conflict if an ally is involved.

It is difficult to imagine — at least in the foreseeable future — that Türkiye, which enjoys stable relations with neighbouring Iran, would join a war between Tehran and Riyadh. The same is most likely true for Pakistan, which would not want to risk relations with Iran. Likewise, it is nearly impossible that Saudi Arabia and Türkiye would join a war on Pakistan’s side against India (which has nuclear weapons).

It is more likely, however, that signatories might join a conflict against a smaller, weaker adversary — for example, by supporting Pakistan against Afghanistan or TTP, or supporting Saudi Arabia against the Houthis. However, even this seems unrealistic, at least for now. It is telling that when the Houthis bombed Saudi infrastructure just a day after the Mecca Pact’s announcement, both Pakistan and Türkiye remained silent and have expressed no interest in actively joining the conflict.

The Mecca Pact, at least for now, seems primarily a political alliance of three major Sunni Muslim powers. It is not an anti-US alliance, as the countries remain Washington’s allies. However, neither is it part of the Trump administration’s plan, despite his favourable statement on Social Truth welcoming the “big, bold” defence pact.10 One should not pay too much attention to such messages, which appear between statements about making the Strait of Hormuz “American territory” and his close relations with North Korea’s dictator Kim Jong Un. Irrespective of Trump’s social media posts, it is clear that for Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the relevance of their alliance with the US is decreasing.

Furthermore, this alliance is a severe political blow for Israel. Trump’s plan, after the US’ semi-retreat from the region, is to build a regional order based on expanding the Abraham Accords — essentially a pro-US order under Zionist leadership. Instead of orienting to Israel, Arab states are looking to build alliances among themselves and, perhaps in the future, with China and Russia.

While the alliance may not have much military relevance today, this could change in the future. If the US closes, or hugely reduces, its military bases in the Gulf states; if it focuses more on conflicts in other regions; if Israel continues waging one war after the other and occupying neighbour states; if Iran continues rising as a regional power; if current conflicts in Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, etc, explode into a full-fledged regional war — all such developments could result in the Mecca Pact expanding and deepening into a more effective military alliance.

In sum, the Mecca Pact’s real meaning lies not in what it is today, but in what it reflects and could become in the future.

Michael Pröbsting is a socialist activist and writer. He is the editor of the website thecommunists.net, where a version of this article first appeared.

Middle East Pakistan Saudi Arabia Turkey Palestine Israel United States US imperialism

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