Following a crushing defeat, is the ANC-DA coalition a stabilising or aggravating factor in South Africa’s social and political crisis?

First published at Amandla!.

The African National Congress’s (ANC) precipitous electoral decline by a whopping 17 percentage points, from 57% to 40% in the general elections, has sent shockwaves throughout the political system in South Africa. It has reduced the ANC's seats in the National Assembly from 230 to 159 and ended its 30 year domination of electoral politics. This crushing defeat has shocked ANC comrades to the core. It caught them off guard; their dreams had convinced them of ANC’s eternal, dominant might; “the glorious movement” as they are fond of calling it.

The ANC has chosen to go with the Democratic Alliance (DA) as their main coalition partner, in their multi-party coalition they mischaracterise as the Government of National Unity (GNU). This is not a GNU, but a neoliberal pact trying to stabilise a political and social system in deep crisis. We elaborated this thesis in our previous article published by Elitsha and Amandla. In this article we look at the implications of the ANC/DA-led coalition government for the African National Congress-South African Communist Party-Confederation of South African Trade Union (ANC-SACP-Cosatu Alliance), and for the broader polity.

But to get there, let us first develop an understanding of why the DA in particular emerged as the most advantaged beneficiary in this election.

DA’s 30 years of unbroken fight back

The DA is the only parliamentary party that has consistently waged a political fight against the ANC for 30 years, uninterrupted since 1994. And during the process they have grown significantly. Challenges from the National Party (NP), United Democratic Movement (UDM), and Cope amounted to short-term waves that died down over time. Although the Economic Freedom Fighters’ (EFF) wave has not died down yet, it is stagnating around 10% of the vote.

The DA’s predecessor, the Democratic Party, led by the veteran liberal Zach de Beer, got 1.73% of the vote in 1994, and had only 7 seats. But they were the most vocal opposition party, representing the interests of the white community. The National Party had joined the transitional Mandela-led Government of National Unity, because they had 20.3 % of the vote and a guaranteed Deputy President and eight ministerial positions.

The NP pulled out of the GNU in 1996, but by then the DP had firmly entrenched itself as the main opposition party, defending and advancing white interests in post-apartheid South Africa. So the NP and DA made a deal to form a ‘Democratic Alliance’ of white parties. Then, towards the 1999 elections, the deal fell through, and the NP withdrew.

In the 1999 elections, the DP, led by the liberal firebrand Tony Leon, under the slogan, “Fight Back”, clearly promising to fight back against democratic changes on behalf of the white community, won 9.5% of the vote, and moved from 7 to 38 seats. They became the official opposition and retained the DA name, even though they did not use it officially until the 2004 elections. Meanwhile the National Party (despite having undergone a Damascene moment to become the New National Party) declined to 6.8% of the vote, with only 28 seats.

In the next election, in 2004, the DA increased its vote to 12.3%, with 50 seats. Helen Zille took over the leadership in 2007, and promised that she was the last white leader of the DA. At this stage they had come to the realisation that only a multi-racial character would make them gain Black votes in a substantial way to challenge the ANC. So Zille spearheaded the DA’s turn towards Blacks to be substantively included in the leadership, so as to expand its support base.

In the 2009 elections the DA got 16.6 % of the vote nationally and won Western Cape province with 51%. In 2014, the DA won 22% of the vote, with Zille at the helm, surrounded Black leaders. Mmusi Maimane was elected the first (and probably the last) Black leader of the DA in 2015. They received 20.7% in 2019, a slight decline. This made the DA’s white establishment impatient with Maimane and the strategy of attracting Black voters through placement of Black leaders in the upper echelons of the party. So Maimane and other Black leaders, including Herman Mashaba, the DA’s mayor in the Joburg Metro, were pushed out. The DA was frustrated because the ANC had again declined in 2019, from 62% to 57% of the vote, while Vryheidsfront Plus (VF Plus) increased its vote from 0.9% to 2.3%. The DA lost white votes, their main base, to VF Plus, and yet they still did not gain Black votes, even with a Black party leader.

As they approached the 2024 elections, the DA had gone back to being a white party with John Steenhuisen as party leader. Even though they still have some Black leaders in their upper echelons, they now reach out to the Black community from the vantage point of their white base. Zille, now occupying the powerful position of Federal Council Chairperson, recently openly said that she regrets ever championing Black leadership within the DA. Steenhuisen made it very clear after the 2024 elections results that he was elated that they won 21.8% of the vote, having retained their white base and regained Black votes.

In a country where the white community only makes up 7.3% of the population, the DA has sustainably grown over the last 30 years. It has retained its majority as a governing party in the Western Cape since 2009, and its official opposition status nationally, with above 20% of the vote, since 2014. They have done this amidst a sea of Black poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. Meanwhile, whites, their core base, remain the most economically and socially privileged and powerful racial group, 30 years after the official fall of apartheid. And now they occupy six powerful ministries and have six deputy ministers in Ramaphosa’s GNU.

Clearly the DA has, through modern strategies, mastered the art and science of winning the hearts and minds of Black people, in the midst of the neoliberal crisis, in which democracy is not associated with development for the Black majority.

They have also exploited the racial inferiority complex that still prevails among Blacks, as a hangover of colonial and apartheid ideology that was not completely obliterated, since the apartheid social structural legacies remain. This combines with the post-apartheid neoliberal crisis, through the failures of a Black government and Black parties such as EFF and COPE, that remain trapped in exhausted national liberation politics. The DA has now succeeded in achieving their declared goal of breaking the ANC’s majority. Take note, their goal is not to win an election with an outright majority of 50% plus 1, because they know that’s impossible for as long as they remain a white liberal party.

This all demonstrates why, and how, the biggest beneficiary of this ANC loss is not the MK party, but the DA.

The ANC-DA coalition imposed by the ANC leadership, from above

After the elections results were announced, it was pretty much clear that the mass base of the ANC and its Left flank, the SACP and Cosatu, would not support a coalition with the DA. Initially, the SACP said that, if the ANC formed a coalition with the DA, they would convene a special congress to review their membership of the Alliance with the ANC. Cosatu also expressed disapproval of a coalition with the DA. And there was resistance inside the ANC itself.

So the ANC NEC that met in the immediate aftermath of the crushing electoral defeat announced a GNU as a preferred option, instead of a coalition. However, they did not explain how this GNU differs from an ordinary coalition. The composition of the 1994 GNU was clearly defined in the 1993 Interim Constitution: parties with 20 seats in the National Assembly (5% of the vote) would be allocated ministerial positions proportionally, and parties getting 80 seats (20% of the vote) would be eligible to get a Deputy President position. The purpose was also clearly defined: it was to manage the transition from apartheid to democratic rule.

This contrasts sharply with the current, so called GNU. Its Statement of Intent is vague on both the composition and the mandate. And negotiations for the GNU were conducted under a veil of secrecy. Political deals were made to advance narrow party interests, instead of the professed national unity. A good example of this is when Zille announced that they will defend Cyril Ramaphosa if Phala Phala comes back to parliament as a result of the current EFF court action.

Under the guise of a GNU, the ANC leadership succeeded in imposing the DA- /ANC-led multi-party coalition. The reason they went this route is because they are aware that they are discredited as result of their neoliberal policies. These have wrought dire development outcomes (huge unemployment, massive poverty, inequality and underdevelopment) plus widespread corruption within the state. They promote the discourse of a GNU, accompanied by a ‘National Dialogue’ and a ‘Social Compact’, to regain legitimacy and credibility. But to the extent that they are not prepared to genuinely address the development problems of the neoliberal social crisis, their GNU, National Dialogue and Social Compact gimmicks are only going to fall flat.

Better coalition options that exclude the DA were possible

The ANC leadership preferred the DA coalition option because it was highly preferred by the markets and big business. Their neoliberal inclinations, resulting from their neoliberal policy practice over the last 30 years, made it difficult for them to ignore the DA option. But there were better options. They could have gone with EFF and a few small parties. Or just small parties without the DA and EFF. The Gauteng provincial government coalition that has excluded the DA demonstrates that it was also possible to form a coalition government, without the DA, even at a national level.

But the DA was such a highly preferred choice of big business and finance capital; they thought that ignoring it would be suicidal.

The option of working with small parties, without the DA, remained unattractive to them, not because it can’t work. It could work if they changed their economic policy and thinking. But they have no courage or inclination to ditch neoliberalism and move towards a sovereign development project that delinks from neoliberal global capitalism; a project that would advance development and genuinely revive democracy in a manner that includes ordinary citizens and that reshapes global economic architecture.

That’s why the political and social crisis is going to get worse. It is not possible to resolve it within the neoliberal policy framework .

SACP is allowing itself to perish alongside the ANC

Now that the ANC has clearly embraced the DA as their main coalition partner, the South African Communist Party has somersaulted on its initial position, and come out in full defence of the ANC. They explain the ANC’s big electoral decline by blaming the media for highlighting ANC failures and corruption. They say the media acted as an agent of imperialist forces who are hell-bent on toppling the ANC for its BRICS affiliation and its stance on Palestine. The SACP’s propagandist defence of the ANC ignores their own initial criticism of the ANC’s neoliberal policy framework over the past 30 years.

The SACP lacks the courage of a Left force, and its schizophrenic posture is going to lead to it perishing alongside the ANC, if they are not careful. The SACP doesn’t realise that people are fed up with the ANC’s neoliberal project and corruption over the last 30 years, but don’t have alternatives.

They seem not to be recognising the deepening political crisis of the discredited political ruling class that is losing legitimacy. That’s why rogue right wing elements, such as the MK party led by Zuma, won substantial votes. It’s on the back of the decay of the political system. The SACP doesn’t sufficiently recognise the political significance of the deepening social crisis. It’s a crisis that results from the dire development outcomes of neoliberalism. And this GNU, with its neoliberal consensus premised on the NDP, is going to make that social crisis worse.

Even the SACP’s socialist strategy, that puts the National Democratic Revolution at its centre, is not reviewed to assess its impact over the last 30 years. It is simply constantly restated as an ideologically correct strategy. That is problematic. The strategy has not worked over the last 30 years. A discussion on its serious weaknesses would be very useful.

Exit the neoliberal crisis

What is needed to exit the neoliberal social crisis is audacious measures that include:

• state-led, active industrialisation that delinks from neoliberal global capitalism, that will create jobs, and build robust manufacturing industries that produce consumer and capital goods;
• expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that break with neoliberal austerity;
• a decent basic income grant;
• sustainable public sector jobs;
• improved public services (water, sanitation, electricity, education, health, transport, roads, housing, etc.); and
• increasingly ecologically responsive energy, infrastructure and institutions.

All these will not be possible under the minimum programme of the GNU, announced in the Statement of Intent. The minimum programme amounts to business as usual, premised on the neoliberal agenda of the NDP. Without revolutionary measures, the social and political crisis is going to get worse and more ruinous.

Mazibuko Kanyiso Jara and Gunnett Kaaf are Marxists with the Zabalaza Pathways Institute.