Boris Kagarlitsky on the US elections, Trump, peace talks and prospects for world war

First published in Russian at Rabkor. Translation and footnotes by Dmitry Pozhidaev for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Marxist sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky is currently in a Russian prison for speaking out against the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The following interview with Kagarlitsky was conducted by a Rabkor viewer. This is the second part of the interview which deals with questions relating to the US elections, its potential impacts on the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine and prospects for a new world war. It was conducted before the US elections published on November 4. The first part can be read here.

Do you think that US policy towards the Israel-Palestine war could change with a new president?

Until recently, there was a bipartisan consensus in the US regarding support for Israel. However, things have indeed started to change lately — and not only from the Democrats. Remember that Republicans in Congress last winter delayed the vote on a bill to fund Israel. Yes, this was partly because the [Joe] Biden administration bundled aid for Israel with aid for Ukraine and other issues into a single bill, hoping that including Israel in the aid package would guarantee relatively easy approval from Republicans in Congress. Nothing of the sort happened, and the package stalled until spring.

[Donald] Trump is trying to attract US Jewish voters (most of whom still lean Democrat) by pointing to his sympathy for Israel and warning that [Kamala] Harris will stop supporting Israel’s military efforts. Trump and [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, both right-wing populists, are ideologically close. But it is uncertain whether this will work.

Israel’s main problem is not with the leadership of the US Democratic Party but with its own policies, which are causing worldwide outrage, including among Americans. Worse yet, the number of opponents and critics of Israel among US Jews is growing, as it is among Democratic voters in general. Thus, the evolution of party leaders’ positions reflect shifts in public opinion — and this actually strengthens Harris’s position.

Overall, reduced US support for Israel is inevitable, unless there is a change of power in Tel Aviv itself. That said, a complete reversal of US policy is impossible — Israel is still its main strategic partner in the Middle East. Netanyahu believes the West will tolerate his policies, no matter what he does, but he risks crossing a line where serious problems could begin.

Will a new US president influence the conflict between Russia and Ukraine?

Among the Russian elites, there was a long-standing illusion that Trump’s rise to power would solve all its problems. How he would do this was unclear — magical thinking was at play. Somehow, things would just improve. But by early autumn, two realisations set in. First, that Trump was unlikely to return to the White House. Second, that if he did return, things could get even worse. Trump is not interested in Ukraine. And if the Russians want to do something bad there, it is not his problem.

However, giving [Russian President Vladimir] Putin freedom on the Ukrainian question would require one very important condition: that Russia become a key US ally in the fight against China. For Trump, the Chinese threat is an obsession (as is opposition to Mexican migration). For the Russian economy, which has grown increasingly dependent on China, a pivot to the West would be catastrophic, economically and geopolitically. After all, the extensive land border with China lies with us, not the US.

Thus, friendship with Trump’s Republicans is far more dangerous for Moscow than hostility with the Democrats, who can ultimately be appeased with superficial political reforms and concessions in Ukraine. Especially since Ukraine’s “gains” are of no real value to Russia’s economy; this war is not about territory but about preserving the political regime in Moscow. Western elites will not demand deep democratisation; a mere facade of liberal decorum will suffice, as the more pragmatically-minded Kremlin faction understands.

Lastly, we need to understand China’s role in this setup. Not only is Beijing interested in keeping Trump out of the White House, but China’s economic interests also require the restoration of transit routes for goods to Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway through Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, the Chinese need peace between these two countries and no conflict with the West, along with open and transparent borders. It’s just the economy. In the early years of the conflict, the loss of transit was offset by capturing the Russian market, but now that market is taken, and could face issues with European markets. So, not only is peace needed, but it is also becoming urgent.

Thus, a new configuration arises. Harris is backed by Chinese allies and Moscow’s pragmatists, while Trump has the support of a few very influential madmen within the Russian elite.

While Trump was president, he began building the wall between the US and Mexico. This resembles a mega-project to enrich construction businesses, while diverting budget funds from the military-industrial complex to the wall. Moreover, Trump did not start any new wars; he only ended conflicts inherited from previous administrations. Does this indicate that Trump has the support of the more peace-minded segment of US capital, or at least the segment that prefers pouring money into a wall over military production?

Trump indeed lobbies for the construction industry. Incidentally, a substantial portion of orders for construction work related to the wall would have gone to Mexico. And most of the migrants rushing to the US come from even poorer countries south of the Yucatán. So, regardless of Trump’s rhetoric, there will not be a conflict with Mexico.

But calling Trump “peace-loving” is very conditional. Increased defence orders benefit industry, and we must remember that, regardless of who the US president is, there is the state apparatus, Congress and intelligence agencies. They are far from omnipotent, but they will not just readily accept any policy. They benefit from continuity, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. The same problems would face any new president, including Harris if she were elected. But Democrats are better at working with the establishment than Trump’s people (the old Republicans also cooperated well with the bureaucracy, but they have since lost influence).

Lastly, while US capital is divided into competing factions, we should not underestimate their ability to reach compromises. They will seek a compromise under any president, though achieving one is more difficult now than it was a decade ago.

Even if Trump does not become president, his supporters will not disappear from US society. Do you think there could be another storming of the Capitol or a similar attempt by conservatives to seize power by force in the US?

Trump’s defeat, if it happens (which seems likely now), will demoralise his supporters. The storming of the Capitol was an exceptional episode. Trump’s strategy of grassroots mobilisation in 2020 unexpectedly backfired. In mobilising the grassroots, Trump’s supporters resembled the left. We too advocate grassroots mobilisation. The question is whom you are mobilising and by what means.

Trump brought millions of forgotten working-class people into politics, mostly white but not exclusively — people historically betrayed by the Democrats, who abandoned their progressive agenda. Tom Frank’s book What’s the Matter with Kansas? addresses this, showing how these people, mostly uneducated and politically inexperienced, expressed their resentment and frustration, first by voting for Trump and then, feeling betrayed again by the system, storming the Capitol. Ultimately, they got nothing but more humiliation and repression.

But Trump’s team learned lessons from the “Leninists” who relied on mobilisation — most of them were purged (I’m not joking; [former White House Chief Strategist under Trump, Steve] Bannon, for example, directly quoted Lenin). Trump’s team learned lessons from the Leninists who relied on mobilisation from within their ranks. Trump has distanced himself from grassroots activism, seeing it as a chaotic, dangerous, and uncontrollable force. Trumpism has become more bourgeois, even more conservative, despite the populist rhetoric. It has not become more respectable, of course, but it has grown consistently reactionary.

In 2016, both Trump and Brexit supporters in England, and even the National Front in France, mixed reactionary xenophobic or anti-immigration slogans with social demands that should have been voiced by the left. Back then, I wrote that such movements, unfortunately, expressed legitimate social protest. Even Bernie Sanders acknowledged this at the beginning of his campaign. Later, when the Democratic Party apparatus sank his primary campaign by dubious methods (and Bernie gave in), many of his supporters went over to Trump. And in Britain in 2016, both right and left supported Brexit. In France, during the European constitution referendum, there was a similar situation.

Recently, I was told that during a debate between Svetova and Sakhnin on Zhivoy Gvozd,1 a viewer commented that Kagarlitsky would support Trump. In reality, I have never supported Trump, but in 2016 I outlined the ambiguity of the situation whereby some progressive demands were being voiced by right-wing populists. Since then, things have changed (as they have with Donbas, if we compare 2014 and 2022). Trump, French nationalists, and their British counterparts have consistently abandoned any social agenda. Now it is a purely reactionary movement with no progressive elements.

And regarding workers, the right now behaves exactly as the left used to — they believe that workers have nowhere else to go and will keep voting for them. This is their fatal mistake. Theoretically, this creates an opportunity for the left — the true left, grounded in class positions — to win back the support of blue-collar working-class voters. But this will not happen at once and automatically. For now, we are likely to see growing demoralisation among society’s grassroots.

Why is Trump popular among Americans with his ideas?

Trump’s popularity was due to him addressing problems that the liberal establishment (including its left wing in academic institutions) denied.2 Yes, his proposals were wild. For example, let’s build a wall to keep out Mexico (incidentally, here in prison, I heard a similar idea — that Russia should build a concrete wall along its borders and shut itself off from the world, so IK-4 in Torzhok3 has its own Trump supporters).

But the problem of uncontrolled migration really exists! A low-educated worker from the Rust Belt or a farmer from the American South, for whom the outside world is limited to Mexico and Canada, is ready to accept such answers. No alternatives are offered! And however much we mock the ignorance of Trump supporters, there is a certain logic and even a hint of common sense in their behaviour. Sadly, I do not always notice this among intellectuals.

In recent years, conflicts that have been smouldering for years have intensified. Does this resemble the situation before World War I?

I have seen comparisons to World War I, or rather the period before it, in various texts for a long time. And indeed, there are similarities. World War I was preceded by an unprecedented economic globalisation that culminated in the exhaustion of markets. As a result, competition increased, leading to what Marxists of the time called heightened inter-imperialist rivalry. Only libertarians believe that markets function independently. In reality, market competition inevitably fuels political confrontation, often in the harshest forms.

But those are the similarities. There are fundamental differences as well. To begin with, in the early 20th century, more or less stable blocs formed: Germany and its allies against the old empires (Britain, France, and Russia), joined by the United States, whose ruling class chose a non-aggressive strategy at that time. Instead of attempting to push Britain out of its position as the world hegemon, the US began supporting Britain while simultaneously replacing it in this role — at first partially.

What is significant is that the competition centred on the same territories and the same markets. Today, the situation is qualitatively different. Only the Russian elite is still playing by late 20th-century rules, and only a few domestic Marxist dogmatists continue to analyse the situation in those terms.

The fact is, China does not strive for hegemony in the world-system; it is simply forming a China-centric economic space, using the rest of the world as a resource base. Naturally, goods need to be exported — to Europe, the US and Russia. But Chinese capital does not consciously create new markets or attempt to reformat them; it simply exploits them. China’s growth is disruptive to the world-system, precisely because there is no attempt to compete for hegemony.4 After all, hegemony is not just dominance but an ordered organisation and development of the system. There is none of that here.

For the US, war with China holds no prospects, but it does not solve the main issue: as long as the neoliberal regime of global trade exists, China will exploit it. And changing the regime would require radical changes to the entire system. Trump tried to introduce protectionist measures (which hurt Chinese capital), but even he is unwilling to reform the system, let alone revolutionise it. This approach will not work.

The crisis is escalating, and it will be accompanied by local wars and then a series of revolutions. In the end, as the old Soviet joke goes: “There will be no war, but the struggle for peace will be so intense, it will be even harder to bear.”

Do you see any threat of a new world war? Could the Israel-Palestine conflict trigger a world war?

Based on what I have said earlier, it logically follows that the Middle East conflict will not lead to a world war, not least due to China’s position, as war does not serve its interests. China is not trying to take anything from the West. This is not peace-loving but rather arrogant indifference. China wants peace, especially since its internal situation is not as stable as it seems.

The paradox is that regional players, trying to drag superpowers such as the US and China — and indeed anyone they can — into their conflicts, are the ones igniting wars. Israel’s ruling clique diverts growing domestic discontent by focusing public attention on war with an external enemy — that is Netanyahu’s policy. But this is unnecessary for the US, China or even Iran. There is a paradox here: the forces considered irresponsible and radical — Hezbollah, Iran — have shown restraint, while Israel (supposedly a civilised democracy) displays complete irrationality.

I have previously written about the similarities between our situation and what’s happening in Israel. Netanyahu understands that any end [emphasis in original] to the war would mean the end of his power. In Russia, we see influential forces reasoning in a similar way. And if we return to the situation with Lebanon, the war is not being waged to defeat Hezbollah but to prevent peace, which would require accountability.

What would have to happen for a world war to break out?

As I mentioned, we are not threatened by a new world war. We face a growing and expanding number of smaller or regional conflicts that consume enormous human lives and resources. The cumulative toll could be monstrous — and it is already huge. But this is not a world war with two opposing global camps.

More importantly, I sincerely hope that the warring parties, deeply affected by internal crises themselves, will gradually slide towards peace. Endless war is impossible, especially when these wars have no geopolitical purpose or sense. No one can win, and no one even wants to. But war for the sake of war is a dead end. If maintaining power requires endless war, that power will not last long.

For many today, unfortunately, peace is far scarier than war. In the long term, peace means revolution, or at least radical reforms. We are on the threshold of great change. The old man [Immanuel] Wallerstein,5 I think, was right when he predicted the end of the current world-system (which, by the way, included world wars).

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  Zhivoy Gvozd (Live Nail) is a Russian opposition media platform established by former staff members of the now-defunct radio station Ekho Moskvy. It offers a range of content, including news podcasts, expert analyses, and discussions on political, economic, and social issues. Ekho Moskvy, a prominent independent radio station in Russia, was effectively shut down in March 2022. The Russian Prosecutor-General’s Office ordered its removal from the airwaves, accusing it of disseminating information that called for extremist activities and violence, as well as spreading false information about Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. 

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  In his last book, The Long Retreat, Boris Kagarlitsky critiques the left for abandoning the working class by aligning with urban bourgeoisie interests and adopting politically correct stances. This shift, he argues, created a political void that the right exploited, co-opting the working-class agenda and causing a general rightward shift in the electorate. 

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  Penal colony No 4 in the town of Torzhok in Russia’s Tver Region where Kagarlitsky is serving his term. 

• 4

  For a more detailed discussion of China’s capitalism, its resource-extracting nature, lack of hegemonistic ambitions, and the destructive consequences for the world-system, see Boris Kagarlitsky’s article "China and Russia in the Modern World-System — A Dual Challenge" on LINKS.

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  For example, Wallerstein explores the structural crises facing the modern world-system and contemplates its possible transformations in his 1999 book, The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century.