Should we expect a new world war? Two prison letters from Boris Kagarlitsky
First published in Russian at Spichka. Translation and introduction by Dmitry Pozhidaev for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.
The following text is based on two letters sent from a Russian penal colony by sociologist and Marxist thinker Boris Kagarlitsky, who is currently imprisoned on charges of “justifying terrorism.” The first letter is comprised of responses written on October 4 to questions posed by the Marxist media platform Spichka (Match), which initiated a correspondence with Kagarlitsky in late 2024. The second letter, written on October 24, includes some further comments by Kagarlitsky to Spichka regarding the specific topic of the potentials for a new world war.
Spichka is a Russian left-wing media collective committed to reviving Marxist theory and making it accessible. Initially focused on socialist countries, it now covers capitalism, culture and leftist strategy through articles, podcasts, and a visually distinctive online presence.
Many Russian Marxists began considering the threat of a new world war at the very outset of the “Special Military Operation” (the official term for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine). Since 2022, a series of long-smoldering local conflicts have flared up — in Ukraine, Gaza, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and among the Turkish Kurds — reinforcing the belief that the present moment echoes the run-up to 1914, when a proliferation of local tensions ultimately culminated in World War I.
From the start, however, Kagarlitsky took a different view. He argued the present moment more closely resembles the Crimean War of 1853–1856, in which a "small victorious war" turned into a disaster for Russia, ultimately triggering sweeping reforms — including the abolition of serfdom.
Spichka directly asked Kagarlitsky: should we expect a new world war? In his letters, he reflects on that question by drawing on historical analogies, analysing China’s place in the global system, and uncovering the deeper structural crises that underpin today’s international conflicts.
Kagarlitsky laid out his analysis in his responses written back in October 2024, six months ago. Is it still relevant? The answer appears to be yes.
While written in response to immediate questions, Kagarlitsky’s letters focus on underlying structural and geopolitical trends rather than momentary developments. His central argument — that we are not heading toward a Third World War, but rather toward an era of intensifying regional conflicts and systemic crises — remains strikingly consistent with global events in 2025.
His reflections on the Sino-American relationship have proven especially prescient. Kagarlitsky argued China, unlike Germany before 1914, is not seeking global hegemony but is instead building a China-centric economic zone while continuing to rely heavily on access to US and European markets. The recent escalation of the US–China tariff dispute supports his view: rather than leading to open confrontation, the conflict has played out as an economic tug-of-war — disruptive but carefully managed by both sides, underscoring the interdependence neither can afford to sever outright.
Similarly, Kagarlitsky warned that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though severe, would not spiral into a global war — primarily due to the disinterest of major powers, such as China, and the strategic restraint shown by regional actors, such as Iran and Hezbollah. That assessment still holds: despite ongoing violence and immense human cost, the conflict has remained regionalised, not globalised.
Kagarlitsky identifies a new condition of modern warfare: wars not fought to win, but to prolong power. This applies to Israel, to Russia, and — potentially — to other declining regimes. In these cases, war is not a continuation of economics by other means, but of domestic politics — a desperate attempt to sustain fragile legitimacy through external conflict. When peace threatens power more than war, the very logic of political survival becomes destructive. It is a grim insight — but a necessary one for understanding the dynamics of today’s fragmented and protracted conflicts.
It is always interesting — and often instructive — to revisit earlier political forecasts. Kagarlitsky’s letters do more than offer short-term commentary; they frame today’s crises in the context of long-term systemic contradictions. That alone is a compelling argument for translating and revisiting them now.*
‘For many elites, peace is more frightening than war’
In recent years, long-smoldering conflicts have been intensifying. Doesn’t this resemble the situation before World War I?
I have seen comparisons to World War I — or rather to the period that preceded it — in many different texts for some time now. And indeed, there are similarities. World War I was preceded by an unprecedented globalisation of the economy, which eventually reached the limits of available markets. As a result, competition increased and, as Marxists of the time said, inter-imperialist rivalry intensified. Naturally, only libertarians believe that markets operate on their own. In reality, market competition inevitably fuels political confrontation — in its most extreme forms.
But that is the similarity. There are also fundamental differences. For one, in the early 20th century, relatively stable blocs had formed: Germany and its allies versus the old empires (Britain, France and Russia), later joined by the US, whose ruling class at the time pursued a non-aggressive strategy. Rather than trying to push Britain out of its hegemonic position, the US chose to support it, gradually replacing it in that role — at first only partially.
It is important to note that the arena of rivalry used to be the same territories, the same markets. Today, the situation is qualitatively different. Only the Russian elite continues to play by the rules of the late 20th century, and only a few domestic Marxist dogmatists persist in analysing the situation through those categories.
The fact is, China is not striving for hegemony within the world-system at all. Rather, it is constructing a China-centric economic space around itself, using the rest of the world merely as a source of resources. Naturally, it needs to export goods — to Europe, the US and Russia. But Chinese capital does not consciously seek to create or reshape new markets; it simply exploits them. China’s rise is becoming destructive for the world-system precisely because there is not even an attempt to struggle for hegemony. After all, hegemony is not merely about domination — it is about organising and developing the system in an orderly way. And that is entirely absent here.
For the US, a war with China holds no real prospects — but that does not solve the main problem: as long as the neoliberal regime of global trade persists, China will continue to take advantage of it. And if you want to change that, then you need to radically overhaul the entire system. Trump [during his first term] tried to introduce protectionist measures (which were painful for Chinese capital), but he never intended to reform the system — not even in a reformist sense (let alone a revolutionary one). That approach will not work.
The crisis is deepening. It will be accompanied by local wars and eventually a wave of revolutions. In short, as the old Soviet joke goes: "There won’t be a war — but the struggle for peace will be so fierce that no one will be spared."
Do you see the threat of a new world war? Could the war between Israel and Palestine become the cause of a world war?
From what I have already said, it logically follows that the conflict in the Middle East will not escalate into a world war. Not least because of China’s position — it has no need for war. China is not trying to reclaim anything from the West. This is not pacifism — it is arrogant indifference. China needs calm, especially since the internal situation in the Middle Kingdom is far less stable than it may appear.
The paradox is that military conflicts today are being initiated by regional players who are trying to drag in the great powers — the US, China and basically anyone they can. The ruling clique in Israel is defending itself from growing domestic discontent by diverting public attention to a war with an external enemy. That is [Benjamin] Netanyahu’s policy. But in reality, neither the US nor China, nor even Iran needs this war. It is a paradox: the forces once considered irresponsible and radical — Hezbollah, Iran — have shown restraint, while Israel (supposedly a civilised democracy) is displaying complete irrationality.
I have written before about the similarities between our own situation and what is happening in Israel. Netanyahu understands that any end to the war would mean the end of his power.
In Russia, we see influential forces thinking along the same lines. And if we look at the situation in Lebanon, the war is not being waged to defeat Hezbollah, but to prevent peace — because peace would mean having to answer for everything. Including the war itself.
What would have to happen for a world war to begin?
As I have said before, we are not facing a new world war. What we are facing is the prolongation and expansion of numerous (or regional) conflicts that consume enormous human lives and resources.
The cumulative casualties could be monstrous. They already are. But this is not a world war with two opposing global camps. And, moreover, I very much hope that the warring sides, each suffering from deep internal crises, will gradually slide toward peace. You cannot fight forever — especially when, from a geopolitical perspective, these wars have neither purpose nor meaning. No one can win — and no one really wants to.
But war for the sake of continuing war — that is a dead end. If holding on to power depends on endless war, then power itself will not last much longer. Alas, for many today, peace is more frightening than war. In the long run, peace means revolution. Or, at the very least, radical reforms.
We stand on the brink of major changes. I think old [Immanuel] Wallerstein was right when he predicted the end of the current world-system — which, by the way, included the world wars themselves.
‘The West cannot afford to suddenly break ties with China’
I would like to continue the discussion on the fundamental differences between the situation in 1914 and the current state of affairs. The fact is that in the early 20th century, the struggle between the major imperialist powers was over access to the markets of third countries. Colonial protectionism played an important role — Germany and Italy were simply denied access to the markets of the British Empire, the French colonial empire, and, notably, the United States, which pursued a strict protectionist policy.
For Germany, the territorial redivision of the world became a pressing issue due to purely commercial problems — particularly the issue of access to cheap resources in those same colonies. At the same time, Germany’s domestic market was extremely strong, which made the country well-prepared for war under conditions of commercial isolation (although by 1917–18 it was the looming economic catastrophe that forced Berlin to essentially capitulate).
In our time, however, the main markets for China are precisely the US and Western Europe, and China’s grievances toward them centre on the fact that they are limiting Chinese capital’s access to their markets. As [University of Massachusetts economics professor] Jayati Ghosh noted several years ago, both India and China are already being forced to indirectly subsidise the West in order to prevent a collapse in demand for their goods. China’s (relative) weakness in terms of domestic consumption makes it objectively peace-seeking. Of course, the domestic market has grown impressively over the past 20 years — but for it to make a real qualitative leap, not only would social policy have to change, but the social structure itself.
However, transitioning to a high-cost labour model undermines (in the short term) the country’s export potential. China still depends on exports, and despite rising labour costs, it remains a country with relatively cheap labour. The real competitive pressure China faces in this regard does not come from the West, but from India and, to some extent, Vietnam. By contrast, in 1914, the conflict was between countries with expensive labour, and capital needed new markets to offset the high cost of labour.
Right now, China’s agenda is dominated by domestic changes, social and political. And yes, the desire to postpone or avoid these changes makes the Chinese party elite aggressive, prone to seeking external enemies to consolidate the nation. In such situations, leaders often try to launch a “small victorious war,” but Beijing currently has no such option: a conflict in Korea or around Taiwan would automatically escalate into a major war, one that China is not prepared for — and the elite understands this.
Vietnam remains a possibility, but there is no pretext, and Beijing still remembers the humiliation of the previous [1979 Sino-Vietnamese] war [when Vietnam repelled China’s invasion]. Vietnam is, as some Vietnamese have put it, “the Prussia of East Asia” or “the Israel of the Far East.”
Then there is the factor of the “Asian slowdown”. In the 1970s, we saw rapid growth in Japan (along with predictions of Japanese hegemony in the 21st century), followed by stagnation. Twenty years later, the same pattern repeated in South Korea. The same is true of the Asian Tigers. The reasons are:
At a certain point, the original growth model exhausts itself and must be replaced;
The socio-demographic composition of the population changes.
In part, stagnation softens the internal crisis, buying time to restructure the system.
China's situation, however, is specific. On the one hand, the scale and momentum of its economic growth are unprecedented, which means the process can be prolonged, and the transition to a new phase of development delayed. But on the other hand, the disproportions, imbalances, and contradictions are accumulating on such a scale that collapse, not stagnation, may follow. This is why China’s leadership, aware of the growing threat, is interested in maintaining economic growth at virtually any cost. It will not risk losing access to its core markets.
Nor can the West, despite its emphasis on reindustrialisation through new “green” technologies, afford to risk a sudden break in ties with China — even if Chinese exports can, to some degree, be replaced by Vietnam and India. Russia, however, cannot substitute Western markets for China.
The conclusion is clear: The Chinese leadership, due to internal political reasons, is interested in preserving ideological tension with the West, but has no intention of crossing the line that would lead to a full-scale military conflict.
And if you are looking for a historical analogy to today’s situation, it is not 1914 — it is the late Cold War-era between the Soviet Union and the United States, when both sides continued to build up their arsenals and even clashed in local conflicts, yet simultaneously expanded trade relations with one another. The only difference is that the Soviet Union, with its state-run economy, did not depend on selling surplus goods to Western Europe and the US, whereas for China, this is a matter of survival.
As we know, even Cold Wars have winners and losers — but that is already a different story.
- *
Spichka only published an excerpt from the first letter, in which Kagarlitsky focuses on the differences between the situation before World War I and today. The full letter can be read at https://links.org.au/boris-kagarlitsky-us-elections-trump-peace-talks-and-prospects-world-war