Solidarity with Venezuela: The real issue is demonisation, not criticism of Maduro

One important debate on the left over the past century has centred on assessing governments committed to socialism that, when confronted with imperialist aggression, veer from their original course.1 Cases in point include: the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin and after 1953, Cuba under Fidel Castro, Vietnam following the death of Ho Chi Minh, China under Mao Zedong and Venezuela under President Nicolás Maduro.2

The exchanges on the pages of LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal between Gabriel Hetland, Emiliano Teran Mantovani, Pedro Eusse and myself over the Maduro government must be seen in this wider historical context. In his latest rejoinder, Hetland does a good job summarising areas of agreement and differences between us, making any further recap unnecessary. This article will only examine four gaps.

Prioritising anti-US imperialism

First, the left worldwide needs to centre its attention on the struggle against US imperialism, and quite possibly characterise it as the number one priority today. Consider the US’s omnipotent role in combating progressive movements around the world, the devastation it has unleashed in Gaza and across the Middle East, and its military budget that fuels arms races and heightens the risk of a nuclear confrontation.

Just one example is its construction of the Golden Dome missile defence system and the Pentagon’s program for the mass production of drones. The aim is to force China to keep pace militarily, thereby straining its economy. The Ronald Reagan administration pursued the same strategy in the 1980s, which the right credits with hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Mao’s dictum on the importance of determining the principal contradiction at any given moment — defined as imperialism during the Japanese occupation of China — is applicable to Venezuela. Its economy is dependent on petroleum to the extent that it is hard to imagine any leftist government escaping the devastating impact of US-imposed sanctions.

Considering Washington’s relentless regime-change actions, US imperialism must be seen as the principal contradiction confronting Venezuela. Yet in his discussion of what he calls “the most important criterion by far” for evaluating the Maduro government, Hetland indicates — at least implicitly — that he does not share this view on the imperative to prioritise the struggle against US imperialism.

Venezuela and Cuba are the front line of defence against US imperialism in Latin America. What is at stake is the prospect of total subjugation — hinted at by US President Donald Trump and his neocon supporters when they invoke the Monroe Doctrine, viewed as essential to safeguarding US national security.

Moreover, US intervention has given rise to failed states and prolonged civil wars in countries such as Haiti, Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether this depiction is relevant to the debate over the Maduro government is a valid question, which merits inclusion in the discussion.

Maduro’s progressive aspects

Second, nowhere in the two articles by Hetland is there any discussion of what I identify as the Maduro government’s positive or progressive aspects (foreign policy, communes, community participation). His only comment along these lines is: “Maduro’s foreign policy continues to exhibit traces of anti-imperialism, but even this is highly limited.” Hetland, however, offers no explanation as to why he considers it “highly limited.”

The failure to address these issues is a fundamental shortcoming because my articles in LINKS do not deny important downsides of the Maduro government, but address the negative consequences and inaccuracies of demonising Maduro. My basic argument against Hetland, Teran and Eusse (writing on behalf of the the Partido Comunista de Venezuela/ Communist Party of Venezuela, PCV3) is that demonising Maduro is counterproductive, as it undermines the work of the Venezuelan solidarity movement in opposing sanctions. 

The issue at stake is not mistaken policies but demonisation. Recognising important positive aspects runs counter to the demonisation that permeates their articles in LINKS. Following from the premise that anti-imperialism needs to be prioritised, the largely progressive nature of Venezuela’s foreign policy has to be brought into the picture in a major way.

The details matter, especially when they go beyond mere rhetoric. Examples include Venezuela’s solidarity toward Cuba in the form of shipments of much-needed oil on generous terms, despite the logistical difficulties imposed by US sanctions.

Furthermore, in the context of Latin America’s increasing political polarisation, Venezuela has been in the forefront of clashes with right-wing governments, including those of Argentina’s Javier Milei, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa and Panama’s José Raúl Mulino.

Moreover, Maduro’s actions have stood in solidarity with Venezuelan immigrants, at the same time as he has lashed out at Washington’s inhumane policies toward them. Also significant is the Maduro government hosting the World Congress against Fascism last year, which drew 500 activists from 95 countries, and vehemently defending the Palestinian cause.

Grey areas

Third, open debate, transparency and the free flow of information are the first things that get sacrificed when a nation is in a wartime-like situation. Such an environment has been thrust on Venezuela since 2014-15, with the four months of regime change street actions (known as the “guarimba”) and Barack Obama’s executive order declaring the nation a threat to US national security.

The resultant “ grey areas” pose a dilemma for analysts lacking inside information and complicate the task of reaching well-founded conclusions. Numerous examples can be cited. One is the cash transactions for oil on the high seas (known as “cash and carry”) to avoid secondary sanctions against buyers and shipping companies, a practice conducive to corruption.

Another is the strengthening of the military faction within Chavismo (which dates back to the start of the Chávez presidency, if not earlier) as a result of Washington’s open calls on military officers to overthrow the government. The unity of the two main longstanding currents within Chavismo, led by Maduro and former military lieutenant Diosdado Cabello, was a sine qua non for the survival of the Maduro government from the outset.4 This reality may have limited Maduro’s options.

The existence of grey areas does not rule out possible condemnation in absolute terms of a president of a given nation. They do, however, underscore the need to recognise that Maduro’s Venezuela represents an extreme case of a nation facing imperialist aggression, and to give serious consideration to the resultant challenges.

The existence of important grey areas also suggests that a nuanced analysis regarding the complexity of the Venezuelan case is more appropriate than the black and white one put forward by those who demonise Maduro.

Solidarity movement

Fourth, in the section in his second article under the subheading “Solidarity,” Hetland notes that the anti-Iraq war movement stopped short of defending the Saddam Hussein regime. He concludes that, by the same logic, there is no reason why the Venezuelan solidarity movement needs to highlight anything positive about the Maduro government.

The example of the Iraq War, however, is compelling precisely because it demonstrates the opposite. Hussein’s reprehensible image contributed to the disappointing mobilisation capacity (after an initial spurt) of the anti-war movement — in sharp contrast to the huge protests against the Vietnam War in the 1960s. One reason (although undoubtedly not the main one) was that large numbers of those who protested in the ’60s were inspired by the tremendous prestige that Ho Chi Minh enjoyed at the time.

Moreover, one of the most important and effective activities of the Cuban and Venezuelan solidarity movements has been organising trips to these countries (as the anti-Vietnam war movement also famously undertook.) One may ask: would an organisation that demonises the Maduro government be likely to sponsor delegations of activists and sympathisers to Venezuela?

Finally, Hetland’s comparison between the Iraq War and the international sanctions against Venezuela falls short, since anti-war movements (as in the case of Iraq) and solidarity movements (as with Venezuela) focus on different issues, as discussed in my previous rejoinder. The effectiveness of international solidarity movements, more than the anti-war movement, largely hinges on the positive image of the government that is being targeted by imperialism.

Anti-imperialism and socialist governments

In closing, I would like to bring into the discussion Domenico Losurdo’s Western Marxism: How it Died, How it can be Reborn,5 which recently has been the source of considerable debate on the left. Losurdo contends that historically much of the left (those he calls “Western Marxists”) has failed to grasp the anti-imperialist nature of socialist governments.

Elsewhere, I have criticised Losurdo for casting too wide a net in placing individual leftists in the pejorative category of “Western Marxism”. On the positive side, however, Losurdo’s book skillfully articulates what the experience of socialist governments have clearly demonstrated over the last century: socialist construction in Global South countries, in a world in which capitalism is hegemonic and imperialism predominates, is a far more complex process than the struggle to achieve state power. Even more so, in the case of Venezuela, which has been singled out by Washington for special attack, a fact that has been thoroughly documented.6

Losurdo contends that only leftist purists deny the role played by private capital in socialist transition. None of the four articles in this debate recognise the complexity involved in the economic transformation of a nation committed to socialism, such as Venezuela, and specifically the thorny issue of tactical allies with the private sector, which beyond doubt open the door to corruption.

Hetland notes that Chávez (and Maduro) “was unable to overcome Venezuela’s longstanding hyper dependence on oil,” while Eusse asserts that the Chavista government left the “rentier” model intact. While both statements are accurate, the authors fail to outline a viable alternative economic strategy, taking into consideration current circumstances. Indeed, there are no ready-made blueprints or panaceas to deal with the types of challenges the Maduro government has faced on the economic front since 2015, when Washington escalated its war on Venezuela and options became limited.

Any realistic analysis that offers solutions to the pressing economic problems confronting post-2015 Venezuela will inevitably be at odds with black and white thinking that demonises Maduro and equates his government with the right-wing opposition.

• 1

  I would like to thank Leonardo Flores and Lucas Koerner for their critical comments on this article as well as the previous one posted by LINKS.

• 2

  On what basis do I assert that Maduro is committed to socialism? Maduro’s personal and political trajectory is relevant. His background is not that of a social democrat-type politician. Born into a leftist family, Maduro was an activist and member of radical left parties in his youth, before joining the Chavista movement in the 1990s. For six years he served as foreign minister under former president Hugo Chávez, who few would deny was a socialist. Maduro heads the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela, PSUV), which officially adheres to scientific socialism and Marxism. 

• 3

  With regard to the PCV’s critique of, and split with, the Maduro government in 2020, I have argued elsewhere that both sides committed errors that contributed to the falling out. I would like to add that throughout my career as a writer and analyst, I have written extensively on the PCV’s history (beginning with my PhD dissertation) and have highlighted its heroic struggles. In the process, I interviewed, got to know, and developed great admiration for numerous PCV historical leaders. Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela: Maduro’s Defensive Strategy and Contradictions among the People.” Science & Society (July 2023), p. 401-402. 

• 4

  When Chávez died in 2013, there was considerable speculation that Maduro and Cabello would come into conflict over control of the Chavista movement. Maduro, who in the early years of the Chávez presidency headed the Chavista labour movement fraction in the National Assembly, was associated with worker demands and leftist ideology, unlike Cabello. Ellner and Fred Rosen, “Chavismo at the crossroads: Hardliners, moderates and a regime under attack.” NACLA: Report on the Americas (May-June, 2002), pp. 9-11.

• 5

  Losurdo, Western Marxism: How it Died, How it can be Reborn (New York: Monthly Review
  Press, 2024).

• 6

  Joe Emersberger and Justin Podur, Extraordinary Threat: The U.S. Empire, the Media, and Twenty Years of Coup Attempts in Venezuela (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2021), pp. 21-23; Ellner, “Objective Conditions in Venezuela…,” pp. 396-399